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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the intended and unintended outcomes of government intervention 
policies in the Muda irrigation scheme, Malaysia. It focuses on the process by which the 
farmers and government staff manipulate these policies to secure their individual and 
collective needs. This process is manifested in the informal actions of these actors when 
contrasted with the formal rules and regulations of system governance and management. 
This is explored through the detailed analysis of one particular government policy - tertiary 
intervention. 
It is argued that because the irrigation management concepts and models fail to address the 
nature of the relationship between governments, irrigation agencies and irrigators they are 
unable to incorporate the objectives of all actors in the intervention process. To facilitate 
such an integration, the theoretical focus explores the appropriateness of actor-oriented 
research in a coercive/cooperative framework. Such an approach recognises the power, 
knowledge and agency of all actors engaged in government intervention at the macro, meso 
and micro spatial scales. 
The research design incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods within the 
context of case-study research. The use of these methods in combination enables the 
analysis to express causality and generalisations in addition to depth and meaning. These 
methods are utilised through the logic of triangulation, including; data, investigator and 
methodological triangulation. 
The findings presented in this thesis indicate that the government policy of tertiary 
intervention is not facilitating the water saving, or productivity increase, expectations of 
the federal government and MADA. Instead, tertiary intervention has increased the 
capacity for the farmers to diversify into other sectors of the economy whilst still retaining 
access to the rice farming culture. This is illustrative of the mis-match of expectations 
between policy implementors and policy recipients. 
Such a situation has emerged because of the powerful position of the farmers vis-a.-vis 
MADA and the federal government. In particular, because the farmers are powerful actors 
in the national political arena, this influences both their actions at the local level and the 
policy options available to the federal government. By contrast, because MADA are 
'powerless' to enforce rules and regulations they are unable to restrict the unofficial actions 
of the farmers. These unofficial actions significantly diverge from the formal rules of 
system management. 
The research concludes that the policy of tertiary intervention is a valuable policy if the 
focus of its performance is improvements in the livelihoods of farmers as opposed to 
improvements in yields. However, the water saving potential of tertiary intervention can 
only be realised if a cooperative framework is applied to system governance whereby the 
farmers are active decision-makers rather than consultative partners. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Why research large-scale irrigation? 
At the dawn of the third millennium the problems associated with large-scale irrigation lie largely 
unresolved: engineers still design and rehabilitate schemes; governments still manage and control 
schemes; and farmers are still expected to conform to the policies, rules and regulations decided 
and implemented by others. The outcomes of government policies rarely correspond with 
expectations, leading to conflict and misunderstanding between federal governments, local agency 
staff and farmers. 
Much of the research into large-scale schemes is discipline focused, 'bottom-up' or 'top-down'. 
Even with the plethora of research in the last three decades there is still a clear division between 
the technical research conducted by engineers and the institutional, managerial and operational 
research conducted by social scientists. What there is not is a comprehensive and clear analytical 
framework which includes both the 'hardware' and 'software' of large-scale schemes (Diemer & 
Huibers, 1996) I. Furthermore, because of the difficulty in integrating the field, farm, nation and 
international community, research projects which have focused on the wider political economy 
and agrarian conditions have provided limited detail about irrigation. Likewise, research which 
has focused on the irrigation system per se has provided limited information about the context 
within which these operate. What is needed is research that incorporates the inter-linked nature of 
the field, the system, the nation-state and the international community. This is arguably the most 
important contribution of this study. 
The role that irrigation plays in securing sustainable livelihoods for the rural peasantry cannot be 
understated. The extent of international and national policies and finance directed towards this 
sector is indicative of the importance attached to irrigation in the on-going struggle for poverty 
alleviation. This is hardly surprising given the concentration of poverty within rural areas. To 
paraphrase Robert Chambers (1988): 
'Canal irrigation provides livelihoods for hundreds of millions of people in 
developing countries ... [with]. .. extensive irrigation networks co-exist[ing] with 
the greatest concentration of rural poverty in the world' (Chambers, 1988:3). 
1 By 'hardware' I refer to the technical and structural components of irrigation design. By 'software' I refer 
to the collaboration of actors in the governance, management and operation of large-scale schemes. 
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A decade on and the potential for irrigation to assist in poverty alleviation in both production and 
livelihood strategies remains immense. However, in many parts of the world this livelihood 
potential has yet to be realised. In Southeast Asia, irrigation remains a primary focus of rural 
development initiatives whilst still retaining a high concentration of national poverty. Therefore, 
although the temptation is to suggest that large-scale irrigation projects have been 'over-
researched', many millions of people still depend on these schemes to provide for their 
livelihoods. Surprisingly, however, although many studies have been conducted on the use of 
water in these schemes2, there has been very little research that has focused on the relationships 
between the water management practices of farmers (whether formal or informal), the irrigation 
agency and the socio-political contexe. 
Most large-scale schemes are managed and controlled by government agencies which are centrally 
planned and reliant on formal rules and procedures in the daily operation, management and control 
of the system. It is not surprising, therefore, that the formal involvement of farmers in the design, 
management and control of such schemes is difficult to acquire and sustain (Hvidt, 1996). The 
problem is that the lack of fanner participation in the formal framework only goes part of the way 
in understanding the poor performance of large-scale schemes. What is required is the 
recognition, and incorporation of, the informal practice of both farmers and government staff 
within the formal framework. 
It is the informal practice/formal framework dichotomy that my research seeks to explain4. By 
formal framework I refer to the policies and procedures for intervention which depend on the 
international and national agendas of governments as well as the rules and regulations for the 
development, management and operation of irrigation schemes. By informal practice I refer to the 
strategies employed by the various actors in the daily negotiations and compromises to ensure 
access to, and control of, resources. In analysing this, my research focuses on how the informal 
practice of both the irrigators and government staff is impacting on the outcom~ of government 
policy, and the resultant social change, in the Muda irrigation scheme, Peninsular Malaysia. It is 
2 Focusing for example on equity, water-use efficiency, system operation and maintenance, salinity and 
waterlogging. 
3 Perhaps the most influential work being conducted in this field is by IIMI and Small & Svendsen (1992) 
with the latter producing a framework for assessing the performance of irrigation which is in theory 
applicable world-wide (see chapter seven). However, this work is still in its infancy and thus far only 
applicable for qualitative analysis (Murray-Rust & Snellen, 1993). 
4 By informal practice I refer to the actions of individuals and groups of individuals which are not codified 
within the formal framework. The building of illegal pipes, for example, would be considered as 'informal 
practice'. By dichotomy I refer to the lack of congruence between the formal requirements and informal 
practices. 
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argued that without harnessing informality, and recognising its role within the formal framework, 
large-scale schemes will continue to suffer from poor performance. 
1.2 The relevance of power 
The argument underpinning much of my research is the need to recognise the relations of power 
which impact on, and are impacted by, government intervention. Importantly, it is argued that 
research is required which not only recognises the power of national governments and their impact 
at the local level, but also the impact of this local level at the national and international spatial 
scales, e.g. as a political constituency. Within this framework, power is articulated as a 'de-
centred' model where it is neither a substance which can be possessed or exercised by an 
individual or institution. Instead, power is regarded as 'subjectless' consisting of discourse, 
actors, networks and agency (Nelson & Wright, 1995). Consequently, the process by which power 
is articulated, and knowledge is transformed, is dependent on the networks of interaction between 
individuals and institutions. 
By recognising that power is 'de-centred' and that interactions between individuals and 
institutions shape discourse and agency, the relationship between social change and intervention 
policies emerges. Social change is then dependent on the outcomes of the formal and informal 
networks and relations which are exercised within the policy framework. It is these networks 
which interact in the daily negotiations between government staff and farmers, through a process 
of struggle and negotiation. The effect of this is to mould and develop outcomes that result 
directly from these interactions, or as a consequence of them. To unravel the complex association 
between government policy, regional implementation, local adaptation and social change the 
interaction of actors must, therefore, be incorporated. 
There are many different ways of viewing or knowing the world which impact on individual and 
institutional discourse. What is important, however, is that these 'multiple realities' are 
incorporated into both research models and policy agendas. Unfortunately, large-scale irrigation 
projects have rarely seen either policy or research which incorporates such 'multiple realities'. 
Instead, although irrigation is clearly no panacea to the solving of agricultural development 
problems, it is often assumed that if the formal design, governance, management and operation are 
appropriately planned at the regional and national levels then sustainable livelihoods, food security 
targets, and agrarian change can be secured at the local level. 
CHAPTER ONE - Introduction 4 
In the last decade, much of the academic interest within the social sciences has been directed 
towards farmer-managed schemes, recognising the value of indigenous technology and local 
knowledge. In particular, this research has focused on questions of control, arguing that irrigation 
development is less a matter of geographical scale than an issue of management and control 
(Underhill, 1990; Adams, 1990). Consequently, many researchers have promoted the value of 
farmer-managed schemes rather than large government-managed schemes. The question is how 
can the lessons learnt at the small-scale be applied within large government-managed schemes? 
1.3 Lessons from the small-scale 
The promotion of small-scale irrigation originated as a backlash to the poor performance of the 
large-scale schemes of the 1960s. It is now generally acknowledged that, during the 1960s and 
1970s, the US$15 billion which was annually invested in the irrigation sector world-wide 
produced less than 50 per cent of the expected output (Njiman, 1993, cited in Diemer & Huibers, 
1996). Research into the causes of this poor performance have focused on shortcomings in the 
design, management, operation, efficiency, equity and agricultural productivity of such schemes 
(Turral, 1995). By contrast, research into small-scale schemes has focused on the relative 
dynamism of the farmers themselves, as opposed to the system within which they operate (Smout, 
1990: Vermillion, 1989: Ambler, 1994: Vincent, 1994: Guijt & Thompson, 1994). 
One element of the debate has been on the roles and relationships between planners, managers and 
water users. Smout (1990), for example, argues that if participation in the planning, 
implementation and operation of small schemes is to be successful there needs to be a recognised 
power sharing between planners and irrigators. Within large schemes this would require an 
alteration in system governance and a reduction in hierarchical structures which serve to 
perpetuate the perception of institutional power. For power sharing to be recognised there is a 
need for institutional flexibility, a prospect which is as much dependent on the policy design as it 
is on the values and attitudes of government staff to both their bureaucratic position and to the 
farmers. 
The two-way relationship between planners and water users has been articulated by Vermillion 
(1989) in his analysis of the contributions which farmers can make to irrigation design. In 
particular, Vermillion focuses on the role of farmers' knowledge as an essential requirement in the 
design process. From this perspective, farmer participation in the planning and implementation of 
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irrigation design should involve more than just the incorporation of the 'social aspects' of 
irrigation. For as Vermillion states: 
'As people design irrigation systems, either explicitly or implicitly, they predict 
future cropping patterns, irrigation demand requirements, water supplies and use 
efficiencies, probability of drought or flooding, and command area boundaries' 
(Vermillion, 1989:4). 
Therefore, only by recognising that power sharing is not just a managerial and operational 
concept, but also a requirement in the design process, will it be possible to improve system 
sustainability. 
Much of the literature at the small-scale has focused on the merits of farmer-management. This 
has emerged because of the growing recognition on the part of planners, irrigation officials and 
researchers of the importance of farmer control. However, even though most farmer-managed 
systems tend to be small in scale, there is nothing to say that this cannot be achieved at the large 
scale. For as Martin et al state: 
'[The] study of large farmer-managed irrigation systems may indicate that 
farmers' management responsibilities need not be limited to small-scale systems 
or the tertiary level of large-scale systems and may suggest how farmer 
organizations could take over the management of major portions of large-scale 
systems or possibly even manage the whole system' (Matiin et ai, 1986:5). 
The recognition of the potential oflarge-scale schemes for farmer-management has led to a shift in 
emphasis from top-down governance towards greater paliicipation by the irrigators themselves. 
This change (often referred to as 'turnover') has significant implications for the process of 
intervention - independent of scale. At the small scale, Ambler (1994) analyses the role of 
government intervention in Asia, articulating the need for patiicipatory approaches which provide 
the farmers with, not just management and maintenance responsibilities, but also decision-making 
powers in the governance of such systems: 
'Fanners need full authority over irrigation assets if they are to be expected to 
invest in their maintenance and improvement. The importance of empowerment 
cannot be overestimated. Work in many types of irrigation illustrates how 
important it is to establish conditions conducive for fanner groups to function, 
and to invest them with full legal authority over critical resources. If small-scale 
irrigation in Asia is to be sustained, farmers must be given greater self-reliance 
in financing and operating systems, that is, real ownership over irrigation assets, 
not just the 'sense of ownership' to which government agencies and researchers 
so frequently refer' (Ambler, 1994:273 emphasis in the original). 
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To achieve 'real ownership', the institutional arrangements which currently exist between the state 
and the irrigators requires analysis. What is needed is a shift in emphasis from decision-making 
by government bureaucracies to a shared responsibility between farmers and government staff. 
Such an argument is offered by Vincent who states that there is still a lack of interest in 
'identifying the external assistance still needed for protecting rights and gaining livelihoods at the 
local-level' (Vincent, 1994:321). By recognising that irrigation is only part of these wider 
livelihood strategies, Vincent highlights the failure of many irrigation agencies to understand: the 
range of technologies employed; the risk-spreading mechanisms adopted; the use of irrigation for 
purposes other than yield maximisation; and the flexibility and complexity of water rights and 
allocation rules. This has clear implications for research into large government-managed schemes 
because, although the rules and regulations are codified in the formal governance of such schemes, 
the informal practices of the irrigators are not dissimilar to those in farmer-managed schemes. 
After all, farmers within government-managed schemes also practice irrigation as part of a wider 
livelihood strategy with their own assumptions, reflections and practices for technology use, risk-
spreading and water management. 
The concept of broader livelihood strategies is clearly articulated by Guijt and Thompson (1994) 
who argue that because the irrigation literature is still pre-occupied with engineering and 
management issues it fails to account for the wider ecological, economic and social context. 
Again focusing on irrigation intervention the authors demonstrate how research needs to integrate 
the context of intervention which is explicitly tied to social life. In so doing, they recognise the 
dynamic process of intervention which alters, and creates, certain power relations between the 
various actors involved - stating that irrigation is 'never a "project" with sharp boundaries in space 
and time' (Guijt & Thompson, 1994:295). Such an holistic approach is timely and necessary in 
both small and large schemes, for as the authors atticulate: 
'What is needed is a radically new concept of intervention in irrigation and 
agricultural development. A more sophisticated view of this interaction sees the 
relationships between farmers and research and development agents - be they 
representatives of the state or an NGO or agricultural research centre - in terms 
of the ongoing pattern of struggle, negotiation, cooperation and compromise 
between different actors. This has a historical precedent, since interventions of 
various sorts have invariably occurred before. It also has a continuing dynamic, 
since negotiations of development outcomes are ongoing. Advocacy of 
simplistic, deterministic models of blueprint intervention (e.g. 'transfer of 
technology') or populist process of farmer participation (e.g. 'farmer first') are 
unable to account for the complex economic, social and political forces at play 
in the interaction of contrasting, sometimes conflicting, actors and their 
knowledge. Alternative planning approaches are needed to analyse difference, 
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explore conflicts, recognize negotiation processes and seek common ground, if 
the high ideals of productive, sustainable and equitable agricultural development 
are to be realized' (Guijt & Thompson, 1994:296). 
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This requires research that incorporates the 'multiple realities' of all actors involved in irrigation 
intervention, which not only assesses the irrigation system per se5 but also: the context within 
which irrigation is practised; the networks of actors involved; the knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions of these actors; and the effect of this on policy outcomes and social change. This is 
the approach adopted within my research, articulated below in the research focus, aims, questions 
and structure. 
1.4 Research Focus 
My research examines the complex process by which power relations influence, and are influenced 
by, the practice of water management and the process of social change in a large-scale irrigation 
project. These relations emerge from, and impact on, the action and interaction of individuals and 
institutions - creating an evolutionary and dynamic process in which policies are created, 
implemented and manipulated. To explore the intended and unintended outcomes of such policies, 
analysis focuses on a formal process and informal practice framework which incorporates the 
'multiple realities' of the various actors - whether they are government staff or irrigators. This 
provides the context for recognising the social, political and economic factors which impact on 
these realities. To ensure that the context transcends the various spatial scales, the relationship 
between national policies and local programmes of implementation is explored. This approach 
enables the outcome of government policy to be dependent on the negotiation and compromise 
which emerges at the 'interface' of actor interaction. The significance of which is dependent on 
the knowledge, attitudes and values of these actors. 
The empirical work was conducted in the Muda irrigation scheme, Malaysia which provides 
excellent longitudinal and contemporary case-study material. The Muda scheme is characteristic 
of many large-scale Green Revolution projects, implemented in 1970 in accordance with the 
national objectives of societal restructuring, poverty reduction and rice self-sufficiency. It is the 
largest and most important scheme in Malaysia and the cornerstone of Malaysia's rice policy. 
5 By this I refer to the 'hardware' oflarge-scale systems. 
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The aim of the government agency entrusted with the management, operation and development of 
the region is to increase productivity and improve production stability in accordance with national 
objectives. This is being implemented by policies which promote participation, cooperation and 
estatisation. However, since the 1980s, production in the Muda region has stagnated, government 
group farming initiatives are under-achieving, water shortages are considered chronic, and the 
increased build-up of pests, weeds and disease is seen as a major impediment to sustainable 
development. 
The quantity of research which has been conducted in the Muda region during the past 27 years is 
extensive. My research will be at least the 23rd doctoral thesis, although the first to explicitly link 
water management, power relations and social change within a local and national context6• Much 
of the research to date has focused on the technical and economic analysis of water, with little 
emphasis on the social and cultural structures within which this is practised? Of those studies that 
have focused on the social and cultural structures, none have explicitly linked these structures to 
the governance of the water resource8. It is, therefore, both timely and necessary that a more 
holistic approach is applied to the study of irrigation intervention which not only includes farm-
level water data but also attempts to integrate this into the broader political economy framework. 
Only through analysis of this complexity and the linkages between these spatial scales can a more 
informed picture of 'social reality' emerge. 
The abbreviated research focus is articulated in Box 1.1 and contains five key components: power 
relations; interface analysis; water management; social change; and the informal/formal 
dichotomy. Each of these are defined in Box 1.2 and integrated within my research to answer the 
key questions outlined in section l.5. 
Box 1.1: Research Focus 
My research focuses on power relations at the 'interface' of development 
intervention by an analysis of water management and social change in the 
Muda irrigation scheme, Peninsular Malaysia. To articulate these relations, 
analysis focuses on the dichotomy between the informal practice of actors and 
the formal framework of government intervention. 
6 Jegatheesen - personal communication, June 1996. 
7 See for example: Chaw & Seng (1989), Fujii & Cho (1990,1992, 1993b), Yashima (1995a, 1995b). 
8 See for example: Yasunobu et al (1990,1991,1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c), Jirstrom (1996), Scott (1985, 
1986). 
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Box 1.2: Definitions 
Power relations: The dynamic interplay between individuals and groups of 
actors in the use of knowledge, the control of resources and the ultimate 
domination of certain groups in the process and practice of societal change. 
Interface analysis: The process by which we can analyse these different 
knowledge and value systems through the examination of action, and interaction, 
between individuals and groups of actors. Within my research, the 'interface' is 
defined as the pOint of interaction between the different social systems engaged 
in water management, i.e. the government institution and the rural social 
organisation. The 'analysis' of which targets the discontinuities in the social 
system that are characterised by discrepancies in the values, interests, 
knowledge and power of the various actors involved (Long & Villareal, 1993). 
Water management: To accommodate the social, cultural and political 
dimensions of water management, three key areas have been addressed: water 
control; water use efficiency; and field-level water management. This requires an 
understanding of the management, allocation, distribution and control of water at 
the project, block and farm level. 
Social change: Social change is defined as the process by which society 
evolves as a consequence of: the interaction of individuals and groups of actors; 
the development and application of technology; and the influence of the structural 
forces of the nation state and globalisation. Whether this is enabling, conflicting 
or accommodating, it ultimately alters the social setting in which the interaction 
occurs. 
1.5 Aims and Questions 
The aims of this study are twofold: 
• To describe and analyse the relationship between the formal process and informal 
practice of water management and control. The implication of this for irrigation 
governance will be addressed within a local, regional and national framework. 
• To examine the process by which government agencies and farmers manage 
intervention policies and its implication for social change. 
These aims are investigated by the following questions: 
9 
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1. How is the process and practice of water management manipulated by the relations of power 
between, and among, the farmers and government staff? How is this manifested, both formally 
and informally, and what are the implications for system governance? 
2. What are the intended and unintended consequences of government intervention policies on 
social change? 
3. What is the spatial and temporal distribution of farmer water control? Is the water supply 
adequate, reliable and equitable? How does this impact on policies and policy outcomes, and 
what are the implications for agricultural productivity and water use efficiency? 
1.6 Expected Significance 
It is expected that this research will be important for a number of reasons: 
• It aims to provide empirical evidence which acknowledges the significance of the informal 
practice of both the irrigators and government staff. This is expected to significantly differ 
from the formal process. It is argued that failure to recognise this significance impacts on both 
the management of the water resource and system sustainability. 
• The investigation of water management is not constrained within an economic or technical 
framework. This enables a spatial and temporal analysis to be conducted which includes the 
social and political dimensions of water control and water use efficiency - incorporating the 
different knowledge, attitudes and values of the various actors involved. This approach is 
expected to highlight how the incompatibility of values and attitudes and the misunderstanding 
of local knowledge systems (between the government agency and the farmers) impedes the 
development of the region. 
• My research is expected to highlight some of the causal factors of agricultural stagnation 
(within the confines of water management) due to the failure/inability of government policies 
to incorporate 'social reality'. This understanding is critical if the future policy decisions 
implemented by the government agency are to complement the knowledge, attitude, values and 
practices of the farming community for which they are administered. 
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1. 7 Structure of thesis 
The above discussion provides a brief overview of the arguments explored within my thesis. The 
ten chapters are divided into five core sections - reflecting the holistic philosophy of the research 
design. These include: the context; the formal process of intervention; the performance of this 
intervention; the informal practice of 'social reality'; and the theoretical and policy implications 
that emerge when harnessing informality and recognising its role in the formal framework. Set out 
below is a brief overview of each of these sections and their relative chapters. 
The research context incorporates the introduction, theoretical foundations, methodology and case-
study description. Chapter one has provided an overview of research expectations with chapter 
two focusing on the advantages of adopting an actor-oriented approach to the study of irrigation 
systems. In particular, this incorporates the technical, social and political dimensions of 
intervention - recognising the integration of actors at all structural levels. It is argued that this 
recognition of the 'multiple realities' of intervention facilitates understanding of the intended and 
unintended consequences of government interventions. 
To ensl:lre that the research questions under investigation are incorporated within the theoretical 
framework, an analytical model is developed which serves to guide data collection, analysis and 
write-up. This model provides actors within intervention with 'human agency' and thus the 
capacity to negotiate priorities, interpret and manipulate policies. In so doing, the principal 
critical Junctures of negotiation that influence power relations, and guide social change, are 
atiiculated. The model provides the framework for the analysis of the Muda scheme and the 
chronology of analytical construction. 
Chapter three examines the methodologies and methods employed within my research. This 
includes an exploration of the philosophy of the use of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, 
focusing on the use of triangulation as a rigorous approach to the research design. The design is 
then articulated within the context of case-study research. The approach employed throughout this 
chapter is one of reflection and openness to both the advantages and disadvantages of the research 
design and methods used. In particular, emphasis is placed on the advantages and disadvantages 
of 'cultural outsider' research. 
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Chapter four completes the contextual framework by providing the reader with an overview of the 
changing status and current trends towards rice production in the Muda region. Unlike the 
previous contextual chapters, this chapter is both descriptive and analytical. It is descriptive in its 
account of the pre-Mud a scheme and the Muda project - paying particular attention to the physical 
infrastructure and the establishment of MADA. It is analytical in its understanding of the current 
trends in the Muda region using both the survey and interview data collected during fieldwork. 
Chapter five provides the formal landscape of irrigation intervention from the national perspective. 
This is conducted using an historical approach which unravels the complex political, economic 
and social factors that have helped to shape modern Malaysia. In analysing change, this chapter 
adopts a modified political economy perspective from an authoritarian populist perspective. This 
assists in clarifying the relationship between the populace and the state apparatus. The influences 
of the modern state are examined within the context of the continuity of governance, the 
personality culture of politics and the emerging tensions in Malay identity. This provides the 
framework for the articulation of the strategic importance of rice and the integration of the 
national perspective within the Muda scheme. 
The process by which these national policies are implemented within the Muda region is examined 
in chapter six. In so doing, this chapter approaches irrigated agricultural policy using a conceptual 
framework that recognises three types of policy environments within which higher-level 
governments employ either coercive, cooperative or a combination of mechanisms to induce local 
agencies to implement national policy objectives. In particular, it is argued that the traditional 
irrigation management models and conceptual arguments do not explore the objectives of all 
actors within the intervention process, preferring instead to dichotomise between users and rule-
makers. 
The usefulness of applying a coercive/cooperative policy design framework is explored from a 
MADA-state and MADA-farmer perspective. In accordance with the formal process framework, 
this focuses on the role of the MADA-state relationship in influencing: the commitment and 
capacity of MADA officials to the procedural and structural elements of the policy design; the 
policies, structure and procedures of implementation; the policy expectations; and the codified 
rules and regulations implemented in the daily operation, management and maintenance of the 
scheme. Of pat1icular significance are the procedures employed to ensure the timely and adequate 
delivery of water at the system and block level. 
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In exploring the nature of the relationship between MADA and the farmers emphasis is placed on: 
the formal procedures implemented by MADA; the way in which these are implemented; the 
formal capacity for farmer involvement; and the resultant commitment and capacity of the farmers 
to the formal framework. This provides the official framework of system management within 
which the daily strategies and informal actions of the farmers and government staff are articulated. 
Chapters seven and eight provide the bridging chapters between the formal framework (what is 
meant to happen) and the informal practice (what actually happens) by exploring the intended and 
unintended outcomes of the government policy of tertiary development. Chapter seven questions 
the extent to which this policy has met with its water saving expectations through an evaluation of 
water supply performance. The purpose of chapter eight is to explore the remaining expectations 
of the tertiary policy, namely its performance for improving yields, cooperation, water control and 
water management strategies at the farm level. The overall aim of both these chapters is to present 
the analysis in direct response to the second and third research questions articulated in section 1.5. 
Chapter nine asks the fundamental question: Why is the policy of tertiary development not 
achieving its expected aims? In exploring this, the chapter focuses on the 1st research question by 
analysing: the informal practice of the farmers and government staff; the power relations which 
facilitate these practices; and their influence on the outcomes of tertiary development. 
Specifically, it is argued that the unofficial actions of the farmers are not only facilitated by their 
individual and collective power at the farm level but also their 'powerful' position within the 
national political framework. By contrast, it is argued that MADA are 'powerless' to influence the 
informal practices at the farm level, hence their inability to control the tertiary structures as 
designed. 
Having articulated the mis-match of rules and reality and its effect on both the outcomes of 
government policy and the livelihoods of the farmers, chapter ten (the concluding chapter) comes 
a full circle and places the research findings back into the theoretical and policy framework 
articulated in previous chapters. In particular, this highlights the need to recognise complexity in 
both theory and policy if the 'social realities' are to be incorporated into policy models. To 
achieve this, it is argued that the decision-making capacity of the farmers needs to be harnessed in 
the formal framework of system governance. Without such an approach, large-scale systems will 
continue to be analysed for their poor performance, rather than for the benefits they can offer both 
national governments and the livelihoods of irrigators. 
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Flexible Theory and Concrete Structures 
2.1 Theoretical challenge for irrigation intervention 
The changing patterns of theoretical thought within development studies have created an 
intellectual challenge to academics, practitioners and policy makers involved in development 
intervention. No longer can a clear dichotomy between development practice and theorising be 
advocated due to the inter-linked nature of these two perspectives. For as Long & Long articulate: 
'Obviously policy models and measures are themselves underpinned, either 
explicitly or implicitly, by celtain theoretical interpretations and methodological 
strategies, just as theorization and research are laden with evaluative judgements 
and decisions ofa practical nature' (Long & Long, 1992:3). 
Consequently, the challenge facing research, policy and intervention is the process by which these 
two approaches can be combined to improve the theoretical understanding of the complex 
dynamics of social life whilst simultaneously exploring analytical concepts and methodologies 
which can be applicable to the development practitioner. This is no easy task, but since the 
inception of the populist fanner-first debates of the 1980s, intellectual rigour has attempted to 
move the debate beyond farmer first with the emergence of some stimulating theoretical and 
practical arguments directed towards the integration of actor and historical-structural approaches. 
Central to these arguments is the process by which knowledge and power are used, assimilated and 
exchanged through the interaction of various actors in the process of social change. Such a 
theoretical approach is examined within this chapter as 'flexible theory' in that the networks and 
interactions explored are dependent as much on 'human agency' as the context within which the 
research is conducted. 
In terms of intervention, possibly the most crucial requirement for 'flexible theory' is within the 
'concrete structures' of irrigation design and management. Any intervention or policy decisions 
within this context impact on, and are impacted by, the social structures and power relations in 
evidence prior to, and during, intervention (Guijt & Thompson, 1994). Much of the practice of 
irrigation development has, however, been more concerned with the irrigation system per se than 
the organisation and management functions of both the formal and informal actors within the 
intervention process. This chapter argues for the need to understand the networks and interaction 
of actors involved in irrigation intervention in order to understand the process of social change. 
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This, therefore, incorporates the interaction of different perceptions, attitudes, objectives and 
ultimately knowledge of those actors involved within this process. Likewise, it is recognised that 
no social change can occur within an isolated context due to the implicit or explicit forces which 
impact on human agency, whether they are local, national or international. 
The approach to my research integrates two bodies of literature by the combined understanding of 
rural development theorising and irrigation management practice. In so doing, it incorporates the 
socio-economic and political dimensions of water management and control within a formal 
process and informal practice framework. Central to this understanding is water control when 
viewed as a process by which power is exercised over irrigation management which is technically, 
politically, socially and economically constructed (Mollinger & Bolding, 1996:33). 
The arguments developed within this chapter focus on the need to recognise diversity and 
inequality at the local and national level whilst not eliminating the structural component of 
theoretical understanding. In so doing, an actor-oriented approach is adopted which integrates 
power, knowledge and social change by the application of an analytical model that enables the 
more 'concrete' irrigation literature to be approached from a 'flexible' theoretical position. As a 
result, my research is guided by the complexity of interactions whether they are individual, group 
or institutional whilst simultaneously exploring patterns which are contextual and contemporary. 
In addition, the cultural, political and historical dimensions that guide, assist, enable or restrict 
development intervention are incorporated. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework: The rediscovery of diversity 
Over the last half century, development theorists and practitioners have attempted to tackle issues 
of poverty and inequality with apparently little impact on the poorest of the worlds population. 
The inability of theoretical approaches to tackle real-world issues created a gulf between academia 
and development policy and practice. From the mid-1980s onwards an increasing number of 
pUblications discussed and debated what has now become known as 'the impasse in development 
theory' (Schuurman, 1993a). This debate was the result of: a disillusionment with Marxist and 
neo-Marxist grand theories (Booth, 1985); the realisation of the inability of these theories to tackle 
the crucial questions of poverty and inequality; the growing awareness that economic development 
and 'trickle down' were not assisting the poorest members of society; and the recognition that 
development studies was in a crisis. This was advanced by the increasing number of Non-
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Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working at the 'grassroots' with little regard for grand 
theoretical assertions. Hence, a gulf was created between development theory and development 
praxis, an issue which was forcibly articulated by Edwards (1989) in his memorable article 'The 
irrelevance of development studies'. 
The result was an increased concern, within development studies, for a focus on diversity as 
opposed to homogeneity (Booth, 1985, 1994a). In discussing the Marxist and neo-Marxist 
development theories of the 1970s, Booth argues that: 
'by refusing to make diversity a focus of particular attention they had 
contributed little or nothing to illuminating the alternatives facing policy-makers 
and other responsible actors concerned with less developed countries. Whether 
as a cause or as a consequence of their generality, they also seemed to neglect or 
even deny much of what is specifically human about human societies: action and 
interaction, history, culture and the 'social construction of reality" (Booth, 
1994b:4-5). 
The platform from which this literature sprung was the enlightening and controversial article by 
Booth (1985) entitled 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse'. In this 
article, Booth criticised Marxist traditions for having too narrow a focus of development towards 
the meta-theoretical. This criticism was directed towards the more general Marxist approaches 
(including the classical and dependency schools), arguing that these traditions (including the 
'mode of production' theory) were reductionist and teleological. Another major critique was that 
Marxist approaches were fundamentally economistic which failed to account for the complex 
interaction between economics, politics and the social forces of society. Consequently, the post-
impasse debates have been generated around diversity, where developing countries are not 
homogenised under the banner of the 'Third World' but are instead recognised for their diverse 
histories, cultures, politics, economics and environments. 
The 'rediscovery of diversity', as a theoretical construct, is in itself a contentious debate. For 
post-Modernists it is not possible, or desirable, to generalise from the particular or to find patterns 
of diversity at a structural level. For as Booth argues: 
'On this side of the argument, method is all and theory is nothing ... all 
generalities are suspect, linked as they are to one or other of the grand discourses 
or 'meta-narratives' of modern western thought' (Booth, 1994b:14). 
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Conversely, there are those who believe that if development studies is to flourish then there is a 
need for empirical studies to be linked to the explanation of patterns of diversity (Butte I & 
McMichael, 1991; Long, 1990; Booth, 1985). However, as Schuurman (1993a) states, 
development theory cannot move forward on the concept of diversity alone but must also 
incorporate inequality, for: 
'too great an emphasis on diversity and specificity leads to a voluntarist plurality 
approach to the development problem, allowing no space for a universalistic 
emancipation discourse' (Schuurman, 1993b:30). 
The only theoretical framework which Schuurman advocates as recognising this is Long's actor-
oriented approach. This is, however, problematic in that it focuses on the meso and micro levels 
and largely ignores the macro structure within which these levels are located. Therefore, although 
the impasse debate has created some interesting critical thinking, there is still much work to be 
done to link the various structural levels in the analysis of patterns of diversity and inequality. A 
quote from Schuurman highlights this well: 
' ... the analytical framework of post-impasse development theory would have to 
involve the relationship between power, actors and structure, which 
subsequently would have to be substantiated at the various analytical levels 
using historical comparative research. Diversity and inequality would then form 
the explanandum' (Schuurman, 1993b: 31 emphasis in the original). 
At the macro and meso levels the principal argument is directed towards comparative analysis 
(Buttel & McMichael, 1994), such as those conducted by Bates (1989), Grindle & Thomas (1991), 
Lofchie (1989) and Gibbon et al (1992). In much of this literature, the state is the centre of 
analysis whether it is as structure (Skocpol, 1985) or 'modes of domination' (Mouzelis, 1988; 
1991; 1994). At the micro level, partiCUlarly in rural development, emphasis is on 'actor oriented' 
analysis that takes patterns of diversity and complexity seriously by analysis of institutions 
(Grindle, 1980; Clay & Shaffer, 1984), or analysis at the household-level (Long, 1989; Arce, 
Villarreal & de Vries, 1994). The emphasis here is on the diversity of rural people and rural 
projects which can be found in the writings of Chambers (1983; 1993; 1997), Chambers et al 
(1989) and Richards (1985). 
Essentially, my research is directed towards the complexity of interactions between actors, the 
importance of knowledge and power and the well-being of the poor. Consequently, it aims to 
account for patterns of diversity and inequality by empirical research at the micro level. This is 
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contextual in approach, thus not ignoring the wider influences whether they are spatial, historical, 
political or cultural. Therefore, it is neither post-Modernist nor neo-Marxist but adheres to the 
philosophy of an actor-oriented approach when exploring intervention and its impact on the rural 
poor (Long, 1990; Long & Villarreal, 1993). However, in line with the criticisms directed towards 
this approach, an attempt is made to incorporate the analysis within a national perspective. 
To achieve this, understanding is sought of the implication of international and national policies of 
socio-economic change at the 'interface' between institutions and the rural population (Long, 
1989)9. This means that my research is neither top-down nor bottom-up but is instead interested in 
the process and practice of change which occurs through the interaction of these actors at the point 
of contact between different value and knowledge systems. This requires an evaluation of the 
theoretical importance of 'human agency' which incorporates the knowledge and power dynamics 
of social actors in developing an understanding of how different actors respond to, and influence, 
development intervention. To achieve this, an understanding is required of the changing attitudes 
to development theorising which has led to the emergence of the power and knowledge debate .. 
2.3 A theoretical path to power and knowledge 
The changing trends of theoretical reflection are indicative of the lack of a dominant paradigm 
within development research. Many of these changes have emerged in direct opposition to the 
theoretical climate prevalent during their inception. However, although it is possible to generalise 
the changing perspectives of theoretical thought, at no point has one perspective dominated. To 
explore the current climate of integration, it is important to recognise the influence of these 
changing patterns of thought from those which are 'macro' to those which are 'micro' (Long & 
Long, 1992). 
The late 1950s and early 1960s theoretical debates were dominated by the modernisation school 
(e.g. Rostow, 1961). This approach sought to transform traditional societies from what were 
perceived to be 'backward' environments towards the western capitalist notion of developed status. 
This structural, or 'macro', theoretical approach was the principal reason for the dominance of 
'rational science' within agricultural development where western science was transferred to 'Third 
World' societies which ignored traditional techniques and regarded local farmers as either 
9 'Interface' being the nodes of contact between individuals, groups of actors and institutions which are 
multi-dimensional in approach. 
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'adopters' or 'rejecters' of knowledge (Scoones & Thompson, 1994:18). This created an 
environment where commercial agriculture dominated, industrialisation was transformed from 
labour intensive to machinery intensive, and urbanisation was regarded as paramount. Central to 
modernisation was the positivist thought that technology and science are universal and agricultural 
transformation could occur without affecting the social context. Such an approach was indicative 
of the practice of development intervention which can be found in the large-scale irrigation 
projects funded and implemented during this period. 
In response to the modernisation approach, the dependency perspective, prominent in the mid-
1960s, argued that the very process of interaction between the capitalist developed societies and 
the 'Third World' was exploitative and served to reinforce the underdeveloped nature of these 
societies. The principal argument being that the extraction of surplus and capital from these 
countries, to the developed world, created societies that were dependent on the world capitalist 
system in terms dictated by the wealthier nations to the detriment of their long-term development. 
The focus of the modernisation and dependency schools was one of structural understanding within 
the world capitalist order. As such, both these theoretical reflections failed to account for the 
complexity of 'social reality', preferring instead to view power as a function of the state, or 
international order, where power is exercised between states with little understanding of the micro 
dynamics of power and social change. Likewise, local knowledge was seen as backward with a 
preference for western scientific knowledge. Both these approaches failed to account for the role 
of knowledge and power in the interaction of actors at the micro level. 
These structural approaches to theorising are of little use to development practitioners and policy 
makers. Consequently, Long and Long (1992) have argued for an actor-oriented sociology of 
development - expanded from the approach developed in sociology and anthropology in the early 
1970s. This incorporates the market and state functions evident in the more structural theories but 
also incorporates the power and knowledge dynamics of human action, including both the internal 
and external factors which impinge on human agency and hence interaction. This implies that: 
'Social actors are not simply seen as disembodied social categories (based on 
class or some other classificatory criteria) or passive recipients of intervention, 
but active participants who process information and strategize in their dealings 
with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel' 
(Long & Long, 1992:21). 
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Intervention outcomes, from this perspective, are dependent on the diversity of interactions, 
negotiations and the often conflicting or hidden struggles between actors (Scott, 1985). Unlike the 
modernisation and dependency approaches, the actor-oriented perspective of the 1970s was 'micro' 
in focus, thus inviting its own set of critical comments. Again drawing on the work of Long & 
Long, the following are some of the criticisms directed towards this approach: 
• Too great a concentration on individual decision-making without the recognition of the role of 
structural meaning and action in this process. 
• Individual methodologies were often employed which were constrained by individual 
motivations, perceptions and intentions. 
• In an attempt to counter the individualist argument the concept of rational choice towards 
human behaviour was adopted, but this again suffered from a lack of understanding of culture 
and context in its ethnocentric approach (Long & Long, 1992:21-22). 
The recognition of the inadequacy of the 'macro' and 'micro' approaches to development 
theorising moved the debates in the 1980s, and early 1990s, towards the importance and 
conceptualisation of the 'social actor'. This required a change in perception about the value and 
importance of local knowledge and action. In particular, the recognition of the importance of local 
indigenous knowledge emerged largely as a result of the impacts and outcomes of the Green 
Revolution. 
The Green Revolution grew out of the same ideology as modernisation in that western technology 
and knowledge was regarded as essential for agricultural development, requiring the dismantling of 
traditional technology and knowledge in favour of western methods and the transfer of technology 
(TOT). The success of this approach for increasing production was immense. As Lipton & 
Longhurst articulate: 
'In many areas with MVs [Modern Varieties], food production (per acre per 
season) has doubled or tripled in 20-30 years, outpacing population growth; 
short-duration MV s have permitted many farmers to take two crops a year; and 
more land has been put into cereals, because MVs made them more profitable or 
safer. History records no increase in food production that was remotely 
comparable in scale, !'peed, spread and duration' (Lipton & Longhurst, 1989:1. 
emphasis added). 
The principal components included within the Green Revolution technology, enabling this 
dramatic production increase, included the: 
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• distribution of high yielding genetically bred seed varieties; 
• organisation and distribution of packages of high pay-off inputs including fertilisers, pesticides 
and water regulation (principally through irrigation); 
• increase and spread of extension services for the transfer of knowledge and technology to the 
farmers; 
• implementation of some system of credit; and 
• the implementation of this new technology in favoured agroclimatic regions (Jirstrom, 
1996:32). 
This resulted in a concentration of development interventions in favourable locations with a 
specific focus on irrigation and the production of rice or wheat. Despite the production increases 
within these 'lead areas' two major criticisms of this approach emerged regarding questions of 
distribution and equity. Likewise, much criticism focused on the indirect impact of this agrarian 
technology on the 'neglected areas', thus creating the 'regional dilemma' (Lipton & Longhurst, 
1989). Whilst this is not the place to expand on the various arguments directed towards the Green 
Revolution, it is important to recognise the affect that this 'modernisation of agriculture' had on 
the development thinking of the 1980s. 
The work of Robert Chambers (1983; 1993; 1997), Paul Richards (1985; 1986) and thefarmer-jirst 
theorists, emerged from concerns expressed about the transfer of technology approach to 
development. The criteria for this agrarian populism was primarily focused on questions of 
knowledge, debating in particular who's knowledge counts? These populists argue that 
modernisation approaches to development are inadequate due to their linear development and 
inability to recognise the decision-making capacity of poor farmers: 
'When pressed to extremes, the populist line supports the conclusion that 
development studies in general is irrelevant, and that its Marxian lineage is 
especially so' (Corbridge, 1994:94). 
Fundamental to this argument, is the extent to which rural peoples knowledge and abilities are 
largely ignored by 'normal professionals'. From this perspective: 
'centralised, urban and professional power, knowledge and values have flowed 
out over and often failed to recognise the knowledge of rural people themselves' 
(Chambers, 1983:82). 
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Although Chambers was influential in stimulating intellectual thought by 'putting the last-first' 
much of his work is often viewed as advocacy rather than theory (Bebbington, 1994). Richards, on 
the other hand, in his work entitled Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (1985) assists in the 
formulation of theory out of advocacy. Like Chambers, Richards argues for a need to recognise 
and act on the importance of indigenous agricultural knowledge, questioning the generalisations 
and theoretical implications of previous Marxist approaches. Fundamental to his argument is the 
complexity and diversity of traditional farming practices and the need to act upon these in rural 
development practice. Richards, like Chambers, argues for the need to challenge the traditional 
'top-down', centralised and bureaucratic procedures evident in the Green Revolution approach to 
the transfer of technology. He also argues for the need to decentralise research and extension 
systems and to alter the approach and values of researchers to indigenous knowledge through the 
development of local organisations. Richards' work can, however, be differentiated from that of 
Chambers by his detailed empirical and historical evidence of peasant research and innovation in 
West Africa (Bebbington, 1994). 
Since the mid-1990s, although the farmer-first perspective has received much acclaim, the primary 
advantage has been to stimulate and expand intellectual thought on the issues of knowledge, 
power, agency and structure. Probably the most influential work has emerged from within the 
fields of agricultural research and extension, and the sociology of development. In particular, 
many of the problems associated with the popUlist literature emerge from its failure to account for 
the dynamic context within which knowledge is generated and power is exercised. For as Anthony 
Bebbington illustrates: 
'In order to comprehend issues of knowledge, power and agricultural practice, 
we must understand these wider structural conditions and their role in shaping 
local livelihood strategies' (Scoones & Thompson, 1994: 16). 
Furthermore, whilstfarmer-first has been hailed by some as a paradigm shift many of the critics of 
this populist perspective argue that it: 
'fails to confront the impact of power on relations between different groups 
within farming communities or between local people and outside change agents. 
Further, it does not capture the complex sociocultural and political economic 
dimensions of knowledge creation, innovation, transmission and application 
within rural societies and scientific organizations. Because they do not 
adequately address these fundamental issues of power and knowledge, critics 
charge that Farmer-first initiatives often encounter many of the same problems 
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as conventional transfer-of-technology (TOT) strategies' (Scoones & Thompson, 
1994:2, emphasis in original). 
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The question remains as to how far intellectual thought has enabled these concepts to be grounded 
within theory and practice of development intervention. In exploring this, the following section 
highlights the theoretical roots and assumptions inherent in the actor-oriented framework of 
'interface' analysis, with a specific focus on how this can be situated within the context of 
irrigation management. 
2.4 Actors, interfaces and irrigation management 
While development theorising has moved beyond farmer-first, it is important to recognise that 
unlike the clear dichotomy between the modernisation and dependency debates, this transition is 
not due to a disillusionment with farmer-first arguments but more a recognition of the need to 
enhance the theoretical understanding of these basic assumptions. The principal differences 
recognised at present are outlined in Table 2.1. 
These differences, as expressed by Scoones & Thompson (1994), explicitly recognise the diversity 
of local knowledge, power, and access to resources between those actors involved in development 
intervention. Likewise, two crucial arguments are involved in the beyond farmer-first debates, 
namely: the role of interaction and networks; and the negotiation of priorities that emerge from 
these interactions. It is here that Long's 'social interface' finds its niche for the analysis of water 
management within irrigation. Through the daily negotiation between the different actors within 
the practice of irrigation management, the competition and conflict between different interest 
groups with their resultant differential power relations emerges. Likewise, through an analysis of 
these interactions, an understanding of the informal and formal management practices can be 
obtained. In addition, by exploring the different knowledge, perceptions and attitudes between 
individuals, institutions and external agents, together with national and international policies, the 
reality of social change can be explored. It is through this process that policy decisions can be 
guided and theoretical reflection can be enhanced. 
An actor-oriented approach 
The essence of an actor-oriented approach is to move beyond the traditional 'patron/client', 'class 
struggle' and 'peasant organisation' analysis, which fails to account for the complex process of 
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interaction that shapes change. In addition, it is an attempt to move 'beyond farmer-first' and 
'farming systems analysis'. The central constructs of an actor-oriented perspective are the three 
concepts of agency (actors), knowledge and power (Long & Long, 1992). To enhance the 
argument for the use of this perspective within irrigation management, I shall briefly expand on 
these concepts as articulated by Long and colleagues. 
Assumptions 
Process 
Role of 'Outsider' 
Role of 'Insider' 
Styles of 
Investigation 
Populist Approaches: 
Farmer first 
Populist ideal of common goals, 
interests and power among 
'farmers' and 'communities'. 
'Stock' of uniform, systematized, 
local knowledge available for 
assimilation and incorporation. 
'Farmer' or 'community' consensus 
solutions to identified problems. 
Managed intervention, designed 
solutions and planned outcomes 
with farmer involvement in planning 
and implementation. 
Invisible information collector, 
documenter of RPK; planner of 
interventions; manager of 
implementation; more recently: 
facilitator, initiator, catalyst. 
Reactive respondent; passive 
participant. 
Positivist, hard-systems research 
(FSR, AEA, RRA, some PRA, FPR 
& PTD) 
Beyond Farmer first? 
Differentiated interests and goals, 
power, access to resources 
between 'actors' and 'networks'. 
Multi-layered, fragmentary, diffuse 
knowledge's with complex, 
inequitable, discontinuous 
interactions between (local and 
external) actors and networks. 
Bridging, accommodation, 
negotiation and conflict mediation 
between different interest groups. 
Process learning and planning with 
dynamic and adaptive 
implementation of negotiated 
outcomes; collaborative work 
requiring dialogue, negotiation, 
empowerment. 
Facilitator, initiator, catalyst, 
provider of occasions; visible actor 
in process learning and action. 
Creative investigator and analyst; 
active participant. 
Post-positivist, soft systems 
learning and action research (PAR; 
increasingly FPR, PRA & PTD) 
Table 2.1. Beyond Farmer-First: Challenging the populist view 
Source: Scoones & Thompson, 1994:22 
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Agency 
Human agency is central to the integration of actor and historical-structural approaches (Long & 
Long 1992). Therefore, it forms the fulcrum for an actor-oriented perspective. However, the 
concept of agency is not determined solely from an individual perspective but also incorporates the 
interaction of individuals through networks which impact on, and are impacted by, these 
interactions (Long & Long, 1992; Long & Villarreal, 1993; 1994, Long & Van del' Ploeg, 1994). 
Drawing on the work of Giddens (1984)10, Long & Long argue that the amalgamation of 
individuals in institutions, political parties, state organisations and church organisations also 
classify as social actors 'with the power of agency' (Long & Long, 1992: 23). They are, however, 
careful not to over-generalise this notion of human agency to incorporate amalgamations of 
individuals without decision-making ability: class for example is not regarded as agency. 
Following this, Long & Long emphasise that agency should not be solely equated with decision-
making capabilities but must also recognise the role of social relations in the capacity of actors to 
manipulate networks in order that agency may become effective. In this respect: 
'agency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors 
who become partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the 'project' of 
some other person or persons. Effective agency then requires the strategic 
generation/manipulation of a network of social relations and the channelling of 
specific items (such as claims, orders, goods, instruments and information) 
through certain 'nodal points' of interaction (Clegg, 1989: 199)' (Long & Long, 
1992: 23-24; Long & Villarreal, 1993: 196, 1994:48; Long & Van del' Ploeg, 
1994: 66). 
By adopting this notion of agency, my research recognises the role of actors within irrigation 
intervention. In so doing, recognition is made of the negotiations and compromises between the 
farmers and irrigation staff. Likewise, by expanding agency from the purely individualistic 
perspective the role of government institutions (MADA), political parties (UMNO, PAS)ll and 
local organisations (PPK)l2 can be incorporated within the analysis. This approach should enable 
patterns of social relations and power relations to be explored within the context of irrigation 
10 Where agency is attributed to the capacity of the individual actor to process social reality in such a way 
that s/he becomes 'knowledgeable' and 'capable' (Giddens, 1984). 
11 The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) are the two 
majority Malay political parties. 
12 Pertubuhan Peladang Kawasan (PPK) is the local Farmers' Association (FA). 
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management, hence an understanding of the formal and informal practices can be obtained. To 
achieve this, it is important to recognise the agency of both the researched and the researcher 13 • 
Know/edge 
Knowledge is a social, political and cultural construct which is constantly changing dependent on 
the context within which human agency is articulated. This context is in itself changeable as a 
result of the relationship between power and knowledge and its impact on human agency. As such, 
the theoretical understanding of how knowledge is generated, articulated and disseminated between 
and within actors requires an approach that is holistic and flexible. This type of approach is 
offered by the actor-oriented perspective which argues against the formulation of knowledge as 
something that can be possessed and accumulated, qualified or quantified, depleted or used up 
(Long & Long, 1992: 27). Instead, an actor-oriented perspective argues that: 
'so long as we conceptualize the issues of knowledge creation/dissemination 
simply in terms of linkage or transfer concepts, without giving sufficient 
attention to human agency and the transformation of meaning at the point of 
intersection between different actors' lifeworlds, and without analysing the 
social interactions involved, we will have missed the significance of knowledge 
itself. Our guiding notions, we suggest, should be discontinuity not linkage, and 
transformation, not transfer of meaning. Knowledge emerges as a product of the 
interaction and dialogue between specific actors' (Long & Villarreal, 1994: 43). 
Knowledge from this perspective is generated and disseminated as a direct consequence of actor 
interaction. In addition, knowledge (like power) cannot be expressed as a zero-sum model but is 
instead an attribute that is possessed by actors and altered and developed by the interaction of these 
actors, without being directly transferred from one to another. It is, therefore, more to do with the 
interpretation of information than its assimilation. This approach leads to the conclusion that 
information itself can be generated and disseminated from within, and between, any spatial scale, 
whilst at the same time the interpretation of this information is selective, partial and fragmentary 
(Arce & Long, 1987). The result is clearly complex, however, by recognising that: 
'we are dealing with 'multiple realities', potentially conflicting social and 
normative interests, and diverse and fragmented bodies of knowledge, then we 
must look closely at the issue of whose interpretations or models (e.g. those of 
agricultural scientists, politicians, farmers, or extensionists) prevail over those of 
other actors and under what conditions' (Long & Villarreal, 1994: 49). 
\3 For a detailed account of the role of the researcher see chapter three. 
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For irrigation management, the concept of 'multiple realities' can arguably account for the 
negative outcome of many government policies. In this respect, the recognition of a complex and 
diverse knowledge landscape within which policies are administered is crucial for any 
understanding of policy outcomes. In addition, it is important to recognise the networks of 
knowledge dissemination between farmers, government agents and national actors. Only by the 
recognition of the impact of human agency on knowledge can the 'true' picture of irrigation 
management emerge. 
Power 
Power within an actor-oriented framework, possesses many of the theoretical arguments expressed 
in the analysis of knowledge above. The basic argument being that power cannot be 'possessed, 
accumulated and unproblematically imposed on others' (Long & Villarreal, 1994: 49), it cannot be 
qualified or quantified, depleted or used up. Likewise, the zero-sum model is misplaced because if 
an actor has power this does not imply that there must be an actor without power. The crucial 
question, therefore, is not only how does power affect knowledge (Scoones & Thompson, 1994:24) 
but also how is power manifested in the negotiated interaction of actors? 
Any analysis of power must not only recognise access to resources, room for manoeuvre, economic 
and political power but must also recognise the impact of control on the degree to which power can 
be articulated and made effective. Within this framework, power is: 
'fluid and difficult or unnecessary to measure but important to describe more 
precisely. It is not only the amount of power that makes a difference but the 
possibility of gaining an edge over others and using it to advantage. Power 
always implies a struggle, negotiation and compromise. Even those categorized 
as 'oppressed' are not utterly passive victims and may become involved in active 
resistance. Likewise, the 'powerful' are not in complete control of the stage and 
the extent to which their power is forged by the so-called 'powerless' should not 
be underestimated' (Long & Villarreal, 1994: 50 emphasis in original). 
This approach implies that power and struggles over development intervention, in the everyday 
practices of rural peasants, such as those articulated by Scott (1985) in his analysis of Muda 
peasants and their hidden transcripts, are central to enhance our understanding of knowledge 
processes (Long & Villarreal, 1994). 
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From a rural development perspective, Arce et al (1994) expand on these assumptions to suggest 
that any analysis of power must include: 
• ' .... a close examination of the ways in which relevant authorities condition rural actors' 
responses, and affect their discretion through discourses. 
• (an understanding that) ... development situations are not only shaped by but also help to shape 
power relations. 
• ... that local discourse formation highlights the importance of knowledge interfaces and of 
actors' capacities to internalize and translate discourses at the level of the ordinary person, in 
order to negotiate the meanings of their local reality with others' (Arce et aI, 1994: 159). 
When examined within the context of irrigation management, struggles over the effective use of 
power, within the framework expressed above, are articulated at the 'interface' between actors in 
the process of intervention and management. Therefore, there is a requirement to understand the 
role and action of both the 'powerful' and 'powerless' within development intervention if one is to 
understand and examine the outcome of intervention and the process of social change. Within an 
irrigation context, the process and practice of water management provides this framework of 
analysis. 
Why an actor-oriented approach to irrigation? 
What, then, is different about an actor-oriented approach and why is it an effective theoretical 
position for an evaluation of irrigation? Put simply, it argues that not only does meso level action 
influence the micro level but more importantly through the actions of individuals at the micro 
level, the actions of individuals at the meso level are also influenced. This may at first appear 
obvious, but within the parameters of many of the modernisation and dependency theoretical 
traditions, this has largely been ignored in preference to single trajectory analysis within which the 
micro level is perceived as powerless. Of central importance to an actor-oriented approach is the 
recognition that the behaviour of actors is not solely derived from their structural position, and that 
'human (re)action and consciousness playa central role' (Schuurman, 1993:18), within which both 
internal and external factors and relationships serve to guide and develop human agency. In 
attempting to incorporate both the structural and micro levels of analysis, Long & Van der Ploeg 
(1994) argue that although the structural level requires incorporation it should not be expressed as 
the driving force. Instead, it should be viewed as: 
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'an extremely fluid set of emergent properties, which, on the one hand, results 
from the interlocking and/or distantiation of various actors' projects, while, on 
the other hand, it functions as an important point of reference for the further 
elaboration, negotiation and confrontation of actors' projects' (Long & van der 
Ploeg, 1994: 81). 
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Structures, therefore, emerge out of interaction which impact on the choices and actions of the 
actor - whether institutional or individual. As a consequence, research which is actor-oriented 
focuses on the micro level but does not ignore the two-way relationship between structure and 
agency. To achieve this, analysis is focused at the 'interface' within development intervention 
which: 
'concentrates upon analysing critical junctures or arenas involving differences of 
normative value and social interest, entails not only understanding the struggles 
and power differentials taking place between the parties involved, but also an 
attempt to reveal the dynamics of cultural accommodation that makes it possible 
for the various 'world views' to interact' (Long & Villarreal, 1993: 148). 
Why, then, is this theoretical position advocated within my research for the study of irrigation and 
water management practices? Firstly, in order to explore issues of intervention it is important to 
recognise the intended and unintended consequences of such intervention. These consequences 
must, therefore, be explored 'from above' and 'from below', if one is to examine: how different 
actors manage and interpret intervention; how actors create space for their own interpretations and 
interests; and how these processes can influence the broader issues of power and social change14. 
To achieve this, Long & Long (1992) argue for a need to deconstruct planned intervention by 
recognising that development 'outcomes' are not a direct result of implementation but are instead 
due to the complex integration of the actors involved through constant negotiation and conflict. It 
is this interaction which shapes the outcome of policy intervention. Consequently, the use of an 
actor-oriented approach with analysis at the 'interface' of actor strategies offers a valuable 
theoretical framework from which to analyse irrigation and water management practices. 
To use an actor-oriented methodology it is impOliant to recognise the social, political and cultural 
issues which impact on irrigation. To achieve this I again draw on the work of Long & Long 
(1992). The authors categorise three arenas within irrigation practice and management that are 
appropriately analysed from an actor-oriented perspective. These include: 
14 In so doing, the aims and questions articulated in section 1.5 can be explored. 
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1. Irrigation organisation: Rather than system design and technology, irrigation organisation is 
interested in how actors involved in the management and distribution of water organise their 
interests, sometimes through conflict, to secure access to and control of the water resource. 
This implies that irrigation 'emerges as a set of social arrangements worked out between the 
parties concerned, rather than simply 'dictated' by the physical layout and technical design, or 
even by the 'controlling' authorities who built and now manage the system' (Long & Long, 
1992: 36). As a result, it is the recognition of both the formal and informal process and 
practice of irrigation management which enables the complexity of social practices and 
intervention 'outcomes' to be understood, hence guiding policy makers. 
2. Actor strategies: In order that social change can be articulated as an 'outcome' of the 
negotiation and conflict between actors, the strategies employed by these actors requires 
analysis. This, in pmticular, relates to both the livelihood and resource strategies of farmers as 
well as the institutional and personal strategies of government bureaucrats. 
3. Intervention: This final issue confronts the process by which government policies are 
implemented, from a national, irrigation agency and farmer perspective. By viewing this 
intervention as a process of negotiation between the various actors who defend, define and 
create space for their own positions within the power structure, it is possible to recognise the 
choices and strategies which influence social change. (Long & Long, 1992: 36-37). 
These interactive arenas need to be approached from a wider structural framework which considers 
how the economic and political relations and policies at the national and international spatial scales 
affects human agency and intervention 'outcomes' at the local level. This, Long & Long argue, 
can be accomplished by adopting a modified political economy perspective that integrates local 
labour, productive and economic activities with state politics and economics. 
This is the theoretical framework adopted within my study. To enable this framework to be 
applied to the research practice, an analytical model has been developed which not only draws on 
the theoretical constructs expanded on so far, but also incorporates the analysis within the 
Malaysian context. 
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2.5 Analytical Model 
The post-impasse debate and actor-oriented literature has been important in formulating the 
theoretical framework. However, it does not in its own right offer any specific analytical 
framework. Because of this, an analytical model has been developed to enhance understanding of 
the structures and linkages which serve to identify how knowledge, agency and power relations 
influence social change in the process and practice of water management within the Malaysian 
context, focused in particular on the Muda irrigation scheme (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Analytical model 
At this juncture it should be recognised that the model is a representation of complex dynamics, 
thus its inevitable simplification. However, it is this simplification that enables the theoretical 
arguments developed in this chapter to be accounted for within the research practice. This section 
is an explanation of the model's usefulness in examining actors, knowledge and power in the 
process of social change. In so doing, a hypothesis is suggested which incorporates the Malaysian 
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contextual issues I5 . This hypothesis is presented in Box 2.1 and emerges from the perceived 
relations of power within Malaysian society - namely that the state holds the political and 
economic power which is administered through the intervention policies of MADA, hence 
assuming the 'powerlessness' of the farmers I6 . Instead, this hypothesis argues that due to the 
struggles and negotiations between these 'social actors', the process of social change is 
increasingly affording power to the farmers. 
Box 2.1. Hypothesis 
The negotiation of priorities between the macro, meso and micro levels is 
altering the traditional power relations within Malaysian society. This changing 
power structure is enabling the farmers to become more powerful whilst the 
power of MADA is being diminished, thus affecting social change. 
This approach provides all actors within irrigation intervention with 'human agency', thus the 
capacity to negotiate priorities, interpret and manipulate intervention. To expand on these issues, 
an understanding is required of: the actors involved; the critical junctures of negotiation; the 
intervention process; and the wider structural framework. 
Irrigation actors 
The actors incorporated within the model of Malaysian irrigation intervention, and the Muda 
scheme in particular, include: the national and state governments; the government organisation 
responsible for the implementation of national and state policies within the Muda region (MADA); 
and the farming populace. To recognise the connectivity of these actors, the model has represented 
the actors, who have the 'power of agency', as separate and inter-linked entities. By adopting a 
Venn diagrammatic approach it should be recognised that each of these spheres incorporates the 
'multiple realities' of the individual and groups of actors concerned. This is essential if the 
dynamics of both inter- and intra-Venn relations are to be incorporated into the analysis. For 
example, the farmer sphere does not regard farmers as a universal actor but instead as a social actor 
who interacts as an individual and within groups (e.g. PAS and UMNO, PPK or TICKK)I7 in the 
social and power relations of other fanners and other spheres. Likewise, the informal practice 
15 For a detailed understanding of the power relations and contextual issues in Malaysian society see chapter 
5. 
16 The Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA). 
17 The Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung (JKKK) is the local organisation responsible for 
village development and security. 
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which operates within the formal process is dependent on the effective agency, knowledge and 
power of the individual/groups of farmers in the manipulation of intervention policies which, in 
turn, requires an understanding of the complex dynamics within the farmer sphere. 
Farmers 
The expected significance of the socio-economic political status of farmers cannot be understated. 
It is this criteria that impacts on the amount of power afforded to actors, plus the effective use of 
this power both within the farmers sphere and in interaction with other actors and groups of actors. 
Consequently, the incorporation of variables indicative of this status is essential. Clearly, the 
indicators developed for this purpose are in no way exhaustive or comprehensive but it is argued 
that, when used in combination with official data and research findings, the dimensions explored 
will assist in the formulation of the power relations, roles and responsibilities of the actors 
concerned. These dimensions include: household demographics; education; employment; 
membership type and position in local organisations and political parties; as well as ownership and 
access to resources. 
This is developed further by the farm and field characteristics of the various actors on an 
individual basis. Although, theoretically, it is recognised that the technical design of irrigation 
does not dictate the social arrangements which emerge from intervention, it is also recognised that 
the location of farm plots, in relation to the water source, are important factors in: controlling and 
accessing the water resource; the efficient use of the water source; and water management. 
Clearly, a farmer whose plot is located next to a main irrigation outlet is less likely to experience 
water control difficulties than one located far from a main canal. Likewise, access to resources and 
the effective use of power for those farmers some distance from the main canal is a critical factor 
in gaining control of the water resource. For as I discussed earlier, it is the impact of control which 
recognises the degree to which power can be articulated and made effectivel8 . In addition to water 
issues, farm and field characteristics are expected to be influential in the productivity of farm lots, 
playing its part in securing a sustainable livelihood for the farmers. The factors considered 
important include: land size and tenure type; field location; plot fragmentation; and individual plot 
topography. 
18 See the sub-section 'power' in section 2.4. 
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A further factor considered important within the farmer sphere is that of farmer-farmer 
cooperation. This is closely tied to participation which is categorised within the model as a 
critical juncture of interaction between MADA and the farmers. Cooperation emerges as a strategy 
employed by the farmers to secure access to, and control of, the water resource for effective farm 
management. This is critical in an irrigation system that relies in part on field-to-field water 
application together with scheduled planting, management and harvesting. It is expected that the 
power and knowledge of individual, and groups of, actors will impact on this intra-sphere 
cooperation. The indicators considered include: farmer-farmer cooperation in the management and 
operation of field turnouts, canals and drains; the experience of conflict between fanners; the role 
of social organisation and social relations which impede/enhance cooperation; the knowledge of 
other farmers within the irrigation block; and the existence of joint fanning and resource sharing 
activities between the farmers. 
MADA 
The 'multiple realities' afforded to MADA staff are both individualistic and bureaucratic. These 
actors are located within the formal process framework with their own policies, knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions towards intervention. The decision-making capacity of these actors is 
constrained/enhanced by their position as outside agents of change responsible for policy 
implementation as directed by the national and state governments. This said, it is also important to 
recognise the individual strategies employed within the organisational structure which are 
personal as opposed to institutional. Furthermore, the role of these actors in policy 
implementation is critical to both the type, approach and outcomes of intervention. The 
individual power afforded to these actors is largely dependent on their location within the 
organisational structure and their role within the intervention process. 
National/State government 
The national and state governments provide the context within which policy is generated. 
Therefore, these actors are decision-makers and powerful at the macro level. This is evident in the 
agricultural policies directed towards the rice sector. As with the MADA sphere, these actors are 
again afforded with both personal and bureaucratic 'realities' which although political also include 
those that are social and economic. Consequently, this sphere provides the context for the policy 
environment. 
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International environment 
The final actor depicted within the model is the international environment. This is important for 
the recognition of the role of international agency in terms of information, decision-making 
capacities and social relations. This is again contextual but is an impOliant actor in the 
manipulation of national government policies, both indirectly as a result of global market 
conditions, and directly as a result of Malaysia's role and relations within the international 
community and its regional organisations (e.g. ASEAN)19. 
Critical junctures 
Critical junctures are the main nodal points of interaction within which discontinuity and 
transformation occurs (Long & Villarreal, 1994). This suggests that these nodes provide the 
location for the struggles, negotiations and power differentials that take place in the interaction of 
different actors' lifeworlds. For irrigation intervention, these include: the process by which 
farmers and irrigation staff manage the distribution of water; how the farmers secure access to and 
control of the water resource; the impact of this management on the efficient use of the water 
resource; and the integration of the farmers and MADA staff in the management and governance of 
the irrigation scheme. 
This implies that the negotiation between MADA and the farmers regarding the value of, 
perceptions of, attitudes to, and social interest in, water management strategies is fundamental to 
the outcomes of development intervention. To expand on this logic further, outlined below is a 
brief overview of why the topic areas situated at the 'interface' between MADA and the farmers 
are perceived to be significant in understanding: how power is made effective by different actors; 
the influence of the different attitudes, values and social interests of these actors both in terms of 
direct intervention and manipulation; and the cultural accommodation of these actors. 
Broadly speaking, water management includes all the functions associated with the efficient and 
effective use of water, to ensure the advancement and sustainability of agricultural production and 
rural development (Low & Cho, 1996). Within rice farming, water management is: pivotal to 
successful cultivation and farming practices; and a fundamental factor in the pursuit of social and 
economic change in the rural community. In the context of the Muda irrigation scheme, MADA is 
19 This actor is analysed contextually not empirically. 
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responsible for the main system operation, delivery and allocation of water and the farmers' 
responsibility is confined to on-farm water management practices. This is a factor which is 
constantly negotiated between the farmers and MADA and is indicative of the relations of power 
between the actors involved. At the project level, attention is focused on the structure, policies and 
procedures adopted by MADA in the operation and management of the system. At the farm level, 
attention focuses on: the ability of farmers to maintain their field water levels; the flexibility of 
water availability; the timing and adequacy of water allocation; and the adequacy of drainage 
facilities, water control devices and field-level maintenance activities. 
With such a clear formal division between the responsibilities of the farmers and MADA staff, this 
analysis enables the identification of conformities and irregularities at the point of contact between 
the various knowledge and value systems. Hence, the extent to which actors accommodate for the 
interests of others and the extent to which actors apply effective power to secure their own social 
interests and values can be explored. 
MADA's responsibility for water control begins with dam storage and ends with the releasing of 
water to the individual irrigation blocks. The farmers' formal control is confined to the irrigation 
block within Muda I facilities and the Irrigation Sub Unit (lSU) in the Muda II facilities2o. This 
control is partially dependent on the management of water within the block, or sub-block, and 
partially dependent on MADA. To recognise the articulation and manipulation of power through 
an analysis of water control, research must incorporate both the formal and informal practices of 
both the farmers and MADA staff. This requires an analysis of water control which is social, 
political, economic and technical, focused at the point of interaction between these two networks. 
To achieve this, the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of water supply adequacy, reliability and 
equity are explored from both the MADA and farmer perspective. Likewise, the process by which 
farmers secure access to water, which is informal, is assumed to be indicative of: the negotiations 
and conflicts with MADA staff and other farmers; the generation and manipulation of social 
relations and networks in order to secure access to, and control of, the water resource; and the 
mticulation and manifestation of power. 
Water use efficiency is often used as a parameter of system performance. This is particularly true 
in system modernisation where the primary objective is often to improve production and 
20 Muda II facilities are the irrigation blocks developed with tertiary irrigation and drainage facilities. Muda 
I facilities are those blocks which have yet to be developed and still rely on secondary structures. 
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productivity, with efficiency measures used as an indicator of successful policy implementation 
(Levine & Coward, 1989). Within my research, water use efficiency is explored at the farm level 
as an indicator of the values attached to the water resource by the farmers, and as a function of 
effective farm management. This is a critical juncture because of the different values attributed to 
the efficient use of water by MADA and the farmers. Therefore, an analysis of the attitudes, 
perceptions and values of water together with the actual field water use efficiency levels will 
provide an insight into: the struggles and negotiations which occur between these actors; the 
wastage of water and the influences for this wastage; and an evaluation of the 
conflicting/accommodating values ascribed to the water resource. 
The final critical juncture expressed within the model is that of participation. This concept is 
related to cooperation but rather than focusing on farmer-fanner relationships, participation in this 
context is explicitly concerned with MADA-farmer relationships. In particular, the uptake of 
participative strategies by the farmers is expected to be indicative of the accommodation of the 
farmers to the intervention policies of MADA. The MADA policy of group farming, for example, 
is a clear example of the government's desire to use 'participation' as an extension tool to meet its 
policy agendi1. This policy has, however, been relatively ineffective and, as such, the expressed 
lack of participation is often considered to be the primary cause of many of the problems 
associated with the Muda region. An analysis of the participatory policies of MADA and the 
adoption/manipulation of these policies by the farmers will enhance the analysis of: the decision-
making capacities of the farmers; the relations and networks involved; the transformation of 
meaning at this nodal point; the negotiations and compromises; and the differences in attitudes, 
perceptions and values of farmers and MADA to the policy design and resultant outcomes. 
Process of intervention 
The process of intervention is illustrated within the model as the nodal point between the three 
primary actors involved. This interaction is referred to as negotiated priorities and is the critical 
node for: the deconstruction of intervention; an explanation of the formal process of policy making 
and implementation; and an explanation of the informal practices at the local level. These 
negotiated priorities incorporate the various knowledge, power and agency perspectives of an 
actor-oriented approach by recognising the choices and strategies of actors in the negotiation of 
21 Group farming is a policy implemented by MADA under the direction of the federal government in an 
attempt to coordinate the cropping activities of the farmers. See chapter six. 
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priorities. It is at this juncture that actors 'defend, define and create space for their own positions 
within the power structure' (Long & Long, 1992:37), thus shaping the outcome of policy 
intervention and, in turn, social change. 
It is also recognised that the intervention process is a result of the intersection of the conflicting or 
accommodating knowledge, attitudes and values of actor strategies. These concepts are depicted 
within the model as transcending all spheres within the intervention process. The outcomes of this 
process are inevitably simplified and depicted within the model as agricultural productivity. 
However, it is important to stress that this is analysed as patt of a wider livelihood strategy which 
is analysed more specifically within and between the specific spheres of the model. This approach 
to the intervention process enables the research aims set out in chapter one to be incorporated 
within the theoretical framework set out in this chapter. 
Wider structural framework 
The inclusion of the international environment provides the international framework of analysis. 
This incorporates the role of the international environment in shaping the knowledge and power of 
those actors involved in the intervention process, enabling the inclusion of the international market 
conditions, power relations and policy arrangements to be incorporated into the analysis of 
outcomes at the local level. However, unlike the MADA and farmer spheres the wider structural 
framework is analysed contextually rather than empirically. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The principal argument developed within this chapter is the requirement for research to integrate 
agency, knowledge, power and structure within an analytical framework for an analysis of 
irrigation management. In so doing, this chapter began with a summary account of the arguments 
formulated within the development literature for a need to 'rediscover diversity' whilst recognising 
the fundamental factor of inequality. As analytical concepts, diversity and inequality are arguably 
too holistic for theoretical analysis. Instead, a chronology of theoretical understanding which led 
to the contextualisation of the power and knowledge debate within development studies was 
articulated. This enabled diversity and inequality to be explored within an actor-oriented 
perspective, ensuring that this formed the explanandum which was articulated through the analysis 
of agency, power and knowledge within a structural framework. 
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The approach debated the usefulness of an actor-oriented perspective within the context of 
irrigation management. Having recognised that this perspective provided a valuable theoretical 
framework, an analytical model was presented within the Malaysian context. The resulting 
discussion developed a framework within which irrigation management could be analysed from an 
actor-oriented perspective which accounted for the actors, critical junctures, intervention process 
and the wider structural framework in the analysis of the 'outcomes' of intervention, whether 
formal or informal. 
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Methodology 
Research is a process of decision-making which influences the results obtained. Consequently, it is 
imperative that this process is recorded and examined in an open and reflective manner so that the 
research findings can be effectively evaluated by the reader. Explicit to this chapter is the 
transparency afforded to the research philosophy, design and methods. Of particular importance is 
the balance between the conceptualisation of the research process and the tools used to explore this 
conceptualisation. 
The empirical nature of my study is contextual and contemporary, facilitating the use of a case-
study design (Yin, 1984). This has enabled a triangulation methodology (Denzin, 1970; 1978) to 
be adopted which includes the data collection techniques of in-depth interviews, direct (non-
participant) observation, ad-hoc surveys and field water depth measurements. As a result, my 
research draws on both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to benefit from the differing 
techniques available within each approach, whilst recognising the epistemological debate 
concerning the integration of methodologies. The primary fieldwork was conducted between 
March and September 1997 after a preliminary investigation in June 1996. 
This chapter examines the philosophical debates surrounding the use of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies and, in so doing, focuses on the use of triangulation as a rigorous approach to the 
research design. This design is explicitly stated within the context of case-study research. Interest 
is centred on: the principles and practices employed to ensure the reliability and validity of 
findings; the role which I as a 'cultural outsider' employed during fieldwork; and the methods 
employed within my study to enhance the value of the results obtained. 
3.1 Philosophical issues 
The prominent debate between proponents of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies 
is concerned with the differing theoretical perceptions about the conceptualisation and process of 
viewing 'social reality'. This debate is engulfed in the philosophy of social science and not only 
effects the choice of research methods and methodologies but is fundamental to the value attributed 
to the assimilation and interpretation of knowledge. This debate has clear conceptual significance 
for the methodological framework selected which, in turn, influences the methods chosen for data 
analysis. As Cornwall et al (1994) emphasise: 
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'Methodologies provide the user with a framework for selecting the means to 
find out about, analyse, order and exchange information about an issue. They 
define what can be known or exchanged, how that should be represented and by 
and for whom this is done' (Cornwall et aI., 1994:98, emphasis in the original). 
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This what, how and whom differs dependent on the research philosophy adopted within the 
methodological framework. Consequently, the choice of research methods ultimately reflects the 
researchers' theoretical perspective about 'social reality'. The debate, therefore, is whether 
quantitative and qualitative research methods are mutually exclusive or whether they can be used 
in combination. 
The identification of these two 'schools of social science', as polar opposites, is inherent in the 
Kuhnian approach to research which views methodologies as separate and isolated paradigms that 
are inherently exclusive due to their incompatible epistemological foundations (Kuhn, 1970). This 
philosophy requires a choice to be made between quantitative or qualitative research designs. On 
the other hand, social scientists who perceive methodologies to be technically constructed 
(Bryman, 1988), rather than epistemological, use research methodologies that can best approach 
and analyse the research questions under investigation (Silverman, 1985: Walker, 1985). It is this 
latter perspective which is em braced within my research. By way of justification, the logic of both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies and their use in combination is examined. 
The logic of quantitative enquiry 
Quantitative research has been variously labelled as positivist (Giddens, 1974; 1976; 1984), 
rationalistic (Guba & Lincoln, 1981) and even 'scientific' - language which reflects its natural 
science tradition. Historically, this tradition has been the dominant paradigm in social science 
research (Guba, 1990) and is characterised by a notion of science which is embedded in the 'social 
reality' of the natural science model (Bryman, 1988i2 . This view of 'social reality' underpins 
much of the quantitative discourse, where the language of science influences what is recognised as 
knowledge. Quantitative research, therefore, finds its roots within the positivist and natural science 
genre which dictates the techniques and epistemologies that underlie this methodology. In 
particular, quantitative research is encapsulated in the philosophy that: 
• nature is orderly; 
• we can know nature; 
22 Anthropology is an obvious exception to this argument. 
CHAPTER THREE - Methodology 42 
• all natural phenomena have natural causes; 
• nothing is self-evident; 
• knowledge is derived from the acquisition of experience; and 
• knowledge is superior to ignorance (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 5-7). 
Quantitative research is preoccupied with observable concepts which are constructed from within 
theoretical frameworks. These frameworks provide for the generation of one or more hypotheses 
that can be tested by the formulation of indicators, which are operationalised into variables, for 
inclusion in the research design (Ford, 1995). The dominant mode of inquiry for quantitative 
research is the social survey, although quantitative methods may sometimes (particularly within 
psychology) include experimental investigation (Fordham, 1992: Bryman, 1988). As a result, the 
type of knowledge obtained is predetermined by the researcher, where questionnaires are 
categorised and coded according to the researcher's preconceptions and standardised framework 
(Patton, 1980; 1990). Qualitative researchers often cite the loss of knowledge, experience and 
information as the principal problem with survey data when used in isolation (Eyles, 1988). Such 
an argument is expanded by the notion that quantitative research by definition pre-defines 'social 
reality' and' may impose a meaning on social relations which fails to pay proper attention to 
participants meanings' (Silverman, 1985:3, emphasis in the original). For as Moris & Copestake 
(1993) argue: 
'the distinction between quantitative and qualitative enquiry hinges less on the 
source of information than on the point at which information is codified, or 
otherwise simplified. Early codification permits rigorous statistical analysis, but 
at the same time entails introducing restrictive assumptions which limit the 
range of possible findings' (Moris & Copestake, 1993:1). 
To understand why quantitative research requires this simplification it is necessary to understand 
what Bryman refers to as the preoccupation of quantitative research, namely; causality, 
generalisation, replicability and individualism (Bryman, 1988: 30-40). These concepts provide the 
core of the quantitative logic, i.e. why the positivist/natural science philosophy is fundamental to 
the understanding of 'social reality,23. 
Causality is operationalised by the development of dependent and independent variables that seek 
to explore why things are and what is the cause. This is of particular importance for social surveys 
which function to describe cause and effect relationships, using statistical analysis, in order to draw 
23 This is not to say that qualitative research is not influenced by these conditions. However, such ideas do 
not form the core logic of the qualitative philosophy. 
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causal inferences (de Vaus, 1986). By contrast, some researchers believe that data from surveys 
cannot establish causal connections but are instead a result of coincidence (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). Therefore, 'the social scientists ability to establish causality from social survey research is 
severely limited' (Bryman, 1988:30). Others, however, argue that when compared with qualitative 
research, data from surveys reduce the influence of research idiosyncrasies and provide a less 
subjective or value-laden approach (de Vaus, 1986: Marsh, 1982). 
The second preoccupation identified by Bryman is generalisation, resulting from random sampling 
procedures and the requirement to extrapolate findings to either a wider population or different 
social and political setting (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). Within the context of 'natural science' 
this is regarded as an integral part of the research process. This process begins with problem 
formulation from currently established theoretical positions and proceeds to the creation and 
development of: hypotheses; the research design; measurement; data collection; data analysis; and 
generalisation (Nachmias & Nachmias (1996:20). It is argued that this process justifies and 
assures external validity. The approach used to verify this generalisability is the process of 
replication, which is expected to safeguard against researcher error, reduce researcher 
idiosyncrasies, and improve data reliability. 
Finally, quantitative research is primarily targeted at the individual, in that surveys are conducted 
on an individual basis (Bryant, 1985), leading to their inability to study social groups, communities 
and organisations per se. Rather, 'social reality' is constructed from the amalgamation of 
individuals in the analytical process, hence, the image of 'social reality' is 'built up from the 
'disparate individuals' who provide the data' (Bryman, 1988: 40). 
The logic of qualitative enquiry 
Qualitative enquiry has been variously labelled as holistic, inductive and naturalistic (Patton, 
1990:40-41), finding its roots in the philosophical writings of Weber (1949) and Schutz (1962, 
1964, 1967). Qualitative research is a methodology which focuses on the meaning, understanding, 
complexity and connectivity of social phenomenon which is preferred 'to describe and illuminate 
the meaningful social world as prescribed by the interpretivist paradigm' (Silverman, 1993: 21). 
As an indicator of the lack of standardisation in qualitative research, Marshall & Rossman (1989) 
list six categories of qualitative methodological approaches, namely: human ethology; ecological 
psychology; holistic ethnography; cognitive anthropology; ethnography of communication; and 
\ 
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symbolic interactionism (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 9-10). However, in an attempt to increase 
standardisation and reduce ambiguities many researchers regard qualitative research as 
ethnography (Agar, 1986: Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) and field research (Burgess, 1984; 
1991). 
Qualitative research can be summarised as a methodology which 'assumes that systematic inquiry 
must occur in a natural setting rather than an artificially constrained one such as an experiment' 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 10). Therefore, qualitative research can be defined as: 
'an approach to the study of the social world which seeks to describe and analyse 
the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups from the point of view of 
those being studied' (Bryman, 1988: 46). 
The techniques for such an approach are various, including: participant observation; unstructured 
interviews; case studies; and focus groups. Using these approaches the qualitative researcher is 
able to uncover 'social reality' from the perspective of the informants' perceptions, knowledge and 
interpretations. This divergence from the quantitative ethos of 'natural science', to the 
encapsulation of meaning and experience, exemplifies the phenomenological approach within the 
social sciences (Bryman, 1988). However, as Bryman articulates, the intellectual underpinnings of 
qualitative research are not solely phenomenological but also include symbolic interactionism 
represented in the studies of Denzin (1978), Blumer (1969), Weber's concept of verstehen and the 
concepts of naturalism and ethogenics. 
These intellectual underpinnings reflect the advantages of qualitative research, especially when 
offset against the quantitative logic. These have been examined in detail by Silverman (1993) in 
his analysis of the writings of Bryman (1988), Hammersley (1990; 1992) and Hammersley & 
Atkinson (1983). To elaborate on this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter and readers are 
directed to the work of Silverman (1993) for intellectual rigour. However, outlined below is a brief 
overview of the main arenas whereby qualitative research is preferred: 
• for describing, contextualising and analysing the subjects interpretation of 'social reality' from 
within a 'natural' setting. (Bryman, 1988: Hammersley, 1990: Hammersley & Atkinson, 
1983); 
• in emphasising the process and complexity of 'social reality' as opposed to the static 
constructed approach of the quantitative logic (Bryman, 1988: 65-66); 
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• in its flexibility and lack of structure characterised by case-study research requiring an 
emphasis on the issues of reliability and validity (Bryman, 1988: 66-68, Silverman, 1993: 
24)24; 
• for the creation of theory and concepts apparent in the philosophy of grounded theory as 
advocated by Glaser & Strauss (1967) where 'generating grounded theory is a way of arriving 
at theory suited to its supposed uses' (1967: 3) such that theory is generated from the data 
obtained; 
• in its concern with the meaning and function of social action within a 'micro' setting 
(Hammersley, 1990); and 
• as a rejection of the natural science model with a focus on meaning rather than numbers 
(Hammersley, 1992). 
The approach to my research is to use a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods 
in the research design. However, having recognised the different philosophical debates 
surrounding each of these disciplines, their use in combination requires analysis. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
Researchers within the positivist/natural science genre who believe in the differing epistemological 
positions of qualitative and quantitative methodologies have tended to emphasise the polarity of 
these two 'schools of social science'. If, however, these methodologies are perceived to be a 
matter of objectivity and subjectivity, that are technically constructed, there is an argument for 
their use in combination (Bryman, 1988). From a philosophical standpoint: 
'Nobody would now dispute that the cultural world has different properties from 
the natural world and that this implies that some different methods of 
investigation are appropriate. However, it is also an increasingly accepted view 
of science that work becomes scientific by adopting methods of study 
appropriate to the data at hand' (Silverman, 1985:20, emphasis in the original). 
From this perspective, researchers should resist the tendency to increase the qualitative/quantitative 
impasse and should instead focus on the deconstruction of this polarity through the use of methods 
in combination25. For as Silverman questions: 
24 Clearly the extent to which the research is structured is dependent on the individual research design. 
25 This can only be achieved where the research methods are appropriate to the research questions. Nowhere 
is the requirement for an integrated research approach more evident than in the research requirements of 
agricultural and rural development. 
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'Why should we assume, for instance, that we have to choose between 
qualitative and quantitative methods? Why can we focus on only 'meanings' but 
not 'structure' or on 'micro' but not 'macro' processes? Why should case-study 
researchers assume that there is something intrinsically purer in 'naturally 
occurring' data?' (Silverman, 1993: 23). 
46 
After all, it is advantageous for both theory and policy to conduct research that recognises the need 
for causality and generalisations but at the same time is interested in the reasons or meanings 
behind these observations. Consequently, a combined approach is adopted within my research by 
the blending of qualitative and quantitative research through the logic of triangulation. 
The logic of triangulation 
The combining of quantitative and qualitative methodologies finds its roots in the work of Webb et 
al (1966) and Denzin (1970). From Denzins' perspective, it is notju~t a matter of data and method 
triangulation but also includes the triangulation of theories and investigators. This has been 
succinctly categorised by Burgess (1984), where: 
• data triangulation includes time, space and person; 
• investigator triangulation involves the use of more than one researcher; 
• theory triangulation requires the use of competing theories; and 
• methodological triangulation incorporates the 'within method' and 'between method' 
approaches (Burgess, 1984: 145). 
A triangulated approach to research design has been advocated by social scientists as a means of 
increasing the validity and reliability of research findings. For as Patton states: 
'Multiple methods and triangulation of observations contributes to 
methodological rigour' (Patton, 1990: 18). 
Clearly, methodological rigour is an important construct of any research and, therefore, 
triangulation is recommended in most research method textbooks (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 
Silverman, 1985; 1993: Bryman, 1988: Burgess, 1984, 1991: Fielding & Fielding, 1986: Patton, 
1980; 1990). This is not to say, however, that triangulation offers any definitive answers to the 
ongoing epistemological debate within the social sciences. What triangulation does offer is an 
ability to view reality from a multitude of perspectives using a multitude of questions. This results 
in research which provides a greater understanding of the research environment - where the social 
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science interest in process does not loose touch with the reality on the ground. This is clearly 
important within my research where previous research has tended to be discipline focused resulting 
in the separation of culture and society (Scott, 1985; Hart, 1989; 1991; 1992) from engineering and 
hydrological research (Kitamura & Jin, 1993: Yashima, 1995b: Kitamura, 1986; 1987). 
The confines of PhD research does not allow for multiple strategies to triangulation. Therefore, 
my research has focused on three triangulation components, namely; investigator, methodological 
and data. Investigator triangulation was achieved by adopting a team-based approach to data 
collection using myself, MADA officials and local farmers26. Methodological triangulation was 
achieved by using multiple data collection methods, whereby the surveys and interviews 
incorporated repetitive questioning using both the 'within method' and 'between method' 
approach. Finally, data triangulation was achieved by using multiple sources of evidence and 
cross-checking between individuals and with previous research. In so doing, the empirical work 
can be compared with other qualitative and quantitative studies to ensure both case-study 
. de· 27 representatIveness an lor comparative purposes . 
3.2 Research Design: A case-study approach 
If the concept of openness is to be truly adopted within my research methodology then the 
importance of my research design cannot be understated. For as Hakim articulates, it is often the 
case that: 
'the design function is virtually invisible when a researcher carries out a project 
single-handed, developing and revising the initial plan as the study progresses' 
(Hakim, 1987:1). 
So far this chapter has mticulated the logic of using a combination of research methods. However, 
justification for research decisions must also 'flow logically from the research questions and the 
conceptual framework surrounding those questions' (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 13). This 
conceptual framework was discussed in chapter two and highlighted, in particular, the complexity 
and scale associated with an analysis of power. As a consequence, my research design needs to 
26 MADA officials were involved in the survey and field-level data collection methods. Local farmers were 
involved in the survey and interview methods. 
27 It is recognised that much of this comparison is from studies conducted within, or in affiliation with, 
MADA. 
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articulate this complexity, whilst at the same time providing a framework that can be 
operationalised during the data collection process. 
Given this complexity, it was important that the design offered flexibility and variety in the 
methods of investigation available, thus encompassing the triangulation methodology expressed 
above. Due to the very nature of my study and its focus on a single irrigation project the selection 
of a case-study design seemed to offer this approach (Hakim, 1987). Like most case-study designs 
my research adopts a 'within' project comparative approach based on different units of analysis as 
illustrated in Box 3.1. Although this appears static it should be noted that research is an evolving 
process where various elements of the design are ongoing and iterative. For as Marshall & 
Rossman state: 
'real research is often confusing, messy, intensely frustrating and fundamentally 
non-linear' (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 21, emphasis added). 
Box 3.1: Research Design 
General literature review 
Problem identification and question formulation 
Project case-study selection 
Case-study literature review 
Redefining of proposal 
Design of data collection protocol 
Select 1st 
unit of 
analysis 
Select 2nd 
unit of 
analysis 
Conduct fieldwork 
Analyse, integrate and compare findings 
Define policy implications 
Generalise to theory 
Write thesis 
(Adapted from Yin, 1984 & Carr, 1994) 
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The selection of a case-study approach fits closely with the analytical model developed in chapter 
two. This model focuses on the individual (farmers), organisation (MADA) and the social and 
political setting (local and national). In addition, the research questions outlined in chapter one fit 
the criteria for case-study research as applied by Yin (1984): 
• when asking 'what', 'how' and 'why' research questions 
• when the researcher has limited control over actual events 
• when examining contemporary events where behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin 1984: 16-
20). 
Yin expands on these criteria when summarising his definition of case-study research. In 
particular, he states that: 'A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
• multiple sources of evidence are used' (Yin, 1984: 23). 
He goes on to state that case-study research is used when the researcher is attempting to: 
• explain causal links 
• describe real-life contexts 
• illustrate intervention 
• explore intervention and outcomes (Yin, 1984:25). 
Clearly, the research focus outlined in chapter one, the theoretical and contextual approach 
developed in chapter two, and the triangulation approach examined within this chapter, 
accommodate a case-study research design28 . However, in adopting this approach it is important to 
recognise some of the criticisms and prejudices directed towards the use of case-studies as a 
research strategy. 
Possibly the most prominent criticism is the extent to which results can be generalised beyond the 
confines of individual cases (Bryman, 1988: Patton, 1980; 1990). FUlther, case-studies have been 
28 This is emphasised by: the what and how research questions; the limited control which I had over events 
when studying real-life contexts; the fact that I am examining contemporary events without an attempt to 
manipulate behaviours; the intentional removal of boundaries; and the use of mUltiple sources of evidence in 
order to illustrate and explore policy intervention and the resultant outcomes. 
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criticised for their: lack of rigour; the role of the researchers' idiosyncrasies and biased views; and 
the influence of this on the research findings (Yin, 1984). In response to these criticisms: 
'the short answer is that case-studies, like experiments, are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the 
case study, like the experiment, does not represent a "sample," and the 
investigator's goal is to expand and generalise theories' (Yin, 1984: 21). 
In addition, the use of survey techniques within my research which are randomly selected from 
specific populations has enabled statistical generalisations to be possible, provided that these are 
. f l'd I . 29 representatIve 0 t le WI er popu atlOn . 
3.3 Case-study selection 
The Muda irrigation scheme is the largest of the six main rice growing regions and is commonly 
referred to as the 'rice bowl' of Malaysia. The irrigation area is approximately 96 000 Ha, nearly 
three times the size of Malaysia's second largest scheme, Kemubu. The project area is located on 
a coastal alluvial plain stretching 50 miles from north to south and 12 miles from east to west, 
encompassing the north-western Peninsular states of Perl is and Kedah (Map 3.1) 
The Muda region is divided into districts, localities and irrigation blocks (Map 3.2). Of interest 
within my study is the inter-block variation between tertiary and non-teitiary irrigation blocks3o. 
Therefore, it was decided at an early stage to limit the study to two irrigation blocks (one Muda I 
and one Muda II). Furthermore, due to the importance of group farming, each of these irrigation 
blocks needed to be representative of group and non-group farming practices. These criteria were 
used to incorporate the teltiary irrigation and participation dimensions into the analysis. The 
selection process for each of the irrigation blocks is illustrated in Box 3.2. 
Within the 4 districts there are 110 irrigation blocks ranging from 11 0-1400ha in size, 38 of which 
have had their irrigation and drainage facilities improved under the tertiary irrigation system 
known as Muda II. At the project level, district four proved to be unrepresentative of the Muda 
region due to its high proportion of Chinese farmers and above average rainfall. In addition, 
district one was eliminated because, although its management is the responsibility of MADA, it 
29 Such representation is assessed by the comparative use of secondary data, much of which is available from 
within MADA. 
30 In order to explore the outcomes of government intervention, one particular policy (tertiary development) 
is examined in detail in chapters seven and eight. 
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falls within the regional jurisdiction of Perlis rather than Kedah. While this at first appears 
unproblematic, it became clear through the research process that the state of Perlis had increased 
resources available for rural development purposes and was, therefore, unrepresentative of the 
Muda region. On deciding between district two or three the decision was ultimately driven by the 
number and location of Muda II blocks. Due to the need to limit the different environmental 
factors in the water management equation, it was decided that the close proximity of the Muda I 
and Muda II blocks would be a distinct advantage in the operationalisation and analysis of 
research findings3l . In addition, the close proximity to Alor Setal' was expected to influence the 
research findings. Consequently, in order to explore the outcomes of the government policy of 
tertiary intervention, the two irrigation blocks chosen for analysis were LBLBD 6 and LBLBD 7 
(Map 3.2). This has enabled the performance and outcomes of tertiary intervention to be analysed 
using 'with' and 'without' project indices. 
Box 3.2 Selection Process for the Muda I and Muda II irrigation blocks 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Selection of LBLBD6 & 
LBLBD7 in District II 
No_ Remove irrigation block 
from selection 
All irrigation blocks in 
No_ district IV removed from 
selection 
All irrigation blocks in 
No_ district I removed from 
selection 
All tertiary blocks in 
No_ district III removed from 
selection 
Non-selected tertiary 
No_ blocks in district II 
removed from selection 
31 By choosing two blocks located next to one another the influence of environmental factors could be 
reduced. In particular, the two blocks selected displayed similar soil types and classifications, rainfall, 
climate and topography. 
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Muda I: LBLBD6 
LBLBD6 (Map. 3.3) is a Muda 1 irrigation block totalling 601 Ha divided into 372 separate lots. 
Within each of these lots it is not uncommon to find 3 or 4 separate plots owned or rented by 
individual farmers. The irrigation supply is provided by, MADA from the Lana Bulu Canal 
through the main Constant Head Orifice (CHO) which supplies water to the secondary canal. To 
the south of the irrigation block lies the main Tunjang drain which receives its supply from the 
secondary drain located to the west of the irrigation block. The water is supplied to the whole 
block via the main CHO from which it is distributed from field-to-field, along two feeder channels 
and many minor farmer constructed channels. Those farmers whose fields are located next to the 
secondary canal can access water directly and those located near the drain often practice back 
irrigation or 'illegally' obtain water from the next block. The result is a complex system of water 
supply which requires timely and accurate understanding by MADA, as well as good field 
cooperation by the farmers, to ensure the supply of water to the whole block. 
Muda II: LBLBD7 
LBLBD7 is a Muda II tertiary irrigation block (Map. 3.4) totalling 435 Ha divided into 3 Irrigation 
Service Areas (ISA: A, B and C). The block is supplied water by MADA from the main CHO at 
the Lana Bulu Canal which passes down the secondary irrigation canal. Located along the 
secondary canal are four tertiary control offtakes (TI-T4) which supply water to their respective 
canals. On each of the tertiary canals a water control structure (e.g. T1/2, TI/3 and TI/4) regulates 
the water supply through the tertiary canal in accordance with the schedule set by MADA. In 
addition, the block is supplied with teltiary drains to ease field-level water management. Each of 
the ISAs are sub-divided into Irrigation Service Units (ISUs) averaging 25 Ha in size. The official 
irrigation schedule is a fixed rotation design. Formally, each ISU within each ISA is expected to 
receive a full irrigation supply for a maximum of 7 days at which point it receives a supplementary 
supply so that the next ISU can receive a maximum supply. This should proceed until all ISUs 
have received a full irrigation supply. This is made possible by the Farm Irrigation Turnouts 
(FITs) located every two lots. In theory, this enables the farmers to control their water supply by 
the opening and closing of the FITs on a fixed rotational basis. 
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3.4 Role of researcher 
In conducting this research I am without doubt a 'cultural outsider', which to some is highly 
negative (Chambers, 1983), whilst to others is seen as a strength. A quote from MADA highlights 
this latter perspective well: 
'We welcome studies like yours because we are not a research office and studies 
like yours provide us with information from the farmers which we cannot get 
because we don't have the time or money and because we are government 
officers and the farmers don't tell us because of tax' (Mada informant No. 16). 
From this perspective, my role as a 'cultural outsider' has enabled my research to uncover 
information which would otherwise have been unavailable. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
recognise the role which I played within the research process and the possible effect of this on the 
research findings. 
It is recognised 'that no simply neutral or value-free position is possible in social science' 
(Silverman, 1993: 172i3. Therefore, all research is dependent on the political, moral, religious or 
social beliefs that the researcher brings to the research process. These beliefs are value-laden and 
the recognition of the possible effect of these values is critical for rigorous research. For as 
Denzin (1970) shows: 
'the myth of value-freedom is shattered not only by the researcher's own 
commitments but by the social and political environment in which research is 
carried out' (Silverman, 1993: 172-173). 
These values and perceptions require the 'cultural outsider' to learn about the culture, language, 
history, politics, societal and government structure prior to conducting research (Chan. 1995). 
Within my research it was, therefore, essential to conduct a preliminary fieldtrip for 
familiarisation, as well as adopting a non-participant observation approach before conducting the 
surveys and interviews. 
Although there are certain characteristics such as race, gender and age which are beyond my 
control, there are others that can be managed within the research process (Eyles & Smith, 1988). 
These 'others' are due to the culture and background which I brought to the research process. The 
recognition of the influence of these perceptions, and even idiosyncrasies, on the research process 
33 In fact it is arguably impossible to conduct research in any discipline in a neutral and value-free manner. 
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has enabled me to reduce their relative impacts. In so doing, the following actions and precautions 
were taken: 
• By affiliation with the Universiti Sains Malaysia the internal legitimacy from the perspective 
of MADA and the farmers was fundamentally improved. This legitimacy provided unlimited 
access to MADA, at the HQ and locality level, together with a certain research 'respectability' 
from the farmers perspective. The result was a more open and enthusiastic attitude on behalf 
of the farmers and MADA officials. 
• An open self-critical approach to the research was adopted, where the qualitative research in 
particular was led by the concerns and attitudes expressed by the farmers themselves. This 
was achieved by the 'bottom-up' research style, which focused on understanding from the 
farmers perspective prior to conducting interviews with MADA staff at the locality, district 
and HQ. Such an approach enabled my research to be guided less by official perceptions and 
more by the farmers' perceptions. Clearly, the official pUblications and MADA contacts did 
influence the survey structure and research beginnings, if for no other reason than gaining 
access and acceptance for my research proposal. However, the natural culture of the 
Malaysian people is one of kindness, openness and helpfulness which assisted the timely data 
collection at the farm level. This culture is not, however, one of social criticism or analysis. 
• Throughout the fieldwork period the research focus was redefined and altered to account for 
the unexpected. Therefore, although my western preconceptions, from an academic 
perspective, were not disowned, the flexibility of case-study research enabled me to 
incorporate the local reality which I had been unable to recognise from within my own culture 
and background. This flexibility is essential when conducting research as a 'cultural outsider' 
so that preconceived ideas and norms are not imposed on a different cultural setting. It is also 
apparent that this 'cultural awareness' as opposed to an insider's 'cultural blindness' is a 
strength of my work (Chan, 1995). 
• The values which I myself imposed on the research process were ones of honesty, research 
transparency, openness and where possible flexibility. This was fostered by the holistic 
research approach which was iterative, and often locally evaluated, thus attempting to reduce 
the impact of my own cultural values. It is, however, recognised that this is not achievable in 
totality. 
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In addition to values, attention must also be focused towards researcher biases, for as Chambers 
articulates in response to rural development and rural poverty: 
'Many biases impede outsiders' contact with rural poverty in general, and with 
the deepest poverty in particular. These apply not only to rural development 
tourists, but also to rural researchers and local-level staff who live and work in 
rural areas' (Chambers, 1983: 13, emphasis added). 
Chambers articulates six sets of biases including: spatial bias (urban, tarmac, roadside); project 
bias; person bias (elite, male, user and adopter, active, present and living); dry season bias; 
diplomatic bias (politeness and timidity); and professional bias (Chambers, 1983: 13-23). These 
biases (unlike outsider values that cannot be neutral) can be accommodated for, and countered 
against, in the research design. To do so the following precautions were taken. 
Spatial biases were accounted for by an intense seven month research period which was spent 'in 
the field' observing daily routine and collecting field water data. From this, informal contacts 
with local farmers were regularly conducted whilst walking between the paddy fields and visiting 
and engaging in conversations in local coffee-shops on a regular basis. Although much of this 
activity is informal and observational in nature, it enabled me to understand and explore the local 
culture and perceptions within the local spatial context. 
Project bias is more difficult, for it could be legitimately argued that the Muda project is a well 
researched area, hence my research suffers from project bias. However, it is also correct that the 
Muda region has suffered from a lack of integrated research that accommodates for the social, 
political and technical components in the research design. This is, therefore, seen as a strength 
rather than an impediment of my work. 
In countering person bias, my research adopts three mechanisms; method sequencing, local 
knowledge and reflection. Method sequencing was employed to ensure that outsider bias, official 
perceptions and cultural misunderstandings were kept to a minimum. This approach enabled me 
to conduct research with the farmers prior to MADA staff. Local knowledge is used here in the 
simplest of ways, primarily to ensure that informants specified for interview were from a broad 
section of the farming population. Initially, the surveys were used to specify farmers that could be 
categorised as large and small, rich and poor, elite and non-elite, male and female, UMNO and 
PAS. These were then approached for interview. The MADA staff were interviewed from across 
the hierarchical structure from gate operators and local extension workers through to the 
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depatiment heads at the HQ level. The reflective nature of the research process ensured that the 
initial findings constantly redefined the research process. 
Dry season bias is not a consideration of my research. On the contrary, my research was 
conducted specifically during the dry season so that the practices of irrigation management and 
control could be explored in detail. Irrigation water is not supplied during the wet season. 
Likewise diplomatic biases are not inherent in the research undertaken. 
Professional bias is clearly influential in any PhD, where the researcher is undertaking a specific 
type of training in which the values and interests of the researcher and research field are 
influential. To counter this bias, my research has focused on a cross-section of the farming 
community, together with the MADA officials responsible for running the scheme. Therefore, 
focus was given to the point of view of all actors directly involved within the scheme rather than a 
narrow professional realm. 
3.5 Validity and reliability 
For research to be rigorous and credible it must also be valid and reliable. This credibility is 
regarded by some as a requirement for 'objectivity' (Kirk & Miller, 1986) and for others as a 
requirement for 'rigour' - which includes objectivity, reliability and validity (Baxter & Eyles, 
1997). To define these concepts within qualitative research, I draw on the work of Kirk & Miller: 
'Objectivity is the simultaneous realisation of as much reliability and validity as 
possible. Reliability is the degree to which the finding is independent of 
accidental circumstances of the research, and validity is the degree to which the 
finding is interpreted in a correct way' (Kirk & Miller, 1986:20). 
This definition is further refined by Hammersley: 
, [Reliability] refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are 
assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on 
different occasions' (Hammersley, 1992:67). 
'[Validity can be defined as] the extent to which an account accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers' (Hammersley, 1992: 57). 
In quantitative research, reliability and validity provide the framework by which data is tested by 
well developed statistical techniques - where the reliability of a measure refers to its consistency 
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and the validity refers to the extent to which a measure reflects a given concept (Bryman & 
Cramer, 1997). 
For research to be valid it must also be reliable. However, data can be reliable without being 
valid. To some researchers, the concern for reliability is firmly grounded within the 'natural 
science genre' which implies static reality and an unchanging social world, thus an inability for 
replication (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). To others, reliability is as much a concern in qualitative 
as it is in quantitative approaches (Kirk & Miller, 1986). After all, it is not the research 
methodology that is valid or reliable it is the research design. For if research is to be 'trustworthy' 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) then it must adhere to the guiding principles of internal and external 
validity as well as reliability. As Lincoln and Guba express, research must be credible, 
transferable, dependable and confirmable (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 301-328). 
As my research adopts a case-study design, using a combination of methods, data and 
investigators in triangulation, it is impOliant to state the approach adopted to ensure both validity 
and reliability. It is also important to recognise that the use of mUltiple methods or triangulation 
does not by itself ensure reliable and valid research (Baxter & Eyles, 1997) - this is dependent on 
the effectiveness of the approaches to the questions under investigation. My research combines 
the case-study design tactics as advocated by Yin (1984), together with the traditional quantitative 
techniques appropriate for survey data. 
To ensure validity, my research employs the use of multiple sources of evidence through: direct 
observation; in-depth interviews; ad-hoc surveys; field water data; official reports, data and 
evaluations; and newspaper miicles. By using multiple investigators to review the data collected, 
and multiple sources to cross-reference this data, the extent to which the data collected accurately 
represents the social phenomena to which it refers is assured. In addition, by using multiple 
methods and multiple researchers, reliability can be assessed by establishing the consistency with 
which: respondents assign the same response to different categories; and different observers assign 
the same response to the same categories. The process by which this is assured is examined in the 
data collection section that follows. 
3.6 Data Collection 
This study uses a combination of primary and secondary data collection techniques. Given the 
extent of research that has been conducted in the Muda region, access to, and use of, existing 
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sources of information has proved invaluable for: background information; the identification of 
problems; ensuring validity; and in the development of methods for the collection of water use 
efficiency readings at the farm/block level (Yashima, 1995b). The data collection was further 
enhanced by the genuine interest and enthusiasm which was shown for my study, throughout the 
fieldwork period, from MADA staff and the farmers alike. 
Ad-Hoc Surveys 
The development of the ad-hoc survey began prior to the initial fieldwork visit in 1996. It is 
particularly important to renegotiate the survey design from an early stage to ensure the relevance 
of the questions to the cultural context. As with all research there are limitations to the data 
collection methods, and in this respect PhD surveys are not unique. These criticisms have been 
neatly categorised by de Vaus (1986) to include those that are philosophical, technical and 
politicae4. These disadvantages have been recognised but do not discriminate against the use of 
surveys because of the triangulated approach to the research design. However, due to PhD 
limitations the surveys administered were ad-hoc in nature35 . 
Two hundred surveys were administered within the two irrigation blocks. The sampling procedure 
was random for the Muda I block and covered the whole ofISA 'A' in the Muda II block. The 
sampling frame was developed from the irrigation lots as indicated in Maps 3.3 and 3.4 by the 
shaded sections. Within the Muda I block ISA 'A' is a wholly contained service area. Therefore, 
in exploring tertiary intervention on a 'with' and 'without' project basis a random sample of the 
whole block was not required. The total population, for statistical purposes, includes all farmers 
who irrigate plots within ISA 'A'. In the Muda I block a random sample was conducted of all 372 
field lots. This was achieved by the use of a random numbers table from which 80 farm lots were 
selected. The resultant distribution of sampled lots can be seen in Map 3.3. 
The lots selected within each block do not necessarily equate to one farmer per lot of land. 
Therefore, to establish the location and number of responsible farmers, the Farmers' Association 
was consulted. This produced a list of farmers who receive the fertiliser subsidy within the 
sampled lots - providing an initial survey administration framework. As the research process 
unfolded it became clear that this list was inconclusive and other methods of farmer identification 
were required. Initially, the unit leaders were approached and asked to amend the list using their 
34 For a further explanation ofthese criticisms see de Vaus (1986:7-9). 
35 i.e. they were conducted on a one-off basis. 
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knowledge of the local farming population. The list was then further refined during administration 
by asking each farmer to provide information on the names, addresses and number of farmers 
irrigating their respective lots and those located nearby. Through this process, although time 
consuming, accurate and detailed knowledge was obtained of the farmers within each lot. 
Unlike most survey research, a lack of cooperation was not encountered. It is possible that this 
was largely due to the rural Malay culture which is non-confrontational and in this instance 
obliging. It may also be possible that, because of the regularity of survey work within the region, 
my research was not viewed with suspicion. Alternatively, the farmers may have seen this 
'outside' research as a useful channel for expressing their concerns and criticisms. Instead, many 
of the methodological problems were due to the absence of farmers from the immediate locality. 
Some fanners were found to be living as far away as Penang and in one case Kuala Lumper. It 
was impossible to contact these farmers for inclusion within the survey. This problem accounted 
for 20 per cent of all farmers in the sampling frame and is illustrative of the Muda region as a 
whole. As the following MADA official comments: 
' ... About 25% of our farmers live far away so they do not visit the fields often .. .' 
(MADA official, locality). 
The survey was divided into 5 sections covering the following: farm characteristics; water 
management and water control; participation/cooperation; agricultural productivity; household 
demography; and farm economy (see Appendices A: 1 and A:2). The design contained both 
closed- and open-ended questions which enabled quantitative data to be collected which could be 
validated against official statistics, together with the more in-depth explanation-building 
questions. Particular attention was given to the questionnaire wording to avoid ambiguities in the 
translation to Bahasa Melayu. The first draft questionnaire was presented in English to senior 
officials within MADA for comment and was subsequently translated at the Universiti Sains 
Malaysia. The translated version was then checked by the senior economist within MADA for 
meaning and grammar. This process was essential because of the specificity of agricultural and 
local language requirements. The final version was pre-tested with the assistance of MADA staff 
and the necessary text, content and question ordering changes were made. 
After being provided with the necessary training, the surveys were administered by MADA staff 
and local farmers36, facilitating investigator triangulation. These were then checked on a daily 
36 The MADA staff employed for this purpose were employed on a full-time basis by MADA as survey 
administrators. Consequently, they were trained and experienced in the administration of surveys. 
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basis for recording errors and were subsequently amended as required. This reporting and 
checking served as a mechanism for reducing errors and increasing the reliability of the data 
collected. The reliability was further improved by the re-test method which was conducted by 
myself in the interview process. Five questions were re-tested and cross checked with the survey 
data thus ensuring a 1 in 7 reliability. It was also possible to check validity by the cross-checking 
of data to official statistics. The data is analysed using SPSS for Windows. 
Field water data 
The method employed for the collection of data regarding field water supply efficiency was 
developed by Yashima (1995b) in a study of water supply performance in the Muda region3? 
Using this methodology, and research conducted by MADA and the International Irrigation 
Management Institute (IIMI) in the 1st and 2nd cropping seasons 1994, field water depths are 
evaluated as an effective indicator of: water supply performance in each cropping stage; for 
formulating more accurate target irrigation supplies; and for the monitoring of effective rainfall 
and irrigation supply (Yashima, 1995b: 1). This method has proved useful for evaluating the 
effectiveness of tertiary intervention and for improving field-level water use efficiencies by the 
comparison of results between the two selected irrigation blocks. 
To provide effective data within an irrigation block, Fujii & Cho (1990) undertook a study on 
water balance and water management within four irrigation blocks. Central to this was the need 
for twenty-five observation points within each block to ensure sufficient and reliable standing 
water depth readings. Consequently, within my research twenty-five field water gauges were 
placed spatially within the random plots selected for survey in the Muda I block and throughout 
ISA 'A' in the Muda II block (see Maps 3.3 and 3.5 respectively). The standing water depth 
readings and cropping patterns at each of these locations were taken daily for the 1 st season 1997 
prior to, during, and after, the release of water by MADA. Using investigator triangulation this 
data was collected by locality irrigation officers and checked by myself for reliability. This 
checking was daily at the beginning and weekly as fieldwork progressed. Data reliability was 
ninety per cent. 
Additional data required to calculate water use efficiency include the irrigation supply, rainfall, 
evapo-transpiration, seepage and percolation. The irrigation supply was obtained from locality BII 
37 See appendix D:9 for an explanation of this methodology. 
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and the rainfall figures were obtained from station 17 located in the Muda I block. This provided 
the localised water supply data which was checked for reliability on a random basis. Rainfall data 
and pan-evaporation data were obtained from the central Kepala Batas station, enabling the 
analysis of the validity of the local rainfall data and the calculation of eva po-transpiration based on 
the pan-evaporation / evapo-transpiration graph shown in Figure 3.1 (Chaw & Seng 1989: 33). It 
is not possible to measure the seepage and percolation rates. However, this can be quantified by 
measuring the change in field water depths when neither rainfall nor irrigation water is supplied 
(removing evapo-transpiration from the equation). It is, however, generally assumed to account 
for approximately 1mm per day (Yashima 1995b). 
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Figure 3.1: Evapo-transpiration/Pan-evaporation (ET/EP) ratio for direct seeding 
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In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews were conducted with farmers (twenty-six respondents) and with MADA staff 
from the locality (twelve respondents), district (three respondents) and Headquarters (four 
respondents) making a total of forty-five interviews. All of the farmer interviews were semi-
structured with a pre-determined interview guide (see Appendix B: 1). This style of interviewing is 
important because of the translation requirements during the interview process. A local farmer 
was employed for this purpose, thus facilitating investigator triangulation, and was required for the 
farmer and the MADA locality interviews. Separate interview guides were prepared for the 
MADA staff (see Appendix B:2) and as my knowledge improved and their trust increased the 
interviews became increasingly more unstructured. 
The interviews lasted approximately 1-2 hours and were tape-recorded to ensure that the 
information was recorded without loss. More importantly, however, tape recording was used as a 
measure of checking the accuracy of the interpretation. The interviews were also noted which 
allowed me to expand on interesting comments expressed by the informants. However, true to the 
format of semi-structured interviews these deviations were only possible because I was able to 
return to the interview guide. This not only ensured that all of the criteria were covered but it also 
allowed interesting data to emerge which was not restricted by the formalisation of structured data 
collection techniques. In addition, the interview guide enabled the interpreter and myself to have a 
clear understanding of the expectations of the interview itself. 
My relationship with the interpreter was a central feature of the interview process. The interpreter 
was a fanner from a different locality with excellent command of English and Bahasa Melayu. 
The interpretation of interviews obviously has both negative and positive connotations. 
Specifically, I found that: the detail of responses was often lost in translation; the length of the 
interviews had to be extended without an extension in detail; and the clarification of meaning was 
sometimes necessary to ensure accurate understanding. More positively, the inclusion of a fellow 
farmer in the interview process reduced the perception of formality, on behalf of the respondents, 
and provided more interesting and in-depth information than would otherwise have been the case. 
The selection of farmer respondents was not statistically random. Instead, it was carefully 
conducted based on the survey data already collected. This meant that a cross-section could be 
interviewed which included informants that were: large and small land-holders; male and female; 
Chinese and Malay; rich and poor; UMNO and PAS; powerful and non-powerful within the 
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community. The contacting of respondents was assisted by a local fanner who irrigated in the 
Muda II irrigation block. On account of this, the required cross-section of the community were 
interviewed. It is important to note that two small farmers who were both PAS supporters 
declined to be interviewed38 . The interviews with MADA staff were representative of the 
employees at each hierarchical level. The resultant data is coded and analysed using NUD.IST. 
Direct Observation 
Data collected by direct observation was possible because of the kindness afforded to me by 
MADA and the farmers alike. On arrival, MADA provided me with a desk, phone etc. in the 
planning and evaluation division. This enabled me to interact with MADA staff both formally and 
informally on a daily basis. This could be interpreted as a form of manipulation to insure that the 
research being conducted is in line with official thinking. However, at no time did MADA staff 
attempt to influence the research process; therefore, manipulation is not regarded as an appropriate 
argument. 
By spending an intense seven month period in the field, checking water-level recordings and 
spending time in the coffee shops, an understanding of the fanners perceptions and attitudes to 
various issues became clearer39. Likewise, by spending time at the MADA locality office the 
initial concerns about my research were diminished and data became available that would 
otherwise not have been possible by formalised research methods. On the occasions that 
information was obtained this way it would be noted down as soon as was possible. 
Observation is not always a result of conversation. This is especially true in an irrigation scheme 
where the physical infrastructure can help to explain the more complex social relations. For 
example, after conducting the survey and interviews it became clear that the information regarding 
field-bunds was inaccurate for a number of reasons. Firstly, the farmers always specified field-
bund sizes which were equal to, or bigger, than the officially recommended size. MADA, 
however, were inclined to repoli the poor construction and maintenance of these field-bunds by 
the farmers. To clarify these differing perspectives direct observation was undertaken of 50 field 
bunds (see chapter seven). Other forms of direct observation include: water flows; cropping 
38 These farmers are from the Malay opposition party. Therefore, their non-compliance is indicative of the 
role of politics in the farming community. 
39 The coffee shops are imp0l1ant focal points in the rice farming community. 
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pattern variations; 'illegal' pipes and pumping from unofficial sources; and the maintenance of 
canals, bunds and offtakes. 
3.7 Methodological limitations 
The main limitation of my research was the loss of information due to language. Although I 
developed a basic understanding of Bahasa Melayu my competence levels fell short of 
acceptability for conducting interviews. This meant that my reliance on interpretation was much 
greater than I would have liked. Indeed, it would be fair to say that a researcher with a greater 
command of the local language would probably have received more in-depth meaning, particularly 
from the qualitative methods. 
The second limitation was the absentee farmers and the inability, due to logistical and time 
constraints, for their inclusion in either the surveyor interview sampling and selection. This 
meant that those members of the farming community who were most inclined to be labelled as 
'part-time' farmers or 'landlords' were not included in the research process. This lack of 
recognition of absentee farmers was perhaps as much to do with my 'cultural outsider' role as to 
the research design. If I were to conduct this research again, I would attempt to include these 
respondents in the research design. However, in light of the increased costs and time required for 
such an approach it is not anticipated that this would have been possible. 
A further limitation with the methodology was the inability, largely due to time constraints, to 
conduct any in depth farm-management analysis. This was clear in the survey work, where the 
farmers' productivity data proved to be unreliable and unrepresentative, partly due to my inability 
during the pilot study to recognise question ambiguity and partly because of the farmer's inability 
to calculate this figure. As a result, my research draws heavily on official statistics whereas the 
survey production data can only be relied upon when pre-coded. 
Finally, my research would have benefited if a 'before' and 'after' rather than 'with' and 'without' 
approach could have been applied to the analysis of tertiary development. However, because these 
two blocks illustrated similarities in environmental factors such as soil types and rainfall the 
difference between the two irrigation blocks for these factors was considered negligible. For the 
social, economic and political differences this is accounted for in the analysis in chapter eight. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted the philosophy, design and methods employed within my research. 
In so doing, it has articulated the benefits of using qualitative and quantitative methodologies in 
combination, using investigator, method and data triangulation, whilst recognising the ongoing 
epistemological debate of such an approach. Attention focused on the research design in the 
context of case-study research, and the selection of case-studies was made explicit. The role of 
the researcher was articulated together with the data collection methods employed. The validity 
and reliability of these methods was explicitly stated. 
Throughout this chapter a recurring theme has been the impOliance of; using surveys to provide 
the structural understanding and qualitative data to provide the depth and meaning. Such an 
approach, although generating extensive data, has proved invaluable during analysis. In particular, 
the two-hundred surveys have been used extensively in the analysis conducted in chapters four and 
eight. Likewise, the forty-five interviews have provided depth and meaning throughout chapters 
four to nine and the water measurements and supply recordings have been invaluable in chapter 
seven. More impOliantiy, the use of multiple methods in this way has enabled the analysis to be 
conducted at various spatial scales such that the macro scale is analysed in chapter five, the meso 
in chapters four and six and the micro in chapters seven and eight. This has been possible because 
of the combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in the research design. 
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The Muda Scheme: Changing Status and Current Trends 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the changing status and 
current trends towards rice production in the Muda region. It begins by providing the necessary 
descriptive account of the Muda region, paying particular attention to the physical infrastructure 
and the establishment of MADA. This is followed by an analysis of both the changing status of 
rice production since project completion and the impact of direct seeding as a farmer initiated 
cultural change. In so doing, this chapter provides the contextual background for illustrating: the 
role of the political economy and its influence on rice production in chapter five; the formal 
relationship between the national government, MADA and the farmers in chapter six; the 
outcomes of the government policy of tertiary development in chapters seven and eight; and the 
informal practices of the farmers and MADA staff in chapter nine. 
Of the six major rice growing regions in Malaysia the Muda scheme is the largest, accounting for 
57.3 per cent of total domestic production in 1994 (Government of Malaysia, 1996b) and 28 per 
cent of the total rice growing area (Table 4.1). It is the single most important irrigation scheme in 
Peninsular Malaysia. Since implementation, the scheme has undergone significant change in both 
the culture of rice farming and the physical infrastructure. During the first ten years of double 
cropping, the scheme successfully increased the incomes of the farmers by embracing a 
combination of Green Revolution technology, irrigation infrastructure and an integrated 
management approach. Since the early 1980s, however, the farmers have experienced a squeeze 
on their incomes due to rising costs of labour and increasing production costs (Jirstrom, 
1996:101). In addition, the original network of physical infrastructure is now regarded as 
inadequate due to inefficient distribution, inequity and unreliability. To improve this, in 1980, 
tertiary development was implemented under the Muda II irrigation scheme4o. So far, due to 
funding constraints, only 38 of the 110 irrigation blocks have been designed and constructed under 
this scheme. In addition, the farmers themselves have fundamentally altered the culture of 
farming by adopting direct seeding, instead of the traditional transplanting method. 
40 One of the primary characteristics of tertiary development are the alterations in design to include third-tier 
canals, drains and structures. 
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Classification 
Major Granaries (8 schemes) 
MADA 
KADA 
Kerian - Sg. Manik 
N.W. Selangor 
Penang 
Seberang Perak 
Kemasin Semarak 
Besut 
Secondary Granaries (74 schemes) 
Minor Granaries (172 schemes) 
Non Granary areas 
Total 
Gross Rice Area Ha (%) 
212,497 (62) 
97,000 (28) 
31,477 (9) 
30,058 (9) 
19,022 (5) 
13,000 (4) 
9,510 (3) 
7,330 (2) 
5,100(1) 
28,441 (8) 
47,653 (14) 
54,028 (16) 
342,619 (100) 
Table 4.1. Distribution of irrigation area by classification 
Source: Jegatheesan, 1996a:28 
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Current research into the causes of this shift to the direct seeding method have highlighted three 
factors which are believed to have been instrumental in this change. The first is the rapid rise in 
agricultural wage rates caused by the national economic growth of the Malaysian economy and the 
out-migration of labour to the commercial and manufacturing sectors. The second is the alteration 
in the social preferences of the current generation of Malays, who are increasingly disinterested in 
farming, thus reducing the agricultural labour supply. Finally, the chronic water shortages and 
inadequate irrigation and canal densities have made the timely transplanting of the dry season crop 
increasingly difficult (Morooka et aI, 1996: 1 0). 
4.1 Project implementation: A critical factor for change 
The influence of project implementation cannot be understated. The purpose of this section is to 
provide a descriptive account of the main factors of change which occurred prior to, during, and as 
a direct result of project completion. Firstly, an understanding of the pre-project status is 
articulated. This is followed by an analysis of the immediate impacts of project implementation 
including the social, physical and economic benefits that the original project accrued. Finally, the 
influence of both the physical infrastructure and the establishment of MAD A is articulated. 
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The Pre-Muda scheme 
Although rice has been cultivated in the Muda region for centuries, it is only since the mid 19th 
century that the modern irrigation facilities began to take shape. These included the construction 
of the precursors to the Alor Changileh Canal (1890), the Lana Bulu Canal (1913) and the Tunjang 
Canal (1929) (Low & Cho, 1996:39). In 1932 the British colonialgovernment set up the Federal 
Drainage and Irrigation Department (DID) with the Kedah branch following shortly in 1940. 
After the Japanese occupation, the DID began development on the pre-Muda irrigation scheme 
(collectively referred to as the Kubang Pasu Irrigation scheme), which by 1965 combined five 
separate development schemes providing both irrigation and drainage (Map 4.1). By the 
development of the Muda scheme, the entire area was under rice cultivation except for 27,000 
acres to the east of Sungai Pendang (Doering, 1973). For the Muda project to be feasible these 
areas needed to be consolidated. 
Prior to the Muda scheme, agriculture was subsistence oriented with many of the 50,000 farm 
families practising single-cropped rice cultivation. The farm population consisted of 97 per cent 
Malay farmers and 3 per cent Chinese (Mohamad & Y oop, 1967), totalling approximately 300,000 
individuals who were entirely dependent on rice cultivation (Afifuddin, 1975). In 1954 
approximately 80 per cent were in debt (Wong, 1983)41 which when combined with the small 
average farm size of 4.02 acres provided an average income of $43.20 per month. This inevitably 
contributed to the perpetuation of poverty in the region (Afifuddin, 1975). Furthermore, it has 
been estimated that approximately half of all households farmed a mere 17 per cent of the land, 
with the largest 14 per cent farming almost 40 per cent (Table 4.2). Likewise, the tenure 
arrangements during this period meant that 41 per cent of farmers cultivated as pure tenants (Table 
4.3) (Scott, 1985:70-71). 
41 This indebtedness has been attributed to the padi kunca system of credit. This provided the farmers with 
cash or kind prior to harvest to be repaid to the creditor in so many kunca of paddy at harvest, very often 
below the market value (Hart, 1989). In fact, it has been estimated that the annual interest rates charged by 
these middle men amounted to between 40% and 80%. 
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Map 4.1: Kubang Pasu irrigation scheme 
Source: Chaw & Seng, 1989:16, Low & Chow, 1996:39 
Farm size (acres) % of farms % of area Mean farm size 
<2.83 
2.84-7.09 
>7.1 
38.1 
46.4 
15.3 
17.3 
44.9 
37.8 
Table 4.2: Average farm size, 1966 
Source: Scott, 1985:70 
1.8 
3.8 
9.9 
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Tenure status of farmers % of farmers % of area Mean farm size (acres) 
Owner-operators 
Pure tenants 
Owner-tenants 
44.5 
41.5 
14.0 
39.5 
38.8 
21.7 
Table 4.3: Average land tenure, 1966 
Source: Scott, 1985:71 
3.6 
3.8 
6.1 
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Under single cropped cultivation the planting season was dependent on: the rain patterns 
beginning in July and ending in January (Figure 4.1); and long-term seed varieties farmed using 
family labour except during harvesting (Afifuddin, 1973). In addition, there were limited 
institutional arrangements which could be developed in the implementation of the Muda scheme. 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
~ ~ if {; i ~ ~ i m 0 ~ & ~ 7 ~ ~ ill ill ill ill 
Month 
Figure 4.1: Rainfall patterns, Kepala 8atas rainfall station, 1995 
Source: MADA, Alor Setar 
It is difficult to establish the complexity of the rural community prior to the establishment of 
MADA due to a lack of reliable studies, and institutional arrangements, for rural development. 
Much of the work that was conducted was poorly coordinated at the district and state levels -
leading to assumptions and oversimplifications of rural reality (Afifuddin, 1976). Because of this: 
'no matter how much investment was put into the infrastructures and 
technologies, there was very little headway in the sense of a sustained progress 
generated by government initiatives' (Afifuddin, 1976:4) 
A lack of progress was not in keeping with the government's self-sufficiency requirements and 
poverty alleviation programmes 42. As a result, massive investment was undertaken in the Muda 
42 See chapter five. 
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region to improve both the physical infrastructure and the institutional arrangements at the farm, 
district and state levels. Hence, the Muda project was born. 
The Muda project 
The initial foundations for the implementation of the Muda scheme were a direct result of the 
'revived policy goal of national self-sufficiency in rice and a new emphasis on rural poverty 
alleviation' (Almahdali, 1986:87). After an initial study in November 1961, by the engineering 
firm of Sir William Halcrow, the feasibility of irrigation infrastructure was established (Doering, 
1973). By 1964 a more comprehensive report was circulated which identified the necessary 
catchment areas and infrastructure developments to provide double cropping within the region. 
This report was accepted by the newly independent government, and an application was made to 
the World Bank for the provision of a loan. A loan of $135 million was secured and the Muda 
irrigation scheme was launched (Jegatheesan, 1977). 
The project was implemented between 1966 and 1972 with 59 per cent finance from the World 
Bank loan (Jirstrom, 1996). The first phase of irrigation began in 1970 accounting for 33,600ha 
which by 1974 had increased to 92 per cent of the entire project area. Double cropping increased 
cropping intensity to 176% with average yields rising from 3.25t/ha to 4.50tlha - doubling net 
household income (Low & Cho, 1996:41-42). By way of investment, the Muda scheme represents 
the largest development scheme implemented during the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970), and 
remains today the largest agricultural development scheme implemented in Malaysian history. 
The initial project objectives were twofold: the first was a desire to increase production output for 
self-sufficiency; and the second, was the desire to increase the income and standard of living of 
the paddy farmers. The scheme was initiated in the same year as the first release of the Green 
Revolution seed variety IR-8 from the International Rice Research Institute (lRRI) in the 
Philippines. With the provision of irrigation infrastructure the Muda project was able to embrace 
many of the characteristics of Green Revolution technology including; the introduction of modern 
seed varieties, chemical feliilisers, pesticides, and the provision of agricultural credit and 
extension services. 
The Green Revolution was not, however, responsible for the introduction of mechanisation. By 
1966 tractors were already widely used on approximately 40 per cent of the cultivated land 
(Jegatheesan, 1972). This mechanisation was rapidly expanded to include combine harvesters 
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which were introduced in 1976 (Jirstrom, 1996). For some farmers much of this mechanisation is 
directly attributed to the introduction of the Muda scheme: 
'Since MADA started the project there is more machines used, they even use 
machines to seed the paddy. The farmers use the modern way only, even 
though we can use men [sic] to seed the paddy' (Farmer informant No. 11). 
Whilst for others the introduction of mechanised farming is more a process of change that has 
assisted the ease with which farming can be conducted: 
'At the beginning it was very difficult, we have to ask somebody for more labour 
(used) to cultivate the paddy, to harvest the paddy. After you harvest you have to 
use a small like scythe, and then we take the paddy that we cut, bunch it 
together, and then put inside the sack, carry back to the house, lay it out to dry in 
the sun and then after that we can sell the paddy. Otherwise no mill wants to 
accept the paddy. Right now very easy, much easier now. Now it saves cost 
because it is very easy, during my early age I have to harvest the paddy at night 
because it involves a lot of time and [there was] not enough time during the day 
so we carry on in the night. It was very very difficult' (Farmer informant No. 20). 
'For the beginning when we have to harvest (by) using labour, for the 6 relong it 
takes about one month to finish harvesting, a very long time. Now it takes 2 
hours only, a big difference' (Farmer informant No. 21 )43. 
During the initial phase of project development, much of the emphasis was on the design and 
construction of irrigation infrastructure. This meant that: 
'It was not until mid-1967, one and a half years after construction had 
commenced, that planners began to realise that successful implementation of the 
scheme would require more than engineering works' (MADA, 1974:2). 
Consequently, although planning for the construction and design of the irrigation works had been 
in motion for seven years, no arrangements had been made for the management of the water 
resource or the social and economic enhancement of the rural populace. This necessitated the 
improvement of: 
• agricultural extension and support services; 
• the establishment of Farmers' Associations within the rural community; 
• the introduction of an integrated water management and control system which would facilitate 
an adequate supply of water at the right time; 
• the introduction of short-term seed varieties to facilitate double cropping; 
43 The relong is the standard unit of measurement for Malaysian agriculture where: I relong = 0.71 
acres/0.28 hectares. 
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• the provision of fertilisers and pesticides to ensure the yield potential; 
• the provision of credit facilities to enable the farmers to gain access to these technologies; and 
• the expansion of milling and marketing arrangements with favourable farm-gate prices. 
To achieve this, a coordinated approach was developed which included both public and private 
institutions. The role of the private sector was confined to the provision of; credit, machinery 
inputs, transportation, milling and marketing functions. Meanwhile, the Muda Agricultural 
Development Authority (MADA) was established and assumed all other responsibilities for the 
governance and development of the Muda region. 
There is no doubt that this original project was a success. During the period between 1966 and full 
implementation in 1975, average incomes increased 2.4 times in real terms (Almahdali & Ho, 
1985). In accordance with the government policies of poverty eradication, subsidised farm-gate 
prices more than doubled from $13.21 per pikul in 1966 to $26.66 in 1975 (Jegatheesan, 1977)44. 
Paddy production increased from 384,721 tons in 1969 to 795,830 tons in 1974 (Goldman & 
Squire, 1982), enabling the government to achieve its 90 per cent self sufficiency target (Jirstrom, 
1996). However, although the spread of double cropping significantly increased the incomes of 
the farmers and farm labourers, this arguably reinforced the inequalities already in existence prior 
to project implementation (Scott, 1985: Afifuddin, 1978) (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). 
Income 1966 ($) 1966 (%) 1975 ($) 1975 (%) 
Gross annual income 1,509 100 5862 100 
Value of paddy production 1026 68 4961 85 
Non paddy farm produce 148 10 113 2 
Agricultural wages 135 9 310 5 
Non-agricultural income 200 13 478 8 
Table 4.4: Income changes between 1966 and 1975 
Source: Jegatheesan, 1977:40 
44 1 pikul = 0.06 tons/60.S kg. 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Muda scheme: Changing status and current trends 
Household Type 
-----"--.--------~~""- -----------
Area operated (acres) <3.2 <3.2 >3.2 >3.2 
Family workers (adults) <2.5 >2.5 <2.5 >2.5 
Absolute family net farm income ($) 
Pre-project 299 362 544 1232 
Post project 1672 1839 3862 5083 
Relative family net farm income ($) 
Pre-project 100 121 182 412 
Post-project 100 110 231 304 
Table 4.5: Comparison of absolute and relative net farm income by household type. 
Source: Adapted from Goldman & Squire 1982:768) 
The initial project success has led some to describe the Muda scheme as: 
'one of the most successful agricultural development projects in the Asian region 
and not surprisingly, [it] became something of a 'show case', with all the 
evidence suggesting that the strategy of increasing rice production and farm 
incomes through the provision of irrigation and complementary inputs had been 
very successful' (Vokes & Young, 1993: 182 cited in Jirstrom, 1996: 1 01). 
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Arguably, the two critical factors enabling the successful introduction of the Muda scheme and 
double cropping were the physical infrastructure and the establishment of MADA. 
Physical infrastructure 
The physical infrastructure implemented during the late 1960s, and early 1970s, included the basic 
storage, delivery, distribution and drainage systems. These have been subsequently extended, 
since 1980, to include: the provision of tertiary irrigation at the block-level under the Muda II 
project; and the construction of a third storage dam. 
The initial project design included the creation of two dams by the impoundment of the Pedu and 
Muda rivers, some 50km from the project area. A 6.8km timnel was constructed between these 
two dams enabling the transfer of water from the Muda to the Pedu dam from where it is released 
into the Pedu river. The Pedu river transpOlts the water supply to the project area, at which point it 
is divelted into the main north-south canal (Map 3.2). This canal distributes water to the whole 
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system through widely spaced supply canals, from which water is made available to the farmers on 
a block-by-block basis (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: Water distribution in the Muda region 
Source: Chaw & Seng, 1989:25, Low & Cho, 1996:51 
Overall, the Muda I scheme facilitated the provision of inigation water to an estimated 105,000 
hectares of paddy land. The physical infrastructure, to ensure the adequate and timely delivery and 
drainage of the water resource, can be classified into five physical sub-systems: the storage 
system; the delivery system; the distribution system; the collector drainage system; and the 
transportation drainage system. Using this classification it is possible to distinguish between the 
different functions of the system - the characteristics of which, as expressed by Low & Cho (1996: 
48-50), are set out below: 
Storage system: 
Muda reservoir: 
Pedu reservoir: 
Ahning reservoir: 
98,OOOha catchment. 160Mm3 storage capacity. Water diverted to 
the Pedu dam via the Saiong Tunnel for storage. 
17,100ha catchment. 1,049Mm3 storage capacity. Water released into 
the Pedu river for transportation to the Pelubang Regulator. 
Constructed in 1988. 12,OOOha catchment. 200Mm3 storage 
capacity. Water released into the Ahning river leading to the Pedu 
river. Limited use for normal irrigation. Built for times of drought and 
as a special reserve for domestic water supply. 
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Delivery system: 
Reservoirs to canals: Water conveyed via the Pedu and Padang Terap rivers to the 
Pelubang Regulator. Distance 67km. 
Primary Canals: The Pelubang Regulator bifurcates water to the Northern and 
Central Canals. The Northern Canal supplies the Arau Canal, the 
Lana Bulu Canal and the Alor Changileh Canal. The Central Canal 
supplies the Southern Canal. Canal capacities range from 17m3/sec 
to 40m3/sec. Each canal has a main system regulator and control 
structures. 
Secondary Canals: 
Tertiary Canals: 
Distribution system: 
Muda I blocks: 
Muda II blocks: 
Secondary canals receive water through a Constant Head Orifice 
(CHO) each commanding an irrigation block of between 200ha and 
800ha in size. Discharge is regulated by permanent control 
structures. Delivery to the Muda I blocks is dependent on secondary 
canals. Additional pump stations are provided when gravity flow 
is insufficient or when drainage water is available. 
Delivery within Muda II blocks is dependent on tertiary canals, 
with secondary canals designed for conveyance purposes only. 
Control structures are located along tertiary canals. 
Field level distribution is dependent on field-to-field gravity flow 
from pipe offtakes on the secondary canal. Farmers have 
constructed their own field water channels to improve this 
distribution system. Other methods include piping directly from the 
main canal, piping from the secondary canal of the adjacent block 
(back irrigation), pumping or irrigating from the drainage canal. 
Tertiary canals serve as the distribution system. 
Collector drainage system: 
Field drains. Muda II tertiary drains. Secondary drains. Coastal 
borrow pit drains. Natural depressions and swamps. Control 
structures are fitted at the end of the secondary drains only to 
regulate discharge into the trunk drain. 
Transportation drainage system: 
Trunk drain system: Main drains. Canals. Rivers. Diversion barrages. Tidal outlets and 
coastal borrow pit drains. Designed for agricultural and urban 
drainage. Discharge outlets directly into the sea. 
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The initial perception that agricultural-based development would evolve naturally from the 
provision of physical infrastructure was inadequate within an integrated approach. Consequently, 
in August 1967 the Office of the Coordinator of the Muda Irrigation Scheme was formed. Due to 
limited executive powers and state-level capital expenditure problems this was replaced in 1970 
by the Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA). 
The establishment of MADA 
To facilitate the effective use of an integrated approach, MADA was given the responsibility to 
operate, maintain and develop both the engineering and agricultural developments in the Muda 
region. For this to be effective, a coordinated approach was required which would integrate the 
regional-, local- and farm-level activities. Much of this coordination is the responsibility of 
MADA who provide the linkage between national policies, other organisations and the farming 
populace. In so doing, MADA is the single most important agency in the governance and 
management of the irrigation system and related agricultural activities. MADA is not, however, 
the only organisation with an interest in the Muda region. For example, The Bank Pertanian, 
Bernas, MARDI and the veterinary services all work together with MADA in the administering of 
their programmes and initiatives45 . 
At the regional and local levels, MADA has an obligation to manage and control the water 
resource to ensure a timely and adequate water supply to the farmers. This is the responsibility of 
the engineering department who controls, allocates and regulates water from the source to the 
blocks. For the water to be effectively managed at the system and local level the engineering 
department has to coordinate with the agricultural depmiment to ensure that the water supplied 
supports agricultural conditions: 
'MADA has the task of integrating the requirements of agriculture with the 
limitations of engineering' (Chaw & Seng, 1989:2). 
MADA is responsible for system governance, management and control with no formal governance 
or management responsibilities for the farmers beyond on-farm management practices. Instead, 
MADA is involved in the training of farmers in system maintenance, farm management practices 
and technology use in the process of agricultural 'modernisation'. The principal vehicle for 
45 Bank Pertanian (Agricultural bank), Bernas (Paddy marketing and milling agency), MARDI (agricultural 
research institute). 
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which are the Farmers' Associations that are located at the local-level and partly managed by 
MADA extension agents46 . 
4.2 Changing status and current trends 
Since 1966, there has been a significant alteration in the status of rice farmers, from both a 
production and cultural perspective. This section aims to highlight some of the more macro 
factors of change that have occurred since project completion. In so doing, it draws on data 
available from MADA documentation, published works and the fieldwork conducted in 1997. 
Farm size, distribution and tenure 
Within the traditional culture of rice farming, access to, and control of, land is a fundamental 
factor in the socio-political influence and livelihood strategies of farmers in the rural community. 
Because of this, it is important to recognise the changing status of farm size, distribution and land 
tenure in the region. 
On average, there is a trend towards increasing farm sizes from 1.61 ha in 1972 to 2.39 ha in 1997 
(Table 4.6). This has been attributed to the introduction of direct seeding and mechanisation, 
which has reduced the labour requirements and management problems of the farmers (Wong, 
1992a:28). 
46 S h . ee c apter SIX. 
Season Average farm size (ha) 
1972 1.61 
1981 1.39 
1986 1.91 
1988 1.81 
1991 2.00 
1997 2.39 
Table 4.6: Average farm size, 1972 - 1997 
Source: Wong, 1992a: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Farm size distribution, however, has been largely unaffected by this increase, with 60 per cent of 
farmers still farming less than 1.5 ha. In patiicular, the trend for the larger farming units has 
remained relatively stable, with the land farmed over 3.5 ha only rising marginally from 6 per cent 
in 1981 to 7.5 per cent in 1997 (Table 4.7). 
Of significance is the tendency for a growing inequality in the quantity of land operated by small, 
medium and large farmers (Almahadali, 1986). In 1981, for example, the largest 6 per cent of 
farmers operated 17 per cent of the total land. In 1997 the largest 7.5 per cent now operate 26 per 
cent of the cultivated land and the 60 per cent of farmers cultivating less than 1.5 ha account for 
just over 30 per cent of the land area. Some authors have attributed this to a lack of public policies 
in addressing the unequal distribution of farm sizes and incomes (Lim & Muhammad, 1989). This 
is perpetuated by the cultural identity with land ownership and the Islamic laws of inheritance. 
Size 
:": 0.5 ha 
0.6-1.7ha 
1.8 - 3.4 ha 
~ 3.5 ha 
% of farms % of land Size % of farms 
1981 1981 1997 
10 2 < 0.5 ha 9 
57 38 0.5 - <1.5 ha 50.5 
27 43 1.5 - <3.5 ha 33.0 
6 17 >3.5 7.5 
Table 4.7: Distribution offarms by size (1981,1997) 
Source: Gibbons et aI, 1981: Wong, 1992a: Fieldwork, 1997 
% of land 
1997 
1.8 
29.5 
42.7 
26.0 
Tenure % of farmers % of area Mean farm size (ha) 
1966 1997 1966 1997 1966 
Owner-operators 44 57 39 48 1.5 
Pure tenants 42 27 39 24 1.5 
Owner-Tenants 16 16 22 28 2.5 
Table 4.8: Tenure arrangements between 1966 and 1997 
Source: Scott, 1985: Fieldwork, 1997. 
1997 
1.4 
1.5 
2.9 
Land ownership significantly increased between 1966 and 1997 (Table 4.8). In 1966,44 per cent 
of the land was owner-operated with an average farm size of 1.5 ha, amounting to 39 per cent of 
cultivated land. Conversely, although by 1997 the average farm size has changed little, the 
percentage of owner-operators has increased to 57 per cent accounting for 48 per cent of the land. 
This indicates a growing trend in the ownership of cultivated land largely to the detriment of 
tenant farmers, clarified in the reduction of tenant farmers from 42 per cent to 27 per cent and a 
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corresponding fall in the percentage of land planted from 39 per cent to 24 per cent. With no 
significant change in owner-tenants this represents an out-migration of tenant farmers from rice 
production. 
Production and productivity 
Increases in productivity have been at the forefront of government policies for the development of 
the region. In the post-project period both yields and farm incomes increased dramatically. 
However, since 1981, the region has experienced a stagnation in productivity and an increase in 
production costs. Cropping intensity has generally remained around 170 to 180 per cent but 
fluctuations in yields have resulted in an unstable production system (Figure 4.3). In 1978 this 
instability resulted in the abandonment of the irrigated season crop47. Since then, gross yields 
have fluctuated between a low of 2.7 t/ha in the 1987 irrigated season to a high of 5.4 t/ha in the 
1991 non-irrigated season, with an average yield of 3.9 t/ha in the irrigated season and 4.7 t/ha in 
the non-irrigated season. It is only since the widespread introduction of direct seeding that a 
general increasing trend in yields has been observed. There is, however, immense variability in 
yield performance, with the non-irrigated crop showing an increasing tendency and the irrigated 
crop continuing to fluctuate around 3.5t/ha without any significant improvement since project 
implementation. However, the steady increase in average yields over the past five years has led 
many of the farmers surveyed in 1997 to be relatively positive about this development (Figure 
4.4). 
The observed instability in yields has been attributed to: an increased build up of pests and disease 
(Jirstrom, 1996); the high and frequent loss of production due to droughts and flooding; and the 
inadequate water management and control procedures at the local level contributing to an 
unreliable, inadequate and inequitable water supply system. Chapters seven and eight examine 
these issues in greater detail. However, a selection of quotes from the farmers interviewed during 
fieldwork provides an overall perspective of the problems associated with production and 
productivity: 
Water supply: 
'The biggest problem is ... sometimes the canal cannot supply water sufficient for 
my paddy land and then if we cannot find the source of water for the paddy, 
47 The irrigated season is commonly referred to as the dry season. 
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Figure 4.3: Yield variability in the Muda region , 1965 - 1996 
Source: Morooka et ai, 1996: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 4.4: Perceptions of changes in production costs and yields in past 5 years 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
because paddy needs more water, then this is a problem' (Farmer informant No. 
1 ). 
The biggest problem is the water problem, solve the water problem first, and then 
because for weeds I can control by using so many chemicals they have in the 
market, but for the water problem. If there is no water that means that I can't do 
anything. To fight the weeds no problem but the water is the biggest problem' 
(Farmer informant No. 15) 
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Water and weeds: 
'If there is a water problem that means that weeds will grow faster. If there is 
enough water then less problem with the weeds. Other disease we know already 
how to fight because we are facing similar problem for a long time. We know how 
to prepare for the certain problem attack by insect and other disease .... when 
there is a water problem there is a weeds problem. If they can overcome the 
water problem then the weed problem will be less' (Farmer informant No. 22) 
Weeds, Insects and disease: 
'The problem now is the weeds and the attack by insects. It is very difficult to 
identify the suitable weedicide [herbicide] to fight the certain weeds. Normally I 
get advice about the suitable chemical to fight from the PPK [Farmers' 
Association]' (Farmer informant No. 17). 
'After two months the insects attack the paddy, there is certain insect that attacks 
the stem so there is nothing inside the paddy, no grain. Then when we take the 
paddy to the mill the yield is less than what we expect' (Farmer informant No.6) 
Mechanisation 
87 
Although the process of mechanisation began prior to project implementation, this has rapidly 
expanded since the introduction of the combine harvester in 1976, impacting on, and being 
impacted by, the changing production practices in the region (Figure 4.5). During project 
implementation it was widely recognised that to ensure two crops per year, limit production costs 
and increase incomes, mechanisation would be essential (Mansor & Jegatheesan, 1996:91). 
Initially, farm mechanisation was limited to land preparation with the aid of tractors. However, 
since direct seeding, it has become increasingly common to find farmers replacing labour in the 
preparation, production, protection and harvesting activities of cultivation. Mechanisation is 
particularly important in the preparation and harvesting stages due to the limited time span 
between the first crop harvest and the second crop establishment. This, when added to the 
increased labour requirements in an area already suffering from a labour shortage, naturally 
required an increase in mechanised activities. 
To this extent, tractors are now widely used for land preparation. This has increased since the 
introduction of direct seeding which requires extensive land-levelling to ensure good water 
control, seedling establishment and yields (Mansor & Jegatheesan, 1996:96). Furthermore, 
mechanised harvesting is now virtually essential under direct seeding, due to limited in-field 
walking space for hand harvesting and the need to ensure at least a one month fallow period to 
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reduce the build-up of pests and disease. In addition, speed of harvesting is now essential, leading 
one observer to comment that: 
'This has resulted in the popularity and extensive use of large combine harvesters 
which have increased in numbers to saturation point in the Muda area' (Mans or 
& Jegatheesan, 1996:99 emphasis added). 
§ 
'.0 
0.. 
0 
"Cl 
'" '4)' 
~ 
Cl.l 
6 
'$. 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
\0 
0 
0 M 
'" 
0- <'I 
'" '" '" '" 
r--
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
V") 00 
-r-- r-- 00 ~ 0- ~ 
-
Year 
'<t r-- 0 
00 00 0-
~ ~ ~ 
--Tractor 
--Double Cropping 
Combine Halvesting 
--Direct Seeding 
Figure 4.5: Changes in rice production practices in the Muda region 
Source: Jirstrom, 1996:99 (Adapted from Norton & Wray, 1990: Ho & Md. Zuki, 1989: Ho et at, 
1993) 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that out of the 200 farmers surveyed in 1997, more than 70 per cent 
use tractors and combine harvesters in the production process, inespective of the size of land 
operated (Table 4.9)48. Conversely, the ownership of both two- and four-wheeled tractors is 
influenced by land size, with the larger farmers renting these out for extra income to the smaller 
farmers. In this respect, these owners act as 'middle men' within the community - an activity made 
possible by the lack of government involvement in mechanised activities. Other mechanised 
activities within the region include hand-held seeding and fertiliser/herbicide application machines as 
well as the more obvious transportation and milling activities. 
48 The two farmers who owned combine harvesters were large-scale contractors for whom farming was 
ancillary. 
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2-wheel tractor 4-wheel tractor Combine harvester 
% Ha % Ha % Ha 
Own 27 2.63 5 4.53 1 1.75 
Hire 52 1.27 66 1.52 70 1.73 
Neither 22 1.37 29 1.46 29 1.45 
Table 4.9: Ownership and use of tractors and combine harvesters 
(n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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As it becomes increasingly clear that the culture of direct seeding will be the predominant form of 
cultivation in the Muda region, mechanisation looks likely to increase. This means that not only 
will the percentage of hectares mechanically cultivated increase, but this machinery will also have 
to be adapted to complement the direct seeding method. This requires good land-levelling and 
preparation, necessitating further research on more appropriate technology than the tractor which 
leaves extensive wheel ruts that are not conducive to a level field. Furthermore, the lack of 
government involvement in mechanised activities is likely to increase the power of the 'middle 
men' within the community. 
Paddy varieties and planting methods 
With the introduction of shOli-maturing seed varieties, and the influence of direct seeding, there 
has been a significant change in both the planting methods used and the paddy varieties seeded. 
This is important for both the planting schedules and water management practices of MADA and 
the farmers. In particular, the planting methods used can have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of: the irrigation schedule; weed and pest control; the cost of production; yields; the 
establishment of seedlings; and labour requirements. Likewise, the paddy variety influences the: 
rate of seeding establishment; yield; resistance to disease; length of cropping period; and the 
timing and quantity of water requirements. 
After the discouragement of the use of IR42 the trend within the Muda region is to use MR84 
which was released in 1985 as a replacement for IR42. The benefits of which are: a high and 
stable yield potential; low sterility; resistance to blast49; moderate resistance to tungro disease50 ; 
49 A form of bacterial leaf blight. 
50 The tungro virus first appeared in the Muda region in the 1980s and is transmitted by the green leafhopper. 
It has, however, been suppressed in the 1990s. 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Muda scheme: Changing status and current trends 90 
and relatively low susceptibility to lodging under direct seeding51 (Ho, 1996:77). However, the 
125 day cropping period required for transplanted varieties meant that MR84 could not be adopted 
by the fanners52 . Direct seeding, however, facilitates the 120 day cropping period, hence its 
popularity. This variety accounted for 75 per cent of the farmers surveyed in 1997 (Table 4.10), 
complementing the trends observed by numerous studies in the region between 1977 and 1990 
(Figure 4.6). 
=~.,.. ,.. 
Variety % of farmer adoption 
MR84 74.5 
MR 167 10.5 
MR 166 3.0 
MR48 2.5 
IR42 1.5 
MR 106 0.5 
Mixed 7.5 
Table 4.10: Percentage adoption for paddy varieties (n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork 
The principal planting methods used under direct seeding include wet seeding, dry seeding and 
volunteer seeding - although volunteer seeding is rarely practised on a large-scale with most 
farmers preferring the wet seeding method (Table 4.11). Each of these methods requires different 
water management practices. The procedure for wet seeding is as follows: tillage; initial 
irrigation supply; puddling; drainage; sowing under wet conditions; seeding establishment; and the 
resumption of irrigation (Fujii & Cho, 1993a: 14-15). Dry seeding, on the other hand, requires a 
single irrigation supply after seeding has commenced. Using this method, rainfall aids seeding 
establishment thus reducing the quantity of irrigation water required. By contrast, wet seeding 
requires two irrigation deliveries with a 10-15 day break between supplies. Because of this, the 
water requirements under wet seeding are not dissimilar to those of transplanting whilst the 
shorter irrigation period in dry seeding results in a reduced water demand (Table 4.12). 
51 Lodging occurs when the stem of the plant breaks resulting in the rice panicle coming into contact with the 
water surface. 
52 This is because MR84 requires a 120 day cropping period. 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Muda scheme: Changing status ami current trends 91 
Dry season Wet season 
Wet seeding 77 92 
Dry seeding 21 6 
Volunteer seeding 1 0.5 
Mixed methods 1 0.5 
Transplanting 0 0.5 
Table 4.11: Planting method as a percentage of cultivators 
(n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 4.6: Changes of rice varieties in the Muda area, 1977-1990 
Source: Ho, 1996:78 
Irrigation period Transplanting Wet seeding Dry seeding 
Nursery bed 40 days 
Soil Soaking/Puddling 15 days 15 days 
Germination/Seeding establishment (by soil water) (by rain) 
Transplanting 10 days 
Root taking 10 days 
Growing period 65 days 90 days 90 days 
Total 140 days 105 days 90 days 
Table 4.12: Variation in irrigation period dependent on planting method 
(based on seed variety MR84) 
Source: Fujii & Cho, 1993a:18 
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The main reason for the widespread adoption of wet seeding is because of the close relationship 
between water and weed control. For as the farmers articulate: 
'The wet seeding is better because if we seed our paddy through wet seeding it is 
easy for us to control weeds. With dry seeding the weeds will grow very fast' 
(Farmer informant No.9) 
'I use wet seeding. When I use dry seeding it makes it easy for weeds to grow up 
very fast' (Farmer informant No. 11) 
'I try to do dry seeding but it is not effective because the paddy does not grow as 
fast as the wet seeding' (Farmer informant No. 15) 
Unfortunately, because of the reduction in annual rainfall (Figure 4.7), the Muda region is 
regarded as being water scarce. Consequently, MADA encourage the farmers to practice dry 
seeding as a water-saving mechanism and to facilitate effective scheduling. The farmers, 
however, are not inclined to adopt this planting method due to the recognised benefits of wet 
d· 53 see mg . 
4.3 Direct seeding 
The transformation from transplanted agriculture to direct seeding was initiated by the farmers in 
the early 1980s. In 1982, direct seeding accounted for approximately 26 per cent of the cultivated 
area. By 1989 this had increased to 76 per cent and in 1997 the figures were 100 per cent in the 
irrigated season and 99.5 per cent in the non-irrigated season (Kanetani & Mansor, 1996: 
Fieldwork, 1997). The official reasons for this have been attributed to the shOliage of labour and 
the reducing trend in annual rainfall patterns (Figure 4.7). This has adversely affected the 
reliability and adequacy of the water suppl/4. 
With the majority of farmers now practising direct seeding, the reasons for its uptake (as 
articulated by the farmers) include: the labour shortage problem; a reduction in the cost of 
production; and an increased ease with which farming can. be conducted: 
'The present system [direct seeding] has advantages because I use less 
manpower to cultivate the paddy and then it is easy to harvest the paddy. That is 
the advantage of direct seeding' (Farmer informant No.1). 
53 See chapter eight. 
54 See chapter eight. 
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Figure 4.7: Rainfall trends at Kepala Batas rainfall station 1970-1996 
Source: Data obtained from Fujii & Cho, 1993a: MADA headquarters, 1997 
The advantage is direct seeding because I use less labour. Last time when I 
practice the transplant I had to import the labour from southern Thailand .. .' 
(Farmer informant No. 13). 
' ... the advantage is direct seeding because it saves cost' (Farmer informant No. 
15). 
'Direct seeding is the advantage because for transplanting, first we have to make 
a nursery, this takes a lot of time and money. We have to put a fence around 
there to prevent it from being attacked by rats and we have to build a small batas 
here to prevent the water from leaving or getting in. So there is a lot more 
difficulty by using transplanting' (Farmer informant No. 17)55. 
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The correlation between labour saving activities and a reduction in production costs is articulated 
by economists as a simple alteration in the relative factor price. Under this hypothesis, as the cost 
of labour increases and the real price of rice decreases, farmers are forced to supplement direct 
seeding for labour, where; transplanting represents a labour consuming technology that is weed 
repressive, and direct seeding represents a labour reducing technology that is herbicide intensive. 
However, as Jirstrom mticulates, 'economic factors alone will not explain the spread of the direct 
55 Batas is the local description for field-bunds. 
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seeding technique' (Jirstrom, 1996:77). Instead, other factors need consideration, including: the 
increased control of water; the availability and use of herbicides; and biophysical determinants. 
Water control is a critical factor for understanding the spread of direct seeding. This was not, 
however, articulated by the farmers56 because of the mis-match between irrigation design and 
cropping requirements. For transplanting, irrigation water is supplied for a single period only with 
the nursery beds acting as water storage units. For direct seeding the farmers preference for wet 
seeded conditions has substantially increased the water requirement resulting in two periods of 
supply with critical water requirements during the initial crop establishment. Neither the Muda I 
or Muda II irrigation blocks are designed to supply water under these conditions: 
' ... the Muda irrigation project was designed for a specific cultivation method which 
was transplanting and in transplanting you don't throwaway the water. But now 
with direct seeding they throwaway and they expect us to give them the water 
the next minute that they need it. Our system is not able to respond to that kind 
of situation because we have a lack of time between supply and drainage ...... well 
we have got no choice because the farmers want to do direct seeding .. .' (MADA 
informant No. 18). 
The effect of this mis-match between design and system requirements is that MADA is unable to 
supply enough water at the right time. This has increased water demand and scarcity within the 
regIOn: 
'For direct seeding there is more water used than for transplanting because for 
transplanting the water flow is one time only, at the beginning. They use the 
same water either to tractor their land or to transplant, so the same amount of 
water. But for direct seeding we have to supply water at least twice per season. 
Let's say 20 cusec57, so now maybe 40 cusec which is double the amount of 
water required' (MADA informant No.6). 
'In the first place the Muda II project is designed for transplanting, it is not for 
direct seeding. Under direct seeding there is more water used because, for 
example, we have to give water two times per season .. .'(MADA informant No.7). 
The change to direct seeding has had a detrimental impact on the ability of women to participate in 
farming activities. Under the traditional transplanting culture it was the women's responsibility to 
harvest the paddy. Under direct seeding this occupation has been replaced by mechanised 
harvesting, impacting on the social organisation of farming activities: 
56 Even though in theory direct seeding should increase water control. 
57 Cusec (cubic feet per second). 1 cusec = 0.028 cubic meters per second. 
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'Since direct seeding, women are less involved in farming activities, they just stay 
at home as full-time housewives' (Farmer informant No.5). 
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Furthermore, where previously the transplanted culture enabled the standing water-level in the 
nursery and main field, to act as a natural weed control mechanism, this is no longer retained 
during crop establishment thus increasing the incidence of weeds within the paddy fields58 . In a 
study conducted in 1987, the increased build-up of grasses under direct seeded conditions resulted 
in a yield decrease of 35.4 per cent (Itoh et ai, 1996:190). These weeds and grasses germinate at 
the same time as the paddy and are difficult to distinguish during early growth, making both weed 
identification and herbicide selection problematic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the farmers 
articulated weeds as a problematic of direct seeding: 
'For direct seeding we have a big problem with the weeds and pests like 
Sambau59 , but for the transplanting there is less problem with the weeds but right 
now we don't have labour to do the transplanting' (Farmer informant No. 26). 
'When it comes to direct seeding the biggest problem is the weeds and insects, 
the Sambau' (Farmer informant No.7). 
Other problems with the direct seeding culture include an increased build up of pests and disease 
due to the modifications to field habitats and micro-climates (Ito et ai, 1996). The net effect is an 
increased use of pesticides and fertilisers for improved growth and reduced lodging: 
'As far as fertilisers is [sic] concerned, the recommendation of 18kg-20kg per 
hectare is for [aJ transplanted crop. Under direct seeding with higher plant 
density the research has indicated that farmers need to top-up with another 20kg-
40kg of Nitrogen on top of that..'(MADA informant No. 19). 
Direct seeding clearly represents the future of farming in the Muda region. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the federal government, MADA and the farmers to conduct activities that will 
ensure the sustainability of this farming culture. This sustainability is, however, dependent on the 
knowledge and actions of these actors in the governance and management of the Muda scheme. 
58 This negatively impacts on the yield obtained under direct seeded cultivation. 
59 Sambau is the Malay term for the Echinochloa weed species which is a grassy weed that competes directly 
with the rice plant. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a descriptive overview of the changing status and current trends in rice 
farming in the Muda region. This change has not, however, occurred within a political, economic 
or social vacuum. Instead, the changes examined in this chapter have, for example, been 
influenced by: the types of policies implemented by the state government and MADA; the process 
by which these have been administered; technological and agronomic developments; and the 
relationship between the state government, MADA and the farming populace. Therefore, to 
explore the research questions illustrated in section 1.5 it is necessary to examine the macro, meso 
and micro spatial scales. In so doing, the following chapter begins by analysing the changing 
nature of the 'macro' political economy and the influence of this on the rice farming community. 
This is followed in chapter six by an examination of the formal policy environment at the meso 
spatial scale by an analysis of the state/MADA and MADA/farmer roles and relations in the 
process and practice of government intervention. Chapters seven and eight then examine the 
outcomes of one specific government policy - teltiary development, with chapter nine examining 
the way in which the informal practices of both the irrigators and MADA staff influence these 
outcomes. By exploring all these spatial scales it is possible to articulate how the relations of 
power impact on, and are impacted by, the process of intervention through the negotiation and 
compromise of actors at all spatial scales. 
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Malaysian Political Economy and the Rice Sector 
This thesis differentiates between the formal process and informal practice of irrigation 
management and water control. To recognise the significance of the informal power and control 
exercised by the farmers this requires an understanding of the formal landscape of intervention. 
This formal landscape is atiiculated within my research at the national, regional and local spatial 
scales. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the national spatial scale through an analysis of 
the Malaysian political economy and the rice sector. 
Rice farming in Malaysia is strategically important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is the staple 
diet of the population. Therefore, under the National Agricultural Policy (1992-2010), rice has 
been accorded the status of 'strategic food crop' and the granary regions are required by the state 
to meet a minimum target of 65 per cent self-sufficiency (Jegatheesan, 1996:33)60. Secondly, 
because rice farming is a Malay dominated occupation it has been the focus of generous 
investment since independence as a means of modernising the rural sector and correcting the 
economic imbalances in society - where economic function is identifiable with race61 . Thirdly, the 
rice sector is historically the poorest sector of the economy. Therefore, extensive government 
investment is directed towards this sector as a means of reducing poverty and increasing the 
income levels of these farmers. Finally, much of the government's political support is located in 
the rice growing regions of the economy. Consequently, the political support of this sector is 
impOliant to ensure political stability for the Barisan National ruling alliance. What all this means, 
therefore, is that rice farming in the Malaysian context is a highly politicised activity. For as one 
MADA officer articulated: 
' ... paddy is a political crop, when it comes to [the] political crop the government 
has to consider otherwise they loose their advantage in the farming community .... 
I shouldn't talk like this ..... Normally they [the government] help the farmers, most 
of their voters are farmers' (MADA respondent No. 10). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the process by which the development of the Malaysian state 
has influenced the political power of the rice farming community. To do so, it is useful to 
approach this chapter from an historic perspective because any policy decisions or programmes 
which are implemented, impact on, and are affected by, the social structures and power relations in 
60 See Table 4.1, chapter four for an explanation of the principal granary regions. 
61 The historical developments of this argument are examined throughout this chapter. Suffice it to say here, 
however, that historical events have influenced the identification ofrace with economic function whereby the 
Chinese tend to be commercial and urban and the Malays tend to be political, rural and agricultural. 
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evidence prior to, and during, implementation (Guijt & Thompson, 1994). Consequently, by 
adopting a historic approach the changing ideological perspectives of the state to the rural populace 
can be explored. 
In exploring the politicised nature of rice farming this chapter begins by offering an analysis of 
change from an authoritarian populist position which helps to clarify the relationship between the 
populace and the state apparatus62 . To establish how rice farming has been politicised and why 
this is important, the development of the relationship between the state and the rural populace is 
explored. The influences of the modern state are examined within the context of the continuity of 
governance, the personality culture of politics and the emerging tensions in Malay identity. This 
is followed by an examination of the strategic importance of the rice sector within the national 
framework, providing a platform from which the actions and activities of the government and 
farming populace can be explored in subsequent chapters. 
5.1 The Authoritarian Populist State 
To classify Malaysia as an authoritarian populist state is to accept an analytical concept which 
seeks to explain the apparent paradox in society. This incorporates the recognition of economic 
success, authoritarian control and some measures of democratic processes that have created 
political stability with popular support for the status quo (Munro-Kua, 1996). As an analytical 
concept this appears contradictory. However, closer examination uncovers an authoritarian regime 
which through its manipulation of the constitution, legislation and policies has created an 
environment where authoritarian principles are accepted provided that certain semblance's of 
democratic procedures are adhered to. 
Scholars interested in the Malaysian state have tended to advocate that Malaysia is neither 
authoritarian nor democratic (Crouch, 1993), preferring instead to categorise Malaysia as a semi-
democracy (Case, 1992). In fact, drawing together the related roles of liberalisation and 
democratisation, Case argues that the Malaysian state is an amalgamation of both political 
liberalism without full democracy and democratic procedures without liberalisation. For: 
'In Malaysia, state elites have interwoven aspects of both approaches, offering a 
synthesized, durable pattern of semi-democracy' (Case, 1992:3). 
62 See section 5.1 below for a detailed analysis of authoritarian populism. 
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However, to argue that Malaysia is a semi-democracy is to accept an argument that minimum 
conditions of democracy exist. Drawing on the work of Gomez & Jomo: 
'In spite of fairly regular multi-party elections and some other features requiring 
accountability of the regime, the Malaysian state has been authoritarian since the 
colonial period' (Gomez & Jomo, 1997:2). 
The extent to which Malaysia is authoritarian or semi-democratic does, however, depend on the 
interpretation of democracy. Therefore, to classify the Malaysian state as authoritarian populist is 
to accept a concept of democracy which adheres to the following definition: 
'the existence of universal suffrage, direct popular elections, a responsible 
government, the freedom of expression and association, together with protection 
from arbitrary arrest' (Munro-Kua, 1996:6/3. 
The features of authoritarian populism derive from a coercive capitalist state which through the 
use of repressive institutions and an established national ideology is able to enact authoritarian 
measures (Munro-Kua, 1996). Malaysian examples include: the Internal Security act; the 
manipulation of the public through the control of the media in both written and transmitted form; 
the states' ability to harness the importance of traditional values and social systems in its 
ideological outlook; and the use of government institutions in the channelling of public funds for 
political support. Through this process the government is able to enhance its position in the rural 
63 Universal suffrage has been recognised in Malaysia since independence. (Munro-Kua, 1996:6). However, 
although the right to vote is upheld, such a situation has only been possible because these elections have not 
seriously threatened the established political order (Crouch, 1993); Direct popular elections are held at both 
the state and federal levels although the extent to which these are free and fair is limited due to the 
gerrymandering of boundaries and voter registration interference (Munro-Kua, 1996:6). The opportunities 
for popular protest through the forum of opposition parties is evident but the extent to which this opposition 
is able to compete 'on a level playing field' is questionable because of the restrictions on electoral 
competitiveness. These manifest themselves in the control of the media by the ruling coalition, the 
limitations on public rallies, the hurried campaign periods and the governments use of state facilities and 
patronage functions through on-the-spot development grants (Case, 1992:3); The responsibility of the state to 
the populace is largely a formality due to the continuity of governance by the ruling coalition since 
independence in 1957 (Munro-Kua, 1996:7). Moreover, the centralisation of power by Dr. Mahathir has 
reduced the effectiveness of the state bureaucracies and the elected legislature. Examples of which would be 
the process by which Dr. Mahathir has removed the effective power afforded to the judiciary and the limited 
ability of the parliamentary electorates to actively partake in the policy-making process; Freedom of 
expression and association have been removed from the Constitution through the persistent use of the 
national security and stability ideology. This has been institutionalised by the restrictions on the public 
debate of 'sensitive issues' under the parliamentmy Sedition Act; Finally, protection from arbitrary arrest is 
not a characteristic of the Malaysian state. Instead, an active and extensive secret police force is maintained 
and detention without trial is regularly practised (Munro-Kua, 1996:7). This is again institutionalised 
through the legislature which provides the ruling coalition with the power to enforce a state of emergency, 
suspend state constitutions and exercise their power under the Internal Security Act. 
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communities. This does not, however, imply that these rural communities are passive actors 
within the political arena. After all, the importance of the rural sector for political support in the 
election process is essential for the continuation of the status quo. This is illustrated in the 
government institutions and policies directed towards societal restructuring and the increased 
economic well-being of the Bumiputeras (sons of the soil). In essence, the analytical concept of 
authoritarian populism: 
'refers to the means by which an extensive degree of (class) control is exercised 
by the state on the day-to-day existence of its populace, in which populist 
ideological apparatuses involve an authoritarian aspect. At the same time this 
may be backed up by explicitly authoritarian apparatuses, which are more or less 
visible' (Munro-Kua, 1996: 161). 
In the Malaysian context the authoritarian apparatuses is 'less' rather than 'more' visible64, 
whereby the quest for political stability means that it is more a question of the 'ordinary' and 'day-
to-day' than the' one -off and' exceptional' event, such as the recent demise of President Suharto 
in Indonesia65 . My thesis adopts this concept of authoritarian populism as a useful analytical 
approach with which to address the role of society in ensuring the political status quo. Emphasis 
is placed on the role of the Malay peasantry, and the rice sector, in acting as a check to 
government activities whilst also perpetuating the status quo. This facilitates a greater 
understanding of the significance of the control and power exercised by the farmers at the micro 
level. 
5.2 Historical development of authoritarian populism 
Social scientists interested in the analysis of Malaysian politics, economics and social formation 
have tended to advocate the impact of colonialism, on the altering of traditional society, as the 
most impOliant feature in shaping the modern social structure of Malaysia. For as Brennan states: 
'The Malaysian social formation is a recent and complex phenomenon which 
came into existence as a direct result of imperialism and colonialism' (Brennan, 
1985:93, emphasis added). 
Although there is no doubt that the British colonial administration had a direct influence on the 
social formation of Malaya, it is equally true that in the 42 years since independence the political 
64 Particularly when compared to other Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and Indonesia. 
65 Although the recent detainment, trial and imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim would constitute a 'one-off' and 
'exceptional' event. 
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stability of the Malaysian state has facilitated the development of policies and ideologies which 
have themselves influenced this social formation. Consequently, it would be incorrect to argue 
that the social structures in 1999 are 'as a direct result of imperialism and colonisation,66. The 
purpose of this section is to elaborate these argument in an analysis of the development of 
authoritarian populism, focusing in particular on the relationship between the state and the rural 
populace. 
The colonial impact and the rural Malay 
The landscape colonised by the British already displayed elements of socio-economic identity as a 
function of ethnicity. The traditional Malay feudal elite, with a long history of pre-colonial and 
pre-capitalist modes of production, historically possessed both the political and economic power in 
the rural communities (Brennan, 1985). Meanwhile, the emergence of trading posts between the 
hinterland and coastal traders provided the beginnings of Chinese economic interests in the urban 
areas. Generally speaking, ethnic relations during this period displayed cultural and communal 
tolerance with even an element of assimilation taking place (Munro-Kua, 1996). Lacking a 
specific strategy, the main objectives of British colonial rule were to: 
' ... preserve the basic structures of Malay society as far as possible, if only 
because it best ensured political order and stability ... [and] to lay the conditions 
for a thriving export economy to provide the finances for running the colony' 
(Jesudason, 1990:27). 
To facilitate this, the colonial government initiated the immigration of Chinese labour for the 
development of the mining sector and Indian labour for the development of the rubber sector. This 
served to swell the numbers and influence of Chinese traders in the commercial sectors (Brown, 
1994). During the colonial period the Malay peasantry were encouraged to remain in the rice 
sector of the economy to support the increased demand for rice. By contrast, the non-Malays were 
actively discouraged from this form of production. In fact, Brown argues that: 
'There is debate as to whether the resultant clustering of Malays in rice fanning 
arose primarily from British responsiveness to the economically rational 
preferences of each communal group, or from the deliberate policy of racial 
occupational stereotyping' (Brown, 1994:217). 
66 This argument is further enhanced by the current Islamisation ofthe Malaysian state through cultural 
reinforcement and political determinism. In patticular, the focus on Islamic issues is a political necessity by 
UMNO to reduce the significance of PAS whose political manifesto is dominated by Islamic ideals. 
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This perception, however, fails to acknowledge the pre-colonial social structures. For as 
Jesudason states: 
'One should not conclude that the separate development of ethnic groups was a 
deliberate product of a British colonial policy of 'divide and rule' .... [for] there 
was no need for them to divide and rule Malaya in order to maintain power for 
plainly the society was already a very divided one. The colonial officers merely 
took the most expedient and inexpensive way of controlling it.' (Jesudason, 
1990:40 emphasis added). 
Whatever the underlying policy, the outcome was a society within which race could be identified 
with both occupational function and geographic locality (Table 5.1). The Malay aristocrats were 
recruited into the state bureaucracy, the Malay peasants were encouraged to remain in agriculture, 
and the Chinese were encouraged to gain control over domestic capital. This created the 
foundations for a 'tradition of accommodation' characterised by a society in which the Malays 
possessed much of the political power and the Chinese held much of the economic power (Case, 
1992:2). 
Industry Malays Chinese 
(%) 
Agriculture, fishing, forestry 73.2 
Rice 37.2 
Rubber 25.4 
Mining, manufacturing & commerce 6.6 
Government, Police, Armed forces 7.4 
Table 5.1. Occupation by Ethnic Group, 1957 
Source: Adapted from Jesudason, 1990: 37 
(%) 
40.2 
1.2 
25.9 
34.1 
1.3 
Indians 
(%) 
55.7 
0.1 
48.0 
15.4 
4.1 
From this foundation, decolonisation saw the emergence of political parties developed along racial 
lines to defend their political and economic interests (Brown, 1994). Meanwhile, the British were 
faced with the problem of ensuring a politically stable state which would continue to support their 
economic interests in the region. This required that the Malay rulers would become custodians of 
political power and the rapidly increasing non-Malay population would retain their large stake in 
the economy (Munro-Kua, 1996:23). This facilitated the creation of the Alliance government 
incorporating the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). To secure electoral support all of 
the major parties were developed along communal lines. In the struggle for power prior to 
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independence the British formulated, and secured acceptance of, the 'racial bargain,67 under the 
guise of racial harmony: 
'In essence the Bargain was the acceptance by the non-Malay leaders that the 
Malays, as the indigenous race, were entitled to political dominance while in 
return the Malay leaders recognised that the socio-economic pursuits of the non-
Malays should not be infringed upon' (Milne & Mauzy, 1986:28). 
Independence was granted on 31st August 1957, laying the basis for; the institutionalisation of 
communalism, the maintenance of neo-colonial links, and the beginnings of authoritarian rule 
under the state of Emergencl8 (Munro-Kua, 1996). The Alliance formula and the Constitution 
became the platform by which communalism has been used by successive governments as a means 
of securing electoral support, administering authoritarian controls and legitimising its policies and 
legislation. Of particular importance for the rise of authoritarian populism is that the state of 
Emergency was still in force at independence, 'for it means that the freedoms enshrined in the 
Constitution were overridden' (Munro-Kua, 1996:24). These early roots of authoritarian rule, 
although largely neglected in the laissez-faire Alliance government, were fostered and developed 
by subsequent governments in the formation of the modern state. The following sections highlight 
some of the more fundamental historical events in post-colonial Malaysia which have impacted on 
the development of authoritarian populism. In particular, the significance of the rural Malays in 
securing political stability is highlighted. 
5.3 Elite accommodation and the 1969 watershed 
The era of elite accommodation 
From 1957 to 1970 the political and economic expressions of the 'racial bargain' were largely 
maintained. The government was characterised by a laissez-faire attitude69 where various ethnic 
67 The primary objective of this was to provide a liberal citizenship where non-Malays would not be 
alienated from society whilst preserving the Malay cultural, religious and political dominance. This resulted 
in a Malay head of state; Malay as the official language; Islam as the official religion; the creation of special 
privileges for Malays in land acquisition, civil service and education; and, the agreement for non-Malays to 
be given citizenship rights. 
68 The state of emergency was implemented because of the political uprisings and revolutionary tactics of the 
Communist Party of Malaya. This was implemented between 1948 and 1960. 
69 The underlying perception being that the development of a bureaucratic and commercial elite would foster 
economic growth which would 'trickle down' to the rest of society. 
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and elite interests were incorporated into' an elite accommodation system' 70. This system created 
domestic pressures for change due to: increased poverty; limited employment opportunities; 
increased rich-poor and rural-urban inequalities; and low productivity in the rural areas (Munro-
Kua, 1996). This disaffection was particularly evident in the rural areas due to the urban bias of 
policies and the inability of the Alliance to tackle the fundamental question of access to land 
(Munro-Kua, 1996). The result was disillusionment from both the Chinese and Malay 
communities. The Chinese feared that the major power within the Alliance was held by UMNO 
which was likely to threaten their cultural and economic position in society. By contrast, the rise 
in opposition parties to the Alliance7l created a fear within the Malay community that their 
political position was under threat. This dissatisfaction and fear provided the climate for what was 
to follow in 1969. 
The 1969 Watershed 
By 1969 the general dissatisfaction with the Alliance government reached boiling point, 
facilitated by a medley of opposition parties who for the first time had organised themselves so as 
not to split the anti-Alliance vote (Rigg, 1991: 116). Although the federal elections in 1969 were 
won by the Alliance, its percentage of the vote declined to 48 per cent72 (Rigg, 1991:116), 
preventing a two-thirds majority. This increased tensions within both the Malay and Chinese 
communities provoking the outbreak of communal riots on 13th May 1969. What followed was 
the implementation of another state of Emergency to restore stability and reinforce state order73 • 
These riots were to have a major impact on democracy and power relations within Malaysian 
society because although the Alliance had been relatively democratic in its governance it had also 
created a foundation for the emergence of an authoritative regime. In particular, the introduction 
of the Internal Security Act led to the detainment of opposition leaders in the aftermath of the 
70 The ideals behind this system include the assumptions that: 'each ethnic community is unified under a 
leadership which can authoritatively bargain for the interests of that community; that the leaders of each 
community have the capacity to secure compliance and 'legitimacy' for the bargains that are reached by elite 
negotiations; that there is sufficient trust and empathy among elite's to be sensitive to the most vital concerns 
of other ethnic communities; that public mobilisation on 'ethnically sensitive issues' is kept to a minimum to 
enable the elite's to deal with these issues in a bargaining mode; and that representative institutions accept 
their diminished role of merely 'ratifying' the product of elite bargaining as appropriate for resolution of 
these issues' (Means, 1991 :2). 
71 In pmticular the Chinese affiliated parties; Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Gerakan. 
72 From 58 per cent in 1964. 
73 This was declared for 21 months within which democracy was suspended, parliament was disbanded and 
civil liberties were restricted. Civil order was restored by the army and the National Operations Council 
(NOC) was formed to assume governance responsibilities (Ross-Larson, 1980:20). 
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communal riots, an approach which has been adopted by subsequent leaders in response to open 
criticism of government policies74• More importantly, however, is the impact that the racial riots 
and the resultant Emergency have had on subsequent government policies and ideological stances. 
The first policy initiative to be implemented in the immediate aftermath of the riots was the formal 
declaration of a national ideology called the Rukunagara (Box 5.1). This was negotiated between 
the elite's of the respective communal parties and any challenge to its principles was 'to be 
answered with severe penalties' (Means, 1991:13). This was the first step towards laying the 
foundations for civil and political order. 
Box 5.1: The Rukunagara 
Our nation, MALAYSIA, being dedicated-
to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; 
to maintaining a democratic way of life; 
to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably 
shared; 
to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; 
to building a progressive SOciety which shall be oriented to modern science 
and technology; 
WE, her people, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by 
these principles-
Belief in God 
Loyalty to King and Country 
Upholding the Constitution 
Rule of Law 
Good Behaviour and Morality 
(Means, 1991:12-13) 
By the time parliament reconvened on 23 February 1971 the Malaysian political landscape had 
entered a new era which would mould the political discourse exhibited in modern Malaysia today. 
Of particular importance to democracy was: the banning of political activities; the reduction of 
union rights; the Rukunagara ideology; the Sedition Ordinance; the expulsion of foreign media; 
and the censorship of domestic media. These were further enhanced by the implementation of 
restrictions on the public debate of' sensitive issues': 
' ... which might arouse racial emotion, in respect of Malay, the National 
Language, the special position of Malays, citizenship rights and the sovereignty 
of Malay rulers' (Munro-Kua, 1996:60). 
74 The Internal Security Act has also been used in response to internal factionalism within UMNO. A case in 
point being the detention of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998/9. 
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In an amendment to the Sedition Act in 1970 it became an offence for discussion of 'sensitive 
issues' by both politicians and the populace alike - thus narrowing the scope for any freedom of 
expression. In addition, the concept of 'Malay special rights' was enlarged in an attempt to 
address the social and economic imbalances in society. In particular, the constitutional 
amendment to article 153 had wide-scale implications for the obligation of higher education 
institutes to reserve academic places for Malays. In effect, this was the beginning of the societal 
restructuring policies which were to alter the social and economic landscape of modern Malaysia. 
Furthermore, through these measures, the government increased its ability to: issue emergency 
decrees; suspend state constitutions; allocate federal revenues to states; allocate extensive 
patronage in return for political support; and exercise their power using the Internal Security Act 
(Means, 1991: 15). These policies, plus the two-thirds majority which the ruling Barisan National 
(BN) coalition patty has managed to retain, has enabled the BN to update and alter the constitution 
and legislation to ensure that, although democratic elections are held, the government is not 
greatly inconvenienced by them (Case, 1992:4, Crouch, 1993). The two key policies implemented 
are societal restructuring and the New Economic Policy. 
5.4 Societal restructuring and the New Economic Policy 
The official philosophy for the communal riots cited the failure of the previous administration to 
address the economic imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays. This assessment was to 
have far reaching implications for the economic and social policies developed and implemented by 
the Barisan National in the form of the New Economic policy (NEP). This, in turn, was to have 
far reaching implications for the rice growing sector of the economy within which the majority of 
the Malays were located. 
The NEP/NDP is a series of 5-year policy plans aimed at reducing the economic backwardness of 
the Malays by restructuring society and reducing poverty75. The official criteria, as set out in the 
Second Malaysia Plan, had two principal components: 
1. 'to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race'. 
75 This was a 20-year policy first implemented in 1970 and continued and renamed the National 
Development Policy (NDP) in 1990. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Malaysian political economy and tlte rice sector 107 
2. 'To restructure Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance, so as to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (Government of 
Malaysia, 1997: 1. Rigg, 1991: 116). 
By eradicating poverty and reducing inter-ethnic differences the NEP was expected to foster: 
'national unity' by ensuring both economic and societal security; continuing economic growth 
rather than outright redistribution (Lim, 1983); an expansion of public sector expenditure (Jomo, 
1990); and legislation to ensure 30 per cent Malay share in the corporate sector (Rigg, 1991). The 
mechanisms to achieve this have been numerous, whereby: 
'This process involves the modernization of rural lives, a rapid and balanced 
growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community in all categories and at all levels of operation, so that Malays and 
other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects of the economic 
life of the nation. The New Economic Policy is based upon a rapidly expanding 
economy which offers increased opportunities for all Malaysians, as well as 
additional resources for development. Thus in the implementation of the Policy, 
the Government will ensure that no particular group will experience any loss or 
feel any sense of deprivation' (Government of Malaysia, 1971 :5). 
By assessing poverty as a principally Bumiputera problem, many of the poverty alleviation 
policies have been directed towards the rural regions which incorporate two-thirds of the Malay 
population. It is not coincidental, therefore, that the development of the Muda scheme 
corresponds with the introduction of the NEP. This favouring of Malay rural areas led to criticism 
amongst the Chinese that although poverty alleviation was to be pursued' irrespective of race', in 
actual fact programmes are targeted at the rural Malays and not the poor in general (Rigg, 1991). 
This, when coupled with the clearly discriminatory policy of societal restructuring, creates a 
society which favours the Malay population and ensures the large-scale subsidised government 
intervention in the Muda region. Furthermore, through the patronage functions of the state 
governments, the federal government and government institutions, together with the suppression 
of political criticism through extensive use of the Internal Security Act and Sedition Act, it is 
unlikely that these issues will be publicly debated. 
The policies implemented under the NEP prompted numerous schemes aimed at helping Malay 
smallholders and rice farmers. These were the sectors of the economy in which poverty was 
mainly concentrated (Table 5.2). For the Muda region, this resulted in: the extension of irrigation 
and support systems; the implementation of a Guaranteed Minimum Price (GMP) for rice, the 
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encouragement of Green Revolution technology to increase productivity; and the introduction of 
subsidies for this sector. 
1970 (%) 1976 (%) 1984 (%) 1987 (%) 
Rural 58.7 47.8 24.7 17.3 
Rubber smallholders 64.7 58.2 43.4 40.0 
Padi farmers 88.1 80.3 57.7 50.2 
Estate workers 40.0 19.7 15.0 
Fishermen 73.2 62.7 27.7 24.5 
Coconut smallholders 52.8 64.0 46.9 39.2 
Other agriculture 89.0 52.1 34.2 
Other industries 35.2 27.3 10.0 
Urban 21.3 17.9 8.2 8.1 
Agriculture 40.2 23.8 
Mining 33.3 10.1 3.4 
Manufacturing 23.5 17.1 8.5 
Construction 30.2 17.7 6.1 
Transport & Utilities 30.9 17.1 3.6 
Trade and services 18.1 13.9 4.6 
Activities not adequately 22.4 17.1 
defined 
Total 49.3 39.6 18.4 17.3 
Table 5.2: Incidence of poverty in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970 to 1990 
Source: Rigg, 1991: Jomo, 1990: Munro-Kua, 1996 
1990 (%) 
21.8 
7.5 
17.1 
Although there is no doubt that poverty in Malaysia has been significantly reduced76, and the 
Malay business sector has been significantly increased77 (Gomez & Jomo, 1997:167), many social 
scientists and political analysts have argued that these policies have contributed to the continuation 
of rich and poor disparities 78. Furthermore: 
'By its own admission, the Malaysian government claims that only 40 per cent 
of the $30 billion spent on poverty eradication under the NEP has actually 
reached the target groups intended, with the balance going to administration and 
infrastructure costs. Unfortunately, however, it is quite unlikely that even this 
76 In 1970 the official incidence of poverty was documented at 49% which by 1992 had been reduced to 15% 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1997). 
77 For example, in 1995 64% of the population who were regarded as having a professional or technical 
occupation were Bumiputeras (Gomez & Jomo, 1997:167). 
78 In terms of poverty reduction, the official target set by the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) stated that by 
1990 the poverty level should have fallen to 16 per cent. Although there is no doubt that the 17 per cent 
figure articulated in the Fifth Malaysia Plan and the 13 per cent figure articulated in the Sixth Malaysia Plan 
are indicative of the success of the NEP, there is much scepticism about the official rates and data reliability 
In particular, these criticisms are largely due to the reduction in the official poverty level by about 8 per cent 
from $33.00 per capita per month in 1970 to $30.30 in 1990 (once adjusted to 1970 prices) (Jomo, 1990:6). 
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$12 billion has actually reached the poor since it is now clear that many 
beneficiaries in the government-identified poverty eradication target groups 
were not necessarily poor' (Jomo, 1990:6). 
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Evidence of the mis-match between government allocations and poverty reduction can be seen in 
the Muda region whose expenditure between 1982 and 1995 totals RM79.53 million whilst the 
incidence of poverty is still the second highest in Peninsular Malaysia. (Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively). This is largely because the GMP for rice is based on quantity produced thus 
providing greater benefits to the larger farmers. Likewise, the subsidies offered to this sector are 
based on land size which ultimately benefits the larger farmers (Jomo, 1990)79. What is also clear 
is the role of patronage in the administering of government grants and subsidies under the poverty 
eradication programme. In particular, the government through UMNO has been able to mobilise 
Malay political support via its poverty and agricultural programmes, where the rural Malay has 
found it to be in their best interest to be a member of UMNO (Jomo, 1990). Within this context, 
being a member of UMNO enables the farmers to partake in rural development decision-making 
and provides them with increased power within the community: 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Allocation 
9.486 
4.173 
4.41 
4.6 
6.06 
4.005 
4.195 
3.7 
2.335 
4.624 
3.5 
10.2 
12.2 
12.929 
Expenditure (RM Million) 
7.8 
3.256 
1.88 
3.177 
4.076 
4.209 
2.288 
4.469 
9.477 
4.682 
6.146 
8.852 
7.364 
11.854 
Table 5.3. MADA development budget, 1996 
Source: Government of Malaysia, 1991 a; 1996b 
79 Even though there is a 6.0ha ceiling on the subsidies given, the rural community have been able to by-pass 
this by registering land ownership along kinship lines even if these family members do not actually farm the 
land. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Malaysian political economy and tlte rice sector 
state 
Johor 
Kedah 
Kelantan 
Melaka 
Ng. Sembilan 
Pahang 
Pulau Pinang 
Perak 
Perlis 
Selangor 
Terengganu 
F.T. Kuala Lumper 
Peninsular Malaysia 
Sabah 
Sarawak 
1976 (%) 
29.0 
61.0 
67.1 
32.4 
33.0 
38.9 
32.4 
43.0 
59.8 
22.9 
60.3 
9.0 
39.6 
58.3 
56.5 
42.4 
1989 (%) 
10.1 
30.0 
29.9 
12.4 
9.5 
10.3 
8.9 
19.3 
17.2 
7.8 
31.2 
3.8 
15.0 
34.3 
21.0 
17.1 
Table 5.4: Incidence of Poverty by state, 1976 & 1989 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1991 b, 1996a 
'Normally my view will be considered by [the] farmers because I am [a] vice 
chairman of [an] UMNO branch' (Farmer informant No. 19). 
'JKKK [Village development and security committee] is part of UMNO and for 
PAS there is no JKKK because this JKKK is set up by [the] government through 
UMNO so if you are from the opposition party you do not have a chance to be 
one of the JKKK. .... The JKKK function in the name of security and development 
so if there is any new development that is going to be implemented by 
government in this area, I mean small project, they will know first, the government 
will ask their opinion regarding to that matter. This can be anything from a 
school, or maybe they are going to build up a small bridge or maybe [a] clinic. 
We voice out our opinions about what we need' (Farmer informant No. 25). 
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Clearly, therefore, being a member of the ruling party within the fanning community provides 
advantages which are not open to those fanners from the opposition party. In fact, the difference 
between the PAS and UMNO farmers can have a significant affect on the delivery or receipt of 
government subsidies within the rice sector: 
'Generally the PAS farmers are reserved, it is most of the ruling party supporters 
which are very dependent [on the government]. The opposition party, because 
over the years they have been in opposition, although they still receive the same 
subsidies [but] they have not had the same political control. All the farmers [in the 
Muda area] receive the subsidies because MADA allocate the subsidies but in 
many other parts of the country, particularly Kelantan, it is different. Only the 
government supporters will benefit from the subsidy, not the opposition party 
supporters, they don't get the subsidy. But some of them are too proud [in the 
Muda region] to get the subsidy because they see it coming from the government 
because the government has put the scales [on the bags] which is the symbol of 
the main party and they are too proud to accept it' (MADA respondent No. 16). 
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In Malaysian terms, societal restructuring means positive discrimination in favour of Bumiputera 
advancement in the agricultural and commercial sectors. The rice sector provides a clear example 
of this with its active discouragement of Chinese participation, thus retaining this as a Malay-
dominated occupation. 
It is argued that the NEP has merely concentrated income and ownership in the hands of the Malay 
elite (Rigg, 1991). Furthermore, it has been argued that the quotas required to achieve government 
contracts and licenses are merely filled by Malay figureheads rather than actual Malay ownership. 
F or it is widely believed that: 
'some ostensibly Bumiputera owners are being used and controlled by non-
Bumiputera beneficial owners, especially for new share issues of various types' 
(Jomo, 1990:10). 
Consequently, the extent to which the policy of societal restructuring has achieved its stated aims 
is debatable. In general it can be argued that the NEP, and now the NDP, has significantly 
improved the welfare of the rural Malays and the ability of Malays to enter higher education or 
gain employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors. However, as will be expanded on in the 
following section, this increase in welfare and opportunities has altered perceptions of the Malay 
'identity'. Furthermore, as the Malays become increasingly more dominant as a percentage of the 
population, it seems necessary to analyse the modern Malaysian state from a different perspective 
to that which has preceded it. 
5.5 Continuity in the Malaysian state 
By the use of the NEP, and the restrictive policies on public debate, the Barisan National has 
remained in power from 1974 to the present day. During this time the leadership has changed only 
three times with the present Prime Minister Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad leading the nation since 
1981. This stability has meant that: by the enhancement of nationalism and national identity; the 
undemocratic electoral system; and the continuing power of the state structure, the government 
continues to be re-elected and the status quo is upheld. The questions, therefore, are how through 
supposedly democratic elections has no opposition party been able to wrestle power from the BN, 
and what factors are perpetuating this status quo? Once again the concept of authoritarian 
populism emerges. 
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Firstly, the cross communal nature of the BN has enabled the Chinese and Indian communities to 
partake in the governance of the country, even if in a relatively superficial manner80. This is 
supported by the populace because the main opposition parties are developed along communal 
lines81 which, although obtaining some electoral success, are unlikely to unify or create a realistic 
opposition82 . Therefore, through its patronage functions and enormous wealth UMNO is able to 
ensure the majority of the Malay votes and, overall, the BN is able to secure the majority of the 
non-Malay votes. This is achieved through genuine popularity, authoritative means and the 
manipulation of the electoral system. 
In terms of genuine popularity, the government has been careful to ensure that it is seen to meet 
the expectations of a large part of the electorate. This has been partly due to its control over 
patronage distribution in both the Malay and Chinese communities. For as Harold Crouch 
articulates: 
'Business people wanting contracts, bureaucrats wanting promotion, peasants 
wanting land and parents wanting scholarships for their children have all found 
it helpful to be recognised as UMNO supporters' (Crouch, 1993: 13 8). 
When this is added to the policies pursued under the NEP it is understandable that the status quo 
would be preferred. Furthermore, although the government may perceive the need for 
authoritative measures to be implemented, it is also careful to be seen to respond to the needs of 
the community to ensure electoral support. In any case, as long as the BN continues to win 
support through the ballot box it feels no need to revert to total authoritarianism. 
Such confidence in electoral support is partly because of the restrictions on the political activity of 
the opposition parties. When added to the electoral weighting system which clearly favours the 
Malay populace, it virtually guarantees the continuation of the BN government. For although in 
the 1980s the Malay popUlation formed 57 per cent of the total, its representation in parliament 
was 70 per cent - a clear over-representation (Crouch, 1993). 
80 By superficial I do not suggest that their involvement per se is superficial but that their decision-making 
powers are superficial in comparison with the UMNO stronghold. 
8! For example, PAS (Malay) and the DAP (Chinese). 
82 This said, within the Malay community the PAS has a strong following evident in their state victory in 
Kelantan. 
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Added to this is the control and management of the populace, by UMNO, through its amendments 
to the Constitution and repressive activities. With a two-thirds majority in parliament, the BN has 
been able to alter the rules: 
'Opposition can be effectively undercut by alteration of the 'rules of the game' 
in the form of boundmy adjustment or constitutional amendment. Under such 
conditions, politics acquires a rigidity which makes it difficult to achieve 
changes in the allocation of power since those who have power can control the 
political environment to perpetuate their supremacy' (Means, 1970:215). 
This means that if UMNO can secure the Malay vote then it is virtually assured continued success. 
Here again, the 97 per cent Malay majority in the Muda region signifies the political importance of 
this scheme. Furthermore, by the use of authoritative measures which restrain free speech for all 
members of society, including the judiciarl3, the BN removes the voice of opposition from the 
public arena. This, when added to the criminalisation of dissent, the suppression of trade unions, 
and the total control of the media and ideological thought, makes it difficult to see the status quo 
being dismantled. In fact, UMNO's control of the national ideology, which has been particularly 
developed through the Mahathir reign, presents some of the more compelling arguments for the 
popUlist support of the BN. 
In 1999, even with the current financial crisis in the Malaysian economy and the internal crisis in 
UMNO, it seems unlikely that there will be any change in government or that democratic 
pressures will emerge. After all, Dr. Mahathir has successfully managed to detain his chief rival 
for power, Anwar Ibrahim, and further centralised his own personal power. Therefore, analysts 
interested in the Malaysian case study should really be asking a different question. Ifwe can agree 
that authoritarian populism is one way of explaining the political continuity of the Malaysian state 
then what has been the effect of this continuity on the government and society? To address this 
question, I shall focus on two key areas that are influential in the modern Malaysian state; the 
'personality culture' of politics and the emerging tensions in 'Malay identity'. 
Mahathir's 'personality culture' of politics 
Possibly the most influential effect, on both the government and society, has been the process by 
which Dr. Mahathir has created a 'personality culture' of politics. Since 1981 there have been a 
number of significant changes to the character of politics within the Malaysian state that have 
83 Which have themselves been subjected to constitutional amendments and a reduction in power. 
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altered the 'face' of politics. The most influential of these is the personal 'style' which Dr. 
Mahathir has adopted to the Prime Ministers role. In fact, it would be fair to argue that this style 
is more Presidential than Ministerial. 
Of particular significance has been the reduction in the power of government institutions in favour 
of an expansion and centralisation of executive power within Dr. Mahathir's own office. Whilst 
this has created tensions within UMNO, by bypassing these institutions, Dr. Mahathir has been 
able, through his control of the mass media, to obtain direct access to the people (Munro-Kua, 
1996: 105). In so doing, he has been able to enhance his personal image of modern Malaysia with 
populist appeal. The result has been an intensification of nationalism and national unity. 
In the period between 1981 and the late 1990s Dr. Mahathir has pursued policies which have: 
speeded up industrialisation and the 'modernisation' of the Malay community; increased 
privatisation; concentrated policies on the manufacturing sector; launched ambitious national 
projects; and significantly eroded the powers of the Legislature, Monarchy and Judiciary (Munro-
Kua, 1996: 105-112). Throughout this process, the economy has grown by an average of 6.3 per 
cent per annum and nationalism has been enhanced. In effect, Dr. Mahathir has been able to alter 
the national identity of the populace. Nowhere is this more evident than in his Vision 2020. In 
1991 this was clearly articulated in a paper presented to the Malaysian Business Council entitled 
The Way Forward - Vision 2020 in which Dr. Mahathir states that: 
'by the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian 
society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is 
democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, 
progressive and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is 
competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient' (Mahathir bin Mohamad, 1991: 1). 
To achieve this, Dr. Mahathir has placed the onus firmly on the role of the populace. Through this 
process national pride has intensified and Dr. Mahathir and his associates have increasingly 
centralised their power. In so doing, Dr. Mahathir has been able to merge social, economic and 
political decisions such that by 1999 all new policies implemented are enshrined in ideological 
values to ensure 'national security'. These values are then publicly expressed through the mass 
media which is barred from airing any alternative ideology than the one offered by Dr. Mahathir. 
The result is a 'personality culture' which transcends all sectors of Malaysian society. However, 
as Munro-Kua articulates: 
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'To what extent the peasantry and workers identify these projects [large state 
funded initiatives such as the Proton car] with progress and national pride is 
difficult to measure. Dr Mahathir works on the assumption that 'group' pride is 
felt by the rakyat when they see another of their own kind become a millionaire' 
(Munro-Kua, 1996:115). 
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This concept of group pride is not fostered by the farmers who are generally critical of the 
government subsidy programme when analysed comparatively with other sectors and occupations: 
The government should give more subsidies or increase the price of the paddy to 
cope with the increasing cost of the goods price. The civil servants also enjoy the 
increase of the salary so the farmers should also enjoy the increase of subsidy or 
price of paddy' (Farmer informant No. 18). 
'Compared to other sectors like rubber estate and palm oil in the agricultural 
sector, the paddy farmers are left behind. I hear the information through the 
newspaper that the government are not going to increase the subsidy or the price 
of the paddy. According to the acting Prime Minister [Anwar Ibrahim] the 
government will find another way to help [the] farmers. We don't know yet what 
this other way is' (Farmer informant No.4). 
Since the beginning of Malaysia's economic crisis in July 1997 there has been a downturn in the 
economy where in August 1998 the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange fell to its lowest level in 10 
years (Guardian, August 12th, 1998) and the value of the ringgit depreciated against the US$ from 
2.4 7 in July 1997 to 4.88 in January 1998. Although many observers at the outbreak of the crisis 
assumed that the crisis was caused by either poor macro-economic management or crony 
capitalism, in retrospect: 
'it soon became clear that all the governments affected had been maintaining 
decent macroeconomic balances except for balance of payments current account 
deficits, especially in the case of Malaysia and Thailand ..... [and that allegations 
of cronyism] in fact explained nothing at all' (lomo, 1998: 1). 
The truth is that the Asian financial crisis is a crisis of many origins with the national effects 
largely dependent on: the financial policies prior to the crisis and the way in which the government 
responded to and managed the crisis. In Malaysia's case: 
'whilst 'crony capitalism' does not really explain the origins of the crisis, except 
in so far as crony financial interests were responsible for the financial policies 
from the mid-nineties which led to the crisis, it has certainly exacerbated the 
crisis in Malaysia' (lomo, 1998:2). 
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Put simply, although the origins of the crisis cannot be shouldered by the Mahathir administration, 
the 'personality culture' created by Dr. Mahathir has influenced the government policy response 
which has exacerbated the crisis from a currency crisis to an economic crisis (Jomo, 1998). This 
'personality culture' is illustrated in the reaction of the financial community to Dr. Mahathir's 
statements, for as Jomo states: 
'The ringgit probably fell much further than might otherwise have been the case 
due to international market reactions to Mahathir's various contrarian 
statements, including his tough speech in Hong Kong on 20 September 1997, at 
a seminar before the joint World Bank-IMP annual meeting. Arguing that 
'currency trading is unnecessary, unproductive and immoral', Mahathir argued 
that it should be 'stopped' and 'made illegal', and, most damagingly, seemed to 
threaten a possible unilateral ban on foreign exchange purchases unrelated to 
imports by the Malaysian authorities (which never happened)' (Jomo, 1998:9). 
The economic crisis has had far reaching implications on the political stability of UMNO, 
recognised by the internal turmoil culminating in the arrest and detainment of Anwar Ibrahim. 
The question is whether Dr. Mahathir will be able to secure his personal appeal with the populace 
in light of the strength of support for Anwar Ibrahim and the Reformasi movement. 
Emerging tensions in 'Malay identity' 
So far this chapter has covered much of Malaysia's historical development from pre-colonial times 
through to the current crisis. During this time there has been a substantial change in the identity of 
the 'traditional Malay' - an issue which has been accelerated during the Mahathir reign. In 
particular, the societal restructuring policies since 1970 have significantly increased the proportion 
of Malays with tertiary education and interests in the commercial sectors of the economy. If we 
look at the government policies since 1981 much of the emphasis of the Malaysian plans have 
been focused on the industrialisation of the manufacturing sector. With higher wages to be found 
in the manufacturing sector, when compared to the agricultural sector, many of these policies have 
increased Malay rural-urban migration. These policies have had, and will continue to have, a 
profound effect on the rural community, for as one farmer articulated to me: 
'Most of the farmers are Malay and sometimes they cannot cope with the rapid 
developments in Malaysia but if you see the Malay people in the other fields like 
business, of course they can compete with the other races for development. But 
for the farmers they still want to remain with traditional cultures. I think the 
generation after mine don't want to stay in farming any more and if they stay in 
farming they will think 'what is the thing inside this area which can make 
money?' .... otherwise they will go to other fields' (Farmer informant No.1). 
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The question is how has this affected the traditional 'Malay identity'? The characteristics of 
which include: a rural livelihood system with productive activities in agriculture and fishing, with 
a specific emphasis on rice cultivation; a way of life which focuses on the kampung (village) with 
a strong sense of community; a rural society closely bonded by kinship and friendship which spans 
generations, thus enhancing the Malay 'sense of place' within the rural kampungs; an identity 
which is steeped in customs and traditions which are commonly practised within the kampunl4; a 
strong ethnic value system less inclined to material objects and more inclined to Islamic religious 
beliefs and values; and a traditional relationship with the land resulting in an inheritance system 
which ensures that land is divided equally amongst the children causing land fragmentation and 
the uneconomic land size associated with paddy farming (Chan, 1995:212-221). Much of this 
identity is associated with a rural way of life: 
' ... It's [farming] about valuing what you have in terms of lifestyle not so much 
about earning lots of money but about the kampung. Very few [farmers] think 
about money. Farming is not economic' (MADA informant No. 10). 
However, under the current national government policies it is clear that the government does not 
perceive this 'way of life' or 'kampung identity' to be conducive to national development. 
Instead, the government is pushing for a high technology nation, evident in the proposed 
Multimedia Super Corridor, which has no room for the traditional 'Malay identity'. 
Whilst it is still true that most agricultural and fishing occupations are Malay dominated, it is also 
true that the perception of the Malays as rural, or civil service, is no longer acceptable. Malays are 
rapidly expanding in the business sectors of the economy and increasing in numbers in the urban 
centres. This is further enhanced by the increased mechanisation of the rural sector, making 
agriculture a less labour dependent activity. In fact, the National Agricultural Policy 1992-2010 
clearly states that: 
'The NAP (1992-2010) foresees the creation of a dynamic and vibrant 
agricultural sector comprising of efficient agribusiness's, farms and enterprises, 
the growth of which will be based on rapid pace of innovation in products and 
processes, productivity increases and expanded technological diffusion' 
(Government of Malaysia, 1991a:2). 
84 These customs, or adat, ties individuals to their kampungs. Some of these customs include ritual feasts 
which are both religious and traditional but also involve rites in the practice of paddy farming itself related to 
the cropping cycle. 
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Dr. Mahathir himself articulates the modernisation of the rural sector as a process which requires 
that: 
'In the years ahead, we must work for a second rural development 
transformation, restructuring the villages so as to be compatible with both 
agricultural and modern industry. Less and less farmers should produce more 
and more food, thus releasing manpower for an industrial society' (Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, 1991 :9). 
This position has been subsequently adopted within MADA, for as one officer articulated: 
'One very clear phenomenon in the Muda area is the out-migration of the younger 
generation, so the labour shortage is going to be more acute in the future. 
Mechanisation can solve this problem maybe to a certain extent but structural 
reorganisation of the farming unit is very important. Individual farmers may 
extend the farm size, at the same time there will be some cut in farmers .. .' (MADA 
informant No. 19). 
In effect, there is no room for the traditional 'Malay identity' in Dr. Mahathir's Malaysian vision. 
For as he states in his own words: 
'There is a need to ensure the creation of an economically resilient and fully 
competitive Bumiputera community so as to be at par with the NonBumiputera 
community. There is need for a mental revolution and a cultural 
transformation' (Mahathir bin Mohamad, 1991:4 emphasis added). 
As Dr. Mahathir continues to dominate Malaysian politics his policies will continue to cause 
tensions over 'identity'. Clearly the one articulated within the kampung is not likely to appeal to 
the younger generation with good education and urban lifestyles. This said, at present the rice 
sector still remains important for the national government as many farmers are not content to alter 
their identity in the way which suits Dr. Mahathir's future vision. Therefore, the rice sector still 
retains its strategic importance. 
5.6 The political importance of rice 
The rice sector of the national economy is the third most important crop in terms of land use 
(651,600ha), accounting for less than 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (1990) and 4.7 per 
cent of value added in agriculture. In terms of employment it is estimated that rice is farmed by 3 
per cent of total households, farming on average 1.5ha of land (Jegatheesan, 1996:25). In spite of 
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its relatively small size the rice sector has been the recipient of generous government investment 
since the 1950's, being supported in particular by: 
• 'Government funded investments in irrigation development to enable multiple-cropping, 
without any cost recovery from farmers; 
• Subsidised irrigation water charges; 
• A Guaranteed Price Support Scheme as well as a Price Subsidy for rough rice. At present the 
total guaranteed price for rough rice is approximately US$2981t; 
• Free fertilisers for all rice farmers up to nearly 80 per cent of the agronomic requirement; and 
• Subsidised interest rates on agricultural credit and zero import taxes on farm machinery' 
(Jegatheesan, 1996a:26). 
This support has led one government official to comment that: 
'in this country rice farmers have been a pampered lot almost to the point where 
they think that the rest of the country owes them a living because they do rice .. .' 
(MADA informant No. 16). 
Such support clearly requires a large economic investment on the part of the government. The 
question is why does this sector continue to be the cornerstone of Malaysia's agricultural policy? 
After all, economically, the cost of domestic production not only contributes very little to value 
added agriculture but rice can be imported more cheaply than it can be produced and probably 
consumes more foreign exchange than through outright import (Tan, 1990:6). What this suggests 
is that farming in Malaysia is not an economic crop: 
'[the farmers] are doing farming as their culture not as an economic crop or 
economic work' (MADA informant No. 10). 
Why, therefore, is so much government expenditure allocated to this sector? Firstly, rice is the 
staple food of the Malaysian people and is currently successfully producing 76 per cent of 
domestic consumption85 . However, an annual population increase of2.3 per cent and a stagnation 
in rice production in the principal granary regions could jeopardise the country's ability to meet 
this target (Jegatheesan, 1996:34). Nevertheless, self-sufficiency to ensure a domestic supply of 
rice remains strategically important in the national agricultural policy and serves to legitimise the 
huge investment in this sector. 
85 16 per cent higher than expressed in the National Agricultural Policy 1992-2010. 
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The second strategic importance lies in the voting pattern of the rice farming community, in that 
much of the government's political support is located in the rice growing regions of the economy. 
As James Scott states: 
'To put is crudely, the dominant political party since independence (the United 
Malay Nationalists' Organisation, UMNO) is an exclusively Malay party that 
depends largely on Malay votes to keep it in power. Many of those votes must 
come from paddy farmers, who are overwhelmingly Malays' (Scott, 1985:52). 
When added to the gerrymandering of the electoral system86, this means that the political power of 
the rice fanner is much greater than their numbers would suggest. The paddy farmer is, therefore, 
a vital political player in the UMNO dominated system. After all: 
' .. the political dimension is something of concern with the farming community, 
politics features very prominently in the community, especially in the Malay 
community .. .' (MADA informant No. 18) 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that this is a sector of continued government support. Such 
support is legitimised by the government to ensure societal security - the argument being that a 
strong state is required to correct the economic imbalances in society by direct investment towards 
the 'sons of the soil' which will ensure internal stability and ethnic harmonl7• In addition, 
because the rice sector is historically the poorest sector of the economy and accommodates more 
than 80 per cent Malay patticipation it fits the requirements of the government restructuring 
policies for correcting the identification of ethnicity with economic function. Furthermore, as both 
of the NDP and societal restructuring policies are not open to debate, preferential support for the 
rice sector is not publicly disputed. 
This is further enhanced by the reduction of traditional buffer zones between the farming 
community and the state apparatus because of the direct involvement of the state sector in the rural 
community. Within the Muda region, for example, the state intervenes in all processes from the 
supply of water to the harvesting and marketing of the paddy. Again drawing on the work of 
Scott: 
'The state was once largely a bystander or mediator in these relations with nature 
and the private sector. It is now a direct participant, decision maker, allocator, 
and antagonist in nearly all vital aspects of paddy growing. Most of the buffers 
86 By gerrymandering I refer to the altering of the political administration boundaries so that there are more 
seats for those regions which are supportive of the ruling party. 
87 The primary aims of the NDP. 
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between the state and rice farmers have fallen away, thereby vastly increasing 
both the role of politics and the possibilities for direct confrontation between the 
ruling party and its peasantry' (Scott, 1985:56 emphasis added) 
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Direct confrontation is, however, largely checked by the continued support the peasantry offers 
PAS. Although UMNO has infiltrated every village, PAS retains strong support with both the 
wealthy and poor within the Malay community - offering a vehicle by which the rural peasantry 
can display their dissatisfaction without direct confrontation. This is remarkable considering PAS 
is unable to offer the material incentives that are characteristic of UMNO allegiance. Instead, the 
support for PAS is influenced as much by the cultural, ethnic and religious issues as it is by 
politics and economics. The fact that Kelantan is presently under PAS state rule is indicative of 
the serious threat of PAS to UMNO. It is, therefore: 
'little wonder that rice sometimes has been referred to as a political crop' 
(Jirstrom, 1996:98). 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided the formal landscape of intervention at the national spatial scale. In so 
doing, it serves to illustrate the complexity of the relationship between economics and politics at 
the state level and the influence of this on the authoritarian popUlist nature of the state apparatus. 
In particular, the politicised nature of rice farming and the subsequent political power of the Malay 
peasantry has been highlighted. What this has achieved is an articulation of the importance of rice 
farming, and hence the extent of support for this sector, within a national context. 
The close relationship between the Malay peasantry and UMNO is highly influential in the actions 
and activities of the actors within the Muda region. As was illustrated in chapter four, the Muda 
region is the largest of the national granary areas and is the most important area for the growth of 
the nations 'strategic food crop'. In addition, not only is this a Malay dominated activity, the 
Chinese are actively discouraged from farming in the region. Consequently, the government 
policies of societal restructuring, under the NDP, are highly influential in the direct and indirect 
investment that the government supplies to the Muda region. 
Bearing in mind the politicised nature of rice farming, as articulated in this chapter, the following 
chapter illustrates the process by which the policies developed at the national level are 
implemented in the Muda region. The outcomes of one of these policies, tertiary development, is 
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examined in chapters seven and eight. Finally, chapter nine explores the interconnected nature of 
the macro, meso and micro levels by examining how the power of the rice farmers at the national 
level influences their informal activities at the micro level and the informal practices of the 
MADA officers at the meso level. Such an analysis enables the integration of all these spatial 
scales in exploring the research aims and questions illustrated in section 1.5. 
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Formal intervention: Coercive or Cooperative? 
The analytical model developed in chapter two focuses on the structures and linkages between the 
three principal actors in the Muda region. So far this has been explored from the perspective of 
the national government and its relationship with the rice sector and the rural peasantry. Within 
the model intervention is depicted as a process of negotiation between the three actors in the Muda 
region, offering an important understanding of the linkage between policy design, implementation 
and outcomes. To explore the outcomes of government policy it is necessary to analyse the 
process and procedures for the implementation of national policies at the local level. 
Drawing on research in the field of environmental and hazard management, this chapter offers a 
conceptual framework to explore the nature of the relationship between the national government, 
MADA and the fanners. Such a framework recognises three types of policy environments within 
which higher-level governments apply either; coercive, cooperative, or a combination of these 
mechanisms to induce local agencies to implement national policy objectives (Handmer, 1996). In 
addition, local agencies are also perceived to apply either; coercive, cooperative or a combination 
of these mechanisms to induce the farmers to follow the rules and procedures implemented in the 
management of irrigated agriculture. In this capacity, MADA 'sits in the middle' between the 
requirements of the federal government and the requirements of the farming community. 
Even though this conceptual framework was developed for the analysis of intergovernmental 
approaches to environmental and hazard management, by applying such an approach to the study 
of irrigated agricultural policy an understanding can be gained of what, how and why programmes 
are implemented, objectives are set and actions are taken88 . In particular, it is argued that the 
traditional irrigation management literature does not explore the objectives of all actors in the 
intervention process, preferring instead to dichotomise between users and rule-makers resulting in 
an inability to establish why rules exist and conflicts emerge (Vincent, 1995). A modified 
coercive/cooperative model aims to integrate all actors in the policy design and implementation 
process thus enabling a better understanding of the formal framework within which informal 
practices occur. 
Irrigation schemes are complex systems that depend on the amalgamation of structural, economic, 
and social elements to meet the objectives set in the policy framework. Likewise, policies involve 
decisions about the means to achieve these objectives which involves choice about the institutions, 
88 In this respect I refer to the actions of both the MADA staff and farmers which are formal and informal. 
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programmes, rules and procedures for intervention (Vincent, 1994). The extent to which formal 
choice can be exercised at each level is dependent on the coercive or cooperative nature of the 
policy design - the central component of which is the local level government agency which acts as 
the authority-user linkage between the policy guidelines of the state and the requirements of the 
local community (Coward, 1980). 
MADA is, for want of a better expression, the authority-user link for the implementation of 
national policies. However, to perceive MADA as a mere 'authority of implementation' would 
fail to recognise the coercive/cooperative relationship between both MADA and the state and 
MADA and the farmers. Instead, the intervention by the state and MADA in the operation and 
management of the Muda scheme is regarded as one of shared governance within which MADA 
itself responds to the coercive/cooperative policy environment through its development and 
evolution of rules and procedures at the local level. 
This chapter examines the usefulness of applying a modified coercive/cooperative policy model to 
the study of irrigated agriculture. This requires an understanding of the primary conceptual 
models currently used within the irrigation literature, and to establish how and why a modified 
policy model can assist in analysing the relationship between policy expectations and policy 
outcomes. Having theoretically argued the case, the Muda scheme is explored from two 
perspectives: the first analyses the relationship between MADA and the state government, the 
influence of this on the policies implemented, policy expectations, and the capacity and 
commitment of government staff to the formal objectives; the second analyses the MAD A-farmer 
relationship by examining the formal procedures implemented by MADA, the way in which these 
are implemented, the formal capacity for farmer involvement and the resultant commitment of the 
fanners to the formal policy framework. 
6.1 What's missing in the literature? 
There is no single and comprehensive theory to the study of irrigation management or system 
performance (Hvidt, 1994). Instead, because of the very nature of irrigation systems they have 
attracted research from many different disciplines, drawing on theoretical and conceptual 
arguments from within anthropology, sociology, geography, economics, political science, 
engineering and hydrology. The problem is that where researchers have shown interest in the 
wider political economy, agricultural change and agrarian conditions they have provided limited 
detail about irrigation. Likewise, research which has focused on the irrigation system and 
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irrigation management has provided limited detail about the political economy or agrarian 
framework (Vincent, 1995). The reason for this dichotomy is that research is often divided into 
either a managerial problem or a policy problem; whereby the managerial problem is evaluated on 
the basis of objectives (what should happen) and the policy problem is evaluated on the basis of 
the setting of these objectives (Seckler et ai, 1988). This means there is no clear framework for 
integrating the on-farm management practices of the farmers within the policy framework of 
national governments. 
Irrigation management involves the coordination of activities to ensure that certain objectives or 
criteria are met such as increased well-being, water-use efficiency, equity, productivity, reduced 
conflict, greater resource mobilisation, stability and sustainability. Within the literature there are 
five main models or conceptual arguments that have been influential in explaining the 
management arrangements required to secure these objectives and criteria89. These models have 
improved our conceptual understanding of the activities, management, institutions and 
organisation of irrigation. What they have not done is provide a framework which links the policy 
design process and objectives at the national level, or irrigation agency level, with the 
management activities and institutions required to meet these objectives at the locallevel9o. 
For example, Uphoff (1986) and Uphoff et al (1991) explore the interaction of various activities 
but do not explicitly at1iculate the diversity in: objectives and institutions; the livelihood and 
resource strategies of irrigators; or the personal and institutional strategies of managers. 
Furthermore, the 'matrix of irrigation management activities' does not incorporate the influence of 
the wider political economy on the setting of objectives and the implementation of programmes, 
rules and procedures. Likewise, the matrix does not distinguish between the formal processes and 
procedures (how the system is meant to be managed, operated and governed) and the informal 
practices of those actors engaged in the daily governance, management and operation of this 
system (how the system is actually managed, operated and governed). 
Coward (1980; 1991) expands on the 'irrigation activities model' of Uphoff (1986) by explicitly 
matching the institutional rules, roles and social groups with the critical tasks of irrigation 
management. However, by dichotomising between users and rule-makers, Coward's approach is 
89 These include the work of Chambers (1988) on 'criteria, objectives and causal chains'; Uphoff and 
colleagues on 'irrigation management activities' (Uphoff, 1986, Uphoff et aI, 1991); Clyma & Lowdermilk's 
(1988) framework of' organisational coordination'; the' institutional and organisational' conceptual 
argument of Coward (1980; 1991); and the more recent work by Tang & Ostrom (1993) on 'governance and 
institutions' . 
90 Readers are directed to Appendix C:2 for a description and examination of the five main models and 
arguments addressed. 
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unable to establish why these rules, roles and groups exists or why conflicts emerge. Therefore, 
this approach does not enable the integration of the policy design process in establishing the 
institutional element (what people believe should occur) or the structural element (what actually 
occurs). 
Chambers (1988) moves beyond production and productivity as an end in itself by embracing a 
broader perception of outcomes focused on increased well-being. However, although this model is 
less prescriptive than the 'irrigation management model' of Uphoff (1986) and Uphoff et al 
(1991), it suffers from similar inadequacies in incorporating: the diversity of livelihood strategies 
and objectives; the management strategies employed to ensure improved 'well-being'; and the 
types of organisations and institutions required to achieve this. Furthermore, the model does not 
incorporate the role of the political economy in the decision-making process which, in effect, 
omits the role of policy and policy design from the domains and linkages of irrigation systems91 . 
Like Chambers, Clyma and Lowdermilk (1988) regard 'well-being' to be the ultimate objective of 
irrigated agriculture. However, unlike Chambers, they focus specifically on farmer 'well-being' 
as opposed to the well-being of the wider population. To achieve farmer 'well-being', the authors 
identify two processes that must be integrated within irrigation management: firstly, it must 
involve farmers in the decision-making process; and secondly, there must be coordination in 
organisational activity. What they do not establish, however, are: the diversity of objectives, 
institutions and organisations; the broader livelihood strategies employed by the various actors; 
the 'level' at which farmer involvement should occur; or the process by which objectives are set 
and decisions are made. 
Finally, Tang and Ostrom (1993) focus on the importance of fanner involvement in the 
governance of schemes and the requirement for effective institutional arrangements to secure this. 
In so doing, the authors focus on the institutional rules which impact on the management, 
governance and performance of irrigation systems. By articulating three 'rule types' the authors 
distinguish between governance (who establishes the rules) and management (how these rules are 
implemented). What this does not do, however, is extrapolate to the policy environment within 
which government agencies and users negotiate the 'operational', 'collective-choice' and 
'constitutional-choice' rUles92 . FUlthermore, they do not articulate the type of institutional 
framework which would facilitate rule compliance or the overall objectives of system governance 
and management. 
91 See Appendix C:2 for an illustration of these domains and linkages. 
92 See Appendix C:2 for an explanation of these three rules types. 
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It appears, therefore, that there is a significant gap in our conceptual understanding of irrigation 
management which specifically addresses the nature of the relationship between governments, 
irrigation agencies and irrigators. Because of this, the models and conceptual arguments currently 
in use are not able to establish the process and procedures for the implementation of national 
policies at the local level. Consequently, although the models are useful for understanding the 
management arrangements within irrigation systems, they cannot integrate the management 
practices of farmers and agency staff (whether formal or informal) within the policy framework of 
national governments. To explore this relationship, a coercive/cooperative framework is applied 
to the study of irrigation management below. 
6.2 Coercive and cooperative policy designs 
The key issue to emerge from the discussion so far is the difficulty in conceptualising the complex 
interactions and activities involved in the governance and management of irrigation schemes. Due 
to this complexity, it is difficult for researchers to establish what, why and how programmes are 
implemented, objectives are set and actions are taken93 . To facilitate understanding of these 
debates, this section offers a useful conceptual framework for understanding the relationship 
between the national government, irrigation agency and the farmers. In so doing, it is argued that 
the type of policy design influences both the capacity and commitment of actors to comply with 
formal objectives and the ability of lower-level agencies and farmers to establish the means to 
achieve these objectives. In particular, it is argued that the type of policy design adopted 
influences: the objectives and criteria of irrigation management and their resultant activities 
(Uphoff, 1986: Chambers, 1988); the extent to which farmers are involved in the decision-making 
process and the organisational coordination which this entails (Clyma and Lowdermilk, 1988); the 
institutional and organisational tasks of Coward (1991); and perhaps most importantly, the type of 
policy design implicitly prescribes who is eligible to establish the 'constitutional-choice' rules of 
governance and how these should be implemented in system management (the 'collective-choice' 
rules and the day-to-day decision rules) (Tang and Ostrom, 1993). 
The coercive/cooperative approach 
The distinction between a coercive and cooperative approach to intergovernmental policy design 
originates from the work of May and Handmer (1992) in their analysis of cooperative verses 
deterrent governmental mandates. This approach has been examined in particular by May et al 
93 Here again the actions are both formal and informal. 
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(1996; 1997), Handmer (1996) and May and Burby (1996). In each of these works the aim has 
been to conceptualise and examine two different (but not mutually exclusive) approaches to policy 
design which differ in the way that policies are implemented at the local level. 
Coercive policy design 
In a coercive environment the national government implements policies as rules to be followed 
which are detailed, prescriptive and 'order like', effectively limiting the capacity of local-level 
agencies to develop their own policy agendas or to develop their own means of implementing 
policies within the formal context (Table 6.1). Coercion becomes the mechanism by which 
higher-level governments enforce lower-level agencies to comply with the procedural and 
structural prescriptions as laid down in the legislature. These legislatures, or mandates, set the 
standards and procedures required by local agencies to achieve policy goals, thereby leaving little 
discretion for local level capacity. Instead, a coercive higher-level government monitors the 
compliance of local agencies to the rules and regulations prescribed. Failure to comply results in 
the invoking of penalties or sanctions when deadlines are not met, the prescribed process is not 
followed or rules are not enforced. 
Cooperative policy design 
By contrast, a cooperative framework implements policy guidelines as part of a shared 
governance procedure, which may still prescribe the policy directive but allows the local agency to 
develop its own means of implementation (May et aI, 1996). Cooperation implies a partnership 
between the higher-level government and the local government or agency. The emphasis here is 
that: 
'local governments do not have any fundamental disagreements with policy aims 
and therefore do not have to be forced to comply. They are assumed to already 
possess at least a modicum of commitment to policy goals, which we label as 
normative commitment. But normative commitment needs to be mobilized, for 
which financial and other inducements can be important. By removing barriers 
created by deficiencies in capacity and by enhancing normative commitment, 
cooperative intergovernmental policies seek local government compliance with 
the objectives of higher-level governments' (May et aI, 1996:5). 
The logic behind the cooperative model is that although the government may prescribe the policy 
goals, processes and performance related goals they do not monitor for compliance, prescribe 
standards, procedures and rules or impose penalties for non-compliance. This is an important 
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distinction because by assuming normative commitment, the role of the higher-level government 
is altered from one focused on enforcing commitment to one focused on building and enhancing 
local capacity. Examples of which may include financial, technical or other inducements to ensure 
that the lower-level agencies can meet higher-level objectives. The overall objectives are, 
however, the same - to ensure the procedural elements support the substantive elements. The 
difference is the process adopted to ensure that this occurs. 
~"';--.~-~'- , .. 
Design Issue Coercive Policy Cooperative Policy 
--Policy objective 
Role of lower-level government 
or agency 
Emphasis of higher-level 
government policy 
Control of lower-level 
government or agency 
Assumptions about 
implementation 
Implementation emphasis 
Potential problems 
Adherence to prescribed 
standards. 
As regulatory agents to enforce 
rules or regulations prescribed by 
higher-level governments. 
Prescribe regulatory actions, plans 
and process. 
Monitoring for procedural 
comp liance-enforcement and 
penalties for failing to meet 
deadlines of for not adhering to 
the prescribed process or for 
enforcing prescribed rules. 
Commitment and compliance is a 
potential problem. Need for 
uniform application of priorities. 
Adherence to detailed policy 
prescriptions and regulatory 
standards. Building' calculated 
commitment' as a primary means 
of inducing compliance. 
Weak monitoring of performance 
and unwillingness to use 
Achievement of policy goals. 
As regulatory partners to develop 
and apply rules that are consistent 
with higher-level goals. 
Prescribe process and goals. 
Specify planning components and 
considerations, along with 
performance goals but does not 
prescribe actions and plans. 
Monitoring for substantive 
compliance with more limited 
monitoring for procedural 
compliance. Monitoring systems 
for assessing outcomes and 
progress towards them. Financial 
inducements to develop plans and 
programmes, advice given but no 
penalties. 
Commitment and compliance not 
a problem. Local discretion is 
important for policy 
implementation. 
Building capacity of local 
government or agency to reach 
policy goals. Enhancing 
'normative' commitment as a 
primary means of inducing 
compliance. 
Gaps in local commitment and 
insufficient resources to build 
_____ m ___ • "pe~a,ltie~.,&= capacity. Possibility of 'cap!~~e'. 
Table 6.1: Coercive and cooperative policy designs 
Source: Adapted from May and Handmer (1992), May et a/ (1996:1997) and Handmer (1996) 
Capacity alUi Commitment 
The focus on capacity and commitment is central to understanding the two models of policy 
implementation and compliance. It is argued that the type of policy mandate implemented is 
dependent on the perception by higher-level governments of the commitment and capacity of 
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lower-level governments to the substantive and procedural elements of the policy design. The 
simple hypotheses being that when the commitment of lower-level governments is high, a 
cooperative environment facilitates greater compliance which would otherwise be constrained 
under the inflexible, rule-related coercive design. By contrast, when commitment at the local level 
is low, a coercive environment is required to induce participation and ensure outcomes which are 
acceptable to substantive requirements. When commitment is lacking, it is assumed that lower-
level governments will not respond to either the substantive or procedural elements of the policy 
design. This is important because the extent to which actors are capable or committed to the policy 
mandate, or the process by which this is implemented, ultimately influences the compliance of 
these actors and the resultant outcomes of government policy (May and Burby, 1996). 
The main assumption of the coercive/cooperative approach concerns who has the power to make 
decisions. In a coercive environment, for example, the assumption is that capacity exists at the 
lower level but that commitment does not. Therefore, a 'strong hand' is required to ensure 
commitment - power in this respect resides with the higher-level government. In a cooperative 
environment, the commitment is perceived to exist but the capacity does not. Therefore, the 
lower-level government needs to be empowered to build its own capacity - power in this respect 
resides with the higher and lower-level governments. 
The coercive/cooperative framework is a simple conceptual dichotomy which is difficult to apply 
to the complex and diverse reality of competing policies and differential policy environments. 
However, there are two important assumptions which emerge: firstly, although most policy 
designs incorporate elements of both the coercive and cooperative designs, each policy 
environment is likely to favour one design over another; and secondly, it is recognised that both 
higher- and lower-level actors have knowledge, agency and power to make decisions about both 
the substantive and procedural elements of policy compliance which influences, and is influenced 
by, the environment within which they operate. This second factor is very important with respect 
to an actor-oriented approach because it recognises: 
.. the interconnected influence of the micro, meso and macro levels; 
.. how the connectivity between actors influence and develop their human agency; and 
.. that negotiation and confrontation between actors with different perceptions, attitudes and 
power differentials influences the outcome of government policy. 
The question is what is the implication of embracing the coercive/cooperative policy framework 
for irrigation management? 
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Designs for irrigation management 
The advantage of adopting the coercive/cooperative framework for irrigation management is that it 
establishes the link between the irrigation agency and the federal government. This is important 
because although there have been substantial developments in our conceptual understanding of the 
governance and management of large-scale schemes there is, as yet, no understanding of the role 
of the political economy and how this impacts on the formal decision-making abilities of the 
actors involved. The work of Uphoff (1986), for example, analysed the linkage between the 
irrigation agency and the users, to provide a basis for articulating the need for improving farmer 
participation. In his analysis of the 'levels' of operation and organisation, Uphoff characterises 
schemes dependent on the number of levels involved in their management and operation94. 
Indicative of this approach is the lack of any recognition of the 'levels' beyond the irrigation 
agency in the decision-making process. Instead, the political economy is regarded as a contextual 
factor which influences farmer participation rather than as an active player in the policy design 
framework. A coercive/cooperative approach recognises this higher-level as an important factor 
in the relationship between the policy goals, the decision-making powers of the irrigation agency, 
the resultant capacity and commitment of this agency and the policy outcomes which emerge. 
A similar gap in conceptual understanding can be found in the work of Tang and Ostrom (1993). 
These authors provide a useful examination of the difference between governance (i.e. who has the 
power to establish the policies, programmes and rules) and management (i.e. how the rules, 
policies and programmes are implemented at the operational level). In particular, Tang and 
Ostrom (1993) argue that the integration of farmers in the management of schemes will continue 
to suffer from disappointing results if these farmers are not involved in governance itself. In 
addition, the authors argue that: 
'the management of irrigation projects will produce poor results unless effective 
institutional arrangements exist to structure the governance and management 
processes of irrigation projects' (Tang and Ostrom, 1993:3). 
As with Uphoff, the authors focus specifically on the relationship between the irrigation agency, 
its institutions and the water users - thus neglecting the role of the higher-level government in the 
decision-making process. Here again, the coercive/cooperative framework provides this valuable 
link. For example, in a bureaucratic scheme which is solely governed by the irrigation agency, the 
coercive or cooperative nature of the relationship between the agency and federal government 
94 In this classification, the Muda scheme is regarded as a three-level scheme, encompassing the Small 
Agricultural Units (SAUs), the Farmers Association (FA) and MADA itself. 
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impacts not only on this relationship but, more importantly, on the coercive or cooperative 
arrangements which emerge between the agency and the irrigators95 . To expand on these 
arguments further, the following sections explore the usefulness of applying the 
coercive/cooperative framework, within the Muda context, by examining the nature of the 
relationship between MADA and the state government and its affect on the policies implemented, 
policy expectations, and the capacity and commitment of government staff to the formal 
objectives. 
6.3 MADA-State linkage, cooperation or coercion? 
The political economy examined in chapter five would, at first glance, suggest that the expansion 
and centralisation of executive power is indicative of a coercive inter-governmental relationship 
between the state and local government agencies. However, as shall be expanded on in this 
section, because the executive power within MADA has been retained by its Board of Directors, 
MADA has maintained many of its decision-making powers with respect to the implementation of 
policies and procedures. The result is a cooperative approach whereby the federal government 
prescribes the general policy objectives (the substantive element) and MADA establishes the 
means to achieve them (the procedural element). This assumes 'normative commitment' and the 
requirement by the federal government to ensure that MADA has the capacity to achieve their 
wider policy goals. 
To explore the MADA-state linkage, this section establishes: the nature of the relationship 
between the state and MADA and the capacity and commitment of MADA staff to the substantive 
objectives; the organisational structure designed to facilitate this; and the resultant policies and 
expectations implemented by MADA to secure the substantive goals of the federal government. 
The nature of the relationship 
MADA is a statutory agency of the Malaysian federal government with semi-autonomous powers 
to manage and implement agricultural development in the Muda region under the guidance of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The procedural decision-making power is legislated into MADA's 
constitution, thus providing the framework for a cooperative policy design. To ensure that MADA 
has the capacity to implement its procedural objectives, the role of the federal and state 
95 In a coercive environment, the governance of the system is retained by the irrigation agency. In a 
cooperative environment, the governance is distributed between both the irrigators and agency staff. 
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governments is focused on the setting of objectives and the provision of financial support96 . For as 
one official commented: 
'MADA is a government agency so we receive money from central government. 
We are not a corporate body ... ' (MADA informant, No. 10). 
The close association between MADA, the state governments and the federal government is an 
important linkage for both the management of the water resource and the continuation of funding. 
In particular, because the states of Kedah and Perlis are governed by the ruling party this reduces 
the antagonism between federal and state requirements in the allocation of funding. For as 
expressed by one official: 
'In Muda, water is a state asset, they control. We have a very loose agreement 
because the state is under the same government, the Barisan government in 
Kedah and the Barisan government of central so there is not much quarrel. But if 
you look at the situation in Kelantan where the federal and local governments are 
different, here there is trouble .. .' (MADA informant, No. 17). 
In accordance with a cooperative framework, the objectives of the government investment focus 
not on the prescription of standards but on the achievement of two fundamental policy goals: 
1. to uplift the living standards of the majority of the rural population; and 
2. to increase production of rice to ensure 65% self-sufficiencl7. 
The role played by MADA is to ensure that their procedural objectives facilitate the compliance 
with, and help to secure, these substantive objectives98, whereby: 
'The primary role played by MADA is to stimulate, to induce and to unite the 
farmers into a progressive community that can instil agricultural, economic and 
social development in the Muda region' (MADA, n.d.:9). 
This is a wide remit which neither prescribes regulations nor enforces rules. Instead, MADA is 
expected to implement programmes which comply with the substantive policy aims of the federal 
government. To achieve this, section 4(1) ofthe 1970 Act, states that MADA is expected to: 
96 This financial support comes primarily from the annual allocation of the Ministry of Agriculture (see Table 
5.3, chapter five), with a supplementary allocation from the state governments of Per lis and Kedah in the 
form of grants which are supported by the collection of irrigation taxes (in the form of land taxes) from the 
farmers(Ramli, 1984). 
97 Goals which are in accordance with the aims of the NEP (see section 5.4). 
98 This process is both flexible and extensive, involving the management activities articulated by Uphoff 
(1986) and the rule-making governance and management articulated by Tang and Ostrom (1993). 
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• promote, stimulate, facilitate and undertake economic and social development in the Muda 
area; and 
• to plan and undertake within the Muda area such agricultural development as may be assigned 
to it by the state authority of the states of Kedah and Perlis (MADA, n.d.: 11). 
The process and procedures by which MAD A is expected to secure such developments are not 
articulated. Instead, the approach is one of shared governance in which MADA is expected to 
develop and implement policies and programmes which prescribe to these substantive 
requirements. The result is an extensive list of activities for which MADA is responsible99 (Box 
6.1). 
Box 6.1: Procedural programmes (MADA) 
• the construction, expansion, operation and maintenance of all the irrigation 
and drainage infrastructures; 
• the propagation and advancement of agriculture technology through training 
and extension services to farmers; 
• the conducting of programs for studies and research on yields, technical, 
economic and social information; 
• the regulation and promotion of farmer association activities; and, 
• to ensure the overall development of the agriculture sector to progress all 
aspects of the farm family, farm institutions and local industries. (MADA, 
n.d.: 12, Low & Cho, 1996:43) 
The commitment of MADA to the national objectives of societal restructuring and poverty 
eradication is evident in the response of MAD A staff when questioned about MADA's policies. In 
patticular, all of the staff interviewed recognised these wider objectives as an integral part of the 
policies adopted by MADA itself. Consequently, these staff offered no distinction between the 
procedural policies of MADA and the substantive policies of the national government, examples 
of which include: 
99 What is particularly interesting is that MADA is not only responsible for the setting of programmes, rules 
and regulations in the Muda region, it is also responsible for monitoring and assessing the outcomes of these 
programmes and the progress of the region towards the substantive targets. What this means is that not only 
are there no penalties imposed by the federal government for non-compliance, but it is MADA who 
establishes whether the procedural policies implemented are progressing towards the substantive goals. This 
diverges from the theoretical coercive/cooperative framework in Table 6.1, which suggests that the 
monitoring of progress is a control procedure of the higher-level government. 
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'The main objective of MADA is to increase the production, to increase the 
standard of living of the farmers and to try to reduce the poverty rate .... ' (MADA 
informant No. 11). 
'The main policy of MADA now is to try to make sure that the paddy production is 
enough for the Malaysian consumption and to give a better standard of living for 
the farmers, and of course by that we have to increase the yield, introduce them 
to other activities or other crops, let them be involved in this cottage industry and 
maybe from there we can improve the standard of living of the farmers' (MADA 
informant No. 12). 
'The objective of MADA now is to increase the yield and then from there to make 
sure that the production meets the national level put by the government so that 
they will less depend on the imports of rice. Otherwise it is to improve the 
standard of living of the farmers' (MADA informant No.9). 
'We are following the national policy and we have that expectation of us that we 
have to plan to achieve' (MADA informant No. 17). 
'For the government side their mission is to increase the yield, of course to 
increase the standard of living of the farmers. They want to less import of rice 
from outside that means when it comes to foreign exchange and trade of balance. 
For the MADA side we also have to increase the yield because sometimes the 
government policy is the same with MADA. We also want to help these farmers 
under poverty, to less the percentage under poverty' (MADA informant, No. 11). 
'I also have the national responsibility to achieve the target for farmers. The 
Malaysian target right now for the federal government they say that the 60 per 
cent of the food consumption from rice must be from farming activities, only 40 
per cent imported from outside' (MADA informant, No.7). 
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The focus on production and productivity is central to the substantive policy aims of the federal 
government. In focusing on these goals, the government has set specific production targets, and 
time-frames, which aim to increase average yields to 6.0 tons per hectare by the year 2000 and 6.5 
tons by 2010. In accordance with the cooperative MADA-state linkage, it is the responsibility of 
MADA to manage the Muda region and implement programmes of development which will enable 
the fanners to meet these targets. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the MADA staff 
interviewed regarded production and productivity increases to be fundamental to the policy aims 
of MAD A. For as expressed by these staff: 
'The main policy of MADA is to make sure that the farmers get higher yields from 
their farming activities and then to make sure that the irrigation system is working 
well' (MADA informant No.1). 
'MADA policy ... 1 think it says in this book that we have to have six tons [per 
hectare] by the year 2000, we hope we can get six tons and then by 2010 we 
hope to get 6.5 tons [per hectare]. For me, I think that in order to receive 6.5 we 
need to inject a lot of money inside the tertiary system, it is absolutely necessary' 
(MADA informant No. 13). 
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The main goal of MADA is to have all the farmers follow the irrigation schedule to 
ensure that they get better yield .. .' (MADA informant No.4). 
The main policies are to increase yields and, of course, to ensure that the 
standard of living of farmers increases ... ' (MADA informant No.6). 
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Out of the 19 officials interviewed no respondents questioned the substantive policy goals or the 
production and productivity focus of these goals. What this suggests is that the assumption of 
'nonnative commitment' articulated by May et al (1996) fits closely with the cooperative policy 
design observed in the MADA-State relationship. The Muda case study, therefore, supports the 
assumption that within a cooperative policy design, the commitment to the policy goals exists, 
whereby higher-level governments are not required to seek local-level compliance. However, as 
one respondent articulated, the close association between national objectives and MADA policies 
can sometimes act as a restriction to the type of programmes that MADA can implement in the 
Muda region: 
'Our policies are not independent of federal policies so by and large we are 
powerless. We do not have very much leeway in deciding policy matters as such. 
For example, we cannot [change from rice production] even if we find that there is 
more effective control of seaweed or something like that we still have to stick with 
rice, that is [the] national policy for irrigating activities of this area. Rice 
production is more important than anything else even if we sometimes conflict 
with farmers incomes .. .' (MADA informant No. 16). 
Because of the 'normative commitment' of MADA staff to the national agenda, the relationship 
between the federal government and MADA focuses on the building of MADA's capacity to 
implement programmes which will assist in meeting national targets. This is achieved by the 
financial allocation stated above100 and the decision-making responsibility afforded to MADA, in 
collaboration with other agencies, in the planning and implementation of rules, regulations and 
101 programmes 
The programmes implemented by MADA are expected to: stabilise and increase yields; improve 
farmer incomes; and improve the management of the water resource to ensure an adequate, 
reliable, and timely delivery of water to the fanners which is efficient and equitable. The ultimate 
objectives, therefore, are to improve water-use efficiency and productivity which involves both 
100 and illustrated in more detail in section 5.6, chapter five. 
101 Examples of which include: the expansion of tertiary infrastructure to improve water supply, efficiency, 
reliability and equity with a view to reduce water requirements and increase yields; the education and 
training of farmers for improved farm-management practices including technology use and adoption, in-field 
water management, agronomic practices, and the management of weeds, pests and disease; the introduction 
of new seeds, technologies, crop protection and farm management practices; the povelty eradication 
programme; and the encouragement of group fanning to increase farmer-farmer cooperation and facilitate 
the coordination of farming practices. 
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water and non-water activities to increase yields and improve farmer well-being102. To achieve 
this, the organisational structure and management philosophy of MADA has been devised to 
facilitate the planning and coordination of agricultural development on a regional basis. As is 
stated in its policy documents, MADA has been structured so that: 
'a major part of such coordination involves the establishment and strengthening 
of linkages required between the farm localities and the region. Each 
agricultural support activity in farm localities must be connected with the related 
regional organisation activities. The organisation either provides the linkages 
itself or assists in their development' (MADA, 1970:2). 
The recognition of the need to link the locality with the region is important within the cooperative 
approach because it implicitly incorporates the requirements of, and capabilities of, the local 
community within the regional planning framework. In order to establish how MADA 
implements its programmes to link the locality and the region, it is necessary to articulate 
MADA's organisational structure. 
An intergovernmental cooperative structure 
MADA is governed by its Board of Directors (BOD) who decide on issues of policy, approve 
programmes and assumes ultimate control (Low & Cho, 1996:43). The formal linkage, whereby 
the state negotiates its policy requirements with MADA programmes occurs at this level103 . The 
Chairman of the Board is appointed directly by the Prime Minister and is in overall responsibility 
of the board and its other members104. The executive power within the Board is held by the 
deputy chairman who is also the general manager of MADA. His/her responsibility is to 
coordinate between the Board and the organisation to ensure that the policy decisions made at this 
higher-level are coordinated with the activities of the four divisions and units within MADA. 
It is the responsibility of the general manager to ensure that the decision-making which occurs at 
the Board level is implemented by MADA staff in their daily intervention and management 
activities. The implementation of these decisions falls to the general manager and the senior 
managers within the four sections; Administration, Engineering, Agriculture and the Planning and 
102 These objectives are in accordance with some of those illustrated in the 'criteria, objectives and causal 
chains' model of Chambers (1988) - see Appendix C:2. 
103 The Board consists of individuals from several government agencies and is responsible for determining 
policies, approving programmes, allocating and assessing budgets, and forging links with external agencies 
and organisations (Ramli, 1984). 
104 These members include two state government representatives from Kedah and Periis, and representatives 
from the Department of Irrigation and Drainage, The Bank Pertanian, BERNAS, and the Federal Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (F AMA). 
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Evaluation department (Figure 6.1). These departments are sub-divided into their relative sections 
to facilitate the overall management of the scheme. The hierarchical structure is broken down into 
4 districts and 27 localities (Figure 6.2) each with their own roles and responsibilities (Box 6.2). 
Ministry of Agriculture I 
J 
Board of Directors 
I 
General Manager 
I 
Ad min istration Engineering Agriculture 
Division Division Division 
I 
District I District II District III 
Kanga Jitra Pendang 
I 
27 Localities 
1 
1_27 Farmer associations 
Figure 6.1: MADA Organisational Structure 
Source: MADA 
Planning & 
Evaluation 
Division 
District IV 
Kota 
MADA's organisational structure dictates the process by which information is exchanged between 
the farmers and decision-makers as well as between MADA officers. Likewise, it impacts on the 
process by which policies are implemented and working rules are established for system operation 
and management. The following section highlights the means by which MADA seeks to attain a 
higher standard of living for the rural population and an increase in production to secure the 65 per 
cent self sufficiency target and the 6.0-6.5 ton/hectare target. Because MADA was set up, and is 
run, as an integrated agricultural development authority rather than a mere' irrigation authority', it 
pursues these 'means' with respect to both the management of the water resource, and its related 
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structures, as well as the management of the agricultural and social development of the region 
itself. 
Box 6.2: Organisational structure roles and responsibilities 
Engineering division 
To control and manage the water resource from the dams to the individual irrigation 
blocks. The main responsibilities include the operating and maintaining of all the 
structures concerned with irrigation, including the ancillary structures such as farm roads 
and bridges. 
Agricultural division 
Responsible for planning and implementing all agricultural policies and programmes 
including training, extension, agronomic field studies, crop protection, group farming and 
the daily management of the Farmers' Association (FA). Any policy not strictly related to 
the management, maintenance or operation of the water resource and its related structures 
is the responsibility of the agricultural section. 
Planning and evaluation 
The operating and support division for both the agricultural and engineering divisions. 
Main responsibilities include project evaluation, securing government funding, 
conducting farm management and crop cutting surveys, pilot studies and trials. 
District level 
Divided into agricultural and engineering divisions. The agricultural division is 
responsible for: assisting in the running of the FA; providing extension services, training 
and development programmes; and the supply of credit, inputs and marketing facilities. 
The engineering division is responsible for: managing the water resource; constructing, 
operating and maintaining infrastructure at the district level; investigating complaints 
made by farmers; keeping water distribution records; allocating water to the localities; 
coordinating repairs; and training farmers in effective water management. 
Locality level 
Divided into agricultural and engineering division. The agricultural division is 
responsible for: the activities of the FA; implementing the poverty eradication 
programme; and transferring information, technology and campaign policies to the 
farmers. The engineering division is responsible for: checking and operating control 
structures; operating supply gates on the main canals; recording and managing farmers 
complaints; allocating water to each block; and reporting water distribution data. 
Intervention to secure substantive goals 
The rules, regulations and programmes implemented by MADA are indicative of the process by 
which MADA attempts to secure the substantive requirements of the national government through 
its own procedural objectives. These objectives focus on; increasing yields, saving water and 
increasing the standard of living of the farmers. Such objectives are based on the philosophy that 
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improvements in the supply and delivery of the water resource plus improvements in the on-farm 
management practices of the farmers will facilitate increases in yields and hence incomes. It is 
anticipated that this will be achieved by improving the physical infrastructure, changing the 
attitudes of the farming community, and introducing new technology. For as one official 
commented: 
'So to achieve the target we have to use our imagination so we need to improvise 
so there are certain areas where we have weaknesses like organising farmers, 
lack of infrastructure, saving water. We are trying to push now for full scale 
tertiary to all blocks. Also the training of farmers to train them to accept change 
and then of course you notice that we have a training school...The main 
objectives are to increase the yield to ensure that the standard of living of farmers 
increases' (MADA informant, No. 17). 
The procedural strategies employed by MADA to achieve this, can be neatly sub-divided into; the 
rules of governance, management and operation, and the infrastructure and extension programmes 
of intervention. The purpose of this section is to explore the process by which MADA implements 
its procedural strategies in accordance with the national substantive targets. In so doing, analysis 
focuses on the formal rules of management (collective-choice rules), the formal day-to-day 
operation and maintenance rules (operational rules) and the formal rules of governance 
(constitutional-choice rules) (Tang & Ostrom, 1993). In addition, two of the main programmes of 
development are explored, namely; tertiary development and group farming. 
The formal rules of governance and management 
Irrigation system management is the responsibility of both MADA and the farmers, whereby: 
MADA's responsibility is to ensure that the farmers receive an adequate, reliable and equitable 
water supply by effective management of the storage, delivery and distribution systeml05 ; and the 
farmers' responsibility resides with their on-farm management practices within the irrigation 
blocks. In particular, MADA is responsible for deciding when the water is supplied, how much is 
supplied, to whom it is supplied and by what means it is supplied. Through this process the 
cooperative relationship between MADA and the state determines both the 'constitutional-choice 
rules' and 'collective-choice rules', with the fanners acting as consultative partners. The 
'operational rules', however, are entirely at the discretion of MADA 'above the outlet' and the 
farmers 'below the outlet'. 
105 For a detailed description of these systems see chapter four. 
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The rules of governance for the distribution and timing of the water supply are determined by the 
formulation of an 'operational plan,I06. This plan is the single most important decision-making 
process in the supply and distribution of water during the irrigated season. Moreover, it is highly 
complex involving the assessment of cropping requirements, water availability and predicted 
rainfall. For this purpose a Coordination Committee on Irrigation Supply (CCIS) is convened, 
consisting of senior managers within MADA, the FA and representatives from other related 
government agencies (Low & Cho, 1996). The responsibility of this committee is to compile the 
hydrological and agronomic data to predict the implications of various scheduling scenarios on the 
successful completion of the cropping cycle. These scenarios are tabled for consultation with the 
farmer leaders and local-level staff at the lower end of the hierarchical structure. By involving the 
farmer leaders in this process the number of alternative scenarios is reduced and MADA can 
ensure a greater acceptance of the final schedule by the farming community (Low & Cho, 1996). 
This is not, however, to say that the farmers are participative members in the decision-making 
process. Instead, the farmers input is more consultative once a variety of scenarios have been 
proposed. This is illustrated in the following MADA quote: 
' ... we check the storage and then after that we have a discussion [at MADA HQ 
level) and then I will come back and discuss with my staff [at district level]. Then 
we call the PPK, the preSident, the second in command, the farmer leader in the 
PPK , the persons which are in charge of the water [at the locality level) and we 
will come back and brief them. After that I can then determine that our farmers 
are valued. We will tell them what the situation is and then discuss and then we 
get the result of the discussion in a meeting and then we'll feed back to the head 
office. Then some adjustments will be made and then after that we call the whole 
of the 27 PPK's and they'll come and discuss and then of course in the meeting if 
they are not sure eventually the decision is made and we'll advertise [the 
schedule) in the coffee shops. After that they have to follow it, of course 
sometimes the farmers want like that and some don't. If they say they are 
prepared to face it, if they say yes then we feel that it is better but of course the 
final say is with the boss [at HQ level) .. .' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
After such consultation, the CCIS approves the irrigation schedule which is then printed and 
publicised throughout the farming community. The result is a schedule that determines the spatial 
distribution and phasing of supply throughout the region including both the dates of water supply 
commencement and stoppage107 . The importance of this process cannot be understated, for as 
Low and Cho articulate: 
'Over the years, many landmark decision had been made with the consensus of 
farmers, with far reaching implications on the paddy cultivation sector. 
106 This plan determines the phases by which water is spatially distributed and the dates by which water 
supply commences and stops. See Appendix C: I, Figure 1 for an example ofthe operations plan. 
107 An illustrated example in the surveyed case study region for the irrigated season, 1997 is provided in 
Appendix C: 1, Figure 1. 
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Examples are the cancellation of the off season of 1978, the imposition of one-
month fallow period after the main season, and the enforcement of a water 
supply cut-off date' (Low & eho, 1996:54). 
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The phased stop and start dates for the irrigation supply influence all of the agronomic practices of 
the farmers, from when they start ploughing, seeding, applying fertilisers, herbicides and 
insecticides, to when they harvest108. The importance of this schedule is, therefore, immense. The 
process by which this schedule is finalised is indicative of the cooperative relationship between 
MADA and the state, whereby the final decision is normally at the discretion of MADA in 
consultation with the other members of the eels - from both higher-level government and other 
agencies. However, where problems arise, such as in the requirement to cancel the irrigation 
season in 1978, the final schedule (or lack of schedule) is forwarded to the Ministry of 
Agricultural for approval and endorsement109. 
Although MADA has the authority to manage agricultural development, it is also recognised that 
some decisions can only be made with the involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture. For as one 
farmer commented with respect to the development of tertiary infrastructure: 
'MADA can't do anything because there is the red tape of administration, if they 
suggest something to do the final say rests with the agricultural minister. So the 
red tape jeopardises their effort to make a beUer irrigation system. The best 
person to solve this problem is at the federal government level, maybe by the 
minister of agriculture or the environment minister or someone else - higher than 
this level' (Farmer informant, No. 14). 
This need to involve higher level decision-making was also articulated by MADA staff 
themselves: 
'When there is a problem that this PPK, or [the] MADA officer, can't solve that 
problem because it involves the policy or it involves the law, or it involves the 
other higher-level decisions, we will bring up [the problem] to the higher authority. 
For example, here [district level] we will bring up to MADA HQ and if the problem 
can be solved here [HQ level] we will solve by ourselves. If the problem cannot 
be solved and we need higher authority to solve we will bring to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and so on' (MADA informant, No.8). 
By contrast, MADA officials also expressed a need to illustrate to higher-level officials that their 
policies are inadequate for implementation in the Muda context. One such example is the 
suggestion by Dr. Mahathir that to make the supply of water from the dams to the irrigation 
108 To illustrate this argument, Appendix C: 1, Figure 2 provides an example of the scheduling of cropping 
activities based on the knowledge of water release and stoppage. 
109 See Appendix C: 1, Figure 3 for the flow chart procedure for the formulation of the operational plan. 
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scheme more efficient, MADA should construct storage ponds nearer the project area. However, 
as expressed by MADA staff: 
'In fact our Prime Minister extensively travels overseas and this pond seems to be 
feasible solution to him and he has recommended that these ponds should be 
constructed. We have one big pond in Pendang and that pond we don't take up 
productive land, so we are doing it to prove a point to the high ups that it doesn't 
work' (MADA informant, No. 18). 
'Basically, the Prime Minister came back and suggested that we fix up irrigation 
ponds which we have done but we in the engineering division have to go to Kuala 
Lumpur and try to convince him that irrigation ponds are not viable. The water for 
every unit area we need about 4 feet of water, just imaging an irrigation pond 
taking 30 acres how much can we get. You might as well be planting paddy in it. 
So right now we are embarking on another study which we are trying to convince 
our PM, why not we look at increasing recycling, looking at upstream why don't 
we pump water but how do you justify the cost of pumping? You can justify 
pumping domestic water. Right at the moment irrigation is wasting water. 
Whatever you are doing for the future is actually for domestic so for agriculture 
we cannot increase our area so therefore you justify it under domestic and then 
they can go. So that we are pushing and we have appointed consultants on the 
study, our aim is to impress on higher authorities that irrigation is a good method 
of water use' (MADA informant, No. 17). 
Such higher-level approval is not required for the 'operational rules' which are implemented by 
MADA in the daily management of the irrigation schedule. Here, the operation and control of the 
system is entirely at the discretion of MADAI10. Therefore, MADA has to be knowledgeable 
about the water demand and supply situation throughout the entire region in order to conserve as 
much water in the reservoirs, whilst at the same time ensuring that each irrigation block receives 
an adequate, reliable and timely supply. This requires rules and regulations in both the 
management of the water resource by MADA staff 'above the outlet' and the farmers 'below the 
outlet' . 
The management of the water resource 'above the outlet' is dependent on the distribution and 
allocation rules developed by the engineering division of MAD A headquarters and implemented at 
both the district and local levels. In each of the four district offices, the engineering division is 
required to request water from the water control centre in accordance with the irrigation schedule 
and local water requirements. If granted, it is the responsibility of the district engineer to allocate 
this water to the locality levels for distribution to each individual block. This process serves to 
110 This illustrates the procedural element of the cooperative framework. 
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devolve decision-making for the distribution and allocation of water throughout the system to the 
lower administrative units - although not to the farmers lll . 
There are three main sources of water for paddy cultivation in the Muda region, these include: 
direct rainfall; uncontrolled river flow below the dams; and controlled flows from the reservoirs. 
The rules governing water supply involve a highly complex process determined by the quantity of 
water available in the system and the expected amount of rainfall over the reservoir catchments in 
a specific time period. This is particularly important because most of the water supply is 
dependent on uncontrolled flows and rainfall ll2 . Consequently, water demand within the region is 
always first met by uncontrolled supplies which are supplemented, if necessary, by dam release. 
(Sim et aI, 1986: 10). Therefore, to accommodate system requirements the management and 
If " . 'lii' . 113 contro 0 1l1-S1tu water IS crucla or meetlllg crop water reqUirements . 
To support the accurate and timely release of water from the reservoirs, MADA employs a water 
demand and supply model (WMCS)114. The rules and procedures embedded in the operation of 
this model dictate the supply of water throughout the system 115. These rules are dependent on: the 
availability of water supply in the dams; the availability of uncontrolled flows in the project area; 
actual and expected rainfall; field water depths; agronomic practices; and the relative stages of 
paddy growth. Because of this, the procedures required for the WMCS are not only indicative of 
system governance but also impact on the daily operation and management activities at all 
hierarchical levels. In practice, however, the WMCS is dependent on the supply of reliable and 
timely information from the field-staff on the status of water and agronomic practices in their 
region - hence the overlapping of governance and management. The detailed rules and regulations 
implemented in the management and control of the water resource 'above the outlet', and the 
field-level data which facilitates this, are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, Appendix C: 1. 
So far this section has illustrated the rules implemented by MADA 'above the outlet'. By default, 
however, these influence the rules governing the actions of the farmers in the operation and 
III It is the rules developed at the headquarters level which determine: the timing of water release from the 
dams; the distribution of water throughout the system; the quantity of water allocated to each area; the timing 
of water delivery; and the method of water extraction. 
112 In fact, it is estimated that 70 per cent of supply is determined by uncontrolled flow s and rainfall, with 
only 30 per cent of the regions water supply originating from dam release. 
113 It should be noted, however, that the irrigation supply only supports the dry season crop with the wet 
season being totally dependent on rainfall. 
114 The Water Management and Control System (WMCS) was implemented in 1988 and involves the 
computation of total water supply against theoretical demand, the outcome of which dictates the quantity and 
timing of reservoir release. 
115 An issue of importance because of the 2-3 day time-lag between reservoir release and the arrival of water 
in the project area. 
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management of the system. For example, it is illegal for the farmers to manipulate the 
management of the water resource 'above the outlet' by tapping into this resource or altering the 
control gates at the block level. Instead, the rules governing the actions of the farmers focus on 
their activities 'below the outlet'. Consequently, once the water passes through the control 
structures at the block level it is entirely the responsibility of the farmers to ensure that this water 
is managed in such a way that all farmers receive an adequate, timely and equitable supply to their 
fields. These rules differ dependent on whether farming activities are conducted under tertiary or 
. d·· 116 non-tertiary con 1t1Ons . 
This section has illustrated how the cooperative relationship between MADA and the state 
influences the 'constitutional-choice' and 'collective-choice' rules of system operation, 
management and maintenance. In so doing, the formal rules and regulations implemented by 
MADA 'above the outlet' in the management of the water resource, and the resultant rules 
governing fanner actions both 'above and below the outlet', have been articulated. In an attempt 
to secure substantive compliance with national objectives, MADA's responsibility for the overall 
development of the region goes beyond the management, operation and control of the water 
resource. To illustrate this, the next two sections examine two specific programmes of 
intervention currently practised by MADA to increase production and secure an increase in the 
'well-being' of the farming population. 
Tertiary development 
Although the initial scheme was very successful in the implementation of double cropping, it 
became apparent that the distribution of irrigation water for the saturation and flooding of the 
paddy fields during pre saturation was inadequate (Kitamura & Jin, 1993). This was attributed to 
the inadequacies in infrastructure intensity resulting in inequitable and inefficient water 
distribution. The low canal densities (lOm/ha) in the Muda I blocks means that only 10 per cent of 
farmers have direct access to canals, drains and farm roads (Ho, 1983). Likewise, the inadequate 
116 In the non-tertiary irrigation blocks the water is supplied through the main CHO from which the farmers 
are required to coordinate their activities and distribute the water throughout the block by maintaining and 
operating their batas to ensure that water is both retained in their individual plots and allowed to flow to 
neighbouring plots. By contrast, within the tertiary structures, each ISU is supported by a water user 
committee whose responsibility it is to operate and manage the Field Irrigation Turnouts (FIT's) and 
Drainage Outlets (DO's). A representative from each ISU in turn participates in an ISA committee whose 
responsibility it is to control the water resource through the operation and maintenance of all control 
structures on the teltiary canal. In practice, however, the farmers have been unable to coordinate their 
activities in the management, operation or maintenance of the tertiary system. Consequently, the farmers 
responsibilities within the Muda II irrigation blocks are confined to on-farm management practices through 
the operation and control of their individual FIT's and DO's, with MADA assuming control of the tertiary 
structures (see chapters seven and eight). 
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drainage system results in flooded fields which reduce yield, hamper mechanisation, reduce grain 
quality and increase pest and disease potentials (Low and eho, 1996:43). The delay in water 
distribution creates lags of up to 40 days in agricultural activities resulting in erratic cropping 
schedules and continuous planting (Ro, 1983; Kitamura & Jin, 1993). By having to adopt 
continuous planting there is a dramatic build-up of pests and disease, which when added to the 
reduced load bearing capacity of the paddy soil (brought about by increased mechanisation and 
erratic cropping schedules), severely inhibits the ability of the Muda I blocks to secure the 
productivity and stability requirements of the national government (Kitamura & Jin, 1993; Figure 
6.2). 
Because of this, in 1978 the Muda II irrigation project was launched, again with the assistance of 
World Bank funding. This project was designed to provide tertiary infrastructure with the aim of 
shortening the presaturation period in order to make effective use of the local water resource and 
to increase yields in accordance with national requirements (IIMI-MADA, 1994). To achieve this, 
the improvements were expected to comprise of the following: 
• To ensure an irrigation supply to high areas which at present do not receive positive supply; 
• To enable the practice of proper water management in the fields, thereby saving useful water 
and creating optimum conditions for padi cultivation; 
• To provide proper drainage in the field to prevent loss of grain during harvesting and [to] 
facilitate farm mechanisation; 
• To provide field access where lacking; and 
• To enable the formulation of an optimum management strategy to enhance agricultural 
development' (Ro, 1983:2). 
As with many of the infrastructure projects implemented in the Muda region, the objectives were 
orientated to the substantive policy goals of the federal government - to improve agricultural 
productivity. It was expected that this would be achieved by improving the intra-block 
distribution of water to provide a more timely, adequate and equitable water supply. In addition, it 
was anticipated that by organising the farmers into small geographical units, the operation and 
maintenance of the tertiary canals could be 'devolved' to the irrigators themselves. Furthermore, 
because of the increasing demand on the regional water resource it was anticipated that tertiary 
development would enable MADA to increase the efficient use and supply of this resource. 
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The main purpose of the Muda II scheme was to increase canal densities to 30-3Sm/ha thus 
improving water distribution and decreasing water requirements. In totality, the Muda II scheme 
facilitated the construction and implementation of: 
• tertiary canals and drains improving infrastructure intensity to 34m/ha; construction of farm 
roads along one side of most teltiary canals and drains; major drains and coastal bunds; project 
headquarters office; district offices and staff quarters; workshop facilities and seed stores. 
• Water Committees were formed within each block, organised around the ISU in an attempt to 
involve the farmers in the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure below the tertiary 
turnout. It was expected that this would facilitate the effective and efficient distribution and 
usage of water. In patticular these farmers were expected to organise collectively in the 
operation of the Field Irrigation Turnouts (FITs) and the Drainage Outlets (DOs). A 
committee was also organised around each ISA to oversee the entire block and resolve issues 
of conflict. 
• A rigid irrigation schedule was introduced based on a fixed 7 day rotation design, organised 
around each ISU and facilitating a presaturation duty of 14.6 acres/cusec and a subsequent 
continuous supplementary supply of 80 acres/cusec. The purpose of which was to implement 
a system of staggered cropping schedules within each block. This was facilitated by the 
enhancement of the water management and telecommunication system with associated 
agricultural support and extension services (MADA, 1988; Low & Cho, 1996). 
The purpose of chapters seven and eight are to explore the outcomes of tertiary development in 
more detail. Suffice it to say here, however, that the performance of teltiary development has 
been less than encouraging for both the procedural aims of MADA and the substantive aims of the 
federal government. In patticular, yields have not increased, on-farm management practices have 
not improved, water savings have not materialised and farm-derived incomes have not increased. 
What it has achieved, however, is to reduce the amount of time farmers have to spend in the field, 
thus increasing their capacity for off-farm productive and non-productive activities 117. 
117 See chapter eight for a detailed analysis of these arguments. 
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Group farming 
The group farming policy is a nation-wide development plan which was initiated under the 
National Agricultural Policy (NAP) in 1984 in direct response to the national objectives of rural 
poverty eradication. To achieve this, the NAP focused on the promotion of centralised farming in 
paddy production through the implementation of group farming (Kelompok Tani) and mini-estates 
(Projek Separa Perladangan) (Yasunobu et aI, 1996c). The aim of this policy is to overcome the 
increased existence of idle land within Malaysia through the grouping of farmers into larger farm 
sizes with the expectation of increasing overall farm incomes. 
The Muda region does not suffer from the problems of idle land, with only 2.9 per cent of total 
productive land not under cultivation. However, because of the inclusion of the group farming 
policy in the NAP, MADA is required by the federal government to implement this as a regional 
policy. For as one MADA official commented: 
'It has never been made clear [why MADA promote group farming], it is part of the 
national target that we must get into group farming' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
However, because of the cooperative nature of the MADA/state relationship, MADA is 
empowered to implement this policy in accordance with local conditions. Consequently, in the 
national context the aims are to ensure the cultivation of idle land, whereas in the Muda context 
emphasis is placed on the promotion of both efficient farming and the efficient use of water 
(Wong and Morooka, 1996). What this means, therefore, is that group farming in the Muda 
context is implemented to improve: 
• The efficient and effective use of water such that the member farmers can control water 
distribution and use collectively to ensure staggered planting and the resultant reduction of 
insects and disease; 
• More efficient extension practices between MADA staff and the farmers for better 
understanding and use of new technology; 
• The enhancement of the perception and attitudes of the farmers towards the cooperation of 
farming activities with specific reference to integrated pest and weed management; 
• A better economic return with respect to yields for financial and credit inputs; 
• The procurement of an appropriate amount of hired labour and negotiation with contractors to 
set proper fees (adapted from Morooka et aI, 1991). 
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All of these 'procedural expectations' are anticipated to increase the well-being and productivity 
of the farmers in accordance with the structural requirements of the federal government. As a 
policy, however, group farming is indicative of the power of MADA to implement programmes in 
accordance with substantive objectives using their own procedural prescriptions. Consequently, 
the capacity for MADA staff to implement this policy is administered by the provision of funding 
and the 'devolving' of decision-making powers to the lower levels. The commitment of MADA 
staff to this policy and the extent to which it has secured both the procedural and substantive 
objectives is dealt with in chapter eight. 
This section has sought to explain the cooperative relationship between the state and MADA in the 
intervention of policies in the Muda region. In so doing, the policy directive of the federal 
government and some of the means by which MADA prescribes to this directive have been 
illustrated. What this has achieved is to link that federal political economy articulated in chapter 
five with the formal, rules, regulations, procedures and programmes implemented by MADA in 
the Muda region. 
6.4 MADA-farmer linkage, cooperation or coercion? 
So far this chapter has explored the cooperative relationship between the state and MADA, 
recognising in particular the role of the federal government in the setting of substantive targets and 
the role of MADA in the setting of procedural targets to meet these higher-level objectives. 
Fundamental to the outcomes of both the substantive and procedural objectives are the farmers 
themselves. Consequently, the purpose of this section is to explore the formal process for farmer 
involvement and the resultant capacity and commitment of the farmers to the formal policy 
framework. 
Formal procedures for farmer involvement 
The Muda scheme is categorised as a large government-managed irrigation scheme where the 
formal procedures of governance, management and control are the responsibility of MADA with 
the farmers' management and control confined to on-farm practices 'below the outlet'. As the 
MADA officials state: 
'We have to control the small gate ... that is the responsibility of MADA either to 
close or open the gate. The farmers they control the tunnel that they make by 
themselves. So MADA will control at the gate only, past that it is the farmers 
responsibility' (MADA informant, No.1). 
CHAPTER SIX - Formal intervention: Coercive or cooperative? 
The farmers' responsibility usually starts from their field intake and the field 
channel. If they need to construct that is their responsibility, our responsibility is 
up to the tertiary canals' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
'From the beginning up to the main secondary it is our responsibility so the 
programme that we do, the method of construction, group maintenance and all 
that. All the facilities which are concerned, drainage and irrigation is our 
business. I think from the farmers side all the farm level, that is their 
responsibility .. .'(MADA informant, No. 14). 
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In Adams' classification (Figure 6.3), Muda is an example of the most bureaucratically managed 
and operated scheme available, providing a framework which offers limited formal decision-
making capacity for the farmers (Adams, 1990). In particular, the farmers have no formal 
involvement in the setting of either the 'collective-choice rules' or the 'constitutional-choice 
rules'. Where the farmers do have formal decision-making capacity, however, is in the 
'operational rules' and the implementation of intervention policies. This is achieved through the 
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Figure 6.3: Relations between scale and form of control in irrigation 
Source: Adams, 1990:1312 
interactions at the' interface' between the FA, Unit leaders and local-level extension and irrigation 
staff. This suggests that the relationship between MADA and the farmers is one of cooperation in 
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the day-to-day operation and management of the scheme, and the intervention of policies, but 
coercion in the overall governance of this day-to-day operation, management and intervention. 
By incorporating the role of the political economy in the model of actors and interactions in 
chapter two, the farmers are also perceived to be influential actors in the negotiation or priorities 
with both the state and MADA. For example, the farmers do not make direct decisions over the 
process by which the federal government sets its substantive targets or the procedures by which 
MADA implements their objectives. Instead, the farmers influence both the federal government 
and MADA's decision-making on a day-to-day basis through their networks, interactions and 
negotiations with MADA staff and government officials. What this means, therefore, is that a 
coercive approach is applied for the implementation of the rules, regulations and programmes of 
intervention. However, a cooperative approach is applied to the daily negotiations and problem 
solving between the farmers, MADA and government staff. Consequently, this suppOlis the 
argument that both a coercive and cooperative approach can be used in combination. However, 
the extent to which this is complementary and positively influencing the outcomes of government 
intervention is a matter for de bate 118. 
To explore these arguments, this section analyses the extent to which the state-farmer and MADA-
farmer relationship is one of coercion in governance and cooperation in management. The process 
by which the state requires the farmers to adhere to set policies, and the vehicles by which it 
achieves this, is the focus of the coercive state-farmer linkage. Meanwhile, the cooperative 
relationship between MADA and the farmers focuses on the process by which information is 
shared, conflicts are resolved and decisions are made in the day-to-day management of the Muda 
region. This is followed by an analysis of the resultant commitment and capacity of the farmers to 
the substantive and procedural elements, focusing in particular on the commitment and capacity of 
the farmers to the irrigation schedule. 
The coercive approach 
The state-farmer linkage is regarded as one of coercion because of the process by which the state 
government ensures that the farmers in the Muda region comply with prescribed standards. The 
incentives provided to the farmers to ensure their compliance with national objectives have been 
lIS This debate is explored in chapter nine with particular reference to the mis-match of the extension and 
enforcement obligations of MAD A staff. 
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examined in chapter five with respect to the politicised nature of rice farming l19 . However, to 
elaborate further: the farmers are 'required' to grow rice even if they could obtain higher incomes 
cultivating a different crop; the investment in irrigation and subsidised water charges ensures that 
the farmers are tied to MADA for their water supply and agronomic practices; the guaranteed 
support for rice ensures that the farmers sell this rice to the government controlled BERNAS; the 
free fertilisers ensures that the farmers use specific rice varieties and chemicals; and the subsidised 
interest rates on machinery ensures that they use particular technologies. These strategies ensure 
that the practice of rice farming is a viable occupation for the farmers and is recognised by the 
farmers as an important element in the continuation of this cultural practice. In particular, the 
farming community recognises the requirement by the government to support the rural Malay. As 
expressed by one farmer: 
'They [the government) don't want to depend on imports, if they import paddy 
from other countries they are loosing foreign exchange. The government have a 
strategy, they are not going to totally abandon the paddy field. We don't know if 
they are going to depend on our paddy as a source of food. Maybe they are 
going to import part of that and convert the land into other purposes maybe. So 
the government will do something to help the farmers' (Farmer informant, No.4). 
Because many of these incentives are administered through the Farmers' Association (FA), which 
is jointly-managed with MADA and hence the government, this tied relationship ensures that the 
. d I' f e' . bl' 120 commItment an comp lance 0 t e lanners, to state reqUIrements, IS not pro ematlc . 
Consequently, the FA is a critical organisation at the' interface' between the coercive procedures 
of the state and the resultant commitment and capacity of the farmers to these coercive strategies. 
The process by which the government controls the activities of the farming population is 
illustrated in the role of the FAin administering state policies. In particular, the FA serves as the 
forum in which the farmers obtain government subsidies. For as the farmers illustrate: 
'Being a PPK member we get credit facilities and make it better for us to 
communicate with MADA' (Farmer informant, No. 18). 
'To enjoy the loan from the agricultural bank you must be a PPK member 
otherwise the PPK will not support the loan. That is the rule set up by MADA or 
119 Although the incentives are perceived to be part of the cooperative framework, because non-compliance 
with these incentives results in 'exclusion' from the farming culture, they are in this respect regarded as 
prescribed rules that must be followed rather than inducements for compliance. This is illustrative of the 
difficulties of applying the coercive/cooperative framework developed in an western context to the 
Malaysian case-study. 
120 Here again this deviates from the theoretical perception that in a coercive framework commitment and 
compliance are perceived to be problematic. They are not perceived to be problematic here because of the 
tied relationship between the farmers and the state. 
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the government. If you want to enjoy the loan from the agricultural bank you must 
become a PPK member' (Farmer informant, No. 25). 
, [For] the current [maintenance] policy, the contract is through the PPK and the 
PPK will decide who will get this maintenance of the canal. Normally PPK give 
back to their members to do this contract and they enjoy the profit they get ... ' 
(MADA informant, No.1). 
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Therefore, in order to obtain the subsidies on offer from the government it is advantageous to be a 
member of the FA. However, because rice farming is a Malay dominated occupation and an 
impOliant tool for the governments societal restructuring policies, the Chinese are unable to 
become members of the FA. This effectively limits the ability of the Chinese farmers to benefit 
from the FA administered subsidy programmes: 
'Being a member of the PPK or any other organisation is good but for the PPK the 
Chinese are not allowed to join. I want to become a member but I am not 
allowed. Being a member of the PPK, the transportation costs for fertilisers are 
subsidised by the government and is lower than non-members' (Farmer 
informant, No.7). 
The control of the FA is not, however, the only vehicle by which the government ensures the 
compliance of the farmers with its substantive policies. Being a member ofUMNO in the farming 
community, for example, enables individual farmers to partake in village organisations responsible 
for the development of the region. The foremost of which is the JKKKl21 , an organisation 
responsible for the social and economic development of the kampung. Being a member of this 
organisation enables the farmers to obtain financial support and assistance; however, this 
organisation is only open to members of UMNO. Therefore, to receive assistance farmers must 
comply with the objectives of the ruling party. For as the farmers articulate: 
'JKKK is part of UMNO, for PAS there is no JKKK because this JKKK is set up by 
government through UMNO. If you are from the opposition party you not have 
chance to be one of the JKKK' (Farmer informant, No. 25). 
'There is one association (JKKK) for paddy farmers which is very active. JKKK 
has a voice in pressuring the government and MADA to handle the problem with 
the farmers' (Farmer informant, No.6). 
This is not, however, to say that the link with MADA is officially influenced by political 
affiliation. For, as expressed by one official: 
'I think in the Muda area we take pride in saying that our farmers organisations is 
not really hampered by political affiliations. You are probably aware that some of 
121 Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung (Village Development and Security Committee). 
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the heads of these FA's, I think the latest figures that I got is that 8 or 9 of them 
are from the opposition party' (MADA informant, No. 18). 
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The process by which MADA seeks to secure the substantive targets of the federal government 
means that MADA also implements coercive rules of governance even if the management rules 
are ones of cooperation. As expressed in section 6.3, the formal procedures for farmer 
involvement in the management and control of the water resource is confined to their on-farm 
management practices 'below the outlet'. Meanwhile, MADA assumes all other formal 
responsibilities 'above the outlet'. Consequently, the farmers have no formal capacity to control 
the water resource beyond their on-farm management practices and any attempt to do so is illegal. 
Such attempts include the illegal diverting, blocking, pumping and piping of the water as well as 
the more direct opening and tampering with the control structures122. In accordance with the 
coercive approach, these rules and regulations are implemented in a detailed, 'order like' and 
prescriptive manner in order to ensure rule compliance - evident in the WMCS. In theory, failure 
to comply with these rules leads to the imposition of penalties. However, as shall be explored in 
chapter nine, the power of the farmers and the fusion of the enforcement and extension practices of 
MADA officials means that MADA is unable to implement these penalties. Such rule compliance 
is, however, critical for the smooth management of the water resource. Consequently, the rules of 
governance for water management and the policies of intervention are 'order like' and prescriptive 
on the pati of MAD A, as illustrated in the intonation of the following quotes: 
'We have a clear campaign between 1991 and 1996 tell them at all levels that if 
they want to wait for a wet crop your going to miss your seeding because we are 
not going to release water. So the fact is whatever farmers say they do not like it 
but the fact is that the average already in dry seeding is stated very clearly in our 
annual crop income, the entire area they have done, they may not like it but 
they have accepted it' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
'Our systems are not designed to supply water simultaneously to the entire 
scheme, we have to do by rotation because it has to depend on the capacity of 
the main canals, we do not have the capacity to supply water to the whole area. 
That means that many areas if they want water we will not give to them 
because it is not their turn' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
'So we enforce them to do under group farming if possible because immediately 
they have problem since they cannot co-operate among themselves so the 
problem is large' (MADA informant, No.1 0). 
The rules and regulations implemented in the governance of the Muda scheme are a central feature 
of the MADA-farmer linkage. However, although the farmers have no formal decision-making 
capacity in this governance, the interaction between MADA and the farmers in the day-to-day 
122 See chapter nine for a detailed analysis of these informal practices. 
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management is by contrast cooperative in nature. To elaborate on this argument further, the 
analysis in the following section focuses on the process by which information flows between 
MADA and the farmers - serving to illustrate the decision-making capacity of the farmers in the 
management of the Muda scheme. 
The cooperative approach 
The cooperative approach recognises the need to prescribe processes and goals but does not 
prescribe the actions or plans required to achieve this. In this respect, commitment and 
compliance to the substantive goals is not perceived to be problematic and the role of the higher-
level government is to develop plans, programmes and provide advice to ensure rule compliance 
whilst not imposing penalties for non-compliance. In analysing the cooperative nature of the 
MADA-farmer linkage in the day-to-day management of the Muda scheme, this section focuses on 
the daily interaction, negotiations and conflict resolutions between MADA staff and the farmers. 
Much of the formal contact between MADA and the farmers is determined by the rules of contact, 
and hence information flows, between the different hierarchical structures of MADA and in their 
links with the farmers. In particular, the federal policies are coordinated at the local level by 
linkages between MADA Headquarters, district staff and local extension officers. This means that 
the procedures for the transfer of information between MADA and the farmers is largely 
hierarchical and dependent as much on individual agency as their position within the bureaucracy. 
The formal process by which information is communicated requires a complex system of linkages 
within which the direction, articulation and manipulation of information occurs. Based on the 
interviews with MADA staff and the farmers, Figure 6.4 indicates this communication process 
from both a 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' perspective]23. 
At each nodal point in the model individuals and groups of actors exchange information on either 
water or non-water related topics. This classification dictates the communication route within 
which information is shared. Formally, the farmers are required to channel requests and 
complaints about the water resource through the engineering section with all other issues being 
dealt with by the FA and the agricultural section of MADA. However, as the following MADA 
official comments, where water information is directed to the agricultural division, or agricultural 
123 Although this model is an oversimplification of the codified procedures of information exchange, it serves 
to highlight the official points of communication between the farmers and MADA and within MADA itself. 
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information is directed to the engineering division, these officials are required to pass this 
information onto the relevant division: 
'[Farmers normally complain] about this rice programme, the farming programme, 
something on weeds, on pests and disease. That is our function [agricultural 
division] to overcome their problems. Sometimes they complain about water 
even though in MADA we have two different divisions, my side is under 
agricultural division and we have another division the engineering division 
whereby the engineering side is responsible for water management about the 
irrigation and drainage - it is not under our division. Almost always we 
supplement [assist] them, that is why when you see MADA staff they always help, 
they don't care even if they talk to you [about water]. Even under the engineering 
division they consult about [the] agricultural problem' (MADA informant, No. 12). 
The interaction of actors at the nodes articulated in the model provides the point of intersection 
within which human agency is articulated, knowledge is transformed and power is made effective. 
Consequently, this complex system of interaction dictates the extent to which information is 
interpreted, acted upon or ignored by the actors concerned. As such, although the model indicates 
the official procedures of communication, the reality is dependent on the way in which these 
actors interpret and translate this information from both a structural and individual position. This 
then creates the informal practice of communication which diverges from the formal process 
articulated in the model. 
From a top-down perspective, rules regarding the allocation and management of the water 
resource are developed at the headquarters level, passed down through the relative sub-sections of 
the district-levels and local-levels before being transferred to the farmers through the unit leaders. 
Likewise, rules and information which are agronomic or non-water related such as subsidies, 
credit allocation, group farming and planting methods are generated within the agricultural 
division and passed through a similar hierarchical structure to the farmers. The nodal contact for 
this information is with the Board of Directors (BOD's) of the FA within each of the Agricultural 
Development Service Centres in the 27 localities. The main function of which is to provide 
extension, supervise credit, market produce and supply agricultural inputs. Consequently, the 
aims of the FA are not dissimilar to the substantive aims of the federal government: 
• To advance the knowledge and technical skills of the farmers; 
• to increase farm productivity and incomes; 
• to improve the standard ofliving of the farmers; and 
• to develop the rural economy and community (Samik, 1977:2). 
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The role of the FA is not, however, to prescribe standards or act as regulatory agents for the 
enforcement of such standards. Instead, they are development institutions for providing 
information, advice and inputs for the fanning community. In particular, any problems regarding 
the farming or non-farming activities within the rural community, which are not water related, is 
the responsibility of the FA. The FA is not, however, an independent body but is regulated and 
supervised by the agricultural extension staff within each locality. Consequently, the management 
of the FA is the joint responsibility of both the MADA extension officers and the farmers through 
the leadership of its Board of Directors (Figure 6.5). 
MADA FA 
Manager 
cil Representative Coun  
Accounting Economics Small Agricultural Unit 
Figure 6.5: Organisational structure of Farmers Association 
Source: Adapted from Ramli, 1984:18,20 
s 
This joint responsibility means that the FA is an important vehicle for the channelling of 
information from MADA to the farmers: 
'[Information is provided] through the PPK and then the PPK will give instruction 
to the farmers. They are always in the office so I just wonder over and tell them' 
(MADA informant, No.6). 
'We have so many techniques [for disseminating information], the first one is 
through the FA, through this organisation we can organise meetings. We have 
annual meeting at PPK level and at locality level, so in that gathering they can talk 
about everything there is no formalities. It is very informal otherwise it wouldn't 
work' (MADA informant, No. 15). 
The role of the BOD's is to formulate policy guidelines, determine projects, approve spending, and 
channel information and complaints between the farmers and MAD A staff (Ramli, 1984). As 
elected or chosen farmer representatives, they are, therefore, powerful members of the community: 
'I can make change by being a member of the Board of Directors. I will act as a 
mediator in between the government and farmers because I will bring up the 
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problem being faced by the farmers in this area and let the government solve the 
problem' (Farmer informant, No. 26). 
'Normally I by-pass the unit leader and go straight to MADA because I am board 
of director' (Farmer informant, No.5). 
'the BOD will identify the problem faced by farmers in a particular area and then 
bring up at the meeting [FA], so it is the point of contact for the farmers ... We pass 
the information through the PPK, because the PPK they have a unit every group 
of relongs and then from there they form their own committee and send a 
representative to the annual meeting, or for the meeting, and then from there 
MADA will pass the information to them. Then the PPK pass to the BOD and unit 
leader then pass the information to their members' (MADA informant No.5). 
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This is not to say, however, that they are the most powerful members of the community. In fact, 
the most powerful members are arguably the religious leaders (IMAM) who hold both respect and 
power in the village: 
'I act as an IMAM in the small mosque over there so normally all the community in 
this area they agree with me. I have the final say' (Farmer informant, No. 21). 
'Being a committee member of the mosque administration I enjoy a good 
relationship with the people at feeder x because when they are having water 
problems they want to open the small tunnel at feeder x to let the water flow into 
the small canal in front of my house so it makes it easier for me because they will 
listen to my opinion' (Farmer informant, No. 22). 
MADA also recognise the importance of these religious leaders and target these individuals as a 
way of enhancing farmer-to-fanner extension practices. For as one official commented: 
'Other than giving the advice for farmers to follow the irrigation schedule we use 
the influential people in that particular kampung or that particular area or unit. 
Normally we use the IMAM, the head of the mosque, they are very influential 
people in the kampung, and JKKK and the active farmers in that area. We 
persuade him to follow the irrigation schedule and let him get better yield and then 
the other farmers will follow. If we target the most influential people in that 
kampung they have the final say in everything' (MADA informant, No.8). 
The BOD's and the FA are the formal nodes of contact between MADA and the farmers for non-
water related issues. For water related issues the rules of contact are via the unit leaders. 
Consequently, any problems or difficulties experienced by the farmers regarding the water 
resource should be articulated to the unit leader and not directly to MADA: 
' ... the unit leader will make complaint because the members of that area will make 
complaint to him and he will bring up to MADA and then from there we will take 
action. We do not take action from individual farmers' (MADA informant, No.9). 
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'I will see the percentage of farmers that need water. If let's say only one farmer 
needs water I will not entertain. Considering the area involved with a problem 
with the water so I will then entertain them' (MADA informant, No.1). 
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This is not to say that informal interactions between the farmers and extension staff are not 
important, for as expressed by one of these local-level staff: 
'When we go around to check the gates, beside of information through pamphlet, 
by the mosque I will give advise to the farmers, this is better from mouth to mouth 
is better flow of information. Normally the unit leader will come here to seek 
information and I will give information direct to farmers whenever I am in the field' 
(MADA informant, No.4). 
Such informality is an important factor in the day-to-day management of the water resource. 
However, this does not diminish the importance of the unit leaders as the first point of reference 
for the negotiations between MADA staff and the fanners. In particular, the farmers widely 
recognised the unit leader as 'the proper channel' for the communication of water related problems 
between the farmers and MADA staff: 
'I always meet the unit leader if I have any problem and then the unit leader will 
bring the problem to either the PPK or MADA to solve the problem. I go through 
the proper channel, I go through the unit leader first and let the unit leader solve 
the problem' (Farmer informant, No. 18). 
'I don't have any contact with MADA staff but I have contact with local unit leader. 
I follow the rules, so I should not contact MADA staff' (Farmer informant, No. 13). 
'I follow the schedule and I don't over pass the unit leader so when I have any 
problems I will go and tell the unit leader' (Farmer informant No.6). 
'Being a unit leader, the farmers if they have problem they come to see me and I 
will bring up to MADA. Normally I will contact with MADA agents, that is the 
person responsible for water distribution or water problem' (Farmer informant No. 
25). 
'If I had a problem I would go through the proper channel and go to the unit 
leader. He is a close friend of mine' (Farmer informant No.8). 
Any information or advice about water related activities that MADA wishes to provide the farmers 
is also passed through the unit leaders. For example, the farmers are informed of the water 
schedule by either posters located in local coffee shops and mosques or through the unit leader: 
'When MADA is going to supply water the specific date that the farmers should 
have water according to the schedule is already informed by MADA through the 
unit leader ... ' (MADA informant No.2). 
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The quality and responsibility of these leaders is, therefore, a critical component for problem 
solving and rule compliance. Furthermore, the relationship between the BOD's, unit leaders and 
MADA staff also affects the extent to which MADA officers act on, manipulate, or ignore issues 
presented to them. As such, any complaints made by the farmers must first be regarded as 
important enough for the BOD's/unit leaders to pass onto MADA and then for the MADA officers 
to act upon. Problem solving, therefore, is dependent on either a large percentage of farmers 
voicing out their concerns to the BOD's/unit leaders; the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of 
the significance of these problems by the unit leader; and the resultant action by MADA staff. 
Formally, however, the responsibility of MAD A officers is to: 
'act whenever there is a complaint made by the unit leader, that means that the 
farmers will lodge complaint with the unit leaders and then the unit leader will 
consult with me' (MADA informant No.1). 
Through this process, the cooperative nature of the MADA/farmer linkage emerges, whereby it is 
the information exchange between the BOD's, unit leaders and MADA staff that influences the 
decision-making of these actors: 
'They will have briefing by officer from MADA and the unit leader and delegates 
will voice out the suggestion or maybe complain so they give their opinion and 
sometimes there is minor changes for the project proposed by MADA and then 
from there they are going to implement the programme. MADA will make minor 
changes based on the opinion put out by farmers through the unit leader and 
delegates' (Farmer informant, No. 26). 
The cooperation between MADA and the fanners is critical to ensure the stabilising and increasing 
of yields and the improvements in the management of the water resource to ensure an adequate, 
reliable and timely delivery of water to the farmers: 
'Of course they have to cooperate with MADA because if we want to supply water 
and the farmers are not ready yet to start farming activities so there is a big 
problem, there has to be co-operation among farmers and MADA' (MADA 
informant, No.5). 
The ability of MADA to action the requirements of the farming community is, however, largely 
dependent on the resources available at each hierarchical level - hence their capacity. If this 
capacity does not exist at the local level, the information/request is passed to the district level 
where action is either taken or the information/request is passed to the headquarters. Where 
MADA cannot action such requests, the Ministry of Agriculture or other government agencies are 
consulted. This is an extensive procedure that requires both time and resources for problems to be 
solved. For as one fanner articulated: 
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'I am only dealing with MADA about the water, nothing else but water. There is 
someone that is responsible for irrigation [line operators] but they just take the 
case and make a report. They say never mind we take your case and make a 
report to Jitra office [district level] to solve my problem but nothing gets 
done .... MADA can't do anything because there is the red tape of administration, if 
they suggest something to do the final say rests with the agricultural minister. So 
the red tape jeopardises their effort to make a better irrigation system. The best 
person to solve this problem is the federal government level, maybe the minister 
of agriculture or environment minister or somebody else. Higher than this level .. ' 
(Farmer informant No. 14). 
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The cooperative relationship in the day-to-day management of the Muda scheme inevitably leads 
to conflict and misunderstanding. For as Handmer articulates; 'there must be a process to deal 
with conflicts between the different interests groups ... ' (Handmer, 1996:191). At the local level, 
such conflicts between MADA staff and the farmers are due to the different perceptions about how 
farming practices should be conducted and the resultant supply, or lack of supply, by MADA for 
individual farmers' needs: 
'Normally there is disagreement between MADA and farmers because let's say 
the water to flow to their field takes two days, for example, and then within two 
days there is heavy rain so by that time there is big problem, the farmers say how 
can you give me so much water by that time I don't need water? So then who 
knows that there is going to be rain today? That is the disagreement that 
normally occur between farmers and MADA' (MADA informant, No.1). 
'Yes, I have experienced some conflict sometimes I say you have done wrongly 
you should do this and they say that's what all the farmers are doing. They 
always refer to their friends rather than the MADA staff. So it makes you think 
that there is cooperation but not the type we want. So it is very hard, they like to 
follow their friends rather than follow our advice .. .' (MADA informant, No.1 0). 
For some farmers these disagreements are directly attributed to the lack of commitment by MADA 
to the problems and difficulties being faced by the farmers: 
'[This area has big water problems] because it is under the control of government, 
every year we make a report and every year we go to the meeting and report and 
next on the 12th we also have a meeting and also big report, you see my 
invitation on the 12th - also a report. And the report bring to Jitra and Jitra back 
to Alor Setar and Alor Setar pass to Kuala Lumpur and then pushed inside the 
desk. The administration is a big problem .. .' (Farmer informant, No. 14). 
'I am only dealing with MADA staff about the water, nothing else but water. There 
is someone that is responsible for irrigation (line operators) they just take the 
case and make the report. They say never mind we take your case and make a 
report to Jitra office to solve my problem but nothing gets done' (Farmer 
informant, No. 14). 
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To other farmers, however, the conflicts and misunderstandings are not due to the lack of 
commitment by MADA staff but their lack of capacity to solve the problems facing the farming 
community: 
There is the PPK or MADA less give attention for this area because of the water 
problem. There is only say that they will solve the problem but they don't actually 
do anything. Because they can't do anything about the water they disregard this 
area' (Farmer informant, No. 15). 
'I have contact with MADA staff, the young man, the line operator. Normally the 
MADA staff can't solve my problem because if I have a problem with water there 
is no water inside the canal, how can MADA want to help. There is nothing they 
can do' (Farmer informant, No. 15). 
Here, however, we find disagreement because rather than recognising any lack of commitment or 
capacity on the part of MADA, the local-level officials were more inclined to articulate the lack of 
commitment by the farmers themselves as the cause of many of the disputes, conflicts and 
problems that emerge: 
'MADA conduct a meeting to ask farmer to cooperate in using water to make 
them use the water properly but normally there is less response from the farmers' 
(MADA informant, No.1). 
That one don't listen because they don't maintain a good relationship with MADA 
because sometimes if they have a meeting either a PPK meeting, or briefing 
about the new technology or new seeds which is going to be introduced, they 
don't come here. Then they don't participate in the course which we organise so 
from there we can see this is a lack of cooperation among farmers .. .' (MADA 
informant, No.3). 
It is likely, however, that the difficulties experienced between MADA and the farmers in the day-
to-day management of the scheme are a combination of the commitment and capacity of both 
MADA and the farmers alike. To examine the extent to which the farmers are committed to the 
formal procedures which emerge from the coercive/cooperative MADA-farmer linkage, the 
following section explores the differing perceptions ofthe irrigation schedule. 
Commitment and capacity to the irrigation schedule 
As was expanded on in section 6.3, the planning and implementation of the irrigation schedule is 
one of the most important decision-making processes in the cropping cycle. Therefore, an analysis 
of the commitment and capacity of the farmers to follow this schedule serves as a useful example 
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of the farmers attitudes to the formal framework. The aim of this section, therefore, is to explore 
the differing perceptions and attitudes of the farmers and MADA staff to this schedule. 
When conducting the interviews with MADA staff and the farmers, questions about the 
importance of, and compliance with, the irrigation schedule were addressed124. In analysing these 
responses, there is a clear dichotomy between the perceptions and attitudes of the farmers and 
MADA staff. In particular, the MADA staff tended to advocate a lack of commitment on the part 
of the farmers as the principal problem with compliance. For as illustrated in the following 
quotes, these staff regarded any lack of adherence to the irrigation schedule to be because of the 
'bad attitudes' of the fanners, the 'wait and see' approach to farming and their individualistic 
attitudes: 
'If the farmers follow the schedule when we give water through stages then that 
one is very important but since the farmers don't want to follow the irrigation 
schedule and don't want to follow whatever MADA say so that is why MADA take 
time to mend' (MADA informant, No.7). 
'Normally the farmers who make complaint that they don't have enough water are 
the farmers which don't follow the irrigation schedule' (MADA informant, No.1). 
'I think that certain farmers don't follow the irrigation schedule because they have 
to see whether this schedule is of benefit to them. (Because we have the situation 
in the block because) if every farmers adhere to the schedule then there would be 
no problem but there are certain farmers who I don't know but just couldn't adhere 
to the planting schedule because they say that no good for whatever, they just 
cannot follow. What we see is that there are problems within the farmers 
themselves, within the block, within a group of farmers there are problems, some 
have the attitude that they are with their friends and they wait and see, we'll do it 
when our friends do it. I think that is the contributing factor to the roles, until we 
can at least actually convince the farmers .. .' (MADA informant, No. 14). 
'When MADA is going to supply water the specific date that the farmers should 
have water according to the schedule is already informed by MADA through the 
unit leader or maybe the line operator but the bad farmers they don't care. They 
don't care what time you are going to release water, what time you are going to 
drain water he just follow the other farmers, as long as I get enough water it is 
OK. Let's say that after 3 days of MADA releasing water you are supposed to 
close the tunnel they don't care they just let the tunnel open, that is the big 
problem .. .' (MADA informant, No.2). 
The biggest problem is because farmers don't follow the irrigation schedule so at 
certain times because they don't follow the irrigation schedule they can't get water 
at the particular time they need because the water supply is according to the 
irrigation schedule so when they don't follow the irrigation schedule that means 
there will be problems. Because this is an attitude among farmers, let the other 
farmers do first, see, see first, look and see. If the farmers in that block start first 
then he will follow so this is the attitude of farmers, they want someone else to 
start first so when we ask when are you going to start the farming activities they 
124 See the semi-structured interview guides in Appendices B: 1 and B:2. 
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say wait for other person see for them to start first, this is the bad attitude' (MADA 
informant, No.3). 
166 
This is not to say that only the MADA staff regarded the non-committal attitude of the farmers to 
be problematic. What is interesting, however, is that of the two farmers who regarded the 
commitment of the farmers to the irrigation schedule to be problematic both were BOD's of the 
FA. What this suggests, therefore, is that the close association between the FA, BOD's and 
MADA staff is influencing the knowledge and attitudes of these BOD's to the farming community: 
'It is fair but the farmers don't follow the schedule set up by MADA. MADA set up 
the schedule but the farmers don't follow the schedule so that is the problem. If 
they followed the schedule and the time that MADA open the gates then they 
would have no problem. There are three blocks in this area and there is a 
specific time when MADA are going to open the gates to each block, so the 
problem is that the farmers are not ready yet by that time so the farmers are 
supposed to get ready. MADA has already informed the unit leader when they 
are going to open the gate but the farmers are not ready yet' (Farmer informant, 
No.4). 
'In general it is fair to all farmers, but there are certain farmers that maybe they 
don't follow the schedule set up by MADA so those farmers will face a problem 
with water. If they follow the schedule set by MADA then there is no problem. 
For the land far from the canal they have to put more effort, pump water and build 
up the small pipe' (Farmer informant, No.5). 
By contrast, the farmers who are not BOD's tended to advocate their lack of capacity as the reason 
for not following the schedule implemented by MADA. In this regard, the farmers recognise the 
importance of the schedule but have been unable to conduct their farming practices in accordance 
with this: 
'I can't follow the schedule set up by MADA because there is a water problem so 
if MADA can improve their management of the water then they can put the 
irrigation system in' (Farmer informant, No. 14). 
'Normally we can't follow the schedule because of the water problem, we can't 
follow it is impossible' (Farmer informant, No. 15). 
'The irrigation schedule is good but sometimes we can't follow because we have 
to depend on the other farmers in this area. Let's say MADA say water will be 
released on the second and sometimes water cannot reach this area let's say on 
the 5th or 6th, the water needs 7 days to reach this area so it is not very reliable 
exactly when the date is' (Farmer informant, No. 19). 
'The water supply is enough but some farmer land is far from the canal but if they 
follow the MADA instructions about when to plan and when water will be supplied 
then they should be OK' (Farmer informant, No.1). 
What we have, therefore, is a clear dichotomy between the perception of the commitment and 
capacity of the farmers to the irrigation schedule dependent on the position of the respondent in 
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the MADA-farmer framework. What this suggests, therefore, is that although the cooperative 
approach to the day-to-day management is important for securing farmer compliance with the 
formal regulations, because the governance (decision-making) which drives this management is 
one of coercion, there are conflicting assumptions of the commitment and compliance of the 
farmers. The extent to which this is influencing the outcomes of government policies is dealt with 
in chapters seven, eight and nine which follow. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to articulate the complex process by which the national policies examined 
in chapter five are implemented at the local level in the Muda scheme. In analysing the irrigation 
management literature a significant gap is observed in our conceptual understanding of the linkage 
between the governance and management of irrigation schemes and the policy framework within 
which this is practised. In particular, it is argued that the traditional irrigation management 
literature does not explore the objectives of all actors within the intervention process, preferring 
instead to dichotomise between users and rule-makers at the level of the irrigated agricultural 
system. 
To explore the formal linkage between the state, MADA and the farmers a coercive/cooperative 
framework, developed in the hazard management field, was applied to the study of irrigated 
agriculture. This was recognised to be a useful framework for exploring the process by which 
MADA implements policies and procedures in accordance with the requirements of the federal 
government. In this respect, the MADA-state framework was found to be one of cooperation. 
Moreover, due to the scale and complexity associated with the management of the Muda region, 
the relationship between MADA and the farmers was found to be one of both coercion and 
cooperation, with the approach to system governance illustrative of a coercive approach and the 
day-to-day management illustrative of a cooperative approach, resulting in the co-management of 
the irrigation system. The extent to which this formal framework of intervention is achieving its 
expectations is the focus of the following chapters. In particular, chapters seven and eight which 
follow examine the intended and unintended outcomes of one government policy - tertiary 
intervention. 
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Tertiary Intervention: An Evaluation of Water Supply 
Performance 
The formal expectations, rules and regulations which have materialised from within the 
cooperative policy framework were set out in chapter six. What this achieved was an 
understanding of the complexity associated with the translation of federal policy expectations into 
local-level programmes, rules and regulations. The question is, what have been the intended and 
unintended outcomes of this formal intervention? 
To explore this question, the next two chapters are dedicated to an analysis of one specific 
intervention policy - tertiary development125 . In so doing, this chapter is assigned to an evaluation 
of the water supply/delivery performance of tertiary intervention, with chapter eight focusing on 
the performance of tertiary intervention with respect to the four dimensions of: water control; 
agricultural productivity; farmer cooperation; and water management strategies. As a result, the 
findings in this chapter are in direct response to the third research question articulated in section 
1.5, and those in chapter eight are in direct response to questions one and two. Finally, chapter 
nine responds to the first research question by examining the informal practices of the farmers and 
MADA staff which are contributing to the intended and unintended outcomes of both the 
procedural and substantive policy objectives. 
In assessing the outcomes of government intervention we are, by default, assessing the 
performance of the irrigation scheme when set against certain targets or objectives. This chapter 
begins by providing a conceptual understanding of what is meant by irrigation performance and 
how it is measured. Having articulated the importance of water use efficiency in the Muda 
context, the research findings are presented on a 'with' and 'without' project basis when analysing 
the extent to which tertiary facilities have increased the efficient use of water and met with policy 
expectations. This is regarded as a critical factor for successful policy implementation when 
compared with project objectives. 
125 This policy is targeted for evaluation because it is the primary vehicle through which MADA and the 
federal government aim to increase the standard of living of the farmers by increasing yields. 
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7.1 What is 'performance' and how is it measured? 
Much of the research into large-scale irrigation schemes has focused on 'performance', asking in 
particular, what is performance and how is it measured? This is an impOliant question because: 
'With increasing population and demand for food, sustainable production 
increases from agriculture must be achieved. With limited freshwater and land 
resources, and increasing competition for these resources, irrigation agriculture 
worldwide must improve its utilization of these resources' (Molden et aI, 
1998:1). 
To improve the utilisation of resources, and to ensure sustainable production, it is necessary to 
establish the current status of irrigation performance and the assessment methods used. Likewise, 
to understand performance and policy outcomes we need to articulate from whose perspective 
performance is measured and from what statiing point performance is assessed: Within large 
government-managed schemes, for example, the performance of new schemes is often set against 
the targets of system implementation; for rehabilitated schemes, the performance is often assessed 
by contrasting 'before' and 'after' indices against certain objectives; and, in the ongoing 
improvement of existing systems the performance is often set against policy objectives by 
contrasting 'with' and 'without' project indices. 
To assess the performance of large-scale irrigation schemes it is useful to articulate the distinction 
between objectives and criteria as advocated by Chambers (1988). Such a distinction recognises 
that objectives are the expected outcomes or 'ends' of irrigation intervention as opposed to criteria 
which are the benchmarks used to establish system performance which are easier to measure and 
more specific (Chambers, 1988:29). The problem is that although actors can generally agree on 
the objectives of intervention, the criteria for assessing performance is very much dependent on 
the personal attributes and disciplinary background of these actors (Table 7.1). These criteria are 
constantly negotiated between the actors concerned and no generic conceptual understanding of 
'good performance' has emerged. 
Since 1988 there has been a concerted effort to improve both the methodologies and the 
conceptual tools with which to analyse 'performance'. Much of this work has been conducted by 
specialists in the International Irrigation (Water) Management Institute (IIMIIIWMI)126 in 
126 In November 1998, the act of parliament in Sri Lanka which incorporates IIMI with the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was amended to read International Water 
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Type of person Possible first criterion of good system performance 
Landless labourer Increased labour demand, days of working and wages 
Farmer Delivery to his or her farm of an adequate, convenient, predictable and 
timely water supply for preferred farming practices [and a 'reasonable' 
commensoration for the effort spent] 
Irrigation engineer 
Agricultural engineer 
Agronomist 
Efficient delivery of water from headworks to outlet 
Efficient delivery and field application of irrigation water, from the outlet to 
the root zone of the crop 
Creation and maintenance of the 'optimum moisture regime and plant 
growth and in particular (maximising) production of that part of the plant 
which is the harvestable product' (Willens 1975: 1) 
Agricultural economist High and stable farm production and incomes 
General economist A high internal rate of return 
Political economist Equitable distribution of benefits especially to disadvantaged groups 
Sociologist __ P~cipation of irrigat()r~il'1r:!lt:l_1'1t:l9~':!1el'1tm _m_, __ '. __ 
Table 7.1: Criteria of good system performance according to person's expertise 
Source: Adapted from Chambers, 1988:30 
collaboration with others. The problem is that a comprehensive understanding of performance, 
and in turn how irrigated agriculture is performing, has not been satisfactorily answered. This is 
because of the diversity of irrigation contexts, the catalogue of performance criteria, and the 
variety of variables which influence irrigated agricultural performance. Furthermore, these 
variables are generally project-specific, dependent on: system design, operation and management; 
environmental, economic and political conditions; socio-economic and cultural settings. 
Consequently, much of the performance assessment to date has been on what Molden at al (1998) 
term 'internal process indicators', referring to the assessment of irrigation performance criteria 
that are directly related to system objectives. The result is a very broad definition of irrigation 
performance: 
'Performance is the results delivered by an irrigation system towards a set of 
objectives including productivity, equity, reliability, sustainability, profitability 
and quality of life' (lIMI, 1989:11, cited in Hvidt, 1997: 45). 
Such a definition highlights the range of objectives used in an assessment of irrigation 
performance. It is not the aim of this chapter to analyse the use or mis-use of such objectives. 
However, two criteria for assessing system performance which are most often employed are worth 
elaboration: the efficient use of water and the productivity of irrigated agriculture (Uphoff et aI, 
1991). 
Management Institute (IWMI). IIMI and IWMI will be used throughout this thesis interchangeably 
depending on the date of publication of referenced material. 
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Bos and Nugteren (1974) have categorised irrigation efficiencies as conveyance efficiency, 
distribution efficiency, field application efficiency and project efficiency (Bos & Nugteren, 
1974:8-11). Each definition is associated with a particular relationship between water supply, use 
and output, as a means of calculating water supply/use performance. These criteria are regularly 
used by engineers during project appraisal exercises, although there is no reason to assume that 
farmers would approach the supply and use of water in this way. Furthermore, as has been argued 
by Small (1992), the perception that these are value free, technical judgements which can be used 
as a yardstick for analysis across systems is misplaced because of the implicit or explicit 
jUdgements required for their analytical use. For as Small states: 
'Measures of efficiency are never simply measures of total outputs to total 
inputs. The laws of thermodynamics imply that for any system, total outputs 
must equal total inputs. Efficiency becomes a meaningful concept only when it 
compares useful or desirable outputs to inputs. All efficiency measures, 
including those considered to measure efficiency in some "technical" sense must 
therefore incorporate explicit or implicit value judgements associated with the 
identification or definition of 'useful outputs" (Small, 1992:5 emphasis in the 
original). 
These 'outputs' are determined by the overall system objectives. One such 'output' or objective is 
agricultural productivity - often measured by economists as a means of assessing how well 
irrigated agriculture is performing. The underlying philosophy is that a higher productivity of 
land, water or human resources is a key criteria in assessing performance. However, like 
efficiencies, the measurement of productivity is also dependent on the values and judgements 
associated with the choice of inputs and outputs used to assess productivity. After all, 
hydrologists are likely to measure the productivity of water in the catchment down to the root 
zone. Agricultural economists, on the other hand, are likely to measure inputs and outputs with 
respect to agricultural production (Chambers, 1988:35). 
The case-by-case approach to the study of performance means that although this research has 
significantly contributed to our understanding of irrigation systems, there is still no sound 
theoretical foundation for cross-case comparison. When Rao (1993) summarised the literature he 
found many examples of 'internal process indicators' relating to equity, efficiency, reliability, 
productivity, stability and sustainability. Examples of which include Martin et aI, 1986; Seckler et 
aI, 1988; Sampath, 1988; Levine and Coward, 1989; Mao Zhi, 1989; Molden & Gates, 1990; 
Shivakoti, 1992; Aeron-Thomas, 1992; Small, 1992; and Bos et aI, 1994127 . However, throughout 
127 For a general overview of large-scale performance readers are directed to Martin et al (1986); Mao Zhi 
(1989) and Shivakoti (1992). For a detailed description of issues of equity readers are directed to Sampath 
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his summary, Rao found very few examples of cross-system comparisons or analysis, such as 
those of Bos & Nugteren, 1974; Murray-Rust & Snellen, 1993; and Molden et ai, 1998. This is 
because the evaluation of system performance is still a perplexing and complex question in that 
although large-scale schemes are perceived to be 'under performing' there is still no 
comprehensive understanding of what performance should be and how it is measured (Hvidt, 
1997). To further our understanding, researchers need not only to develop appropriate conceptual 
frameworks but also to examine the specific focus of this assessment; whether as actual 
performance, expected performance or the performance of the irrigation agency itself (Merrey et 
al,1994). 
If 'actual performance' research is to be improved, there is a need to establish indicators which 
can be applied across regions, systems and countries. During the 1990s there has been a move in 
this direction from authors such as Small and Svendsen (1992), Bos et al (1994), Perry (1996) and 
Molden et al (1998). Small and Svendsen (1992), for example, have provided a useful conceptual 
framework for the analysis of actual performance by recognising irrigation systems as 'nested', 
within which irrigation is part of an irrigated agricultural system which is in turn part of the 
agricultural economic system (Figure 7.1). Such an approach recognises that irrigation systems 
are part of a wider socio-economic and political context. In particular, Small and Svendsen (1992) 
argue that performance measurements are dependent on what system is being measured, whether 
the focus is on the systems internal processes, the systems outputs or on the systems impacts 
within the broader setting. Through this the authors are able to categorise two distinct types of 
assessment measures between those that focus on some desired outcome and those that focus on 
some form of ratio of input to output. 
Using the Small and Svendsen (1992) framework, Rao (1993) highlights a minimum set of 
indicators for an assessment of irrigation performance: at the water delivery system level, the 
characteristics of adequacy, timeliness and equity are the three primary criteria in an evaluation of 
performance; at the level of the irrigated agriculture system, agricultural productivity indicators 
are preferred; and at the agricultural economic system level, economic indicators of profitability at 
the farm, system and national level are required. In addition, Rao (1993) recognised the 
importance of social indicators that transcend all levels of the Small and Svendsen (1992) 
framework, noting that because these indicators are often case-study specific they are difficult to 
(1988), Aeron-Thomas (1992) and Levine & Coward (1989). For efficiency readers are directed to Small 
(1992) and Molden & Gates (1990) and for the management of the water supply readers are directed to 
Seckler et al (1988) and Bas et al (1994). 
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develop for general use. Due to this difficulty, Rao notes that the 'irrigation management literature 
contains only a few contributions in this area' (Rao, 1993:60). Consequently, he proposes two 
types of social indicators as measures of performance. The first refers to the social capacity of 
actors to manage and sustain the irrigated agriculture system, and the second refers to the social 
impacts of interventions on actor well-being and livelihood systems (Rao, 1993:55-62)128. In 
addition, he recognises the importance of sustainability indicators and process indicators although 
these also lack detailed investigation within the literature. 
6 POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM 6 
5 ) RURAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
4 ) AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
3) IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE SYSTEM ( 3 
IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
Other Inputs Other Inputs 
Key to Inputs/Outputs 
CD Operation of irrigation facilities 
@ Supply of water to crops 
(1) Agricultural production 
8) Incomes in mral sector 
o Rural economic development 
o National development 
SOlfI'Ce: Small Gl1d,s'wudst!ll. 1992 
Figure 7.1: Irrigation in the context of nested systems 
Source: Small and Svendsen, 1992 (Illustrated in Rao, 1993:3) 
128 This ties in with the focus on 'capacity' illustrated in chapter six and the focus on the social outcomes of 
intervention in chapters eight and nine. 
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In a more empirical manner, Molden et al (1998) embraced the Small and Svendsen (1992) 
framework in attempting to provide a means for comparing cross-system performance within an 
irrigated agricultural systems framework. In so doing, the authors articulate nine 'external' 
indicators involving the relationship between the main output crop production and the main inputs 
of water, land and finance. The aim being that these: 
'Indicators will allow for comparison between countries and regions, between 
different infrastructure and management types, and between different 
environments, and for assessment over time of the trend in performance of a 
specific project. They will allow an initial screening of systems that perform 
well in different environments, and those that do not. They will allow for both 
assessing the impact of interventions and managers to assess performance 
against strategic, long term objectives' (Molden et aI, 1998:3). 
While much of this work is still in its infancy, Molden et al (1998) provide the first attempt to use 
the concept of 'nested systems' as a means of establishing cross-system performance indicators. 
Of the nine indicators developed, four relate to output relative to land and water, two relate to 
relative water supply (Levine, 1982) and relative irrigation supply (Perry, 1996), one relates to the 
water delivery capacity and two focus specifically on financial return and self-sufficiency. 
Using the Small and Svendsen (1992) framework it is possible to categorise the indicators 
developed and used within my research as focusing on the water delivery system and the irrigated 
agricultural system. However, in line with the external/internal arguments of Molden et al (1998), 
it is recognised that because of the very nature of case-study research, my indicators are 
predominantly 'internal' in focuS l29 . Drawing on the irrigation management literature expanded 
on in chapter six and the performance literature examined in this chapter, the choice of indicators 
can be broadly categorised into the three dimensions of water use efficiency, water control and 
agricultural productivity. In addition, there are two other variables which are critical for an 
evaluation of tertiary policy objectives - fanner cooperation and field level water management 
. 130 
strategIes . 
In analysing the performance of tertiary intervention, the focus of this chapter is to explore the 
water supply and use performance of tertiary intervention on a 'with' and 'without' project basis. 
129 By 'internal' I refer to the performance indicators focused on the processes 'within' the irrigation system. 
By 'external' the focus in on the indicators that derive from system inputs. The evaluation of water supply 
performance is an example of what Molden at al (1998) refer to as an 'internal' indicator. By contrast 
'external' indicators would examine inputs into the system and the outputs gained. 
130 See chapter six for an examination of the expectations of tertiary development. 
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Prior to this, however, section 7.2 outlines the findings of previous studies regarding the impact of 
tertiary intervention. 
7.2 What MADA researchers have to say 
The last comprehensive publication of the impact of tertiary intervention was conducted by 
MADA in 1988, at a time when direct seeding was becoming the major cultural practice of rice 
I · . . h . 131 cu tIvatIOn m t e regIOn Along with this, chemical use became heavier, mechanisation 
increased, land ownership patterns changed, production costs increased, farmer expectations and 
values altered, the labour situation changed and water pumps became easier to acquire (Low & 
Cho, 1996:47, fieldwork, 1997)132. This meant it was very difficult to attribute the results from 
the 1988 project completion report (see Box 7.1) on the introduction of tertiary development133 • 
Many studies have been conducted by MADA in collaboration with the Tropical Agriculture 
Research Centre (TARC) 134. In 1986, Yob et al (1986) concluded that a Muda II irrigation 
efficiency during presaturation 135 of 83 per cent was commendable and that the supplemental 
efficiency of 60 per cent was a reflection of improved water control after tertiary development. In 
the same year, Batumalai and Nassir (1986) conducted an evaluation of the performance of tertiary 
development with respect to the equity of water distribution and the improvements in water use 
efficiencies. Using the definitions and standards of efficiency developed by Bos & Nugteren 
(1974), the authors conclude that the water use efficiencies were consistently lower in the Muda I 
than Muda II blocks. For the tertiary irrigation blocks the authors recognised an average 
application efficiency of 32.5 per centl36 . In addition, the authors conclude that intensive 
infrastructure improves the water control capacity of farmers - providing a quicker and more 
equitable distribution of water among the farmers. Furthermore, they expected the Muda II blocks 
to enable fanners to adhere to schedules more closely and to obtain both higher yields and 
131 Between 1986 and 1988 the percentage of area planted using the direct seeding method rose from 65.3% 
to 90.7% with the corresponding reduction in the use of transplanting from 34.0% to only 1.2% or 1067Ha 
(Morooka et ai, 1996:82). 
132 For a more detailed analysis of these changes see chapter four. 
133 For detailed breakdown of figures and tables, readers are directed to the MADA (1988) Muda II irrigation 
project completion report, Alor Setar. 
134 TARC has been subsequently renamed Japan International Research Centre for Agricultural Sciences 
(JIRCAS) 
135 Prior to the seeding of rice, the fields must be saturated with water. This is referred to as presaturation. 
136 Although no significant difference was observed for the net water use efficiency between the blocks 
because of the under utilisation of effective rainfall. 
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Box 7.1: Project benefits and problems 
Project benefits 
• The increased irrigation and drainage intensity from 11 m to 34m per hectare enabled 80% of 
farmers within the Muda II blocks to have direct access to FIT's and DO's making it easier for 
them to obtain and drain water, thus improving the on-farm management practices of farmers; 
• Farm roads have improved the transportation of inputs and outputs whilst also facilitating easier 
access for larger machinery; 
• Cropping intensity in the 'with project' areas increased to 199%, the 'without project' intensity 
increased to 191 %. The latter was largely attributed to the widespread adoption of direct 
seeding in the Muda I blocks; 
• The distribution of water throughout the Muda II blocks has been improved by the increased 
irrigation intensity with the presaturation supply being delivered as designed; 
• The new water management and control system has improved MADA's capacity to manage the 
project area; 
• The Muda II blocks showed a general increase in labour savings due to the improved access 
brought about by the increased network of farm roads; 
• No significant difference in the cost of production per hectare as a result of Muda II facilities 
was observed. 
Project problems 
• Substantial cost overruns which raised the total project cost from US$69.0 million to US$94.6 
million. The reasons cited included the increased costs of construction, land, and salaries (due 
to Government wage revisions) and project extensions; 
• Project completion was delayed for 7 years due to difficulties in acquiring land, poor contractor 
performance, high staff turnover, inappropriate use of aerial surveys, Government budgetary 
delays, objections by the farmers to the alignment of canals and alterations to the traditional 
irrigation flows and requests for additional facilities. Likewise, only 38 blocks have currently 
been developed under the Muda II project, leaving 75% of irrigation blocks with inadequate 
infrastructure density; 
• MADA have experienced difficulties in water delivery and scheduling due to the geographical 
dispersal of Muda II blocks, the different cropping schedule adopted, limited acceptability of this 
schedule by the farmers, technical constraints in the capacity of canals to supply water under 
direct seeding which contradict the original design for transplanting and, the farmers desire to 
plant simultaneously rather than conforming to the staggered scheduling arrangements created 
a 'wait and see' attitude amongst the farmers and their resultant non-conformance with the rigid 
planting schedule; 
• The intention that Water User Groups would be set up to operate and maintain the tertiary 
structures has not been successful due to the lack of congruence between the village social 
structure and the field social structure, the lack of strong leadership, the large percentage of 
absentee farmers, the political and social conflicts among farmers and the fragmented 
ownership of land lots in different ISAs and ISUs. This has meant that coordinated activities 
with the ISU are not the norm and MADA has had to retain the operation tasks for the tertiary 
structures; 
• The expected increases in water use efficiency due to better on-farm management practices 
had not yet been realised; 
• Problems with the implementation of the Training and Visit programme included difficulties in 
forming functional water user groups, the poor response to the maintenance of structures and 
canals which was attributed to the individualistic attitude of the farmers, lack of strong 
leadership resulting in an over-dependence on extension staff, diverse political affiliation which 
tended to segregate farmers within the same block, and the high turnover of extension staff 
further complicated the training and visit system implemented under the Muda II arrangements; 
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there has been no Significant increase in yields obtained 
(whether this is due to a reduced farmer effort or the tertiary blocks has not yet been 
addressed). 
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cropping intensities. They did not, however, find that the overall project efficiency from source to 
crop to be significantly different, with a mere increase of only 11.5 per cent observed. 
Yashima (1987) developed and used a methodology for the analysis of water balance, using field 
water depth figures, concluding that the relative efficiency of supply for the presaturation of Muda 
II fields was 25 per cent higher than under the Muda I conditions. Likewise, Kitamura (1988) 
studied the water balance under Muda II and Muda I conditions, concluding that the relative 
efficiency of supply could be improved by 25 per cent to 45 per cent by the introduction of tertiary 
development. Furthermore, Fujii et al (1993) compared the water consumption of Muda I and 
Muda II blocks, finding a 20 per cent decrease in water consumption due to tertiary development. 
Possibly the most significant contribution to understanding the performance of tertiary 
development has been the collaborative work between MADA and IIMI. The field research for 
which was conducted in 1994 and 1995 with the aim of developing, validating and disseminating 
conceptual frameworks, methodologies and quantitative indicators for assessing the performance 
of irrigated agriculture (IIMI-MADA, 1994). This work sought to address the impact and 
performance of: tertiary development; dry sowing and the irrigation schedule; the decision support 
system; and the organisation of farmers under group farming. In so doing, the MADA/IIMI 
project conducted farm and water management surveys in 10 irrigation blocks with 500 farmers in 
order to quantifY the linkages between irrigation performance and management interventions. 
Likewise, field data was obtained in 8 irrigation blocks to assess the agricultural and water 
performance of tertiary development. Although the research findings of this work have not been 
made available, the methodologies developed for the assessment of water supply performance 
have proved invaluable for the assessment of water use efficiencies in the current research 
(Yashima, 1995b). This methodology is illustrated in detail in Appendix D:9. 
The high costs and uncettainties about the success of implementing Muda II facilities has meant 
that such a wide-scale development of the remaining Muda I blocks is unlikely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. Nevettheless, the intention remains to update the Muda I blocks, over time, 
using the general planning and design principles adopted under the Muda II project. 
Consequently, it is critical to the future development efforts of MADA and the federal government 
that the performance of tertiary intervention is analysed and reported. Using the surveys, 
measurements and interviews conducted in LBLBD6 (Muda 1) and LBLBD7 (Muda II) it is 
possible to provide both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the current situation in 1997, 
providing a more recent analysis of the outcomes of tertiary intervention. 
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7.3 Water use efficiency as a performance indicator 
In the Muda II project evaluation report, there was no realisation of the expected increases in 
water use efficiency as a result of tertiary intervention. Preliminary collaborative studies have, 
however, suggested that savings in the ratio between the amount of water supplied and the amount 
'used' by the rice crop in the Muda II blocks have materialised (Y ob et ai, 1986; Batumalai and 
Nassir, 1986; Yashima, 1987; Fujii et aI, 1993). These findings correspond with the expectations 
by MADA staff of the water saving potential of tertiary intervention. For as one MADA officer 
commented: 
'In the Muda II it is more efficient compared to the Muda I because in the Muda II 
there is a drain river and that makes it easy to drain to the river and also there is a 
canal to supply the water - the concrete one. So, in Muda II it is more efficient 
than Muda I' (MADA informant No.6). 
Although it is clear that tertiary structures provide a water saving potential, the extent to which 
this potential has been achieved is contested. This is largely because efficiency is not a value free 
technical judgement (Small, 1992) but involves the realisation that the efficient use of water is 
dependent on the land-water-human-culture matrix. What is regarded as efficient in a technical 
sense may not be efficient in a social or economic sense. Likewise, the complexity involved in 
any analysis of efficiencies means that research results are entirely dependent on the methodology 
employed. After all, it is in the methodology that the value judgements about efficiencies are 
contained. Small (1992) recognises three such judgements in the standard definition of irrigation 
efficiency supplied by Bos and Nugteren (1990), that regards efficiencies to be some measure of 
desirable output to quantity of water inputted, incorporating a common definition of useful 
outputs: 
'the volume of irrigation water needed, and made available, for 
evapotranspiration by the crop to avoid undesirable water stress in the plants 
throughout the growing cycle' (Bos & Nugteren, 1990: 18, cited in Small, 
1992:5). 
The first judgement is that all water provided for evapotranspiration is a useful output regardless 
of the impact of this on crop production. The second is that only water used for evapotranspiration 
is regarded as a useful output, and the third is that the concept of 'undesirable water stress' is by 
itself value laden - dependent on what minimum level of water is determined to be stressful to 
crop requirements (Smail, 1992:5-9). What Small (1992) argues is that these values are inherent 
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in any understanding of efficiencies, and because of this irrigation efficiencies are by necessity 
descriptive rather than prescriptive parameters. By determining irrigation efficiency in this 
manner, Small (1992) regards efficiency as having limited usefulness for an evaluation of system 
performance because of the difficulty in providing standards of comparison 137. 
Such an understanding of the problems associated with water use efficiencies have been examined 
by Levine (1982). In this work, Levine recognised the value connotations associated with the term 
'water use efficiency' and focused instead on the evaluation of Relative Water Supply138. In so 
doing, Levine argues that this represents a neutral view of the amount of water delivered and the 
amount used by the crop. The two forms of Relative Water Supply expressed by Levine, include 
the Theoretical Relative Water Supply139 and the Actual Relative Water Supply140. It is not the 
purpose of this chapter to examine the computations of Levine's explanation. However, it is 
important to recognise the implications of the concept of Relative Water Supply in order to 
explore the usage of such an approach in the methodology developed by Yashima (1995b) and 
used in my research. 
Like Levine, Yashima's methodology (Appendix D:9) can also be expressed as 'neutral' because it 
does not assess the volume of water needed by the crop. Instead, it analyses the performance of 
the water supplied and delivered when computed for: the efficient use of the rainfall; the efficient 
use of the irrigation supply; and when determined by the theoretical and actual demand141 . 
Although this approach is still dependent on some arbitrary standard of efficiency it does not 
require judgements of outputs such as those identified by Small (1992). For example, it does not 
assume that all water supplied is for evapotranspiration. Instead, it analyses water supply and 
delivery performance as a function of recommended field water depths, within which the range of 
depths delimit the maximum and minimum water requirements for adequate growth and high 
yields respectively. These depths incorporate the water requirements for the range of cropping 
137 The implicit standard of 100% is problematic because more conservation of water could lead to crop 
failure, hence poor performance. Therefore, the assumption that a higher efficiency is better is inappropriate. 
Likewise, the explicit standards of efficiency are impossible to judge because of the varying conditions under 
which irrigated agriculture is conducted. 
138 By Relative Water Supply Levine refers to the amount of water supplied when related to the amount of 
water actually demanded. 
139 The ratio of water supply to water demanded, associated with maximum production of the optimal crop or 
cropping pattern grown with appropriate cultural practices on the total irrigable area designed or intended to 
be served from that location (Rao, 1993 :9). 
140 The ratio of water supply to water demand associated with the crops actually grown with cultural 
practices used for the actual irrigated area (Rao, 1993 :9). 
141 By efficient use of rainfall and supply I refer to the amount actually used. Inefficient rainfall and supply 
is the amount that passes through the system without being used. 
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stages from land preparation through to harvesting. In addition, it incorporates the variations in 
cropping methods and the resultant variations in control and allowable water depths in the rice 
field. What it does not do, therefore, is assume that all water is provided for evapotranspiration or 
that only water used for evapotranspiration is a useful output. It does, however, set a minimum 
advisable water depth to obtain a high yield and a maximum depth for adequate growth. This is 
different from assessing a specific level at which there will be 'undesirable water stress' on plant 
productivity. 
The analysis of water supply and delivery performance conducted below is not, therefore, regarded 
as an analysis of any optimum target. Instead the analysis is conducted with respect to the 
objectives of tertiary intervention, i.e. that the Muda II blocks should enable MADA to reduce the 
required supply of water to these blocks by improving the water management practices of farmers 
at the field level. Therefore, the analysis of efficiencies between the Muda I and Muda II blocks is 
regarded as a relative comparison of difference whereby the standard, or 'desirable level', for 
assessing water use efficiency is not explicitly stated. Instead, the interpretation of the 
performance figures is dependent on the comparison between the two irrigation blocks - the 
hypothesis being that when using the same value judgements with respect to the control and 
allowable field water depths, the Muda II block should display a higher level of irrigation supply 
efficiency than the figure obtainable for the Muda I block142. 
7.4 Does the Muda II block provide a water saving potential? 
Knowledge and perception of MAD A staff 
In theory, the Muda II block should provide a water saving potential. MADA staff are, however, 
unclear about the extent to which this potential has been realised. For example, when questioned 
about the efficiency of the Muda II blocks during interview, MADA staff responses ranged from 
10 per cent to 70 per cent, with a mean response of 60 per cent. The perception by many of these 
officials was that the problems associated with any lower than expected efficiency ratings were not 
due to an ineffective irrigation supply but were due to inadequate water management practices at 
the farm level. Consequently, MADA staff perceive the farmers to be the primary cause of many 
of the losses in water supply: 
142 For a detailed examination ofthe methodology used, readers are directed to Appendix D:9. 
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'I think that the efficiency is ... I don't know ... about 65-70% .... 1 think that most of 
the water is lost at the farm level, yes ... 1 think that the losses will be at the farm 
level' (MADA informant No. 14). 
'For an open canal, 50-60% (efficiency) is very good .... most of the wastage 
occurs at the farm level' (MADA informant No. 17). 
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To establish the extent to which this expected water loss occurs at the farm level or at the MADA 
management level, the first requirement is to establish what this 'loss' is and how the Muda I and 
Muda II blocks compare. 
Data collection 
The data collected for the Muda I and Muda II irrigation blocks are shown in Tables 1 and 2, 
Appendix D:6. For the Muda I block, the entire block was used as the unit of analysis (Map 3.3, 
chapter three). For the Muda II block the unit of analysis was ISA A (Map 3.5, chapter three). 
The standing water depths were taken on a daily basis and, because of the intermittent nature of 
the irrigation schedule, these figures were averaged on a weekly basis to form the initial and final 
field water depth figures for computation. The daily recorded field water depths for each block at 
each location are recorded in Appendix D:7 (including the weekly volume average). 
Unfortunately, due to the unusually heavy rainfall in the Muda area during February, the 
beginning of the irrigation schedule for the first season 1997 was brought forward to the 14th 
March. This meant that the data collection period missed the first four weeks of cropping, 
resulting in the field water depth data only being available for the growth, flowering, maturation 
and harvesting stages. The percentage of land under each cropping stage, for the entire season, is 
calculated from Maps 8.3 to 8.12 in chapter eight and indicated in Table 1, Appendix D:6 for the 
Muda I block and Table 2, Appendix D:6 for the Muda II block. 
All of the 50 observation points were practising the wet seeding culture. Therefore, the control 
field water depths were calculated on the basis of the percentage of land under each cropping stage 
in each 7 day period. Actual rainfall was provided from rainfall station 17 in the Muda I block 
with the actual and target irrigation supply collated using the forms in Appendix D: 1. This 
resulted in daily supply information as shown in Appendix D:8, Tables 1 to 16. As with the other 
data sets, these are computed into weekly intervals. 
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Actual and target irrigation supply 
The purpose of much of the data collected is to enable the data systematisation of field water 
depths and the computation of assessment indicators143. One important factor emerges from this 
data - the relationship between the targeted amount of supply and the actual supply delivered. The 
targeted supply is based on the computations of the water management and control scheme 
(WMCS) set up as part of the Muda II facilities 144. The WMCS determines the timing and 
quantity of supply and is entirely dependent on the ability of MADA to recognise the demand 
situation throughout the region. As with the Yashima model, the required volume of water for 
each irrigation block is computed by MADA, based on: average field water depths; cropping 
stages; rainfall; 'normal' losses (Seepage and Evapotranspiration); and the previous quantity of 
supply. Information from each block is collated together with information on direct rainfall and 
uncontrolled flOW145, which determines the water demand requirement. The quantity of available 
water is computed and target water supplies are provided for each block146. 
The extent to which this target supply is in accordance with the actual supply is shown in Figures 
7.2 and 7.3. For the Muda I block (Figure 7.2), although the total season's irrigation supply was 
129mm more than was targeted (27 per cent over supply), this discrepancy was mainly due to the 
oversupply indicated in weeks 1,7-9, 14 and 15. By comparison, the Muda II blocks (Figure 7.3) 
total seasonal oversupply was 358mm or 191 per cent. When this discrepancy is illustrated 
graphically, at no time was supply in accordance with the target in the Muda II block. There are, 
therefore, clear difficulties in the ability of MADA to supply water as expected to the Muda II 
block147. 
143 For a detailed examination of the assessment indicators, see Appendix D:9. 
144 See chapter six for an examination of this scheme, illustrated in Appendix C: I, Figure 4. 
145 This is the volume of water from the catchment which is not released from the dams. 
146 For detailed explanation of the Water Management and Control Scheme (WMCS) readers are directed to 
Chaw & Seng (1989) or Morooka et al (1996) Chapter 2: 37-62. 
147 See chapter nine for the reasons behind such difficulties. 
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Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Data systematisation for the Muda I and Muda II blocks 
The irrigation supply period ended in the week commencing 26/06/97. Therefore, although the 
field water depth, rainfall and pan evaporation figures were collected after this, the main period of 
analysis for the effective and ineffective irrigation supply is between 17/04/97 and the end of the 
irrigation supply. Using this time period, Tables 3 and 4 (Appendix D:6) provide the data 
systematisation of the Muda I and Muda II blocks respectively. From this data, a basic 
comparison can be made between the two blocks. 
The seasonal field water requirement which is based on the evapotranspiration and seepage 
requirements of the crops is similar, with the Muda II block requiring only 2mm more water than 
the Muda I block between 17/04/97 and 26/06/97. This is in keeping with the homogeneity of wet 
seeding between the two blocks. Likewise, because the target field water depth is based on the 
cropping stage and planting method, the observed similarity between the targeted depths for each 
block is as expected. 
Variations, however, emerge with respect to the targeted and actual water supply, and the 
effectiveness or not of the irrigation supply, rainfall and total water supply. The water supply 
target is the deficit in the targeted field water depth from the existing field water depth. It is, 
therefore, an expression of the extent to which water is retained in the field or lost through 
drainage. The Muda I block displays consistently higher initial field water depths than the Muda 
II block (see Figure 7.4). Therefore, the water supply target for the Muda I block was 
substantially less than for the Muda II block (141mm compared to 220mm). Because the target 
water supply is based on the relationship between the water stored in the field and field water 
requirements, this variable is indicative of better on-farm water management practices in the Muda 
I block when compared with the Muda II block. In addition, because the target water supply for 
the Muda I block is lower, and the initial field water depths are consistently higher, the actual 
water supply to the Muda II block is correspondingly higher. What this means is that the staff 
operating the Muda II block have to supply more water than those operating the Muda I block, to 
ensure that the field water depths are consistent with the allowable ranges displayed in Table 1, 
Appendix D:9. From this perspective, not only does the Muda II block not provide a water saving 
potential but when compared with the Muda I block it is in fact water excessive (801mm for the 
Muda II compared with 678mm for the Muda I) . 
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The question, therefore, is why is there a difference in water supply between the two respective 
blocks? To explore this, it is useful to establish the variations in results between the effective and 
ineffective water supply, rainfall and irrigation supply in the two blocks (recognising that the 
rainfall is the same for both blocks), The most important conclusion is that the amount of water 
lost in the Muda II block is significantly higher than the equivalent loss in the Muda I block 
(450mm and 294mm respectively), 
As described in Appendix D:9, ineffective water supply can be due to: ineffective rainfall only; 
total ineffective rainfall with some ineffective irrigation supply; or a combination of both 
ineffective rainfall and ineffective irrigation supply. Comparing the difference between effective 
rainfall and ineffective rainfall in the two blocks, there is little variation in the amount of rainfall 
used, with losses of 160mm in the Muda I block and 157mm in the Muda II block (see Appendix 
D:6, Tables 3 and 4). The observed difference in ineffective water supply must, therefore, be due 
to losses in the quantity of water supplied through irrigation. This assumption is clarified by the 
observed difference in effective and ineffective irrigation supply between the two blocks, with an 
ineffective irrigation supply in the Muda I block accounting for 134mm compared with 293mm in 
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the Muda II block. This suggests that not only is the Muda II block having to be oversupplied to 
meet the field water requirements but a larger quantity of this supply is not being utilised in the 
cropping process. To establish the possible causes of these losses, the data systematised in Tables 
3 and 4 (Appendix D:6) are analysed with respect to the performance assessment indicators 
examined in Appendix D:9. 
Performance assessment indicators and tertiary development 
To examine the water depth control performance, under each cropping stage, it is first necessary to 
examine the extent to which the field water depths observed at the 50 observation posts correspond 
with the range of allowable field water depths shown in Table 1, Appendix D:9. This examination 
is conducted without converting the negative field water depth values into volume measurements, 
with the total seasonal figures for each plot and block illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, Appendix D:2, 
and the weekly figures under each cropping stage illustrated in Tables 3 to 10, Appendix D:2. 
This results in the calculation of an average weekly water depth control performance for each 
block as illustrated in Tables 11 and 12, Appendix D:2 and a total seasonal water depth control 
performance as shown in Table 7.2. 
Cropping stage (%) 
I Grow Flower Mature Harvest ! 
FWD (cm) MI Mil MI Mil MI Mil MI Mil 
<-30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-10 to -30 1 1 0 7 0 26 6 35 
-5 to -10 2 1 6 1 17 21 15 37 
o to-5 4 10 8 13 52 20 64 14 
5 to 0 5 23 46 54 25 20 14 7 
10 to 5 33 36 39 18 6 7 0 4 
15 to 10 30 22 1 6 0 6 0 3 
>15 25 8 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Target (cm) 15 to 0 10 to-5 5 to -10 <-10 
Achievement (%) 68 81 93 85 94 61 6 35 
Table 7.2: Field water depth distribution in the Muda I and Muda II blocks 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Using the calculated and collected data, it is possible to examine the performance assessment 
indicators for each of the irrigation blocks (Table 7.3). The conclusions drawn from this data are 
illustrated below in respect to the water supply and water delivery performance of the two blocks. 
-
Assessment indicators (%) LBLBD6 (Muda I) LBLBD7, T1 & T2 (Muda II) 
WDCPI miss miss 
WDCPs miss miss 
WDCPg 68 81 
WDCPf 93 85 
WDCPm 94 61 
WDCPh 6 35 
WDCPav 68 65 
WDCsd 20 15 
WSP 483 364 
WSEF 57 44 
RFEF 38 39 
IREF 68 47 
Table 7.3: Assessment indicators for the Muda I and Muda II blocks, 1st season 1997 
Source: Fieldwork 
Water delivery performance 
The water delivery performance in each of the irrigation blocks is illustrated in the three 
performance indicators of water supply performance (WSP), irrigation efficiency (IREF) and 
rainfall efficiency (RFEF). For both the Muda I and Muda II blocks the water supply performance 
is more than adequate, exceeding 100 per cent in each case, based on the logical field water 
requirement. However, in both cases the water supply performance is extremely high - indicative 
of a significant oversupply to requirements. This oversupply is because of the low rainfall 
efficiency of 38 per cent and 39 per cent in the Muda I and Muda II blocks respectively. In each 
case, the efficient use of rainfall needs to be enhanced by both improving the coordination 
between water delivery and rainfall and by enforcing the field dikes to reduce the quantity of 
leakages and losses. 
More significant, however, is the observed difference in irrigation efficiency between the two 
blocks. One of the main aims of tertiary development is to improve the efficient supply of water 
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when compared with the existing Muda I blocks. The current research findings, however, not only 
show that no such improvements in irrigation efficiency have been made but that the significant 
oversupply to requirements, and the poor use of rainfall in the Muda II block, means that the 
irrigation efficiency for this block is substantially lower at 47 per cent than the efficiency figure 
for the Muda I block (68 per cent). This is clearly not in accordance with the expectations for 
tertiary development facilitates. What this suggests, therefore, is that improvements need to be 
made in the quantity of water supplied to the Muda II block, which is neither consistent with 
targeted supplies or being used efficiently by the farmers. One conclusion could be that the 
oversupply observed in this block is a direct result of the wastages occurring at the farm level148. 
Overall, the water delivery performance of both irrigation blocks is poor, with excessive 
oversupply in order to compensate for the high ineffective rainfall. When comparing the two 
blocks, however, the Muda II block is compensating for this poor use of rainfall by oversupplying 
water to the fields. This results in a significantly lower irrigation efficiency. Under these 
conditions, the delivery performance of the Muda II block is worse than the Muda I block. 
Therefore, in these two cases, tertiary irrigation cannot be said to be water use efficient when 
compared with non-tertiary irrigation. 
Water supply performance 
Both of the irrigation blocks had to oversupply (Le. > 1 00 per cent) in order to compensate for the 
low effective rainfall in the area. Here again the efficiency of total supply (WSEF) was higher for 
the Muda I block (57 per cent) than the Muda II block (44 per cent). As an indicator, water supply 
efficiency is used to assess the impact of management interventions; therefore, the lower water 
supply efficiency in the Muda II block suggests that MADA is unable to control the supply as 
efficiently as they can in the Muda I block. The reasons for this deficiency need to be detected 
and shall be explored in chapter nine with respect to the informal practices of the farmers and the 
increased power afforded to Muda II farmers in the altering and tampering with design structures. 
However, to establish whether this reduced water supply efficiency influences the ability of Muda 
II farmers to secure adequate field water depths for their cropping requirements, the water depth 
control performance indicators need analysing. 
148 h . See c apter mne. 
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During the paddy growth stage (WDCPg), the percentage of achievement for observed field water 
depths in the range 0 to l5cm was lower in the Muda I block than the Muda II block. This is 
because 25 per cent of the Muda I farmers sustained field water depths over l5cm, a finding which 
is both advantageous to MADA because of their field water storage requirements and suggestive 
of good field water management practices in the operation and maintenance of field dikes. 
Likewise, when comparing the percentage of farmers with field water depths over 10cm during the 
growth stage, only 30 per cent of the Muda II farmers achieved this target compared with 55 per 
cent in the Muda I block. At the other extreme, the extent to which the rice fields experienced 
'water stress' was slightly higher for the Muda II block (12 per cent) than the Muda I block (7 per 
cent). In light of the oversupply observed in the Muda II block, this is indicative of poor field 
water management practices by the farmers. 
During the flowering stage (WDCPt) the Muda I block provided a slightly higher percentage of 
achievement to the allowable field water depth range (93 per cent) than the Muda II block (85 per 
cent). The critical factor during this stage is, however, water stress below -5cm for which there is 
very little variation between the two blocks with all farmers achieving adequate field water depths. 
The maturation stage (WDCPm) provides the farmers with the opportunity to begin to drain the 
standing water depth from their fields. Consequently, the allowable range during this period is 
between 5 and -1 Ocm. The results indicate that whilst 94 per cent of the Muda I farmers achieved 
this target, only 61 per cent of the Muda II farmers did likewise. This is again indicative of poor 
water management practices at the farm level in the Muda II irrigation block. 
The figures for the harvesting stage (WDCPh) are not encouraging for either the Muda I or Muda 
II irrigation block. This is because during the harvesting period there was unusually heavy rainfall 
which made it difficult for the farmers to drain the water from their fields. In such a situation 
there are clear advantages for farmers in the Muda II blocks who have direct access to drainage 
outlets. 
One reason for the ability of Muda I farmers to retain higher field water depths is because of the 
size of the batas (field dikes) built and maintained by these farmers. The recommended height and 
width of these batas, to ensure adequate field water management, is 2ft wide and 1ft high. To 
establish the extent to which the 50 observation posts in the two blocks correspond with these 
recommendations, the heights and widths were recorded (Figures 7.5 and 7.6). Out of the 25 
observation posts in the Muda II block, none of the farmers maintained the width of their batas in 
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accordance with the 2ft recommendation. For the Muda I block, however, 44 per cent of observed 
batas were at or above 2ft in width. Similar results were found for the batas heights, with only 1 
of the 25 sites in the Muda II block on, or above, 1ft high. By comparison, 30 per cent of the 
Muda I farmers maintained their batas heights over 1 ft. These results suggest that the Muda I 
farmers are more inclined to recognise the necessity for adequate sized batas when compared with 
the Muda II farmers. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Muda I farmers were both able to 
retain a greater quantity of water in their fields and that the initial field water depths were 
consistently higher in the Muda I than the Muda II irrigation block. From this perspective, the 
lower batas are the cause of the higher water supply. By contrast, however, it can be argued that 
the lower field batas in the Muda II irrigation block is a direct result of the oversupply of water to 
the farmers fields. From this perspective, the oversupply is the cause and thc lower batas are the 
effect. 
By way of summary, the water supply performance in the Muda I block was consistently better 
than in the Muda II block with respect to both the water supply efficiency and the water depth 
control performance indicators. The question, however, is does this better performance improve 
the yields obtained by the farmers? 
Water delivery performance and yields 
The primary assumption of the water supply/delivery methodology is that yields are influenced by 
the field water depths under each cropping stage. In Yashima's study of 5 Muda II irrigation 
blocks, he found no significant difference in yields between the irrigation blocks or when 
comparing the worst and best average field water depths. Consequently, Yashima (1995b) 
concludes that the yields must be influenced by factors other than the field water depth. This is a 
logical assumption due to the variety of variables which are known to, or expected to, influence 
yields. To explore the extent to which Yashima's findings are applicable in the current case study, 
the analysis of the 5 highest and lowest yields in each block are illustrated in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. 
In all cases there is no significance between field water depths and the yields obtained, with all 
average field water depths falling within the allowable range for each cropping stage (discounting 
the harvest stage due to the problems stated above). These findings, therefore, support the 
argument by Yashima that yields must be influenced by factors other than field water depths. 
However, in contrast to Yashima's findings, there is a clear difference between the highest and 
lowest average yields in each irrigation block. In theory, the higher yields should favour the Muda 
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II block but as with many of the findings of this chapter such expectations have not materialised. 
Instead, the Muda I blocks highest average yield of 6.0t/ha is significantly greater than the 
corresponding 5.34t/ha for the Muda II block. By contrast, however, the five lowest yields in the 
Muda II block are higher than the comparable yield in the Muda I block. It appears, therefore, that 
the better water delivery and supply performance within the Muda I block does indeed improve the 
yields obtainable although the extent to which this is the causal factor is impossible to assess 
without fmiher analysis. Such an analysis is provided in the following chapter. 
Yield FWOg FWOf FWOm FWOh 
(Uha) (em) (em) (em) (em) 
5 highest yields 
Average 6.0 11.4 5.34 -0.24 -3.58 
Stdev 0.06 2.13 1.78 2.59 0.79 
5 lowest yields 
Average 2.65 11.0 2.57 -3.29 -4.49 
Stdev 1.78 4.01 0.9 4.02 5.01 
Table 7.4: Field water depth and average yields (Muda I) 
* figures in parentheses are mean yields for the 25 observation posts 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Yield FWOg FWOf FWOm FWOh 
(Uha) (em) (em) (em) (em) 
5 highest yields 
Average 5.34 6.34 1.14 -3.06 -5.41 
Stdev 0.14 1.25 5.47 7.42 2.81 
5 lowest yields 
Average 3.27 5.39 3.06 -3.86 -5.97 
Stdev 1.14 2.45 1.19 3.34 2.02 
Table 7.5: Field water depth and average yields (Muda II) 
* figures in parentheses are mean yields for the 25 observation posts 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored one of the aims of tertiary development - to reduce the quantity of water 
supplied and increase the efficient use of this supply. In so doing, analysis was constructed using 
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the Yashima (1995b) methodology for analysing water supply and delivery performance in 
standing water rice fields. In applying this to two irrigation blocks in the Muda region, on a 'with' 
and 'without' project basis, an oversupply was recorded in the Muda II block when compared with 
both targeted supply and the Muda I block. In addition, farmers in the Muda II block were found 
to have consistently lower field water depths than those in the Muda I block. This resulted in a 
higher targeted supply by MADA for the Muda II block; therefore, increased water was supplied 
to ensure that the field water depths were consistent with the allowable range. The result is that 
the Muda II block not only failed to record any water savings but was in fact water excessive when 
compared with the Muda I block. Fmthermore, the increased losses in the Muda II block were 
found to be due to ineffective irrigation supply in addition to ineffective rainfall. Therefore, 
MADA has to oversupply in the Muda II block to meet field water requirements, and a larger 
percentage of this water is wasted. 
The overall water supply performance is poor in both the Muda I and Muda II irrigation blocks 
because neither is efficiently using rainfall. To improve this, MADA needs to improve its 
coordination of the delivery of irrigation water with the rainfall in the command area, and the 
farmers need to improve their on-farm water management practices. In addition, because the 
irrigation efficiency in the Muda II block is significantly lower than in the Muda I block the 
resultant delivery performance of the Muda II block is also negatively affected. Consequently, the 
Muda II block is not saving water, or using its water efficiently, when compared with the Muda I 
block. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the total water supply is also better under Muda I conditions. 
One possible reason for this is that the farmers in the Muda I block have better on-farm 
management practices, illustrated in the fact that the Muda II block has more supply but lower 
field batas and field water depths - even accounting for this oversupply. 
Because the yields in the Muda I and Muda II blocks were not found to be a function of the field 
water depths, the following chapter explores the variables which could be influencing this 
situation. This is important because the primary substantive policy aim of the federal government 
is to increase yields, hence the government investment in tertiary development. The possible 
causes for the findings presented in this chapter and those presented in chapter eight are dealt with 
in chapter nine. 
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Tertiary Intervention: Intended and Unintended 
Outcomes 
In addition to saving water, tertiary intervention is expected to improve agricultural productivity in 
accordance with the national policy requirements for increased yields. It is anticipated that this 
will be achieved by improvements in: the efficient supply and delivery of water; the cooperation 
of farmers at the block level; the water control capacity of these farmers; and their water 
management practices. The relationship between tertiary development and the efficient supply 
and delivery of water has been dealt with in chapter seven. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore the performance of tertiary development in direct response to the second and third 
research questions articulated in section 1.5, chapter one. 
Due to the different nature of quantitative and qualitative datal49, the analysis of the survey data is 
conducted using a model of tertiary intervention 150. This provides the structure which is expanded 
on throughout the analysis by the interpretation of qualitative meaning, and is a useful tool for 
generating hypotheses which can be tested using well recognised statistical techniques. 
Furthermore, to ensure that it is the irrigation block per se which is the causal variable for many of 
the findings, the model also facilitates the analysis of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the 
farm, field and farmer characteristics which are expected to influence the performance of tertiary 
intervention for improving: yields; cooperation; water control; and water management strategies at 
the farm level l51 . 
Having articulated the hypotheses which emerge from the model of tertiary intervention, the 
findings presented below are divided into four main sections. The first provides a background 
analysis of the socio-economic, agronomic and farm management issues. This questions the 
homogeneity of respondents in each block, the extent to which yields have increased under tertiary 
irrigation and the differences, or otherwise, in causal factors which are expected to influence these 
149 See chapter three for a detailed understanding of these differences. 
150 The model of tertiary intervention has been developed from the variables, dimensions and indicators 
illustrated in the more general analytical model in chapter two. 
151 Because my research focuses on a 'with' and 'without' approach, rather than a 'before' and 'after' 
approach, this focus on homogeneity is an important criteria for ensuring the validity of the research 
findings. As was expanded on in chapter three, the case-study selection process was important for reducing 
the ambiguities in the heterogeneity of exogenous variables between the two blocks. The influence of the 
different farm, field and farmer characteristics between the two blocks are incorporated into the analysis 
throughout this chapter. 
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yields. Following this, the three core sections focus on the improvements, or otherwise, in the 
control, cooperation and management strategies of farmers as a result of tertiary intervention. To 
ensure that it is the teltiary intervention which is the causal factor of difference, the analysis is 
conducted by controlling for the observed variations indicated in section 8.3. Throughout this 
process, the impact of both the knowledge and attitudes of the farmers and the farmer-MADA 
relationship are expected to influence the ability of individual farmers to control water, increase 
yields, cooperate and manage the water resource in an efficient and effective manner. 
8.1 Model of tertiary intervention 
The model of tertiary intervention displayed in Figure 8.1 is a summary of the influences and 
relationships between the government policy of tertiary intervention and its expected benefits. In 
this model tertiary development is expected to improve the water control practices, cooperation 
and water management strategies of the farmers in order to facilitate increases in yields. Likewise, 
these factors are expected to be influenced by the field, farm and farmer characteristics 152, as well 
as the relationship between these farmers and MADA staff. 
Control, cooperation and management are depicted as an interconnected looped system whereby 
inadequacies in one creates inadequacies in the other two and a reduction in yields. However, it is 
important to recognise that adequate water control depends as much on the irrigation supply from 
MADA as it does on the cooperation and management of the farmers at the block level. The other 
factors regarded as critical in the analysis of the looped system and increased yields are depicted in 
the model as being outside the direct influence of tertiary development. These include the 
exogenous variables, farm and field characteristics, socio-economic political status, the knowledge 
and attitudes of the farmers and the MADA-farmer relationship153. To ascertain whether it is the 
government policy per se that influences the four, dimensions investigated or the field and farmer 
characteristics, the analysis of the heterogeneity or homogeneity of these attributes is conducted in 
section 8.3 below154. 
152 By field, farm and fanner I refer to the variables which are found within the sub-groups: farm and field 
characteristics; socio-economic political status; and the knowledge and attitude of the farmers. 
153 The farm and field characteristics include variables such as land size, tenure, field location, topography 
and fragmentation. Likewise, the socio-economic and political status includes variables such as household 
demographics, education attainment, employment, income, membership of local organisations, political 
parties and ownership of farming equipment. 
154 Throughout this chapter, the four dimensions of analysis are: water control; water management strategies; 
cooperation; and yields. 
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Figure 8.1: Model of tertiary intervention 
The primary purpose of the model in Figure 8.1 is to assist in the analysis of the outcomes of 
tertiary intervention. The hypothesised relationships that are operationalised in this analysis are 
displayed in Table 8.1 155 . Finally, the model indicates that the knowledge and attitudes of the 
farmers influences the looped system and increased yields. These concepts do not create their own 
variables per se but instead permeate all sub-sections of the model. For example, the knowledge 
and attitudes of the farmers to the irrigation schedule influences the ability of these farmers to 
follow this schedule and hence conduct their fanning and water management activities in a 
coordinated manner. In addition, if the relationship between these farmers and MADA staff is in 
conflict then it is likely that both the knowledge and attitudes of these farmers to the irrigation 
schedule will also be poor. 
155 What are not included, however, are the exogenous variables. When the irrigation blocks were originally 
selected an important criteria was that they were spatially adjacent. This means that the exogenous variables 
which are climatic (although clearly influencing the looped system and increases in yields) are similar for 
each block. Likewise, the exogenous variables referring to market prices and input prices are not expected to 
influence the difference in findings between each block due to the project uniformity of these variables. 
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• That the farm and field characteristics and socio-economic political status of 
respondents influence the yields obtained 
• That there is no significant difference between the farm and field characteristics or 
the socio-economic political status of respondents whether they farm in tertiary or 
non-tertiary irrigation blocks, 
• That tertiary facilities increase farmer productivity by reducing production costs 
and increasing yields when compared with farmers under non-tertiary conditions. 
• That water control is improved under tertiary facilities when compared with non-
tertiary facilities 
• That farmer cooperation and coordination is improved under tertiary facilities when 
. compared with non-tertiary facilities 
• That farmer water management strategies are improved under tertiary facilities 
when compared with non-tertiary facilities 
Table 8.1: Macro hypotheses explored using the model of tertiary intervention 
Operationalisation of concepts 
To operationalise the conceptual arguments displayed in Figure 8.1, the variables and indicators 
that make up each of the core dimensions are explored using the models shown in Figures 8.2 and 
8.3. The first of these illustrates the variables which are likely to influence the yield that are 
outside the direct influence of the looped system. The second illustrates the variables which are 
likely to influence the four core dimensions plus the indicators used in the analysis of these 
dimensions. To elaborate on these models further set out below is a brief overview of the 
relationships observed and the macro hypotheses explored. 
Factors outside the looped system that influence yields 
The factors which are exogenous to the looped system have been arranged into three categories -
farm and field characteristics, production and productivity, and socio-economic political status. 
The macro hypotheses explored using this model are: 
1. That the farm and field characteristics and socio-economic political status of respondents 
influence the yields obtained. 
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2. That there is no significant difference between the farm and field characteristics or the socio-
economic political status of respondents whether they farm in tertiary or non-tertiary irrigation 
blocks. 
To establish the validity of these hypotheses three different bivariate analyses are required: the 
first explores the relationship between the illustrated variables and the dependent variable yield 
(section 8.2); the second explores the differences in fanners and farms between the two irrigation 
blocks (section 8.3)156; and the third explores the influence of the irrigation block on average 
yields and costs of production (section 8.4). By investigating these relationships it is possible to 
reject or accept the macro hypotheses shown above and factor into the main analysis those 
variables which may influence understanding of the improvements, or otherwise, to the control, 
cooperation and management strategies of farmers 'with' and 'without' tertiary facilities. 
Factors inside the looped system that influence yields 
In accordance with the model of tertiary intervention, the second operationalisation model (Figure 
8.3) is not independent of the first (Figure 8.2). Instead, this model depicts the field, farm and 
farmer characteristics which are expected to influence the four core dimensions. In so doing, this 
second model questions whether tertiary intervention has improved the water control, cooperation 
and water management strategies of the farmers. 
To expand on this logic further, the variables illustrated in Box A are expected to influence the 
water control capacity and the water management strategies of the farmers. Likewise, the 
variables in Box B are expected to influence all three dimensions of water control, cooperation and 
water management strategies. Each of these are expected to influence the yield and are 
operationalised as shown in the model. For example, water control is explored using the three 
dimensions of reliability, adequacy and fairness, cooperation is uni-dimensional and water 
management strategies are explored in response to the ability of farmers to maintain appropriate 
field water levels, each being operationalised using the indicators shown. 
156 Within the model there are three variables that are not expected to influence yields. They are, however, 
important when analysing the observed differences between the irrigation blocks. 
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8.2 Factors influencing the yields obtained 
Macro hypothesis: That the farm andfield characteristics and socio-economic political status of 
respondents influence the yields obtained. 
In testing this hypothesis the expected relationships depicted in Figure 8.2 have been correlated 
using the appropriate statistical techniques 157 . The findings are illustrated in Figures 8.4 and 8.5 
for the irrigated and non-irrigated seasons respectively158. From those variables which were 
expected to influence yields only the farm size is significant. At its crudest, this suggests an 
inverse relationship in both seasons whereby the larger the farm size the lower the respective yield 
(Figures 8.6 and 8.7)159. Surprisingly, however, when removing the effect of farm size from the 
analysis only the field location and land fragmentation influence the yield 160. Set out below is an 
elaboration of the reasons why the modelled relationships have not been found to influence the 
yield in the Muda case-study. 
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Figure 8.6: Size of land operated by yield in the irrigated season 
(N = 200: r2 = 0.03)161 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
157 See Appendix E: 1 for the correlation statistics used for each bivariate analysis and the ensuing levels of 
statistical association. 
158 The irrigated season is the 1st season (off/dry) and the non-irrigated is the 2nd season (main/wet) season. 
159 For a detailed analysis of the conceptual and methodological problems of the inverse relationship see 
Dyer, G (1997). 
160 This finding is the result of running a simple factorial ANOV A on the non-significant relationships using 
size ofland as the covariant. The number of plots are significant in the irrigated season and the field location 
is significant in the non-irrigated season. 
161 Both the number of hectares and the yield in the irrigated season have been logged for normal distribution 
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Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Farmers' preference for the wet seeded technique 
The favouritism of the farmers for wet seeding is not because of the increased yield potential of 
this technique, Instead, the farmers regard wet seeding as important for: improving within block 
cooperation; improving the growth of the paddy; reducing the growth of weeds; coping with the 
unreliable water suppl/63; and in response to the general dissatisfaction with the dry seeding 
advice from MADA: 
Cooperation 
'We have to cooperate with other farmers so most of the farmers prefer wet 
seeding. So we have to follow, this is the majority voice, otherwise we have a 
problem with the water .. .' (Farmer informant No. 21). 
Weeds and growth 
'I try to do dry seeding but it is not effective because the paddy does not grow as 
fast as with wet seeding' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
'The wet seeding is better because if we seed out paddy through wet seeding it is 
easy for us to control weeds. With dry seeding the weeds will grow very fast' 
(Farmer informant No.9). 
162 Both the number of hectares and the yield in the non-irrigated season have been logged for normal 
distribution. 
163 Th' , d d' . 8 5 IS IS expan e on III sectIOn , , 
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MADA-farmer relationship 
'At one time I was advised by MADA to use dry seeding but it doesn't work ... ' 
(Farmer informant No. 23). 
'We already try the dry seeding but it does not work because there is not enough 
water supplies by [the] government...' (Farmer informant No. 24). 
'If we seed in the schedule which is advised by MADA then we should do dry 
seeding but the majority of the farmers don't want to do like that because they 
aren't confident with the advice from MADA. . .' (Farmer informant No. 22). 
This preference for the wet seeding technique is not in accordance with MADA's requirements. 
Instead, MADA are actively campaigning for the use of dry seeding because of the water saving 
capacity of this method. After all, as one official commented: 
'For wet seeding you have to fill up the paddy field to about 4 inches, then you 
plough the land, level the land and then you completely throwaway the water until 
it is low standing. This is an unnecessary waste of 2 inches of water. You 
imagine 2 inches over the whole of MADA area - how much water we have to 
waste!' (MADA informant No. 13). 
Here, however, lies the conundrum because although MADA find it difficult to supply water in 
accordance with wet seeding requirements and its staff regard this technique as water inefficient, 
most of these staff also recognise the non-chemical weed control benefits of this technique: 
Weed problem 
'From our experience when the farmers do dry seeding they have a lot of weed 
problems so sometimes after they sow their seeds there is no water so the weeds 
will come up followed by the paddy - this is the problem' (MADA informant No.9). 
'The majority of farmers don't want to follow the MADA instruction to do dry 
seeding, they prefer wet seeding because it is difficult to control weeds' (MADA 
informant No.2). 
Water supply difficulties 
'Unless they [the farmers] can be guaranteed when the water will arrive then they 
can't dry seed' (MADA informant No. 14). 
'Farmers don't want to do dry seeding because two weeks after they seed their 
paddy they want water and MADA can't supply water so the weeds will grow 
faster' (MADA informant No. 11). 
Such a conflict between farmer cropping requirements and MADA's water saving/supply 
requirements has negatively affected the relationship between MADA staff and the farmers, 
leading one MADA official to suggest that to get the farmers to adopt the dry seeding technique: 
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'". MADA just don't supply the water and let them [the farmers] wait. Sure there 
will be the farmers which [sic] try to meet their representative, the member of 
parliament or assembly men to make complaint - "why MADA not supply water for 
this season?". This is the problem but if MADA want more farmers to do the dry 
seeding, they simply don't supply the water' (MADA informant No.2). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that the main reason why farmers use the wet seeding technique is 
as a low cost method for controlling weeds. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that during the 
irrigated season those farmers who use this technique spend less on the chemical control of 
weeds l64. 
Increased inputs do not mean increased yields 
In the original model (Figure 8.2) it was anticipated that the more the farmers spent on inputs the 
higher the yield. However, such a relationship has not been found in the Muda case-study. To 
establish the specifics of these production costs, Table 8.2 shows a breakdown of the significance, 
or otherwise, in the cost of production categories indicated in the model. As expected there is no 
relationship between the cost of combines and ploughing and the yields obtained in either season 
due to the influence of farm size on this relationship. When irrigating, however, it appears that the 
more the farmers spend on fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides the higher the yield. 
Yields 
Cost of combines 
Cost of ploughing 
Cost of fertilisers 
Cost of herbicid.es and pesticides 
Irrigated 
ns 
ns 
S 
S 
Table 8.2: Costs of production by yields 
(Chi-square: p<O.05 : N = 198) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Non-irrigated 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
Because the cost of production is influenced by the size of the farm, the analysis is conducted by 
'controlling' for the influence of this factor on the relationshipsl65. The results indicate that the 
only cost which influences yields is the costs of fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides for those 
164 60% of those farmers using the wet seeding technique paid <120RM on weedicides and pesticides 
compared with 30% paying over 120RM (Chi-square, p<0.05, s = .0212 and c.c = .162). The lack of 
relationship in the non-irrigated season is a logical finding due to the increased rainfall and water control at 
this time. 
165 Here again a simple factorial ANOV A is conducted with farm size as the covariate. 
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farmers operating less than 1 ha of land during the irrigated season. It appears, therefore, that a 
cost threshold is reached in the application of chemicals for farmers operating less than 1 ha of 
land (Table 8.3). In addition, the overall assumption that the cost of production does not influence 
the yields also holds true. 
_____ "___ "_'n __ " ________________ ~~~~--~~~-
_____ <5_tl_h_ai%) >5t1ha (%) 
Cost of fertilisers 
:::; 60RM 
>60RM 
Cost of herbicides and pesticides 
:::; 120RM 
> 120 RM 
64 36 
100 0 
65 35 
89 11 
Table 8.3: Cost of chemicals by yield obtained in the irrigated season for farmers operating:::; 1 ha 
(Simple factorial ANOVA: p<0.05 : N = 77) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The more the merrier? 
Yields are not influenced by the number of household members working on the farm and the 
experience of these farmers. What this suggests is that households which employ more family 
labour on their farm do so for reasons other than increased yields (Figure 8.8). 
S n = 192 
Size of land 
S 
n = 198 
Number of household 
working on farm 
S 
n = 200 
Percentage of income 
from paddy 
Figure 8.8: Explanatory model for the number of household members working on-farm 
(Chi-square :p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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What this suggests is that older farmers with more experience of irrigation and a lower level of 
schooling employ more family labour on their farms than younger farmers with less experience of 
irrigation and higher education attainment. Furthermore, the larger landowners employ more 
household labour on their farm and receive a higher percentage of their income from this farming. 
This is in keeping with the general perception of the farming community that direct seeding has 
reduced the labour required, thus reducing the number of household members required to work on 
the farm: 
'It is not economic if they [his children] stay with me to help with the farming 
activities ... it is not economic ... they should go outside [the farm] to work' (Farmer 
informant No. 13). 
' ... there is no longer the need to go to the paddy fields as much any more so we 
could work in the factories' (Farmer informant No.3). 
Field location and land fragmentation 
In theory, farmers operating field lots which are spatially dispersed would be expected to obtain 
lower yields due to the increased management required at critical times during the cropping 
season. Likewise, it would be expected that farmers whose land is located next to the canal should 
have better water control than those located next to the drainage canal who in turn should have 
better control than those reliant on field-to-field distribution. Therefore, the relative yields of 
these farmers should also be different. None of these relationships have been found to be 
significant in the Muda case-study. 
-.,-----,....,-........... _._---_ ... , 
Land location 
Land fragmentation 
Yield - irrigated 
season 
NS 
S 
Yield - non-irrigated 
season 
.~~-~,-----
S 
NS 
Table 8.4: Correlation between yield, land location and fragmentation controlling for land size 
(Simple factorial ANOVA P<0.05: N = 180) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
To as celia in whether these findings are being influenced by the relationship between land size and 
yields, an analysis is conducted by 'controlling' for the size of the operating unit. Surprisingly, the 
results indicate that the yield in the irrigated season is significantly higher for farmers with 
fragmented land than for those farming only one lot (Table 8.4)166. By contrast, the yield in the 
166 For farmers with one plot, average yields in the irrigated season are 4.29tJha. By contrast, average yields 
for farmers with more than one plot are 4.63tJha. 
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non-irrigated season is as expected, with those farmers located next to the canal receiving higher 
yields than farmers reliant on either field-to-field distribution or the drainage canal167. This is very 
interesting, for one would expect that if the water distribution is controlled as designed, the 
location of the land relative to the canal would influence the yield in the irrigated season. 
However, this relationship is only found during the non-irrigated season when crop growth is 
dependent on rainfall and the distribution and drainage of this water is dependent on the 
cooperation of the farmers. In addition, the fact that yields in the irrigated season are higher for 
farmers with more plots is in direct contrast to the argument from both MADA and the farmers that 
land fragmentation results in absentee farmers which in turn affects their ability to manage the 
water effectively which logically affects their yield: 
' ... normally the farmers which [sic] stay far from their crop they only come twice 
only, at the time to seed the paddy and at the time to harvest the paddy, only two 
times so it is very difficult...' (MADA respondent No. 11). 
' ... they [the farmers] have to go to the field more often to see the condition [of the 
water and crops] and some farmers they stay far away and the water comes in 
and goes out, comes in and goes out...' (MADA respondent No. 13). 
'Sometimes the farmers don't stay here [near their land] but stay outside [some 
distance from their land] and then when MADA announce the date when they are 
going to release the water they don't know because they are not here .. .' (Farmer 
respondent No.4). 
Plot topography and yields 
There is no relationship between the level of the farmers' land and the yield. Likewise, plot 
topography does not appear to be influenced by the use of combine harvesters and tractors. This is 
surprising because one would expect the field level of those farmers who use tractors to be flatter 
than those who do not. Similarly, one would expect that the flatter the plot the better the yield l68 . 
The variable that is likely to influence these relationships is the location of the land within the 
irrigation block. After all, a farmer whose land is located next to the canal, and hence the farm 
road, is more likely to have access to his/her land during the critical times when land levelling and 
harvesting are required. However, such a relationship is not significant. Consequently, in the 
current study plot topography has not been found to significantly influence the yields obtained. 
167 Average yields for farmers located next to the canal are 5.46t/ha, next to the drain they are 4.98t1ha and 
for those farmers reliant on field-to-field distribution average yields are 5.lOtiha. 
168 This is because land levelling reduces the in-field micro variations which would restrict germination and 
paddy growth. 
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Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
The results examined above suggest that the critical factor influencing the yield is the land size 
operated. When this variable is 'controlled', land fragmentation influences the yield in the 
irrigated season and field location influences the yield in the non-irrigated season. Conversely, the 
yield is unaffected by the cost of production, planting method and paddy variety seeded. 
Likewise, farmers who employ more household labour in the cropping process and have greater 
experience of irrigation do not achieve higher yields. Therefore, the macro hypothesis can be 
rejected for all variables investigated other than the number of hectares operated, the number of 
plots farmed in the irrigated season and the location of these plots in the non-irrigated season. 
8.3 Heterogeneity or homogeneity: A comparison of blocks 
Macro hypothesis: That there is no significant difference between the farm and field 
characteristics or the socio-economic political status of respondents whether they farm in tertiary 
or non-tertiary irrigation blocks. 
To attribute the findings presented in sections 8.4 to 8.7 with the government policy of tertiary 
development, this section questions the extent to which the independent variables which are socio-
economic and agronomic are homogenous or heterogeneous between the tertiary and non-tertiary 
irrigation blocks. In so doing, it provides an analysis of the socio-economic political status of 
respondents, and their farm and field characteristics, when analysed with respect to the dependent 
variable block169. In theory, there should be no difference in the independent variables explored in 
Figure 8.2 when cross-tabulated with the irrigation block. For example, the number of hectares 
farmed or the paddy variety seeded is not expected to be influenced by the irrigation block within 
which the farming practice occurs. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 8.9170 and 
expanded on below. 
169 For significant relationships and their measures of association refer to Figure 8.9. 
170 Each matrix contains two figures, the first is the chi-square test of significance and the second is the 
contingency coefficient or Cramer V measure of association. 
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Significantly different farmers 
As expected there is no difference in farmers regarding their membership of the farmers' 
association, political allegiance, ownership of farming equipment or for many of their household 
characteristics l71 . This is in keeping with the perception of the relative homogeneity in the spatial 
distribution of farmers throughout the Muda region. What is interesting, however, is the 
difference in income source and number of household members working on the farm. 
The tendency within the Muda I block is to employ more family labour in their farming activities 
(Table 8.5). This supports the assertions in the 1988 project completion report that the Muda II 
facilities provide the farmers with increased labour savings172. Moreover, on average, Muda I 
farmers rely to a significantly greater extent on paddy farming for their total household income. 
More specifically, 83 per cent of Muda I fanners derive at least 70 per cent of their income from 
paddy farming compared with a corresponding figure of 57 per cent in the Muda II block173. 
Variable Categories MI Mil 
% Mean % 
No of household 1 33.6 1.77 50 
working on farm (n=198) >1 66.4 50 
Percentage of household =0;70 16.9 86.6 43.9 
income from paddy (n=200) > 70 83.1 56.5 
Table 8.5: Farm employment and source of income by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Mean 
1.52 
68.8 
One argument for this disparity is the increased ease with which farming activities can be 
conducted under tertiary irrigation, thus requiring less labour input in the completion of cultivation 
practices. When questioned about the benefits of Muda II facilities, the MADA officials tended to 
171 By household characteristics I refer to the variables age, gender, level of schooling, ethnicity, size of 
household, no. of household in full-time education, no. of household working off farm and experience of 
irrigation. 
l72 Although the current survey did not investigate the total person-hours utilised per hectare, the 1988 
survey indicated a reduction in these hours from 254 to 203 with respect to the Muda II blocks with the 
Muda I blocks observing a corresponding decrease of only 19 hours from 252 to 231. Clearly the number of 
household members working on the farm cannot be related to the number of hours employed but this 
variable is indicative of the increased labour requirement when working in the Muda I block. 
173 Wong (1992d;1995) rep0l1ed that on average 64.1 % of total household income during the off season 
(1991) was obtained by paddy farming with the figure rising to 80.4% in the main season (Wong, 1992d:18; 
Wong, 1995a:64). 
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express this 'ease' as a primary benefit ofte11iary development - focusing in particular on the ease 
of water distribution, access to fields and speed of farming activities: 
'The advantage when they put up the Muda II is that it is easier for water to flow 
into the field so the farmers will find it easy to get water whenever MADA give 
water, so that is the main advantage. Beside of putting up concrete irrigation, 
MADA also build up the small road next to the canal and make it easier for 
farmers to transport their paddy' (MADA informant No.1). 
'The benefits are, if there is Muda II scheme it is very easy for water to flow to the 
field, it is faster time that they take ... So the Muda II there is only one way for 
water to flow into all fields compared to the Muda I - that sometimes takes up to 3 
weeks. Of course the access road, when they build up the Muda II scheme they 
have the road outside of the structure so it makes it easier for them to transport 
their production. Also, it is faster for them to get ready for farming activities' 
(MADA informant No. 12). 
'The main advantage for the farmer in the Muda II is that it is easy for them to get 
water and then from there they can follow the irrigation schedule set up by MADA' 
(MADA informant No.3). 
Such an argument is enhanced by the lack of relationship between household income and the 
irrigation block, indicating that farmers are no more likely to be financially better off as a result of 
tertiary development or the increased time available for off-farm employment. Instead, by making 
farming activities and water control easier and quicker the Muda II facilities provide the farmers 
with more time to spend on other productive and non-productive activities 174. 
The enabling of farmers to become more involved in non-productive activities has influenced the 
perception of the productivity of the farmers by MADA staff, leading some staff (from the 
locality, district and HQ levels) to perceive the farmer to be 'lazy', 'disinterested' or 
'unproductive' with respect to the amount of labour invested in the cultivation of paddy: 
' ... this farmer is lazy to work and sometimes they just wait around the coffee 
shop ... .' (MADA informant No.1). 
'Most of the time you can see that they are spending their time in the coffee shop, 
about 70% I would say. They should work in the field at that particular time but 
they are in the coffee shop. This is one of the biggest problems ... They are not 
interested, they shouldn't say they are not interested because they are doing the 
farming, we are talking about farming, we are not talking about anything else. 
They are more interested in talking in their coffee shop .. .' (MADA informant No. 
10). 
'It is very important that the farmers spend more time in the field, I don't know 
how many hours a day, they spend a lot of time in the coffee shop, including my 
174 The extent to which tertiary facilities improve the water control capacity of farmers is examined in section 
8.5. 
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father in law. You see early in the morning in the coffee shop, you can see all of 
them and they retire too early [at the end of the day]' (MADA informant No. 13). 
' ... Now they spend relatively no time in the field and a lot of time in the coffee 
shops talking politics and a lot of them have some other sort of income. It is very 
clear already that rice farming has become very largely a part time job in terms of 
hours put in, it is also declining in terms of household income. Today we are 
talking about a Muda wide average probably we are talking about rice today 
accounting for about 50% of total income as opposed to the 1970s when it was 
well over 90% .. .' (MADA informant No. 16). 
Overall, these findings suggest that the demographics, income, access to education, experience of 
irrigation and political affiliation of farmers are not significantly different between the two 
irrigation blocks. However, those farmers located within the Muda II block employ less 
household labour in paddy cultivation and receive a larger percentage of off-farm income -
although this does not appear to influence total household income. 
Significantly different farms and fields 
The relationship between the irrigation block, the size of land farmed now and 5 years ago is 
indicative of a difference in land holdings between the two blocks. This difference mainly relates 
to the small land size categories with a higher percentage of farmers in the Muda II block 
operating less than Iha of land. Similarly, 5 years ago, 55 per cent of Muda II farmers operated 
less than 1 ha of land whilst only 28 per cent of Muda I farmers reported likewise (Table 8.6). 
_ .. 
-,~------ . 
Variable .~~!~~.<?!ies ___ ., MI 
-~-~,--~~-.--.-.-... -.-.... --.--~---~----- ----_ .. _. 
% mean 
(log) 
Hectares farmed now :0;1 30.5 .315 
> 1 69.5 
Hectares farmed 5 years ago :0;1 28 .38 
> 1 72 
Table 8.6: Farm size operated by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
MI 
% mean 
(log) 
52.4 .051 
47.6 
54.9 .04 
45.1 
Further to the differences in farm size, the findings in Figure 8.9 also indicate a difference between 
the blocks in planting methods used, paddy varieties seeded, plot topography and field location. 
Because of the increased canal density under tertiary development, the differences in field location 
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are as expected with the majority of Muda II farmers located next to an irrigation canal and the 
majority of Muda I farmers relying on field-to-field distribution (Figure 8.10)175. 
Of importance for water control and effective in-field water distribution is a level plot. In theory, 
this should be practised independent of whether Muda II or Muda I facilities are in place. In fact, 
it is arguably more critical in the Muda I lots because of the distance which water has to travel to 
supply the whole block. However, although 7.1 per cent more Muda I than Muda II farmers 
regarded their land to be 'very flat', three times as many farmers in the Muda I block regarded 
their land to be 'not very flat' 176. 
= c 
Field-to- fiekl 31 
_ •• _66 
~ Next to drain 
.... 
c 
...< 
Next to canal _ •• _53 
o 20 40 60 
Percentage offamlS 
Figure 8.10: Location of fields by block 
(chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 181) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
~ 
80 
This variation can be attributed to the ease with which water is distributed in parts of the Muda II 
block, which has reduced the necessity for these farmers to level their land. Of those which have 
been unable to level their land, this is because their land is either inaccessible for machines, 
regularly damaged by the combine harvesters, directly connected to a supply channel, or because 
of the expense and time required to level their land some farmers are unable to afford to conduct 
this activity: 
'I try to make the level of my land the same but sometimes there is the problem 
with the other machinery. Let's say the harvesting machine, they go there and 
175 For those farmers in the Muda II block, 53% are located next to an irrigation canal compared with only 
22% of Muda I farmers. Likewise, the majority (66%) of Muda I farmers are neither located next to an 
irrigation or drainage canal. 
176 Although the association is weak, 9.8% of Muda II farmers regard their land to be 'very flat' and 16.9% 
of Muda I farmers stated likewise. In addition, 26.3% of Muda I farmers recognised their land as being 'not 
very flat' compared with only 8.5% of Muda II farmers. 
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they make problem, they make hole you know so by that time the land level is not 
the same anymore so I have to re-Ievel' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
'Levelling of the paddy land is very costly, I think that normal farmers they have a 
problem, maybe they are not levelling the land. Levelling the land is a process 
we have to do sometimes maybe it takes 3 or 4 years, that is the reason ... .' 
(MADA informant No. 13). 
The final differences between the irrigation blocks are the planting method and paddy variety 
used. In particular, farmers .in the Muda I block are more inclined to adopt the government 
recommended dry seeding method because of the difficulties associated with receiving an 
adequate and timely water supply (Table 8.7 and Figure 8.11). 
Dry seeding 
Wet seeding 
(%) 
27 
73 
(%) 
13 
87 
Table 8.7: Method of planting in the irrigated season by block 
(Chi-square: p<O.05: n = 196) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
9.5 50 
14.3 
iii Water problems 
• More economic 
o Follow others 
o Easier 
• Other 
Figure 8.11: Reasons for adopting the dry seeding technique (%) 
(n=42) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Although three-quarters of the farmers used the government recommended paddy variety MR84, 
the farmers in the Muda I block are more inclined to use a combination of 'other' varieties in their 
cultivation practices (Figure 8.12). Furthermore, of those farmers who do use these 'other' 
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varieties, 73 per cent farm over Iha of land. Importantly, however, the choice of paddy variety in 
each block is not influenced by this relationship177. 
'0 Q> 
MIl '0 Q> 
Q> 
'" 
.... 
.... Q> 
·c 
eo: 
~ 
.... 
MI '0 
'0 
eo: 
~ 
o 
85 
20 40 60 80 100 
Percentage of respondents 
Figure 8.12: Paddy variety seeded by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 200 ) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
The results examined above illustrate the differences in farms and fanners between the two 
irrigation blocks. By way of summary, the Muda I farmers: employ more household members on 
the farm; receive a larger percentage of total household income from farming; operate on average 
larger farms; have a larger percentage of uneven plots; and are more inclined to seed using' other' 
varieties and the dry seeding technique. Because six of these variables are modelled as 
influencing the yield it is important that these are integrated into subsequent analysis. Therefore, 
in assessing the differences in yields and production costs between the two irrigation blocks these 
variables have been incorporated. 
177 This conclusion is based on a non-significant simple factorial ANOVA between the irrigation block and 
paddy variety with farm size as the covariant. 
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8.4 Significantly different yields - significantly different costs 
Macro hypothesis: That tertiary facilities increase farmer productivity by reducing production 
costs and increasing yields when compared with farmers under non-tertiary conditions. 
Has tertiary development increased yields? 
One of the primary targets of tertiary development is to increase yields in accordance with national 
policy expectations. In 1988, it was recognised that this yield increase had not materialised - a 
finding which is corroborated in the present study (Table 8.8). More importantly, however, 
because there is no significant difference in yields during the non-irrigated season, the lower than 
expected yields in the irrigated season can be directly attributed to the tertiary intervention 
policy178. Moreover, not only has the average yield in the irrigated season not improved under 
tertiary development it is in fact lower than the average yield in the non-tertiary block. It appears, 
therefore, that the Muda II policy has not achieved any of its yield increase expectations. 
Irrigated season 
Non-irrigated season 
4.79* 
5.35 
4.02* 
5.14 
Table 8.8: Mean difference in yields for Muda I and Muda II blocks 
(*T-test for logged functions: F<0.05: n = 198) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Figure 8.13 illustrates a difference in the perception of yield changes over the past five years, with 
15 per cent of Muda II farmers regarding their yields to have 'decreased' or 'remained the same' 
compared with 26 per cent of Muda I farmers stating likewise. Nevertheless, with the majority of 
Muda I farmers indicating that their yield has 'increased' during this time it is difficult to argue 
that the number of Muda II farmers who have experienced a similar increase have done so as a 
direct result of tertiary development179. 
178 Because there is no significant difference in yields in the non-irrigated season the observed differences in 
the irrigated season cannot be assumed to be due to different farm, field and farmer characteristics for these 
would also influence the yield in the irrigated season. Consequently, the non-irrigated season acts as the 
control for the findings illustrated in the irrigated season. 
179 74% of Muda I farmers and 85% of Muda II farmers regard their yield to have 'increased' over the past 5 
years. 
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Clearly, the difference in yields could be attributed to the different farms and farmers between the 
two irrigation blocks. However, the only factor found to influence this yield is the size of land 
operated (Table 8.9). Furthermore, the larger percentage of smaller farmers in the Muda II block 
has not been found to influence the differences in yields between these blocks (Figure 8.14). 
Therefore, even though smaller farmers produce on average higher yields (section 8.2) and the 
Muda II block supports a larger percentage of smaller farmers (section 8.3), the lack of yield 
increases in the Muda II block is a direct result of the tertiary intervention policy. Consequently, 
this policy has not only failed to meet its objectives of increased yields but when compared with 
the Muda I block the yields are significantly lower for all farm sizes. 
$ 
.... 
i@ Decreased! No 
Q" 
';;' change 
"" il 
'>, 
.S 
~ 
= 
'" ii 
..... 
o 
= o 
<= Q" 
" ~
" i>< 
Increased 
o 20 
85 
40 60 80 100 
Percentage of farmers 
Figure 8.13: Perceptions of changes in yields by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 198) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Main 2-way 
I·H~ /lIl MI 
No. 
effects interaction _. ___ respondents 
••• _~. ___ ~~ ______ "m"_ ... ~". __ • ______ " ______ • __ ._ ... _"_._" ___ • ___ ._ 
Paddy variety NS NS N = 198 
Block S 
Method of planting in the irrigated season NS NS N = 194 
Block S 
Size of farm S NS N = 198 
Block S 
Plot topography NS NS N = 198 
Block S 
Location NS NS N = 180 
Block S 
No. household working on farm NS NS N = 198 
Block S 
Table 8.9: Relationship between yield, significantly different farms/farmers and irrigation block 
(Simple factorial ANOVA of logged dependent variable yield in the irrigated season: F<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 8.14: Relationship between land size and yield dependent on block 
(n = 198) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Has tertiary development decreased the cost of production? 
The findings for the average cost of production are similarly discouraging with no difference 
observed in either the irrigated or non-irrigated seasons (Figure 8.9). This finding is not, however, 
mirrored in the attitudes to the changing production costs over the past 5 yrs, with the majority of 
farmers under Muda II conditions perceiving their costs to have increased compared with only 22 
per cent of the Muda II farmers stating likewise (Figure 8.15). 
These perceptions appear to be due to the differences in machinery and chemical costs in the 
respective blocks. For the Muda II farmers, the cost of combines and ploughing is significantly 
less, and their cost of chemical inputs is significantly higher, when compared with the Muda I 
farmers (Figures 8.16 to 8.19). This suggests that the reduced labour investment in the tertiary 
blocks is being substituted by chemical control, a finding with clear implications for the long term 
sustainable production of the tertiary blocks and the uptake of integrated pest management 
approaches in the region. 
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Figure 8.15: Perceptions of changes in the cost of production by block 
(N = 200 : p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 8.17: Cost of herbicides and 
pesticides by block 
(N = 200 : p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 8.18: Cost of combines by block 
(N = 200 : p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 8.19: Cost of fertilisers by block 
(N = 200 : p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
The evidence examined in this section indicates that not only is the macro hypothesis rejected but 
the yields in the Muda II block are significantly lower in the irrigated season than in the Muda I 
block - even accounting for the different characteristics of farms, fields and farmers in each block. 
Furthermore, the tertiary development policy has not reduced the overall cost of production 
because although the better field access has reduced the costs of ploughing and harvesting, the 
costs of chemicals is significantly higher for the Muda II farmers. 
8.5 Water control and tertiary development 
The analysis so far has focused on the first operational model (Figure 8.2) with the findings 
illustrating that, on average: larger land holders produce lower yields; the different characteristics 
observed in each irrigation block do not influence the yield; and the most important factor for 
influencing yields (even accounting for different land sizes) is the irrigation block within which 
farming activities are practised. The question is: why is it that yields in the Muda II block are 
consistently lower than in the Muda I block during the irrigated season? 
To explore this, the analysis is conducted using the second operational model (Figure 8.3) and the 
remaining macro hypotheses shown in Table 8.1. The variables found to be significantly different 
between the two irrigation blocks are illustrated in Figure 8.20 and examined in detail throughout 
the remainder of this chapter. The focus of this section is on the differences, or otherwise, in the 
water control capacity of the farmers between the two irrigation blocks - emphasising in particular 
the extent to which tertiary development has improved the water control capacity of these farmers. 
What is water control? 
Water control is a critical factor for increasing productivity and utilising the water resource in a 
sustainable manner. At the farm level, water control is defined as: 
'the ability of farmers to plan adequately and in time for cropping decisions by 
having the required volumes of water available at the appropriate times and 
places for crop needs plus increments sufficient for leaching requirements and 
evaporation' (Lowdermilk, 1990, p. 155). 
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In other words, water control requires that the farmers have the capacity to obtain the correct 
amount and quality of water, at the right time, to meet both the consumptive needs of the crop and 
the leaching requirements of the soil (Freeman, 1990). 
In large-scale schemes, the meaning of control is dependent on the specific tier of analysis, 
reflecting fundamental differences in the attitudes, values and knowledge of managers and farmers 
(Freeman & Lowdermilk, 1991). At the systems level, for example, water control is dependent on 
the formal scheduling and allocation arrangements of the government agency, whereby effective 
management requires the controlling of the water resource (from the catchment to the outlet) in 
order to provide a predictable and adequate supply to meet the expected collective demands of the 
farmers. At this level, water control means 'managing water flows so as not to exceed the physical 
limits of the system' (Freeman, 1990: 117). At levels below the outlet, water control is dependent 
on the capacity of the farmers to obtain an adequate and reliable supply which is equitable in both 
space and time. These factors are critical for securing efficiency, productivity and equity at the 
farm level (Reddy, 1986). For as Freeman (1990) correctly states: 
'Only the farmer combines the factors of production in a particular field to bring 
in a crop. If water comes too soon, too late, or in amounts too much or too little, 
the productivity of that water is sharply reduced' (Freeman, 1990, p. 112). 
Water control is, therefore, a fundamental factor of production, serving as a precondition for 
increasing production and productivity, improving returns on investment and enhancing resource 
conservation (Hvidt, 1997). The extent to which these objectives are met is dependent on the 
institutional and organisational arrangements implemented in system management. Consequently, 
water control is more than just a technical activity of distribution and supply - it is a social and 
political activity dependent on the collective actions of irrigators and managers (Hvidt, 1996). 
This section focuses on the relationship between tertiary development and the capacity of farmers 
to control the water resource 'below' the outlet. In theory, the more 'formal' control afforded to 
the farmers, the more efficient and productive the supply and the higher the yield returns. By 
contrast, the less 'formal' control afforded to the farmers, the more likely it is that farmers will 
adopt a risk aversion strategy which neglects the common property principle by applying the 
greatest quantity possible, when available, thus reducing the efficiency, equity, quantity and 
fairness of supply on a block basis. The three dimensions explored in the analysis of 'water 
control' are the adequacy, reliability and fairness of supply to the fields using the indicators 
illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
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Have tertiary facilities improved the water control capacity of farmers? 
Macro hypothesis: That water control is improved under tertiary facilities when compared with 
non-tertiary facilities 
Figure 8.20 illustrates the variables and indicators explored in the analysis of water control which 
are significantly different between the two irrigation blocks. Taking each dimension separately, 
the following analysis questions whether water control is improved by the development of tertiary 
facilities. 
Reliability 
Four indicators of reliability have been investigated: The experience of reliability difficulties in 
the past 5 yrs; the regularity of reliability difficulties in the past 5 yrs; the experience of 
deviations in the MADA schedule in the past 5 yrs; and the perception by the farmers to the 
overall reliability of supply. 
Yes 
No 
MI (%) 
46 
54 
Mil (%) 
74 
26 
Table 8.10: Reliability difficulties by block in the past 5 yrs 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The data in Table 8.10 shows that a higher percentage of Muda II farmers have experienced 
difficulties in reliability in the past five years. In addition, although the majority of Muda I 
fanners regard these difficulties to be 'rarely' problematic, 88 per cent of Muda II farmers 'often' 
experience problems in supply reliability, with a handful of farmer in each block regarding these 
problems to be 'always' problematic (Figure 8.21). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the majority of 
Muda II fanners regard their reliability to be 'poor' (Figure 8.22). From this evidence, the 
reliability of supply within the tertiary irrigation block is significantly worse than in the non-
tertiary block. 
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One possible cause for this disparity is that the official irrigation schedule implemented by MADA 
is in itself unreliable. However, the majority of farmers recognise that this schedule is 
'sometimes' altered independent of the block in which they cultivate 1 80. These schedule 
alterations are made by MADA to ensure that as much as possible of the rainfall which falls in the 
catchment area is effectively utilised in the fields. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the alterations in 
scheduling affects both the Muda I and Muda II blocks comparably. In fact, when questioned 
about these difficulties the farmers regard the issue of inter-block distribution to be the critical 
factor for ensuring a reliable supply to their fields. Where this distribution is inadequate, the 
180 67% of Muda I farmers regard the irrigation schedule as 'sometimes' changing with 73% of Mud a II 
farmers responding likewise. 
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majority of farmers regard their supply to be 'a matter of time only' 181. These differences must, 
therefore, be due to distribution factors 'below the outlet'. Such an argument was offered by both 
Muda I and Muda II farmers during interview: 
'Actually the irrigation supply is reliable but there must be no disagreement with 
farmers before my land otherwise there will be a problem' (Farmer informant No. 
12). 
'If you follow the schedule set up by MADA then there is no problem, but there 
are certain farmers beside my land which [sic] sometimes seed the paddy late 
and so they don't need water when I need water. If they followed the schedule 
set up by MADA then there would be no problem' (Farmer informant No.5). 
'If we follow the schedule set up by MADA we will get the water at the right time' 
(Farmer informant No.6). 
This is not to say, however, that all the farmers regard the supply from MADA to be reliable. 
Furthermore, for those farmers experiencing difficulties in the Muda I block, the general 
perception is that tertiary development will improve this situation: 
'The irrigation supply of water is unreliable but to improve this MADA should build 
up the Muda II' (Farmer informant No. 18). 
'The irrigation supply at this time is not fully reliable and by building up the Muda II 
it will be more reliable' (Farmer informant No. 23). 
'In this area, if there is concrete canals under Muda II, the reliability of the 
irrigation supply will be better because we can use this small canal in front of my 
house as a drain river and the other one that they are going to build as a source 
of water so that will improve the reliability of the irrigation system' (Farmer 
informant No. 22). 
'To increase the reliability they should build up Muda II in this area' (Farmer 
informant No. 26). 
'The water supply is unreliable. When I attend the meeting I always voice out the 
problem but normally until now there is no solution from the government, maybe 
near the election we will get the project [Muda II]' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
This illustrates the high expectations the farmers have of tertiary development and the politicised 
nature of this development. However, the survey data indicates that tertiary facilities do not 
improve supply reliability. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that for those farmers in the Muda II 
block there was a mixed response to the causes of this unreliability. For some it was directly 
attributed to the supply from MADA whilst for others it was due to poor cooperation between the 
farmers themselves: 
181 For an expansion of this argument see the water control subsection 'fairness'. 
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There is enough water you can see in the canal but it does not arrive at the right 
times. At this moment we don't have water but now when we don't need water 
there is much in the canal. When we don't need water they [MADA] send and 
when we need water they don't send. So this is the big problem' (Farmer 
informant No.3). 
'By grouping farmers together there will be better reliability of water supply 
because they can follow the time set up by MADA, they can work together and 
seed at the same time' (Farmer informant No.4). 
To clarify whether the differences in reliability are a result of tertiary development, or the 
differences in farm, field and farmer characteristics between the irrigation blocks, a multivariate 
analysis is conducted. The statistical technique used is log-linear analysis and the tabulated 
findings are provided in Tables 1 to 3, Appendix E:3. The aim of such an analysis is to find the 
simplest description of the relationship between variables in order to find the model of 'best fit' 
(Rose & Sullivan, 1996). To illustrate the process of model building, Table 8.11 shows the 
models investigated with respect to the reliability variables l82, the type of interaction and the 
explanation which emerges for significant relationships. 
Model Interaction Explanation if significant 
[BR] [BF] [RF] [BRF] The relationship between the irrigation block and reliability is 
significantly different for the farm/field or farmer variable 
[BF] [RF] 
[BR] [BF] 
[BR] 
[FR] 
There is a significant independent effect of the irrigation block 
on the reliability of supply 
There is a significant independent effect of the farm/farmer or 
field characteristic on the reliability of supply 
Table 8.11: Explanation of log-linear modelling 
(B = Irrigation block, R = reliability variable, F = farm/field or farmer variable) 
Source: Adapted from the explanations of Rose & Sullivan 1996: 205-211 
The results in Table 1 (Appendix E:3) indicate that the different response of the Muda I and Muda 
II farmers to their 'perception' of reliability is not influenced by the differences in field, farm and 
farmer characteristics. Consequently, the perception of the Muda II farmers that their water 
supply is unreliable is a direct consequence of the irrigation block within which cultivation is 
182 The same procedure for log-linear model building is used throughout this chapter for the other water 
control dimensions, the cooperation and water management strategy variables. Within this section, however, 
the reliability variables include the difficulty in reliability in the past 5 yrs, the regularity of reliability 
difficulties and the perception by the farmers to the overall reliability of supply. The experience of 
deviations in the MADA schedule in the past 5 yrs is not included because it is not statistically different 
between the two blocks. 
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practised 183. Similarly, the 'experience' of reliability difficulties is also influenced by the 
irrigation block within which cultivation is practised. However, unlike the 'perception' of 
reliability, the log-linear analysis incorporating the 'experience' variable indicates three-way 
interactions for the field location, source of supply, plot topography and planting methods used 
(Table 2, Appendix E:3). What this means, for example, is that the relationship between the field 
location and the experience of irrigation difficulties is different for the two irrigation blocks (Table 
8.12)184. 
Block MI Mil 
Experience difficulties Yes No Yes No 
Locationlsource 
Next to canal 32 68 80 20 
Next to drain 71 29 27 73 
Field to field 45 55 71 29 
Plot topography 
Flat 70 30 25 75 
Not flat 41 59 80 20 
Method of planting in irrigated season 
Dry seeding 75 25 60 40 
Wet seeding 35 65 78 22 
Table 8.12: Experience of reliability difficulties by block for significant log-linear 3-way interactions 
(Log-linear analysis: p<0.05: n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The log-linear analysis conducted using the 'regularity' variable illustrates significant independent 
associations between the irrigation block and the 'regularity' of reliability difficulties for all 
variables analysed (Table 3, Appendix E:3). Consequently, even accounting for the significantly 
183 Furthermore, Table 1, Appendix E:3 also illustrates that this 'perception' is influenced by the plot 
topography, the use of water pumps, the ability to control the irrigation turnout and the experience of 
irrigation difficulties. However, because there are no three-way interactions, these findings are in addition 
to, rather than in connection with, the influence of the irrigation block. What this means is that neither the 
field location, source of supply, planting methods used or size of land operated influences whether farmers 
regard their water supply to be reliable or not. However, 63 per cent of those who have uneven field 
topography, 57 per cent ofthose required to use water pumps, 82 per cent of farmers who cannot open or 
close the irrigation turnout and 60 per cent of fanners who experience 'a lot of irrigation difficulties' also 
regard the reliability of their water supply to be 'poor'. 
184 There is no direct benefit for being located next to an irrigation canal in the Muda II block, with a higher 
percentage of these farmers experiencing reliability difficulties when compared with the Muda I farmers. 
Where the Muda I farmers do experience difficulties, however, is when located next to the drainage canal. 
For those farmers who rely on field-to-field distribution this influences the reliability difficulties of Muda II 
farmers more so than for Muda I. Furthermore, although plot topography negatively affects reliability 
difficulties in the Muda II block, such a relationship is not observed in the Muda I block. Finally, it would 
appear that the Muda I farmers adopt the dry seeding technique when experiencing reliability difficulties 
whereas the opposite can be concluded for those farming under tertiary conditions. 
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different field, farm and farmer characteristics, the farmers in the Muda II block experience 
reliability difficulties more often than those in the Muda I blockl85 . 
Adequacy 
As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the dimension adequacy is investigated using the following indicators: 
source of supply; experience of excess/shortage of supply; the perception of supply adequacy; and, 
the perception of drainage adequacy. 
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Figure 8.23: Source of supply by irrigation block 
(Chi-square: p<O.05 : n = 181) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Unsurprisingly, most of the Muda II farmers receive their irrigation supply directly from the canal 
with the majority of Muda I farmers relying on the field-to-field distribution of other farmers 
(Figure 8.23). Consequently, farmers in the Muda II block should receive a more adequate supply. 
The source of supply is certainly regarded by the farmers to be important for ensuring an adequate 
supply: 
'I can receive water whenever I need it because my plots are located next to the 
canal' (Farmer informant No.2). 
'My land is next to the canal so there is no problem' (Farmer informant No. 21). 
185 In addition, the topography, use of pump, size ofland, control of turnout and overall experience of 
irrigation difficulties also influence the 'regularity' of reliability problems although these findings are 
independent of the observed differences between the two irrigation blocks. 
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'It is very difficult to get water because I have to go through other farmers land. 
There is 13 relongs between the main canal at feeder 3 and my land ... that is a 
long way and that's why farmers in this area are like me facing the same water 
problem ... ' (Farmer informant No. 25). 
'I can receive water from the canal and because most of my land is near the canal 
so it is easy for me to get water and release water' (Farmer informant No.8). 
During the irrigated season there is no difference between the two blocks for farmers experiencing 
too little water for their crop requirements with the majority of Muda I farmers (92 per cent) and 
Muda II farmers (84 per cent) regarding their supply to be inadequate. A similar finding has also 
been found in the experience of supply shortage over the past 5 yrs (Table 8.14). During the non-
irrigated season, however, the percentage of respondents experiencing a shortage of supply is 
significantly greater the Muda I than in the Muda II block (Table 8.13). 
MI% Mil % SiQ. 
Shortage in the irrigated season ns 
Yes 92 84 
No 8 16 
Excess in the irrigated season <0.05 
Yes 70 13 
No 30 87 
Shortage in the non-irrigated season <0.05 
Yes 74 39 
No 26 61 
Excess in the non-irrigated season <0.05 
Yes 83 20 
No 17 80 
Table 8.13: Experience of excess/shortage of supply in 1996 
(Chi-square: p<0.05: n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
M% MII% Sig. 
Shortage in supply in past 5 yrs ns 
Yes 71 72 
No 29 28 
Excess in supply in past 5 yrs <0.05 
Yes 53 7 
No 48 93 
Table 8.14: Experience of excess/shortage of supply in past 5 yrs 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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For some farmers, the inadequacy of supply occurs throughout the season: 
'It [inadequate supply] is not about the seeding it is all the time. There is a 
problem with water and the paddy needs more water and then the canal cannot 
supply enough water' (Farmers informant No.1). 
Whereas for other farmers the supply inadequacy is at specific stages of the cropping cycle such as 
during tractoring, seeding and the application of herbicides, fertilisers and pesticides: 
'I can't get enough water for my crop ... the most problematic is when we are going 
to tractor 20 days after seeding, that is the most problematic for water. So I need 
water to tractor my land, when we use dry seeding whenever we need water 
there is no supply, no water in the drain river and no water in the canal..' (Farmer 
informant No. 26). 
'I can't receive enough water when I require. When I need more water I contact 
MADA otherwise I have to wait for the rain. After 10 days is the biggest problem, 
we need water in the field because the paddy needs to grow and instead weeds 
will grow' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
'No there is not enough water. The biggest problem is when we want to apply the 
weedicides [herbicides], pesticides, fertilisers so at that time it is the biggest 
problem' (Farmer informant No. 16). 
This is not to say, however, that all fanners regard their water supply to be inadequate: 
'When I really need water normally there is water so there is no problem for me' 
(Farmer informant No. 20). 
'Generally enough water flows to my land, it is a matter of time only' (Farmer 
informant No. 24). 
This said, for most of the fanners interviewed the adequacy of the water supply was generally less 
to do with the adequacy of supply from the main canal and more to do with action taken on their 
part to ensure an adequate supply. Such actions include pumping, piping and the blocking of the 
water supply to others downstream: 
'Normally I can receive enough water because I can pipe from the canal. For me 
there is no problem because if there is not enough water from the main canal that 
means that I can depend on the drain canal and pump from there' (Farmer 
informant No. 19). 
'Generally I get enough water because I am supported by a water pump and then 
I pump in water from the drain river .. .' (Farmer informant No. 25). 
'If I can't get enough water to my land then I will use a pump and then put up a 
small pipe and then pump from the river to my field' (Farmer informant No.1). 
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' ... If after 2 weeks I still can't get water I have to block the small canal to prevent 
water from flowing on and then the water from that will hold in the canal. The 
problem is the other farmers fields, they overflow water so we won't get water and 
that's why I have to block our canal. . .'(Farmer informant No. 18). 
Here again the farmers expect tertiary development to assist them in ensuring an adequate supply 
during the irrigated season: 
To tackle the problem [of inadequate supply] MADA should build up the Muda II' 
(Farmer informant No. 17). 
There is also a difference between the irrigation blocks regarding the excess supply of water in the 
irrigated season (Table 8.13). This suggests that when the supply is adequate, the Muda II farmers 
are able to control the drainage of water from their plots in a way that is not possible for the Muda 
I farmers. A similar finding has been observed for the non-irrigated season, with 83 per cent of 
Muda II farmers able to drain excess water from their fields compared with only 20 per cent of 
Muda I farmers able to do likewise (Table 8.13). Unsurprisingly, therefore, these farmers have 
also been able to drain excess water from their fields over the past 5 yrs and hence the difference 
in responses for Muda I and Muda II farmers during this time period (Table 8.14). 
These findings do not, however, appear to be influencing the overall perception of water supply 
adequacy (Figure 8.24). What they do influence is the perception of the adequacy of drainage 
between the two blocks, with virtually all of the Muda II fanners regarding this to be 'good' 
compared with only 60 per cent of Muda I farmers stating likewise (Figure 8.25). The main 
reasons given for these drainage difficulties are because of the low land level, the requirement to 
drain through other farmers fields, and the high level of water already in the drainage canal 
resulting in a difficulty for these farmers to use this canal for its intended purpose: 
'I have difficulty to drain the water because sometimes whenever it rains it is very 
difficult to drain the land and then sometimes because since my land is far from 
the canal, about 3 to 4 relongs, that means I have to take time to get the land 
drained' (Farmer informant No.1), 
'Because my land level is lower than the other farmers so the water can very 
easily flow to my land but when it comes to drain I have to wait for the water level 
in the drain river to lower. Only then I can flow out the water otherwise the water 
has to stay in my field until I can drain it' (Farmer informant No. 11), 
To get water is the problem but to drain is also sometimes very difficult. Like this 
time, for example, there is water in the drainage canal which already overflows so 
it is very difficult to drain because the water in the canal is already too high' 
(Farmer informant No. 25), 
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'There is no canal next to my land and before the river there is the other farmers 
land so to drain the water I need to pass it through the other farmers land' 
(Farmer informant No.9). 
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Figure 8.25: Perception of the adequacy of drainage by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 193) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
At first glance, these findings suggest that the supply during the irrigated season is inadequate for 
both the Muda I and Muda II farmers, although the Muda I farmers have greater difficulty in 
draining any excess water from their fields. What is interesting, however, is that for the Muda II 
fanners who have experienced supply and drainage difficulties during the past 5 yrs the regularity 
of occurrence is far greater than for the Muda I farmers (Table 8.15). 
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To clarify whether the differences in the adequacy of supply and control between the two blocks 
are a result of tertiary development or the different farm, field and farmer characteristics the log-
linear statistical technique is again applied. The results of which are shown in Tables 4 to 9, 
Appendix E:3 186. Here again we are interested in both the three-way and two-way modelled 
interactions. 
MI% Mil % Sig. 
Regularity of inadequate supply <0.05 
(n=141) 
::;4 68 3 
>4 32 97 
Regularity of excess in supply 
(n=66) 
::;2 77 33 
>2 23 67 
. ,_._.-
Table 8.15: Regularity of excess/shortage in supply over past 5 yrs 
(Chi-square: p<0.05; - Not enough arguments) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The results in Appendix E:3 indicate that all of the relationships between the irrigation block and 
the experience of supply excess in the irrigated season (1996); shortage and excess in the non-
irrigated season (1996); and excess in the past 5 yrs are influenced by the irrigation block. 
However, whilst most of these are independent of the different farm, field and farmer 
characteristics, there are some significant three-way interactions that require consideration. Based 
on the observed frequencies for these models (Table 8.16) it appears that for those farmers who 
experienced too much water in the 1996 irrigated season, the majority of Muda I farmers received 
their water through other farmers' fields whilst for the Muda II farmers half were located next to 
an irrigation canal. What this suggests is that the oversupply for farmers in the Muda I block is 
dependent on the actions of neighbouring farmers whereas for the Muda II farmers the most likely 
reason is that these farmers failed to close their offtake when required187• 
186 As with the reliability variables only those variables which are significantly different between the two 
irrigation blocks have been analysed using the log-linear technique. The source of supply is not analysed 
under log-linear because this is not a logical argument, after all, the fact that farmers prefer different seeding 
techniques cannot be expected to influence the source of their water supply. In addition, the regularity of too 
much water in the past 5 yrs is not included due to the small sample size for this variable (n=66). Likewise, 
because 90% of the Muda II farmers regard their drainage to be 'good' there are not enough arguments to 
conduct log-linear analysis on this variable. 
187 Although the use of pumps is different between the two blocks this does not influence the experience of 
excess in supply. 
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Block MI Mil 
Experience of too much water in the Yes No Yes No 
irrigated seQson % % % % 
Location/Source (n=181) I 
Next to canal 19 31 55 53 
Next to drain 6 28 27 14 
Field to field 75 41 18 33 
Use pump in the irrigated season (n=200) 
20 ! Yes 65 86 36 
No 35 14 64 80 I 
Table 8.16: Experience of excess supply in the irrigated season by block for significant log-linear 3-
way interactions 
(Chi-square: p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
Block MI Mil I 
Experience of too little water in the non- Yes No Yes No I 
irrigated season % % % %. 
Location/Sou rce (n= 181 ) 
48 I Next to canal 10 57 62 
Next to drain 13 10 19 14 I 
Field to field 77 33 19 38 
Table 8.17: Experience of shortage in supply in the non-irrigated season by block for significant 
log-linear 3-way interactions 
(Chi-square: p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The final three-way interaction relates to the inadequacy of supply in the non-irrigated season 
1996 (Table 8.17). As with the data for the irrigated season, this indicates that the shortage of 
supply is predominantly associated with the field-to-field distribution in the Muda I block and the 
canal location of Muda II farmers. Hence, farmers in the Muda I block experience difficulties in 
the adequacy of supply due to their dependence on other farmers. In the Muda II block, however, 
the canal location of these farmers suggests either an inadequate supply in the canal or inadequate 
practices on the part of the farmers 188. 
188 For those farmers who regard their land as 'not flat', 43 per cent experience excess supply whereas for 
those regarding their land to be 'flat', 71 per cent experience excess. Therefore, having flat land does not 
influence the ability of farmers to control the excess water in their fields. Such an arrangement is also found 
with respect to the farmers experiencing an excess in supply during the non-irrigated season 1996 and as a 
total over the past 5 yrs. In the non-irrigated season 82% offarmers regarding their land to be 'flat' and 53% 
as 'not flat' experienced an excess in supply in 1996. A similar relationship is also observed with respect to 
the experience of oversupply in the past 5 yrs with 57% of those regarding their land to be 'flat' and 30% of 
those regarding their land to be 'not flat' experiencing difficulties. Interestingly, however, the excess supply 
in the non-irrigated season influences the larger farmers to a significantly greater degree than those farming 
< Iha ofland. Furthermore, of those farmers expressing 'difficulties' with their irrigation, 40 per cent have 
received an oversupply in the past 5 yrs. Finally, for those farmers experiencing too little water in the non-
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The extent to which the 'regularity' of difficulties is a function of the irrigation block or the 
different farm, field and farmer characteristics is illustrated in Table 7, Appendix E:3. This 
indicates that the 'regularity' by which Muda II farmers experience difficulties in supply is a 
function of the irrigation block itself. Consequently, not only is the policy of tertiary development 
not improving the adequacy of supply it is in fact increasing the number of times farmers 
. l' d'f:C: 1 189 experIence t 11S 1 llCU ty . 
Fairness 
Three indicators of fairness have been investigated: the perception of the fairness of the irrigation 
schedule; the differences in water distribution within the block; and the number of days for water 
to reach the farmers plot. All of these variables are influenced by the irrigation block in which 
cultivation is practised (Figure 8.20). Specifically, nearly all respondents in the Muda II block 
regard the irrigation schedule to be 'fair'. By contrast, 21 per cent of those farmers in the Muda I 
block regard the schedule as 'not being fair' (Table 8.18). 
Not fair 
Fair 
MI 
(%) 
21 
79 
Mil 
(%) 
3 
97 
Table 8.18: Perception of fairness of irrigation schedule by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 190) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
This satisfaction with the irrigation schedule is reflected in the positive response of some of the 
farmers during interview: 
'The irrigation schedule set up by MADA is very good because the job can be 
done in the time given, the harvesting, seeding time, fertiliser time all fits into the 
schedule' (Farmer informant No.1). 
irrigated season the control over the farm gate is a critical factor with the majority of farmers who cannot 
control this gate reporting inadequacy of supply during this season. 
189 In addition, a quarter of farmers who regard their land to be 'flat' experienced regular inadequacy 
difficulties compared with 65 per cent of those farmers regarding their land to be 'not flat'. This suggests 
that farmers with uneven topography are experiencing an inadequate supply more regularly. Likewise, the 
control of the turnout significantly influences the 'regularity' of difficulties, with 57 per cent of those who 
can open their turnout experiencing difficulties and 73 per cent of those who cannot, regularly receiving an 
inadequate supply. 
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'Normally the schedule is always displayed at the mosque or the coffee shop and 
it is a very good guideline because it gives the dates of seeding, ploughing and 
harvesting' (Farmer informant No. 19). 
'I think it is as a guideline for farmers so it is very good' (Farmer informant No.3). 
The problem, however,' is that although the majority of farmers regard the schedule as being 
'good', many have been unable to conduct their farming activities in accordance with this 
schedule19o. According to these fanners, this is primarily due to the inadequacies in the irrigation 
system itself, a lack of machinery or because of the actions of other farmers: 
Water problems: 
'Normally we can't follow the schedule because of the water problem, we can't 
follOW, it is impossible' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
'I try to follow the schedule but some time I can't follow because of the water 
problem. If there is no water I can't follow' (Farmer informant No. 17). 
'I can't follow the schedule set up by MADA because there is a water problem. If 
MADA can improve their management of the water then I will follow the schedule' 
(Farmer informant No. 14). 
Lack of machinery: 
'I can't follow the irrigation schedule set up by MADA because I don't have the 
machinery. For the time [when I have to] to tractor the land, I don't have the 
tractor so I have to wait until there is someone who wants to tractor my land. 
That's why I don't follow the schedule set up by MADA' (Farmer informant No. 
12). 
Other farmers: 
'Sometimes I can't get water whenever I need, I can't follow the irrigation 
[schedule] set up by MADA because I have to depend on the other farmers 
around this area. If they don't start seeding then I can't do [seeding]. I must wait 
for the other person' (Farmer informant No. 19). 
Such a positive response to the irrigation schedule is because the farmers regard the system as 
equitable in time (rather than according to land holdings or water requirements and usage). For 
example, when questioned about the 'fairness' of their water supply, the majority of farmers 
regard this to be 'fair' and a 'matter oftime only': 
190 i.e. they do not have the capacity to follow the schedule - see chapter six. 
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The water supply is fair to all farmers even though we may have to wait 2 or 3 
days' (Farmer informant No. 11). 
' ... the distribution of water to other farmers, I can't say is fair or unfair, it is a 
matter of time only ... ' (Farmer informant No. 13). 
The farmers that have their land located far from the canal, actually they get 
enough water but it takes time. For example, the farmers near the canal get 
water two days already so the other farmers will get up to three to four days later. 
It is just a matter of time only' (Farmer informant No.6). 
'Generally it is fair to all farmers but it is a matter of time. If the land is far from 
the canal then they have to wait for two or three days to get water .. .'{Farmers 
informant No.9). 
As would be expected, however, there are also farmers who regard the system to be 'unfair' due to 
problems with their land location, the quantity of supply and the actions of other farmers: 
Land location/level: 
The distribution is not fair. The worst affected are the farmers with high land 
level. To improve it we must have Muda II' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
'Most of all the distribution of water to farmers is fair. Only for certain farmers like 
their land is far from the canal then the distribution is not fair' (Farmer informant 
No.2). 
The system is not fair because the location of the plot, maybe we have to go 
through to other farmers land and that is why it is unfair to all farmers' (Farmer 
informant No. 26). 
Quantity of water: 
The distribution of water is not fair because the supply of water from MADA is not 
enough' (Farmer informant No. 18). 
Actions of others: 
'Since the water has to go through the other farmers' land so the problem is that 
the farmers before my land don't want to open the batas [field ridges] at a certain 
time. They want the water in their field and so they don't want to pass it. Once 
they have done their farming then they will pass it, so that is why the system is 
not fair' (Farmer informant No. 25). 
'Generally the water supply is enough but for certain farmers when they put up 
the block to make sure they get water and they open the gate. So this is a matter 
of time only but it is not fair because sometimes the people before my land get 
water first and then I have to (make seeding) to do the farming activities later on 
so its not fair' (Farmer informant No. 23). 
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One farmer, however, was very explicit about the inadequacies of the government in improving 
this situation: 
'The distribution is not fair, the government less hear our voice, the government 
should hear our voice and then make the research to do the project as fast as 
possible. This area can depend only 20% on the irrigation, 80% can't depend on 
the irrigation' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
By contrast, MADA's perspective is that the distribution of water within the irrigation block is 
'fair' and it is the farmers' actions that creates an unfair supply: 
'Generally fair ... if they [the farmers] don't maintain [their canals] it is their problem' 
(MADA informant No.1). 
'It depends how you see the system, it is equal distribution. They [the farmers] 
are wasting it [water] at the farm level. It is our job to see that the water is 
distributed at the block level, at the locality. That's our job. Beyond that it is the 
farmers responsibility to make sure that it is distributed fairly within the block' 
(MADA informant No. 14). 
'The farmers that take water first take too much so the other farmers don't get 
enough' (MADA informant No.2). 
'Generally fair, there is enough water supplied by MADA on paper and inside the 
canal but the problem is that when it comes to the implementation. Let's say the 
pipe made by farmers themselves, or they just simply open [the gates] when they 
want water. That is why it is generally fair distribution to all farmers. We give 
water pump to areas with big problems so generally fair - it is the way that the 
farmers control the water that makes it not fair' (MADA informant No.6). 
The dilemma is that if the fanners do not follow the schedule this will result in inequitable water 
distribution. However, the inequitable water distribution by itself means that the farmers do not 
follow the schedule. Here, therefore, we find another conflict between the farmers and MADA 
staff, whereby the farmers regard the lack of adherence to the schedule to be due to factors beyond 
their control and MADA staff regard the lack of adherence to be partly due to factors outside their 
control (field location, lack of machinery, high land) and partly because of their individualistic 
attitude, 'laziness' and cultural obligations: 
Factors outside farmers' control: 
'They [the farmers] can't follow the irrigation schedule because maybe certain 
farmers their plot is far from the canal. Secondly, they try to avoid the time they 
are going to harvest their paddy so they will maybe seed earlier because they 
want to avoid the monsoon which will affect their crops. They also can't follow the 
irrigation schedule because they want to avoid the disease by certain insects and 
because of the lack of machinery. For example, they don't have a tractor on their 
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own so they will ask somebody to tractor their land. If they don't have any money 
and want to pay after they have harvested their paddy the owner of the tractor 
don't want to tractor their land. So this is why they can't follow the irrigation 
schedule' (MADA informant No. 12). 
'There is one thing that they lack in terms of machinery. Not everybody has got 
[a] tractor and not everybody has got [a] water pump to supplement water supply 
from the canal. Also the other tools like the seed spraying machine. That is the 
problem, their lack of machinery, so it is impossible for them to do seeding at the 
same time - there has to be a 1 to 2 week delay. If you have all of the machinery 
then you can start at the same time, if you don't you have to ask somebody to 
work for you and that means that it takes time' (MADA informant No.6). 
'There are two reasons: The first one is that the farmers stay far from the plot so 
it is very difficult for them to follow the schedule. The second one is because of 
the situation of the land, sometimes it is high and sometimes low. It is not level 
and that is why they can't follow the schedule' (MADA informant No.8). 
Bad attitude of the farmers: 
'The farmers that don't follow the irrigation schedule is about 25% and normally 
because this farmers is lazy to work and sometimes they just wait around the 
coffee shop .. .' (MADA informant No.1). 
'The good farmers they follow the irrigation schedule and normally they don't 
make any complaints. The one who makes complaint is the bad farmer. If there 
is no problem that means that the farmers don't make any complaint and they are 
good farmers. The one who has the problem and make complaint is the bad 
farmer' (MADA informant No.1). 
'What we see is that there are problems with the farmers themselves, within the 
block, within a group of farmers there are problems. Some have the attitudes that 
they are with their friends and they wait and see, "we'll do it when our friends do 
it". I think that is the contributing factor until we can at least actually convince the 
farmers. So on our side also we have to convince them that ours is good and 
theirs is not good. Even ours we have some things we have to protect, ours is 
not really prefect based on the existing former system because of the new direct 
seeding there are still a lot of improvements to be made. It is difficult to impose 
our views on the farmers, we have to make sure that ours is perfect' (MADA 
informant No. 14). 
'When MADA is going to supply water the specific date that the farmers should 
have water according to the schedule is already informed by MADA through the 
unit leader or maybe the line operator but the bad farmers they don't care. They 
don't care what time your are going to release water, what time you are going to 
drain water he just follow the other farmers "as long as I get water it is OK". Let's 
say that after 3 days of MADA releasing water you are supposed to close the 
tunnel they don't care they just leave the tunnel open, that is the big problem. 
The farmers should be more educated .. .' (MADA informant No.2). 
'Because this is the attitude among the farmers, let the other farmers do first, see, 
see first, look and see. If the farmers in that block start first then he will follow so 
this is the attitude of the farmers, they want someone else to start first so when 
we ask when are you going to start the farming activities the say wait for the other 
person, see for them to start first. This is the bad attitude' (MADA informant No. 
3). 
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Cultural obligations: 
'They don't stick to the schedule, I don't know why. Maybe we are not telling the 
farmers or they are just not following. I have told them that the schedule has not 
been adhered to because the Malay community are very conscious of this 
marriages, death associations and they stop for a while you know - so this has 
happened and they don't work. During Hari Raya Haji nothing is done or if the 
political leader goes to them to plan something then there is another week when 
nothing happens, they will tend to concentrate on this and not farming. So you 
find that all these things get in the way of the irrigation schedule and you have to 
see what happens' (MADA informant No. 17). 
The extent to which these perceptions are reflected in the actual distribution and delivery of water 
within each block are illustrated in Figure 8.27 and shown graphically in Maps 8.1 and 8.2. On 
average, water in the Muda I block takes longer to be distributed to all farmers, with half of these 
fanners encountering a delay of more than one week. However, the data for the Muda II block 
(ISA 'A') also reflects inter-block variation in the delays to distribution, with 39 per cent of 
farmers receiving their water on the day of supply and 34 per cent of farmers having to wait for 
more than one week. This is clearly not in keeping with the design expectations of the Muda II 
blocks and is represented in the perception of water distribution differences within the block 
(Figure 8.26). Here again the ISA in the Muda II block does not appear to be operating as 
expected with 48 per cent of Muda II farmers regarding there to be 'major' inter-block distribution 
differences compared with only 17 per cent of Muda I farmers stating likewise. As Maps 8.1 and 
8.2 illustrate, the rotational supply is clearly not effective in the Muda II block, contrasting 
significantly with the Muda I block that provides all farmers with their supply in a coordinated and 
effective manner. 
o 
.: 
= ,:;, 
:s 
'" 
No 
:0 . 
. :: Mll10r 
'" .. 
'"' <=
.. 
... 
~ 
.... Q . 
Major 
o \0 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Percentage of respondents 
Figure 8.26: Water distribution differences by block 
(N = 200; p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
~";J (!jJMI 
CHAPTER EIGHT - Tertiary intervention: Intended and unintended outcomes 243 
Z 
~ 
o 
o 
co 
~ 
co 
~ 
Tunjang Drain 
t-
Cl 
~ 
U 
<t:: 
\\ 
~ 
o 
o 
~ 
co 
~ 
C?>''(\?>'\ 
r 
~ ~ 
t--
0-
---
M 
0 
---
~ 
...... 
...... 
~ 
11) 
~ 
• 
t--
0-
---
M 
0 
---
t--
...... 
N 
~ 
11) 
~ 
• 
s 
o 
o 
trl 
o 
Map 8.1 : Muda II water supply pattern in the irrigated season 1997 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 : MADA locality, Sanglang 
t-- t--
0- 0-
--- ---
M M 
0 0 
--- ---
M 0 
N M 
M ..:t 
~ ~ 
11) 11) 
~ ~ 
0 0 
Z 
CHAPTER EIGHT - Tertiary intervention: Intended and unintended outcomes 244 
\0 
0 
~ 
u 
<t: 1un)an'6 
~ p 
~ ~ :.). 
Drain 
t-
O 
~ 
U 
<t: 
1~ 
t-
~ 
Q 
::s 
co 
~ 
c?>,{\?>,\ 
-D 
\ ~ 
t-
0\ 
---
M 
~ 
00 
...... 
...... 
...!:od 
Q) 
~ 
• 
t-
0\ 
---
M 
~ 
I£) 
N 
N 
...!:od 
Q) 
~ 
D 
s 
o 
o 
tr) 
o 
Map 8.2: Muda I water supply pattern in the irrigated season 1997 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997: MADA locality, Sanglang 
r-
0\ 
---
"T 
0 
---
...... 
0 
M 
...!:od 
Q) 
~ 
D 
I: 
CHAPTER EIGHT - Tertiary intervention: Intended and unintended outcomes 245 
'" -a 
'li 
~ 
.;; 
~ 
"" ci 
Z 
More than a week 
./ 
438 
One or less 
10 20 30 40 50 60 
Percentage ofrespomlents 
Figure 8.27: No. days for water to reach plot by block 
(N = 200; p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
~~ wM1 
Overall, this data indicates that the Muda II farmers regard the schedule set up by MADA to be 
'fair'. However, this schedule does not appear to be improving the timing of water distribution 
within the block or the overall differences in this distribution. As with the analysis of water 
control 'adequacy' and 'reliability', the extent to which the differences between the two irrigation 
blocks are being influenced by the field, farm and farmer characteristics is examined using the log-
I· I' 191 meal' tec 1l1lque . For the 'perception of the fairness of the irrigation schedule' and the 
'perception of distribution differences' there are no three-way associations. Therefore, the 
findings explored above are not being influenced by the different field, farms and farmers but are 
instead due to the irrigation block itself (Tables 10& 11, Appendix E:3)192. 
Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
Tertiary development has neither improved the reliability, adequacy or fairness of supply when 
analysed on a 'with' and 'without' project basis. Consequently, the hypothesis that tertiary 
191 Clearly the time that water takes to reach the farmers plots is a function of the irrigation block, therefore, 
no log-linear analysis is conducted for this variable. 
1921n addition, for those farmers who regard the irrigation to be 'unfair': all have uneven topography; 92 per 
cent use the wet seeding planting technique; 90 per cent are able to open and close the irrigation turnout; and 
all report difficulties when irrigating. Similar findings are observed for farmers reporting 'major differences' 
in water distribution with 91 per cent regarding their land to be 'not flat' and 80 per cent using the wet 
seeding technique. By contrast, however, the 80 per cent of farmers who are able to open and close their 
turnout and the 86 per cent who experience irrigation difficulties also report 'differences' in distribution 
within their block. Pumping, however, does not influence their perception of distribution differences. 
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facilities have improved water control is rejected. This section has highlighted that not only have 
tertiary facilities not improved the 'formal' water control capacity of these farmers it is in fact 
worse than for farmers under Muda I conditions. In particular, the water supply in the Muda II 
block is: more unreliable, more often; is equally as inadequate as in the Muda I block; is 
inadequate more often; and is perceived as having a 'fair' distribution but experiences a greater 
extent of inter-block variation in water supply than the Muda I block. More positively, the 
analysis has indicated that the Muda II farmers have better control over the drainage of water from 
their plots. However, in light of the over supply and inefficiency of water use illustrated in 
chapter seven, this is regarded to be a contributory factor in the high wastage of water in the Muda 
II block. 
All of these factors contribute to the argument that farmers under tertiary facilities when compared 
with non-tertiary farmers have a reduced capacity to obtain the correct amount of water, at the 
right time, to meet their cropping requirements. At the systems level, the formal scheduling and 
allocation arrangements of MADA are regarded by the farmers as being generally 'fair'. 
However, because they are unable to follow the schedule implemented by MADA, the control of 
water 'below' the outlet in the Muda II block is considerably worse than under non-tertiary 
conditions. From this perspective, not only has the policy of tertiary development not met with 
expectations it has in fact resulted in a more unreliable, inadequate and inequitable supply when 
analysed on a 'with' and 'without' project basis. 
8.6 Cooperation and coordination 
Cooperation and coordination are critical factors in both the agronomic and water management 
practices of the farmers. As with water control it is expected that the more coordinated the 
farmers activities, and the more intra-block cooperation, the better the yield potential. 
The system by which MADA allocates water on a block-by-block basis is designed on the 
principle that the farmers coordinate their agronomic activities and cooperate in the intra-block 
distribution of the water resource193 • Within the Muda I blocks this cooperation is over the entire 
block whereas in the Muda II blocks, although the overall cooperation is designed on a block 
basis, the day-to-day cooperation is designed around each ISU and ISA. Consequently, the 
193 S h . ee c apter SIX. 
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cooperation in the tertiary blocks is designed around smaller geographical units than in the non-
tertiary blocks. 
Such cooperation in the management of the water resource is crucial for ensuring that the water 
that is supplied by MADA is available to all farmers in the right quantity and at the right time. For 
this to be feasible the farmers are encouraged to stagger their planting and agronomic activities so 
that all farmers in each geographical unit seed at the same time and harvest at the same time. Such 
staggered cropping ensures that: water is available when required; cropping practices are 
coordinated; and the large combines can harvest the farmers land collectively rather than as 
individual field plots. 
This section begins with an overview of the importance of coordination and cooperation, 
highlighted in partiCUlar by the national governments desire to implement group farming policies 
in the region. The initial analysis focuses on this issue of group fanning and the attitudes and 
perceptions of both MADA staff and the farmers to this policy. More specifically, however, this 
section examines the extent to which the coordination of agricultural practices and the cooperation 
of farmers have been improved under tertimy conditions. This is achieved by the examination of 
the following macro hypothesis: 
That farmer cooperation and coordination is improved under tertiary facilities when compared 
with non-tertiary facilities 
Group farming: a coordination policy 
Group farming has been promoted within the Muda region under two arrangements; Kelempok 
Tani (KT: Group farming) and Projek Separa Perladangan (PSP: Mini-estate). The differences 
between which relate to the degree of control afforded to the farmers in their agricultural 
activities. The five main variations are that the mini-estate members must follow the rules and 
regulations set up by the farmers' association and the PSP committee members with regard to the 
scheduling, planting and selling of paddy. The kelompoks have no such arrangement. Secondly, 
mini-estate members receive financial assistance from the farmers' association that is not provided 
to the kelompok members. Thirdly, the farmers' association provides transportation for the 
harvested paddy. No such facilities are provided for the kelompok members. Fourthly, the mini-
estate members receive all technical assistance before the kelompok members and non-member 
farmers. Finally, the farmers' association decides on the cultivation schedule, paddy marketing 
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and all management functions of the mini-estate. Under the kelompok arrangement these decisions 
remain with the fanners. (Yasunobu et aI, 1996a: 1996b). 
Kelompoks and mini-estates are an attempt to embrace the philosophy of reciprocal family 
farming. This traditional form of farming used to play an important role in the employment of the 
landless and small farmers in the transplanting and harvesting practices of paddy production. 
However, since the introduction of direct seeding, increased mechanisation and the reduction in 
rural labour, this traditional labour exchange system has disappeared (Wong & Morooka, 1996). 
Consequently, the state has attempted to incorporate the Malay tradition of go tong royong 
(cooperation) into the direct seeded culture through the promotion of group farming as a 
replacement to the reciprocal family farm (Morooka et aI, 1991). 
It would appear that the uptake of group farming within the region has been successful, with the 
total number of group farming projects increasing between 1988 and 1995 194. However, many of 
these are projects on paper alone with no local level coordinated activity. For as one MADA 
officer stated: 
This is a policy which has really been pushed because it was a government 
directive to talk about group farming. So MADA has to talk about group farming. 
We don't know, maybe only 10% of the total group farming are group farms in the 
sense of the word. Most just exist because that is what has been asked of the 
farmers, to organise them as a group' (MADA informant No. 16). 
This is clearly problematic, asking questions of both the policy directive and the overall 
implications of this poor performance. To understand this, firstly it is impOltant to recognise that 
the group farming philosophy was initiated at the federal level, with the role of MADA focusing 
on implementation with no decision-making capacities for the farmers. Because of this, there is 
no shared sense of responsibility for these projects by many of the farmers. Instead the emphasis 
on the part of the farmers is that both the philosophy and responsibility for group farming is within 
MADA's jurisdiction rather than a responsibility that lies with themselves. Likewise, the 
perception of MADA officials appears to be one of policy implementation rather than adaptive 
learning with the farmers. This is evident in the intonation of the following quotes: 
194 In 1988 the Muda region supported 214 KT, by 1995 this had increased to 274. Likewise, in 1988 the 
Muda region supported 16 PSP which by 1995 had increased to 129 (Yasunobu et ai, 1996b:59). During this 
period, the number ofKT have not significantly increased and the number ofPSP have increased 
substantially. This is because MADA's extension agents are actively encouraged to promote KT before the 
scheme is promoted to PSP, although group farming does not necessarily begin with KT. 
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Farmers: 
MADA: 
'At the beginning it was very active and then when MADA can't solve the water 
problem then the group is no longer active' (Farmer informant No. 15) 
There is a kelompok but active only for 1 or 2 years, if they [MADA] solve the 
water problem then whatever programme they want to start no problem' 
(Farmer informant No. 16) 
There is a kelompok here but it is not active, its been running for 5 years but was 
only active in the beginning. We just follow [what MADA say] at the beginning 
and then after that we don't want to follow' (Farmer informant No. 21). 
' ... So we enforce them to do under group farming if possible because 
immediately they have problem since they cannot co-operate among themselves. 
So the problem is large' (MADA informant No.1 0). 
'Group farming is set up by MADA and has reaped some benefits ... We encourage 
because we want them to adhere .. .' (MADA informant no. 17) 
The official reasons for the inactivity of many of the group farming projects are perceived by 
MADA to be a combination of: a lack of understanding and knowledge on the part of the farmers; 
a lack of strong leadership within the rural community; and a lack of cooperation between farmers 
of different political persuasion. The farmers, however, are much more pragmatic in their 
reasoning, articulating: their uneconomic land size; water problems; and loss of control over 
farming activities as the principal reasons for not undertaking group farming. 
The group farming project is implemented within Muda I blocks only, with the ISU/ISA of the 
Muda II blocks acting as the coordinated unit. The leadership of these projects depends on the 
social organisation already in place within the village community. This means that those members 
of the village who are already in positions of power such as the unit leaders, board of directors of 
the PPK and members of the JKKK committee are able to reinforce their positions - a factor which 
is also reinforced by MADA who rely on such individuals for forming and leading group farming 
projects. MADA clearly recognise the importance of strong leadership to achieve successful group 
farming but have so far found no solution to the problems of leadership at the local level: 
'I think the results have been mixed, some very good group farming projects with 
good leadership and some not. Good leadership, that is a very important job in 
running the operation .. .' (MADA informant No. 16). 
This scheme is not active because of the local leadership for the particular area. 
Sometimes they [the leaders] can't get cooperation from the farmers in that area 
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and they [the leaders] also have a lack of understanding about what they are 
going to achieve, the vision, the target that is set up by MADA. So if they [the 
leaders] don't understand then how can they convince other people to understand 
this?' (MADA informant, No. 12). 
'Certain farmers don't want to join this kelompok or separa because they have 
problems with the leaders inside that area because there is certain people that 
before the project they act as middle men so when their interests will be 
jeopardised they will influence the other people not to join the scheme' (MADA 
informant, No. 12). 
This not only leads to the reinforcement of social inequalities already evident at the local level but 
also leads to problems with the coordination of activities in such circumstances. Moreover, the 
irrigation system is run on a block basis and the social organisation of the farmers is constructed 
around the kampung. This results in group farming projects that are geographically centralised in 
the kampung but geographically dispersed in the paddy fields. This clearly creates difficulties in 
the coordination of activities and the meeting of expectations for a more efficient and effective 
distribution and use of the water resource. For as one farmer commented: 
'Although 17 farmers are part of this separa, which has been running for more 
than 5 years, there is a lot of different plots which we have to work together. The 
management is in terms of when we are going to sell the paddy and things like 
that, not the seeding because we are not together. Of the 17 members, we are 
spread in many places through the block, in A, Band C. Near my land there are 
only 3 farmers involved' (Farmer informant No.9). 
Not only is strong leadership important for the coordination of activities, it is also important for 
the successful continuation of the project. When farmers disagree between themselves or with 
their leaders this can lead to conflict, the loss of members, or the abandonment of the project 
altogether - the net effect of which is to have less cooperation in the post-project period than 
occurred prior to the implementation of group farming in the first place. This was certainly the 
case for one large farmer who, after disagreements with other farmers, left the project and has 
subsequently returned to acting as a 'middle man' for the provision of credit and supplies: 
'When I was part of the separa I was one of the committee members but there 
were some small farmers which [sic] said bad things about me, they said that I 
got more benefits than them so that is why I left ... now I just help with other 
business .. ' (Farmer informant No.6). 
The problems associated with strong leadership emerge from the lack of cooperation between 
farmers at the block level, largely due to the mis-match between the organisation of paddy farming 
and the organisation of the kampung. This impacts on the perceptions of the attitudes of both the 
farmers and MADA staff to field level cooperation: 
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' ... Normally they [other farmers] want to farm their land on their own because they 
think, "I want to go to the paddy today or I don't want to go", "I am going to do 
what I want and I don't care what other people say'" (Farmer informant No.1). 
'They [the farmers] don't want to join the kelompok or separa because maybe 
they less understand the importance of the scheme and maybe there is less 
briefing at the beginning, or the social problem, because there is less cooperation 
among them because there is a political difference. So if say they are from 
UMNO they say "I don't want to cooperate with you because you are from PAS'" 
(MADA informant No. 11) 
Political difference is a major factor in the cooperation of farmers, impacting on both the social 
organisation of the villages and the cooperation of farmers within the paddy fields. For as one 
MADA official highlights: 
'It is very difficult, say within one village you might have 70% which is [sic] UMNO 
members and the others are not, and then getting those to combine together 
under group farming will be very difficult' (MADA informant No. 18) 
This makes the widespread introduction of group farming within the region very difficult, 
particularly if this is to be coordinated in geographically centralised units. This is by itself ironic 
because it is the national level politics that are insisting on the implementation of group farming 
and it is the local level politics that are contributing to the poor performance of this policy. But as 
one MADA officer stated, the national requirements for group farming go far beyond the simple 
notion of agricultural advancement: 
' ... by hook or by crook I think the government has to step in otherwise eventually 
half of the Muda area will be cultivated by enterprising farmers, predominantly 
Chinese, which would not be good for the country. I for one don't think it should 
be the way, basically rice CUltivation is a Malay dominated undertaking, it is not 
good for the country's stability for another ethnic group to dominate the activity. 
So, for the current stability I would feel that MADA going into group farming is the 
right move' (MADA informant No. 19). 
One of the principal reasons articulated by MADA for the poor performance of group farming 
projects is the lack of knowledge and understanding on the patt of the farmers. Unsurprisingly, 
this impacts on the perception and attitudes of the farmers by MADA staff: 
'The farmers don't want to join the kelompok's because they don't understand 
what is this kelompok. So we need to educate them first and then get them to 
understand and see the success and after that they will follow .. .' (MADA 
informant No.2). 
'It is the attitude of the farmers, they have a lack of understanding about 
kelompok ... they don't want to work together, they want to have their own way to 
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do farming. They don't care about these kelompok or separa, they want to do 
their farming activities on their own. "I am the boss and don't tell me what I am 
supposed to do, I can do myself'. This is what we call the bad attitude of the 
farmers, we have to change them from the traditional way to do farming activities' 
(MADA informant No.5). 
The certain farmers don't want to join this group farming because of the bad 
attitude of the farmers, they just want to work on their own so they can do 
whatever they like. They don't want to follow the other instruction from outside, if 
they want to stay at the coffee shop until 12 o'clock its OK and if they want to go 
to the paddy field and start at 7, its OK .. .'(MADA informant No.8). 
One such attitude is what is commonly referred to as the 'wait and see' approach of the farmers. 
This is part of the farming culture in the Muda region in that many of the farmers will 'wait and 
see' what the effects are for other farmers before commencing on a programme or project 
themselves. This is a risk aversion strategy that occurs in most aspects of the production process 
from the uptake of new technologies to when farmers will begin seeding or applying water to their 
fields. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is also adopted with respect to group farming: 
'Farmers do not want to get involved because they only want to see if it is 
successful first and then only will they join' (Farmer informant, No.2). 
'I am willing to join the group farming but the problem is that the other farmers 
don't want to join because they have small land size. If they join then I will join' 
(Farmer informant No.5). 
The perception of the farmers to their non-compliance with the group farming initiative is not due 
to their lack of understanding or lack of cooperation, but is instead due to their land size, water 
problems, and the loss of control over farming activities under the current group farming 
arrangements. 
What is particularly interesting about the Muda case-study is the extent to which land size plays an 
important function in the adherence to group farming policies or not. For those larger landholders, 
there is no perceived benefit to be gained in joining together with other farmers in their farming 
activities: 
'If they [the government] put altogether the land that I am supposed to work on 
my own there is no need to pay expenses to the committee. So it is better for me 
not to join the kelompok. I already have a sowing machine, tractor, fertiliser 
machine so why should I need to join the kelompok?' (Farmer informant no. 7). 
From this perspective group farming is a distinct disadvantage for large landholders because of the 
bargaining power that the grouped farmers obtain by collective action. This is often to the 
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detriment of larger farmers who also happen to be the 'middle men' who provide credit and rent 
machinery to other farmers. Any reduction in harvesting costs that the grouped members are able 
to obtain directly affects the profits of these larger farmers. 
Conversely, the reason given by many of the small farmers for their non-compliance with the 
group farming initiative is also a function of land size. In this instance it is the uneconomic size of 
their land which is the cause for concern: 
'Group farming is very good but when it comes to the implementation there is a 
problem. The big problem is for the smaller farmers, about 2 or 4 relongs. For 
the big farmers there is no problem at all, they always have enough money to 
spend but for the small ones there is a very big problem because if they urgently 
need money they can't go to the middle men once they have joined the group 
farming or mini-estate. They cannot simply take money because they have to 
surrender their subsidy book to the group farming [project] because it is managed 
by a committee and then overlooked by somebody from the PPK. So if the small 
farmers go and spend all their money they can't get any more because they don't 
have the subsidy book. If they have the subsidy book then maybe they can get 
somebody to stand as a guarantor and then they can get money from the middle 
men' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
In theory, by grouping farmers the use and distribution of the water can be improved. However, 
here lies the conundrum: The government perspective is that group farming will help solve the 
water problems, the farmers' perspective is that group farming will only work if the government 
solves the water problems: 
'If they [MADA] can solve the water problem first, then whatever project they want 
to do in this area then no problem at all' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
'Even though this area is involved in this kelompok there is no activity because 
we have a problem with the water. The paddy needs more water or we need a lot 
of water so that means that MADA or the PPK should solve the water problem 
first. Then whatever scheme they want to implement no problem, as long as they 
solve the water problem. If there is no water problem then if they [MADA] want to 
do kelompok, or group farming or mini-estate then we will join because we know 
the advantage but there is no point being a member without water' (Farmer 
informant No. 15). 
'The kelompok cannot work because there is a water problem. When you have to 
work for water on your own and have to pump water on your own this is not a 
kelompok' (Farmer informant No. 23). 
'The kelompok cannot work well in this area because of the water problem. At 
the beginning, 5 years ago, they [MADA] put up a certain date when we are going 
to have water, when we are going to start seeding and so on. But then there is 
no water so we cannot seed. We need water to guarantee a better yield but 
when there is a water problem we don't want to do kelompok' (Farmer informant 
No. 22). 
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, is the concept of control. For even where farmers do not 
experience problems with the supply and distribution of water, group farming initiatives are still 
under performing. The reason is that the process of collective farming, particularly with respect to 
mini-estates, removes from the individual farmer much ofhis/her decision-making capacity, hence 
their power: 
'If there is a programme like kelompok or separa, the subsidy book is held by the 
committee which is responsible to running the scheme. So we don't have any 
power and we just work so that is why we don't want to join. If there is no water 
problem we don't like to join because we loose all our power' (Farmer informant 
No. 23). 
The subsidy book is critical for farmers to obtain both the subsidies on offer from the government 
and a return on their paddy which is sent to the mill. Likewise, the subsidy book is used as a form 
of guarantor when advanced loans are obtained at the beginning of the season: 
'The subsidy is used for getting credit from the PPK and I use the book as 
collateral to get money. So for the 33 relongs I can get a lot of money. From the 
agricultural bank I can get about 11 ,500RM credit. This is dependent on the size 
of the land, the more land the more credit' (Farmer informant No.4). 
Because of this, when we talk about loss of control it is not just that the farmers have to adhere to 
particular cropping schedules and use particular methods or technologies but that they no longer 
have any means by which to raise capital for their agricultural expenses. Consequently, under 
group fanning the farmers become more like tenant farmers who merely work the land as opposed 
to land owners and decision-makers. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the farmers recognise 
this loss of the subsidy book as an important reason for non-adherence to the group farming 
programme: 
'The problem is that when you are going to be part of the separa programme you 
have to surrender your subsidy book and then you can't get any advance from 
any other middle men. In the separa you have to get all your inputs from the 
committee and not from the middle men, that is why farmers don't want to join in 
the separa' (Farmer informant No.9). 
'The problem is that under separa whenever they sell their paddy through the 
separa they have to wait for too long to get their money. The separa committee 
have to distribute the money once they have calculated whatever it is, that is the 
problem. If they can solve that problem and make it easier for farmers to get 
money after they have sold their paddy then maybe I will join' (Farmer informant 
No. 13). 
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The analysis undertaken in this section suggests three fundamental difficulties in using the policy 
of group farming to ensure the coordinated activities of the farmers. The first is that the policy 
was designed at the state level with MADA's role confined to implementation and the farmers role 
to adoption. Secondly, the social organisation of the farming community has made it very difficult 
for the field-level coordination of activities to be integrated into the village-based group farming 
projects. Finally, the administration of the projects has resulted in a difficulty for the farmers to 
become actively involved due to the further erosion of their decision-making powers. 
Consequently, if group farming is not achieving its expected aims in the Muda I blocks, the 
question is has the policy of tertiary development improved the coordination of farming activities 
between the farmers in the Muda II blocks? 
Has tertiary development improved cooperation and coordination? 
Macro hypothesis: That farmer cooperation and coordination is improved under tertiary facilities 
when compared with non-tertiary facilities. 
Coordination 
The Muda II scheme was expected to improve the coordinated activities within each ISU in order 
to assist in the distribution of water and the staggering of cropping schedules. During the irrigated 
season 1997, the cropping patterns were recorded by MADA officers as part of their daily routine. 
These have been collated and are spatially represented in Maps 8.3 to 8.12. 
In theory, the cropping schedules for the 6 lSD's within ISA 'A' should be staggered, with ISU 
'AI' ploughing, seeding etc. first and ISU 'A6' ploughing, seeding etc. last. As can be seen this 
does not occur. In fact, based on the weekly intervals expressed in Table 8.19, only ISU 'AI' 
provided evidence of any form of coordinated activity with the seeding and harvesting of the entire 
area completed within a single weekly interval. However, instead of seeding and harvesting first, 
ISU 'A l' did not begin seeding until the 5th week, with harvesting delayed until the 7th week. 
Comparing the Muda II Maps with the Muda I Maps, not only does the Muda II block not 
facilitate coordinated activities, it reduces the amount of coordination between the farmers. 
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Map 8.3: Ploughing pattern in the Muda II irrigation block, irrigated season 1997. 
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A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
Ripening 
weeks{interval' ... -. ...... 1_' . .- .. _- ._.~ 
5 (1-5) 1 (5) 2 (5-6) 2 (4-5) 
5 (1-5) 4 (2-5) 6 (1-6) 6 (1-6) 
4 (2-5) 3 (3-5) 4 (4-7) 3 (2-4) 
4 (2-5) 3 (3-5) 3 (4-6) 4 (2-5) 
6 (1 -6) 4 (2-5) 7 (1-7) 6 (1-6) 
5 (2-6) 3 (3-5) 2 (6-7) 2 (5-6 
Table 8.19: Coordination of cropping activities by ISU in the Muda II block 
(Figures in parentheses correspond to first and last week of activity commencement) 
Source: fieldwork, 1997 
To explore the coordination of cropping pattems on a block basis, the percentage of land under each 
cropping stage has been analysed. The results of which are shown in Figures 8.28 and 8.29. If 
coordinated activities were in place there would be limited overlap between the various cropping 
stages. Likewise, the larger the overlap between the various cycles, the less the coordination of 
activities within the block. When comparing both irrigation blocks, again the increased coordination 
of activities within the Muda I block emerges. 
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Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
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Figure 8.29: Muda I cropping pattern, irrigated season 1997 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The two critical factors for such coordination are the seeding and harvesting of the paddy. For the 
Muda II block, there is more variation in the seeding of the paddy both spatially (Map 8.5) and in 
totality (Figure 8.28) when compared with the Muda I block (Map 8.6 and Figure 8.29). Likewise, 
harvesting in the Muda II block began when 63 per cent of the block was still under the growth 
stage. By comparison, harvesting in the Muda I block commenced when only 15 per cent of the 
block was still under growth. Therefore, the Muda II block consistently shows larger weekly 
intervals than the Muda I block as a direct result of the greater spread of activities, hence less 
coordina tion. 
Cooperation 
The lack of coordinated activities in the Muda II block could be due to the lack of cooperation 
between the farmers in both their water management and agronomic practices. Figure 8.20 
illustrates that all of the cooperation variables are significantly different between the two irrigation 
blocks. In particular, there are more disagreements between farmers in the Muda I block because of 
the increased difficulty in farming under non-tertiary conditions (Table 8.20). After all, with so 
many farmers reliant on field-to-field distribution, and the cooperation of other farmers for their 
water supply, it is unSurprising that disagreements emerge. 
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Disagree 
Don't disagree 
MI Mil 
(%) - (%) 
19 5 
81 95 
Table 8.20: Disagreement between farmers within blocks 
(Chi square: p<0.05: n=199) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
The knowledge of other fanners, and the extent of cooperation between these farmers, is 
significantly greater for farmers under Muda II conditions (Table 8.21 and Figure 8.30). This is 
largely due to the smaller geographical unit within which Muda II farmers operate, with the Muda 
I farmers having to rely on, and cooperate with, a significantly larger number of fellow farmers in 
their water management and agronomic practices. 
MI Mil 
(%) (%) 
-KrlOwail-------16-·---s4 
Know most/some 84 16 
Table 8.21: Knowledge of other farmers within blocks 
(Chi square: p<0.05: n=195) 
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Figure 8.30: Cooperation by block 
(Chi square: p<0.05 : n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
80 90 
[::1 IIlIMI 
The extent to which these findings are being influenced by the different field, farm and farmer 
characteristics (Figure 8.3, Box B) is analysed using the log-linear approach and illustrated in 
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Tables 12 to 14, Appendix E:3. All of these relationships are influenced by the irrigation block 
within which cultivation is practised. However, although most are independent of the different 
characteristics between the two blocks, there are three-way interactions that require consideration. 
Firstly, although there is no clear distinction between farmers who have experienced conflict and 
those experiencing difficulties in the Muda I block, for the Muda II block there is less 
disagreement between farmers experiencing difficulties (Table 8.22). Furthermore, for those 
farmers with knowledge of 'all' of their neighbours, the majority in the Muda I block are located 
next to other farmers' fields and the majority of Muda II farmers are located next to a canal. By 
contrast, of those farmers in the Muda II block who know 'most or some' of their neighbours none 
are located next to the canal (Table 8.22). Likewise, for those farmers cooperating with 'all' of 
their neighbours in the Muda II block the majority are located next to the canal. 
Most of these differences are due to the irrigation block itself195. After all, being located next to a 
canal in the Muda II block significantly reduces the number of farmers with whom you have to 
cooperate. By contrast, having to rely on field-to-field distribution increases the number of 
fanners required to cooperate. In this respect, the findings illustrating greater cooperation in the 
Muda II block are somewhat misleading. 
Block MI Mil 
Disagree with other farmers Yes No Yes No 
% % % % 
Experience irrigation difficulties (n=199) 
Yes 96 86 25 68 
No 4 14 75 32 
Knowledge of other farmers All MosUsome All MosUSome 
% % % % 
Field location (n=176) 
Next to canal 13 25 66 0 
Next to drain 33 10 7 54 
Field-to-field 54 65 27 46 
Extent of cooperation All MosUsome All MosUSome 
% % % % 
Field location (n=181) 
Next to canal 13 23 64 13 
Next to drain 33 9 6 54 
Field-to-field 
~ -
54 L~~~ __ 30 ___ 3~~_ 
-
- ..... - .... - .... - - ... _-- ..... - .. _- .... - .... _- .... - .... _- .... - _ ....... _ ..... -
Table 8.22: Cooperation by block for significant log-linear 3-way interactions 
(Chi-square: p<0.05) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
195 Clearly the fact that the majority of Muda I farmers rely on field-to-field distribution is a direct 
consequence of the lack of tertiary canals and drains within the block. 
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Interestingly, when questioned about the importance of cooperation during interview, none of the 
Muda II farmers explicitly stated their obligation to this practice. By contrast, the Muda I farmers 
regularly regarded cooperation as a cultural obligation, often referred to as 'the Muslim way': 
'This [water management] is a problem but I have a responsibility to give water to 
other farmers. This is part of the Muslim responsibility to help others' (Farmer 
informant No. 15). 
'My neighbours have to get water through my land so I have to give permission, it 
is the Muslim way' (Farmer informant No. 16). 
'Cooperation is very close among the community here, especially because we 
have Muslim responsibilities to take care of others. We have to cooperate 
because without cooperation our work will be difficult' (Farmer informant No. 18). 
The farmers in the Muda I block recognise this cooperation as essential because without it their 
farming practices would be negatively influenced: 
'Because there is a big problem about the water so we don't want to fight each 
other about the water problem. We want to cooperate to get water, whether you 
get water or I get water it is all the same. If we cooperate we get more water to 
our paddy fields' (Farmers informant No. 14). 
'We are very close with other farmers because for the farming activity even 
though we don't have to cooperate on paper. We are going to cooperate 
because we have to, we have no choice' (Farmers informant No. 22). 
In particular, the Muda I farmers recognise the interdependent nature of their farming activities. 
For some this is a form of mutual dependence in which the farmers are reliant on each other for 
supply and drainage. For others, however, the location of their land reduces their dependence on 
others but enhances their recognition of the dependence of others on them: 
'Of course they have to cooperate with me because they want the water. The 
cooperation is important because we have to cooperate to get the water and to 
make it easier for us when it comes to harvesting' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
'I enjoy very good cooperation with the other farmers. Normally they don't have 
disagreements because they have to take water from my field so they must 
cooperate otherwise I won't allow to open the gate' (Farmer informant No. 16). 
'We have to cooperate among farmers. Normally there is no farmers that don't 
cooperate because otherwise they can't do seeding at the same time, harvest at 
the same time, drain water at the same time. If they don't cooperate then farming 
is very difficult' (Farmer informant No. 19). 
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This is not to say that farmers can always release water when requested because such actions are 
dependent on the coordination of agricultural activities. When applying fertilisers and herbicides, 
for example, farmers are unable to release water to other farmers' land: 
'I allow to open the batas to flow the water to other farmers land when they ask 
but there is certain times when I can't open. I can't give permission normally 
when I want to apply weedicide [herbicide], fertiliser and so on. Normally the 
other farmers understand because they do the same to their neighbours' (Farmer 
informant No. 16). . 
Articulating the cooperative nature of the Muda I farmers does not mean that there is no 
cooperation between the Muda II farmers. However, rather than expressing any cultural obligation 
or mutual interdependence, these farmers regarded the ease with which farming activities can be 
conducted to be the main advantage of cooperation: 
'The cooperation among farmers is needed because it makes it easier for us to 
manage the land for water and the same time we are going to plant and drain' 
(Farmers informant No.2). 
'If we cooperate at the same time we want to take out water, take in water, we 
want to seed it makes it very easy. If we don't cooperate then there is different 
time when the other farmers don't want [water], so there is a big problem' (Farmer 
informant No.3). 
'By cooperating with other farmers it makes our work easier, everything will be 
easy' (Farmer informant No.5). 
Interestingly, however, all of the farmers who either expressed difficulties in their cooperation or 
an individualistic attitude to their farming practices were located in the Muda II irrigation block: 
'There is a small amount of farmers which [sic] have disagreement with me but it 
is up to those farmers because their yield is not so good and I don't care whether 
they want to take care of their land or not, it's up to them, it is their land. As far as 
I am concerned I can get more yield' (Farmer informant No.6). 
'There is a lack of cooperation between the farmers. Normally the problem is 
because of the water. Because there is a lack of cooperation sometimes the 
farmers already seed their paddy so they want to put water into their land and so 
the other farmers at the end of the canal they don't want water so they open the 
gate and then all the water goes to the drain river. . .' (Farmer informant No.9). 
Overall, the farmers expressed both understanding and knowledge of the impOliance of 
cooperation independent of the block within which they practice cultivation. Specifically, the 
fanners recognise the need to cooperate in the maintenance of canals, in the coordination of 
agricultural activities and in the distribution of water: 
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'The other farmers cooperate with me because when I want to release the water 
to the drain river normally they allow me to use their land as the way to release 
the water. They have to use my land to get water and then when I want to 
release water I have to use their land. Sometimes there is disagreement but 
generally there is cooperation' (Farmer informant No. 11). 
'Normally the farmers before my land will give water. When they apply weedicide 
[herbicide] or fertiliser of course they don't want to open the batas. I can see 
whether the farmers before my land apply fertiliser or not so by that time let's say 
before he apply the fertiliser I will ask permission and normally the farmer will 
give. I don't want the water after he has applied the fertiliser' (Farmer informant 
No. 12). 
'Normally we have cooperation between the farmers to clean up the canal' 
(Farmer informant No. 13). 
'Normally we get together to help clean the river even though there is a contractor 
to clean the river from MADA' (Farmer informant No. 18). 
'There is cooperation among farmers around this area, they cooperate to clean up 
the canal in front. We all join together to help clean it up. Normally MADA ask a 
contractor to clean up the river three times per year but there are certain times 
maybe MADA are late to ask the contractor to clean up so the farmers altogether 
join together to clean up' (Farmer informant No. 20). 
Such knowledge and understanding is not, however, mirrored in the attitudes and perceptions of 
the MADA staff to fanner cooperation. Instead, the staff interviewed were discouraging about the 
adequacy of cooperation at the farm level. For some staff, this is directly attributed to the 
inadequate knowledge and incorrect attitudes of the farmers resulting in an individualistic attitude 
towards farming: 
'At the moment they cannot cooperate, I don't know how [sic], either they have 
less knowledge or I think more on their attitude, their culture, they are dOing 
farming as their culture not as economic crop or economic work' (MADA 
informant No.1 0). 
'There is less cooperation especially in the water problem areas ... they act as 
individuals' (MADA informant No.2). 
' ... the farmers don't care about the other person. As long as he can get water 
and he can start seeding, he don't care about the other farmers .... There is no 
cooperation in water, I can notice this because of the different time of their 
seeding. The farmers that get already enough water they will seed first and they 
don't care about the farmers in this area' (MADA informant No.4). 
For other staff, however, the inadequacy in farmer cooperation is because of the fragmented field 
plots, absentee farmers and the lack of machinery: 
' ... there is less cooperation among farmers because there is [sic] so many 
farmers inside the area which are from outside so it is very difficult to get them 
together to cooperate' (MADA informant No. 11). 
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'They can't seed at the same time because sometimes certain farmers stay far 
from the plot and secondly they do the other odd jobs like construction. So in 
theory it should work but in practice no. Number three because they have less 
machinery, like in this area there is about 20 small tractors and let's say 5 big 
tractors so they simply cannot finish the farming activity' (MADA informant No.4). 
' ... because sometimes certain farmers have certain plots which are spread in the 
MADA area. They've got two relongs or three relongs and so they cannot 
cooperate because of course how will he do the farming activities at the same 
time in a different plot? Secondly, because they are staying outside far from their 
plot which makes it a big problem for them to cooperate with the farmers inside 
that area. Also it is the politics' (MADA informant No. 12). 
One important recurring theme is the role of politics in the cooperation of farmers. From this 
perspective, the segregation of the rural community into either PAS or UMNO allegiance restricts 
the interaction and agreement between these farmers: 
'It depends on the area, if there is strong leadership and the settlement pattern is 
more clustered and in terms of political affiliation there is no conflict amongst 
themselves then there is a very good chance of them cooperating among 
themselves. Whereas in places where there is a linear settlement, or scattered 
settlement and then you have PAS as equally powerful as UMNO and then they 
speak for themselves, there is not going to be good cooperation in this area' 
(MADA informant No. 19). 
'There is lack of cooperation because this is one of the factors because of the 
different political parties. This is one of the reasons there is a lack of cooperation 
among them. Let's say you are from the opposition side and I am from the ruling 
side that means that I will not agree with your opinion. I don't want to listen to 
you, he don't want to listen to me so that is the factor why there is lack of 
cooperation among farmers in the Muda area' (MADA informant No.7). 
Political segregation was not, however, regarded by the farmers as being influential in restricting 
cooperation. For as one farmer states: 
'The cooperation is very close even though we are from different political parties, 
generally there is close cooperation ... ' (Farmer informant No. 25). 
From this evidence there appears to be two distinct arguments about cooperation whereby the 
farmers regard this as important and adequate and the MADA staff regard this as inadequate. In 
particular, the quantitative data suggests that cooperation is improved under tertiary development 
although the qualitative data suggests the opposite. However, in light of the different geographical 
units explored, and the uncoordinated nature of the Muda II cropping patterns, it is argued that 
tertiary development has not increased cooperation on a block-wide basis. Such an argument is 
also supported by the following MADA staff member: 
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'Even though they put up the Muda II scheme there is still a lack of cooperation 
among the farmers. This involves what we call the social problem. For example, 
the farmers who have plots close to the canal have to pass water to the next 
farmer and so on. There is a lack of cooperation among these farmers - some 
farmers don't pass water on. Even though there is a Muda II project it is 
supposed to be like that. Farmers which [sic] are close to the structures that are 
built there is no problem but for the farmers far from the canal there is a big 
problem. They are supposed to cooperate with them, now there is supposed to 
be close cooperation among farmers and then from there the distribution of water 
will be much better' (MADA informant No. 12). 
Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
The evidence examined in this section suggests that the coordination of activities at the block, ISA 
and ISU spatial scale is worse under tertiary than non-tertiary conditions. In addition, although the 
perception of cooperation appears to be improved under teliiary conditions this is because of the 
reduced geographic scale within which the Muda II farmers cooperate. Such an argument has 
been emphasised by the qualitative data which illustrates that cooperation is not improved on a 
'with' and 'without' project basis. Because of this, the macro hypothesis is rejected and tertiary 
development has not been found to improve the coordination and cooperation of the farmers. 
8.7 Water management strategies 
From the evidence examined so far there are obvious conflicting and contrasting perceptions 
between the farmers and MADA staff. In particular, the farmers regard the control of water, the 
coordination of activities and intra-block cooperation to be critical factors in their farming 
activities. By contrast, MADA officials have expressed the poor attitudes and actions of the 
farmers to be a key factor in the difficulties experienced by these farmers in their supply of water 
and the coordination of agronomic activities. To assess the extent to which the poor attitudes and 
actions of the farmers are contributing to inadequate yields, control and cooperation this section 
examines the water management strategies employed by these farmers at the farm level. Such 
strategies are critical for both the effective and efficient distribution of water and for securing 
higher yields. Examples of these include: the construction and maintenance of the field batas; the 
operation and maintenance of structures; and the construction of in-field channels and drains. 
CHAPTER EIGHT - Tertiary intervention: Intended and unintended outcomes 275 
Have tertiary facilities improved farmer management strategies? 
That water management strategies are improved under tertiary facilities when compared with non-
tertiary facilities 
The ability of farmers to maintain appropriate field water levels is an indicator of the effectiveness 
of the water management strategies employed by the farmers. This was analysed in chapter seven 
with respect to two important factors in the management of water at the farm level. The first of 
these refers to the difference between the Muda I and Muda II farmers in securing adequate field 
water depths for cropping requirements. This analysis indicated that the Muda I block displays 
consistently higher field water depths than the Muda II block. Similarly, the findings in chapter 
seven illustrated that the height and width of field ridges (batas) were consistently lower for 
farmers in the Muda II than the Muda I irrigation block. What this suggests, therefore, is that the 
farmers in the Muda II irrigation block are unable to secure adequate field water levels due to the 
poor construction of these batas. However, the ability of farmers to maintain adequate field water 
levels results from a culmination of factors in addition to the construction of adequate field batas. 
Consequently, the purpose of this section is to explore these strategies on a 'with' and 'without' 
project basis when exploring the extent to which tertiary facilities have improved the water 
management strategies of the farmers. 
Figure 8.20 illustrates the variables and indicators explored in the analysis of water management 
strategies that are significantly different between the two irrigation blocks. Taking each 
dimension separately, the following analysis questions whether the strategies employed by the 
farmers are improved by the development of tertiary facilities. 
Ability to maintain appropriate field water levels 
The ability to maintain appropriate field water levels is an indicator of both the supply and 
delivery of water by MADA, the cooperation of farmers at the block level and the in-field 
management strategies of these farmers. So far, this thesis has illustrated that the quantity of 
water supplied by MADA to the Muda II irrigation block is significantly higher than that supplied 
to the Muda I block. However, the field water depths of these farmers are significantly lower than 
those in the Muda I block. What this indicates is poor management strategies on the part of the 
farmers. In particular, the Muda II irrigation blocks are constructed so that all farmers have direct 
access to both Field Irrigation Turnouts (FIT's) and Drainage Outlets (DO's). What this means is 
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that the farmers under these conditions are not reliant on other farmers for obtaining or draining 
water from their fields. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that only one respondent in the Muda II 
irrigation block regarded their water level to be 'too high' in the irrigated season. By contrast, 37 
per cent of the Muda I farmers recognised this as a problem - a finding which supports the 
argument that the farmers in the Muda I block have difficulty in draining their fields when 
required (Figure 8.31) 196. Considering the extra water supplied to the Muda II irrigation block it 
is surprising, however, that the majority of these farmers have experienced field water levels that 
are 'too low' in the irrigated season (Figure 8.32). 
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Figure 8.31: Experience of too high water level in the irrigated season 
(Chi square: p<0.05: n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
What these figures suggest is that because the farmers in the Muda II irrigation block are able to 
drain water whenever required they are unlikely to experience field water levels that are too high. 
However, the quantity of water supplied to the Muda II farmers should result in more than 
adequate field water depths but with 72 per cent of the Muda II respondents reporting an 
inadequacy in these depths this is clearly not occurring. Such inadequacies are regarded by 
MADA staff to be a direct result of the poor management strategies of the farmers in the operation 
of the FIT's and DO'sI97. In particular, these staff argue that the farmers in the Muda II irrigation 
196 The log-linear analysis tabulated in Table 15, Appendix E:3 illustrates that the high water level in the 
irrigated season is a direct function of the irrigation block within which cultivation is practised. In addition, 
this is also influenced by the method of drainage, and the experience or drainage difficulties. For those 
farmers experiencing too high a water level the majority are located next to the drain. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that 84% of those experiencing drainage difficulties also experience high in-field water levels. A 
log-linear analysis is not possible for the low water level in the irrigated season due to the non-significant 
difference between the two irrigation blocks. 
197 The Muda I irrigation blocks do not have FIT's or DO's. Therefore, the incorrect management of these 
structures can be attributed directly to the policy of tertiary intervention. 
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Figure 8.32: Experience of too low water level in the irrigated season 
(Chi square: p>0.05: n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
blocks allow a constant flow of water through their land by opening both the FIT's and DO's 
simultaneously: 
' ... The control gates in the Muda II they don't close, so water comes in and water 
goes out at the same time. So that is why we have disagreements, that's where 
the problems come in ... when water comes in they open the drain, they never 
close the gate, they should close the FIT but they don't, its all about the attitude' 
(MADA informant, No. 10). 
'It is very important that the farmers come and see [their fields], they have to go to 
the field more often to see the condition. Some farmers stay far away and the 
water comes in a goes out, comes in and goes out. They are very smart farmers 
you know, they make a weir system here and [then] there is no need to come so 
the water comes in and goes out at the same time. It is the farmers wasting [the 
water] ... ' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
To facilitate MADA in saving water it is important that the farmers fields act as water storage 
units. To achieve this, MADA request that the farmers retain at least eight inches of standing 
water in their fields during the growth periodl98 . However, because the farmers do not directly 
measure their water level this invariably occurs. In fact, when questioned about the water level 
required in their fields, the farmers regarded the water level to be adequate 'provided it remains 
below the top of the paddy'. From this perspective, a direct measurement of the water level is 
rarely practised, independent of whether the farmers cultivate in the Muda I or Muda II irrigation 
blocks: 
198 Personal communication with MADA staff, July 1997. 
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'". I try to maintain the level of the water just below the top of the paddy, there is 
no measure for this thing, I just have to maintain below of the top' (Farmer 
informant, No. 17). 
'I don't have any measure for how many inches we are supposed to put inside the 
paddy field so we just consider as long as the top of the paddy is above the water 
level. Just enough to apply weedicide [herbicides], we don't have any measure, 
as long as there is enough to apply the weedicide [herbicides] then that is fine' 
(Farmer informant, No. 21). 
There is no measurement for this, as long as the top of the paddy is above the 
water level it doesn't matter. As long as there is enough water on the surface of 
the land to prevent the weeds from growing faster, if there is no water the weeds 
will grow faster' (Farmer informant, No. 22). 
'It depends on the height of the paddy, if it is below the paddy then no problem 
and if higher then I drain off' (Farmer informant, No.4). 
The water level below the height of the paddy is normally about 4 inches. If the 
water is above the paddy then we will drain the water but sometimes when we 
can't drain the water because of the overflow [in the canals] we have to control 
the tunnel. Of course we can control the small tertiary canal we just close the 
gate' (Farmer informant, No.9). 
A critical factor in the ability of the farmers to maintain an adequate water level in their fields is 
the maintenance of the batas. After all, batas which are too small or improperly maintained 
ensures that water cannot be retained in the field. Because of this, the farmers in both irrigation 
blocks recognised the maintenance and construction of the field batas to be an important part of 
their water management strategies: 
'Of course I have to maintain these [batas] often because sometimes they have a 
crack and then the rate sometimes makes holes and the water cannot stay in the 
field and goes to the other fields. This is then useless so I have to get more water 
from the canal' (Farmer informant, No.1). 
'I maintain the batas properly because if the grass growls] at the batas then we 
have to cut down to make sure that no rats stay in the batas otherwise the rats 
will make hole and the water will go out' (Farmer informant, No. 10). 
'Normally I take care of the batas and mend the hole made by the rats, just to 
make sure that there is no water running out' (Farmer informant, No. 11). 
'Everyday I have to go and check [the batas] because the water will flow out of 
the small holes and then I have to pump more to maintain the water level' 
(Farmer informant, No. 15). 
'8atas are very important to control water in my land and it makes it easier to walk 
into the fields' (Farmer informant, No.5). 
The batas is very important so we must take care of it properly. I have to make 
sure that there is no single hole in the batas otherwise when I apply fertiliser, if 
there is whole in the batas then it will flow to the other farmers land so I will waste 
my fertiliser' (Farmer informant, No.8). 
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In particular, the farmers regard the critical time for the construction and maintenance of these 
batas to be in the early part of the cropping cycle, during seeding: 
'I always go and check the batas at the beginning of the seeding I go everyday. 
After that just every now and again' (Farmer informant, No. 23). 
'I always maintain the batas especially during seeding time' (Farmer informant, 
No. 24). 
'At the beginning, after we seed the paddy, we always go and check everyday. 
After that like now there is no need to go and check, we don't need water and we 
want to drain. Every season we go twice to clean up the batas' (Farmer 
informant, No. 25). 
By contrast, MADA officials expressed the poor maintenance and construction of the field batas to 
be one of the primary reasons for the poor management and wastage of water in the Muda scheme, 
independent of the irrigation block cultivated: 
'They [the batas] are not maintained very well, they are very poor batas 
maintenance, they are full of holes, they are pressed, they are not cut properly. 
That is why water comes in and the water goes out' (MADA informant, No.1 0). 
'The farmers inside my block take less care of the batas, the best time they take 
care is only at the beginning of the farming activities, about the first month. After 
they have cleared their plot, they want to seed and by that time they have 
properly taken care of the batas, after that there is less care. They don't care 
about the hole made by rats or crabs and so on. So they only take care of the 
batas early on' (MADA informant, No. 11). 
'Because they don't properly maintain the batas there is only the small one so the 
water level in the field cannot be maintained properly. I don't care about the size 
of the batas, it is the responsibility of the farmers. Because maybe they just make 
sure that only a certain amount of water inside their fields so as long as the batas 
is considered a batas even it if is a small one, it is still a batas. They use their 
batas to make it easy for them to visit their fields so they just consider that as long 
as it is a batas then that's OK' (MADA informant, No.2). 
' ... They just maintain whenever they just start seeding, by that time is the very 
crucial time they have to properly maintain their batas, after that no more' (MADA 
informant, No.3). 
, ... only 30% of the farmers take care of their batas ... if there is a lot of complaint 
about the water this is of course because they don't take care of their batas 
properly' (MADA informant, No.9). 
MADA staff regarded this poor batas maintenance to be directly attributed to the culture of 
farming, the bad attitudes of the farmers, and the tendency for farmers to 'follow their fathers' 
rather than listen to the advice from MADA: 
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'There is the good farmers and there is the bad farmers, the good farmers 
properly take care of the water management, properly take care of the batas, the 
other 50% don't really care' (MADA informant, No.4). 
'The farmers have a lack of onus [sic] about how important is the water supply by 
MADA. They are supposed to understand it and properly take care of their batas. 
So by that the management of the water by the farmers will be better, they must 
understand how important are the batas and maybe MADA can try to educate 
them but how can MADA educate them? Normally we advise the line operator 
and technician and they give advice to the farmers regarding to the batas, how to 
properly maintain their batas but these farmers are from the old generation and 
they less listen to MADA men so that's why this happen. The second generation 
understand better and the action will be faster and if the MADA men give them 
advice they will do as soon as possible but most of the farmers are from the older 
generation and they don't want to listen. "You are too young how come you want 
to teach me, I already do farming since you are not yet born so how come I 
should follow your advice?" .. .' (MADA informant, No.7). 
'Because they have moved from planting one season to two season and then you 
compare at that time and now I think it is totally different. At that time they 
maintain their batas or the banks because they know that if they don't maintain 
their batas there would be a big problem. Now it is no problem because if they 
don't maintain their batas they still get water, that is the difference. They just use 
the batas to show their fields not as actual batas' (MADA informant, No. 14). 
'They have forgotten that the soul of the paddy field is the batas, that is their 
word. Normally before our double cropping they would repair this batas because 
they recognise that it is very important but now that the time has changed they 
don't bother about the batas. Formally they say that the batas is the soul of the 
paddy field but if you ask the young they say they don't know. They must 
maintain their batas, I don't know why they don't bother about the batas but 
formally they say that it is the soul' (MADA informant, No. 15). 
What this qualitative data has highlighted is the differing opinions between the farmers and 
MADA staff to the quality of the on-farm water management practices of the farmers. In 
particular, the farmers emphasised the importance of maintaining adequate field water depths and 
field batas, although they did not express the exact measurement for the field water level. By 
contrast, the MADA staff regard both the field water depths and batas to be inadequately 
maintained by the farmers thus resulting in the overall poor management of water in the Muda 
region. Of particular significance for the impact of tertiary development, however, is that the 
increased control afforded to these fanners in the draining of their fields means that although these 
fields are rarely flooded, many of these farmers experience too little water because of the high 
wastage of water at the farm level. This high wastage appears to be due to both the poor 
construction and maintenance of the batas and the opening of both the FIT's and the DO's at the 
same time. Consequently, tertiary intervention has not illustrated any improvements in the 
construction and maintenance of the field batas or the maintenance of appropriate field water 
depths. 
CHAPTER EIGHT - Tertiary intervention: Intended and unintended outcomes 281 
Construction of in-field structures 
One of the factors contributing to the ability of farmers to maintain appropriate field water levels 
is the construction of in-field structures. It is anticipated that by constructing in-field water supply 
and drainage channels, field ridges and in-plot drains the management of the water resource may 
be improved. The variables that have been found to be significantly different between the tertiary 
and non-tertiary irrigation blocks are illustrated in Figure 8.20 and expanded on below. 
Firstly, there is no significant difference between the irrigation blocks in the construction of water 
supply channels l99. This is surprising because one would expect more Muda I farmers to construct 
these channels due to the absence of Muda II tertiary facilities. Where there is a difference, 
however, is that a significantly larger proportion of Muda I farmers have had to construct in-field 
drainage channels and in-plot drains when compared with the Muda II farmers (Figure 8.33 and 
8.34). This finding is because of the increased drainage difficulties experienced by the Muda I 
farmers when compared with the drainage control afforded to the Muda II farmers via their 
individual DO's200. 
More importantly, however, is the difference in findings between the Muda I and Muda II 
irrigation blocks for the construction of field ridges (batas). As was expanded on in the previous 
section these batas are critical for in-field water management strategies independent of whether 
there are tertiary facilities or not. However, as illustrated in Table 8.23, the Muda I farmers are 
significantly more inclined to construct these ridges compared with the Muda II farmers. What 
this suggests, therefore, is that 55 per cent of Muda II farmers either rely entirely on the tertiary 
canals and drains for their water management strategies or are not inclined to construct batas as a 
means of keeping water in their fields2ol . From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that the 
Muda II irrigation block is oversupplying and under-using its water supply. 
199 30% of Muda I farmers have constructed these channels compared with 23% of Muda II farmers. 
200 The log-linear analysis for these variables (Tables 16 and 17, Appendix E:3) illustrate that for the 
construction ofin-field drainage channels the difference between the two irrigation blocks is a direct result of 
the irrigation block within which farming activities are conducted (i.e. no three-way associations). However, 
the construction of in-plot drains are also influenced by the location of the farmers land whereby 89% of 
Muda II farmers who have constructed in-plot drains also rely on field-to-field distribution compared with 
34% of Muda II farmers in a similar position. This finding is because of the increased number of Muda I 
farmers who rely on field-to-field distribution. 
201 To clarify whether the differences in the construction of bat as between the two blocks is a result of 
tertiary development or the different farm, field and farmer characteristics the log-linear statistical technique 
is applied. The results illustrated in Table 18, Appendix E:3 indicate that all of the relationships between the 
irrigation block and the construction of batas are significant. Therefore, this can be assumed to be a direct 
result of tertiary intervention and not the different farm, field or farmers characteristics between the two 
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No 
MI Mil 
(%) 
92 
8 
(%) 
45 
55 
Table 8.23 Construction of field ridges by block 
(Chi-square: p<0.05 : n = 200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
irrigation blocks. In addition, the majority of farmers constructing batas are located in the 'middle' of the 
irrigation block and the majority that do not are next to the canal. This is because these farmers use the canal 
as their batas. This does, however, cause conflict over maintenance responsibility. 
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Operation and maintenance of structures 
Finally, the introduction of tertiary facilities was expected to improve the operation and 
maintenance of these facilities by the farmers themselves202. The current study, however, found 
no significant relationship between the irrigation block and the operation of plot offtakes, 
irrespective of whether this was with MADA, on their own or with other farmers (Figure 8.20). 
Likewise, there was no significant relationship between the irrigation block and the cleaning and 
maintaining of channels, drains or offtakes with other farmers. There was, however, a significant 
relationship in the cleaning and maintaining of channels, offtakes and drains with MADA and the 
maintaining of offtakes on their own (Figure 8.20). 
Maintain plot offtakes on own 
Maintain plot offtakes with MADA 
Clean plot channels and drains with MADA 
% 
23 
39 
25 
% 
37 
17 
7 
Table 8.24: Maintenance and cleaning of offtakes and drains by block 
(Chi-square: p<O.05 : n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
It appears, therefore, that the introduction of tertiary development has increased the likelihood that 
farmers will maintain their plot offtakes on their own (Table 8.24)203. This has in turn reduced the 
likelihood that the Muda II farmers will maintain plot offtakes or clean channels and drains with 
MADA204 . What this has not done, however, is influenced the perception of who is responsible 
for such activities. For example, when asked who should clean canals and maintain off takes, the 
farmers in the Muda II irrigation block tended to express the importance of MAD A's input in this 
202 However, as has been expanded on in chapter six, the initial perception that the operation of the tertiary 
stlUctures would be devolved to the farmers has not been found to be effective. 
203 This is hardly surprising considering the increased availability of plot offtakes in the Muda II irrigation 
block. 
204 The log-linear analysis illustrated in Tables 19-21, Appendix E:3 indicates that for all variables other than 
the maintenance of plot offtakes with MADA and the experience of irrigation difficulties, these findings are 
independent of the different farmers, farms and fields between the two irrigation blocks. What this suggests, 
therefore, is that the difference in findings between the two irrigation blocks regarding the maintenance of 
plot offtakes with MADA is influenced by the experience of irrigation difficulties. In addition, 77% of those 
farmers who clean plot channels and drains with MADA also rely on field-to-field distribution and 50% of 
those reliant on the main drain do likewise. FUlthermore, for those farmers who maintain plot offtakes on 
their own 45% are located next to the canal and 65% experience difficulties when irrigating. Finally, 75% of 
those farmers operating <1 ha of land maintain their plot offtakes with MADA. 
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activity (Tables 8.25 and 8.26io5. For as the following quotes illustrate, the farmers regard the 
maintenance of structures to be the responsibility of MADA: 
'".this canal is under the responsibility of MADA to ask the contractor or ask the 
kampung to clean up and they give them money. So I just clean up the little part 
of the canal just in front of my land only' (Farmer informant, No. 23). 
'It is MADA's responsibility to take care of that [the small tunnel and drain], small 
problems we manage but big problems no' (Farmer informant, No.3). 
'MADA is supposed to repair the drainage control but right now they don't. So far 
it has been three years and still no action' (Farmer informant, No.4). 
MI Mil 
% % 
--------~ 
MADA 29 48 
MADA and farmers 48 45 
Farmers 24 7 
Table 8.25: Perception of who should maintain canals by block 
(Chi-square: p<O.05: n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
MI Mil 
MADA 
MADA and farmers 
Farmers 
% 
23 
52 
25 
% 
54 
13 
33 
Table 8.26: Perception of who should maintain plot offtakes by block 
(Chi-square: p<O.05: n=200) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
205 The perception of who is responsible for maintaining plot offtakes is a direct result of the irrigation block 
within which cultivation is practised (see Table 22, Appendix E:3) and not the differences in farms, farmers 
and fields between the two irrigation blocks. By contrast the findings with respect to who should maintain 
canals are influenced by the different experiences of irrigation difficulties between the two irrigation blocks. 
In addition, the majority of those farmers located next to a main canal perceive the maintenance of this canal 
to be the responsibility of MAD A officials. By contrast those farmers located next to the drain or in the 
middle of the irrigation block regard this as being the joint responsibility of both MADA and the farmers 
(Table 23, Appendix E:3). 
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Here again we find conflicting perceptions, with the MADA officials regarding the maintenance of 
the small canals, offtakes and drains to be entirely the responsibility of the farmers with the main 
and secondary structures the responsibility of MADA: 
'The small canal they use to drain the water that is not the responsibility of MADA, 
there is no allocation to ask the contractor to clean that canal, that is the 
responsibility of the farmers. MADA is responsible just for the main canals. Only 
the small canal is the responsibility of the farmers ... ' (MADA informant, No.1). 
'The farmers' responsibility usually starts from their field intake and the field 
channels. If they need to construct, it is their responsibility. So our responsibility 
is up to the tertiary canals' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
'They have to properly take care [of the small canal] because otherwise if MADA 
pass water it cannot go through their small canal because they don't take care 
properly. So the involvement of the farmers is not to take full control of the main 
gate, just to control the tunnel at their plot, the small canal at their plot .. .' (MADA 
informant, No.5). 
In addition to the maintenance of irrigation structures, tertiary intervention was expected to 
improve the involvement of the farmers in the operation of offtakes and drains. This appears to 
have been marginally successful with more than 50 per cent of Muda II farmers recognising this 
as their responsibility. Unfortunately, however, 40 per cent of these farmers regard the operation 
of these structures to be the responsibility of MADA staff, a significant finding when compared 
with the 21 per cent of Muda I farmers stating likewise (Table 8.27io6• What this suggests, 
therefore, is that the Muda II facilities have removed the 'self-help' mechanism of these farmers 
who rely to a greater extent on MADA for the operation and maintenance of their structures. This 
is reflected in their actual maintenance activities whereby the majority of Muda I farmers 'often' 
maintain structures and the majority of Muda II farmers 'sometimes' maintain these structures 
(Figure 8.35io7 . More importantly is the finding that 77 per cent of Muda II farmers only 
206 Although the operation of plot offtakes is significantly increased under Muda II conditions, it is difficult 
to attribute the perception of who is responsible for operating these structures to the irrigation block itself. 
This is because these fmdings are also influenced by the differences in farm size and the experience of 
irrigation difficulties between the two irrigation blocks (Table 26, Appendix E:3). In particular, whilst the 
majority of farmers operating <1 ha in both the Muda I and Muda II irrigation blocks regarded the operation 
of offtakes and drains to be the responsibility of the farmers, larger farmers (> Iha) in the Muda I block 
perceived this to be the responsibility of both the farmers and MADA and in the Muda II block the majority 
regarded this as solely MADA's responsibility. Similarly, the majority of Muda I farmers experiencing 
irrigation difficulties regard the operation of these structures to be the joint responsibility of the farmers and 
MADA staff whilst farmers in a similar position in the Muda II irrigation block recognised this to be the 
responsibility of the farmers themselves. However, for those Muda II farmers not experiencing difficulties 
the responsibility for the operation of offtakes and drains is perceived to fall into MADA's jurisdiction with 
the majority of Muda I farmers regarding this to be their own responsibility. 
207 This finding is influenced by the different experience of drainage difficulties between the two irrigation 
blocks. As illustrated in Table 24, Appendix E:3 there is a three-way association between the irrigation 
block, maintenance action and drainage difficulties. In particular, 63% of farmers experiencing difficulties 
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maintain structures 'when they collapse' compared with a corresponding figure of only 9 per cent 
for Muda I farmers (Figure 8.36io8. This illustrates the reactive management style of the Muda II 
farmers when compared with the relatively proactive approach adopted by the Muda I farmers. 
What this data suggests is that the control of the offtakes is not being managed satisfactorily by the 
Muda II farmers. In particular, these farmers regard the maintenance of offtakes, canals and drains 
to be entirely the respo.nsibility of MADA even though the MADA staff regard this as the farmers 
responsibility. Furthermore, within the Muda II irrigation block the farmers are less inclined to 
clean, maintain or operate structures with other farmers. Consequently, the cooperation of these 
farmers is assumed to be worse than farmers under Muda I conditions. In addition, the actions of 
the Muda II farmers are reactive in approach whereby the majority of these farmers only maintain 
their structures once they are already damaged. By contrast, the Muda I farmers maintain their 
structures more regularly and in a proactive manner. 
in the Muda I block 'often' maintain structures compared with a corresponding figure of 33% for the Muda 
II irrigation block. Likewise, for those not experiencing difficulties, 78% of Muda I farmers still maintain 
their structures 'often' with only 14% of Muda II farmers do likewise. In addition, 63% of farmers operating 
<1 ha 'sometimes' maintain structures and for those farmers operating> 1 ha, 61% 'often' maintain. 
Likewise, 55% of farmers who can open and close their turnout, 'sometimes' maintain their structures 
compared with 87% of those who cannot, 'often' maintaining their structures. 
208 This finding is influenced by the difference between the two irrigation blocks in the experience of 
drainage difficulties, the ability to open and close the farm gate and the location of the land operated (Table 
25, Appendix E:3). For those farmers draining with the use of in-plot drains, 55% of Muda I farmers 
'always' maintain structures and 85% of Muda II farmers maintain 'when they collapse'. Similarly for those 
reliant on the main drain, the majority of Muda I farmers maintain 'seasonally' and the majority of Muda II 
farmers maintain 'when they collapse'. For those reliant on field-to-field drainage the Muda I farmers tend 
to maintain 'seasonally' and the Muda II farmers tend to maintain 'always'. In addition, farmers in the Muda 
II block who can open and close the farm gate predominantly maintain 'when they collapse' with the 
corresponding farmers in the Muda I block maintaining 'always'. The difference in field locations between 
the two irrigation blocks is also influencing the relationship between the irrigation block and the regularity of 
maintenance whereby farmers in each block located next to the canal 'always' maintain structures and whilst 
farmers located next to the drain or reliant on field-to-field distribution in the Muda I block do likewise those 
in the Muda II block only maintain 'when they collapse'. Finally, whilst the size of land operated or the 
experience of drainage difficulties does not influence the relationships observed they do provide for 
independent associations. In this respect, the majority of farmers operating <1 ha maintain 'when they 
collapse' and the majority of farmers operating> 1 ha maintain' always'. Similarly, those experiencing 
difficulties in drainage 'always' maintain and those not experiencing difficulties maintain 'when they 
collapse' . 
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Acceptance/rejection of macro hypothesis 
The findings illustrated in this section suggest that the water management strategies of the farmers 
cultivating under Muda II conditions have not improved when compared with those cultivating 
under Muda I conditions. Consequently, the macro hypothesis is rejected and the expected 
benefits of tertiary intervention have not been found to have materialised. In particular, it is 
argued that because the farmers in the Muda II irrigation block perceive MADA to be responsible 
for the operation and maintenance of structures they are reactive in their farming activities. 
Furthermore because of the poor management of the Field Irrigation Turnouts (FIT's) and the 
Drainage Outlets (DO's) by these farmers much of the water supplied to the Muda II irrigation 
block is wasted at the farm level. This is exacerbated by the poor construction and maintenance of 
field batas which further reduces the ability of these farmers to maintain appropriate field water 
levels for their cropping requirements. 
8.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the 'outcomes' of tertiary intervention on a 'with' and 'without' project 
basis. In so doing, an inverse relationship between the size of land operated and the yield 
obtained has been observed. In examining the extent to which these yields differ between two 
irrigation blocks it was found that not only is tertiary intervention not increasing yields they are in 
fact lower than under non-tertiary conditions. Likewise, teliiary intervention has not reduced the 
overall cost of production because of the chemical substitution of the Muda II farmers. 
Furthermore, not only has tertiary intervention not improved the reliability, adequacy or fairness 
of the water supply, the 'formal' water control capacity of these farmers is in fact worse than 
under Muda I conditions. What this suggests, therefore, is that under the 'formal' control 
arrangements in the Muda II irrigation blocks, the farmers have a reduced capacity to obtain the 
correct amount of water, at the right time, and in the right quantity. 
This chapter also focused on the improvement, or otherwise, in the cooperation and coordination 
of agronomic and water management practices of farmers on a 'with' and 'without' project basis. 
Here again, tertiary intervention has been found to be lacking, with the cooperation of farmers and 
the coordination of activities worse under teliiary than non-tertiary conditions. Finally, the water 
management strategies of the farmers at the farm level have also not been improved by tertiary 
intervention. 
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It appears, therefore, that the policy of teliiary intervention has failed to meet any of its stated 
objectives. To establish the reasons for these 'unexpected' outcomes and those presented in 
chapter seven, the following chapter asks the fundamental question: Why is the policy of tertiary 
intervention not achieving its expected aims? 
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Informal Practice: The Power of the Farmers 
The argument underpinning much of my research is the need to recognise the relations of power 
that impact on, and are impacted by, the process of intervention. The actors involved in this 
process have been recognised at the micro, meso and macro spatial scales. At the macro scale, 
chapter five explored the formal landscape of intervention from the national perspective, 
recognising the political impOliance of rice and the rice fanning populace. Chapter six examined 
the meso spatial scale through the analysis of the MADA-state and MADA-farmer cooperative and 
coercive relationships. Following this, chapters seven and eight explored the intended and 
unintended outcomes of this formal intervention by the detailed analysis of tertiary development at 
the micro level. The aim of this chapter is to examine the informal actions of the farmers and 
MADA staff which deviate from the formal rules and regulations prescribed by MADA. In so 
doing, the reasons why government intervention have not met with government expectations are 
examined. 
Drawing on the analytical model in chapter two, this chapter focuses on the 'negotiated priorities' 
between the federal government, MADA and the farmers. This negotiation is influenced by the 
relations of power between all actors engaged in this intervention. By recognising that power is 
decentered and difficult to measure, the task for researchers is to describe power through the 
manifestation of events and actions that seek to explain the relationships between people, 
institutions and organisations. This model of power focuses not on the 'power to' action or the 
'power over' action but on the 'power of' action209 . By treating power in this capacity, its analysis 
is determined by the examination of how power is manifested in the action and interaction of 
individuals and institutions. This action and interaction is explored in my thesis by the analysis of 
the informal actions of actors and the influence of these actions on irrigation system governance 
and policy design. In this respect, the deviant behaviour of the farmers and MADA staff (when 
209 The concept of 'power to' suggests that individuals have the power to certain actions that do not 
necessarily affect others, where; power is infinitive, a personal attribute; and exercised within hierarchical 
structures where the individual seeks to transform their understanding and alter the power differentials in 
their relationships. 'Power over' treats power as a finite 'thing' which is coercive in a zero-sum model, were 
power is: held by institutions and described in society as race, class, gender etc. (Nelson & Wright, 1995: 1-
9). By contrast, the 'power of action is a metaphor used here to describe the theoretical constructs of power 
as illustrated in chapter two which focus on power as a subjectless 'thing' that is exercised in the interaction 
of actors. This is manifested in the actions of actors which deviate from the formal procedures and rules of 
intervention. In this respect, power is: exercised concurrently; played out through the negotiation of actors; 
and made explicit in the strategies of these actors. Through these strategies the collective action of actors 
influence the agency and actions of other actors at various spatial scales. 
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compared with formal regulations and legislation) serves to describe how the relations of power 
impact on the intended and unintended outcomes of intervention. 
This chapter begins by examining why intervention has not achieved the expected aims of either 
the procedural objectives of MADA or the substantive objectives of the federal government. In 
particular, it is argued that tertiary structures have increased the capacity of the farmers to make 
use of their power both collectively and individually, whereby; the individual power of the farmers 
results in informal actions that deviate from the procedural objectives of MADA which, in turn, 
influences the actions of MADA staff and inhibits their securement of substantive objectives. 
Furthermore, although the farmers are failing to adhere to procedural objectives or secure 
substantive objectives, because they are politically powerful as a collective body this limits the 
policy options and actions available to both MADA and the federal government - thus further 
enhancing the power of the farmers and their capacity for informal action. 
Individually, the increased geographical concentration of control structures has extended the 
capacity for Muda II fanners to operate these structures in accordance with their individual 
requirements. This has materialised for two reasons: firstly, MADA are powerless to influence 
the informal practices of the farmers; and secondly, the institutions that guide social action are 
located in the villages rather than the irrigation blocks. This means that the rules, norms, values 
and actions that guide village life are not mirrored in the actions of individual farmers in the 
irrigation blocks. Therefore, the farmers are able to make use of their individual power which 
influences the outcomes of the procedural objectives of MAD A and the informal practices of these 
staff at the local level. 
Collectively, the introduction of tertiary development has increased the 'ease' with which farming 
can be conducted - manifested in the reduced time required in the cropping process, enabling the 
farmers to become involved in off-farm productive and non-productive activities. This has 
increased the scope of livelihood strategies available to the Muda II farmers, although not 
increased their yieldl lO. It is argued that the failure of the farmers in the tertiary irrigation block 
to increase yields, and the inability of the state to secure such increases, is indicative of the 
collective political power of the farmers vis-a.-vis the federal government. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the inability of MADA to enforce rule compliance is also indicative of the collective 
power ofthe farmers at the meso level. 
210 By 'scope of livelihood strategies' I refer to the range of opportunities available for farmers to mobilise 
their capabilities, assets and activities to secure a standard of living. 
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Having articulated the individual and collective power of the farmers, the influence of this on the 
actions of MADA staff and the role of the farmers at the national level is explored. In so doing, 
the linkage between the micro, meso and macro spatial scales is articulated. 
9.1 The individual power of the farmers 
The individual power of the farmers is manifested in their non-conformance with many of the 
procedural objectives of MADA. Examples of this can be found throughout my thesis, including: 
the use of wet seeding rather than the recommended dry seeding; the commitment to the group 
farming policy on paper rather than in practice; the non-conformance with the designed operation 
of the Muda II irrigation blocks; the non-conformance with the irrigation schedule implemented by 
MADA; and the failure to improve water management at the farm level. These individual actions 
manifest themselves as collective action against the institutional power of MADA and the federal 
government. Therefore, although this section focuses on the individual power of the farmers to 
informal action, it should be recognised that the accumulation of the individual power of the 
farmers influences their collective power vis-a-vis both MADA and the federal government. 
The government policy of tertiary intervention was expected to reduce the quantity of water 
allocated and increase the efficient use of this supply. However, as chapter seven has illustrated, 
not only has the Muda II block not achieved these aims but it is worse than under Muda I 
conditions. This section argues that because tertiary development has increased the capacity of the 
farmers to exercise their individual power this has resulted in consistently higher supplies, lower 
field water depths, and the lower efficient usage of water in the Muda II irrigation block. This is 
not to say, however, that the farmers under Muda I conditions cannot utilise their power 
(illustrated in the 'illegal' piping of water from adjacent canals) but rather that the Muda II 
farmers have an increased capacity for informal action (illustrated in the 'illegal' operation of 
control gates). 
Informal action 
The primary 'interface' between the farmers and MADA staff are the control structures located 
along the secondary and tertiary canals. These 'sites of interaction' provide the focus for 
expressing the balance of power between the farmers and MADA staff. It is at this point that the 
formal responsibilities of MAD A and the fanners interact. Therefore, the unofficial actions of the 
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farmers in the breaking, altering and controlling of these structures serves to illustrate the conflict 
and negotiation between these actors. 
The development of tertiary structures has increased the capacity of the farmers to control the 
outlet structures unofficially. When originally designed, the control of the tertiary structures was 
expected to be 'devolved' to the irrigators themselves. However, this has not materialised due to: 
the lack of congruence between the village social structure and field social structure; the lack of 
strong leadership at the farm level; the fragmented field lots; and the social and political conflicts 
between farmers. As a result, the formal control of these tertiary structures has been retained by 
MADA. The informal reality, however, illustrates a somewhat different picture. 
It is widely recognised that, in order to ensure a timely and adequate supply, the farmers in the 
Muda II irrigation block interfere with the control of the structures on the secondary and tertiary 
canals. Officially, the tertiary structures should be operated on a strict rotational basis by MADA 
staff. However, the farmers open, close and break these structures which perpetuates the 
inadequate, unreliable and inefficient supply in these blocks: 
' ... the farmers are not supposed to open the gate but the farmers have already 
opened the gate [when the schedule begins]' (MADA informant, No.6). 
The water distribution is put like this, 2 days for this area, after' 2 days we put the 
level and then for the next area 2 days and so on but because of the farmers they 
simply don't want to follow they just open the gate, very big problem' (MADA 
informant, No.2). 
' ... for the Muda II we have given all the concepts and what they should do, we 
have done. We have lectures for them to show them how the fixtures should be 
opened, how the system should be used but they still cannot follow even as you 
see some of the structures have been broken just because they cannot cooperate 
among themselves. The farmers at the end cannot receive water and they come 
and break off the structure. They open the gate by themselves that is among our 
problems' (MADA informant, No.1 0). 
'there is enough water supplied by MADA on paper and inside the canal ... but the 
problem is that when [it] comes to implementation, let's say the pipe made by the 
farmers themselves, so they just simply open when they want water. That is why 
it is generally fair distribution to all farmers ... it is the way that the farmers control 
the water that makes it not fair' (MADA informant, No.6). 
The informal opening and closing of the canal structures is not practised in the Muda I irrigation 
block. This is because the opportunities for such activities are limited and the farmers are more 
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inclined to cooperate with one another in the distribution of water2\]. For the Muda II farmers, 
however, the increased geographical density of control structures, and the reduced geographical 
scale within which they have to cooperate, has increased the individualistic approach of these 
farmers. It is not surprising, therefore, that these farmers have been able to utilise their power in 
the opening and breaking of structures. 
This does not mean that the Muda I farmers have been unable to utilise their power to ensure an 
adequate and timely supply. However, unlike the Muda II farmers, instead of tampering with 
official control structures, the Muda I farmers have built pipes from the main canal directly into 
their fields. During fieldwork fifteen such pipes were observed. These pipes are 'illegal' but 
MADA officials are 'powerless' to stop their construction - as long as these officials are aware of 
the location and dimensions of such pipes they do not exercise any initiative for their removal. 
Instead, they are integrated into the official supply calculations for the block on a daily basis. For 
as one official commented: 
'For the illegal one we just make sure we know where they are and account for 
them in the water supply' (MADA informant, No.5). 
In an attempt to increase their control of the tertiary and secondary structures, MADA has resorted 
to locking and chaining the structures for which they have formal responsibility. However, due to 
the lack of accountability by the farmers to either the water resource, or the structures, these chains 
and locks are regularly damaged by the farmers: 
'usually the main gates are operated by MADA staff but sometimes the farmers 
go there and open but the secondary CHO we don't allow them to touch. The 
times that we set the gate are 8 o'clock, 12 o'clock and 4 o'clock so that after [the] 
gate setting the line operator will lock it up with a chain. Even then they 
sometimes cut the chain if they desperately need water ... the tertiary CHO usually 
we also chain to try and stop them but sometimes they break it open. But you 
see if they get panic and need water, most of their living costs depend on the 
paddy so they have to open the gate' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
'It is very difficult for someone who don't [sic] have a key [to open the structures], 
the small one they can open very easily, they can bring out the pipe or just turn it, 
the big one they cannot, if they want they can but [it is] very difficult. The control 
is at the top of the gate and we have fence around that area so if the farmers 
want to go inside they have to climb the fence .. .' (MADA informant, No.3) 
2ll Opportunities are reduced because the non-teltiary blocks are designed with only one control structure on 
the secondary canal from which all fanners receive their supply. See chapter eight for an examination of the 
difference in cooperation between the Muda I and Muda II irrigation blocks in the distribution of water. 
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Such actions symbolise the way in which policy implementation is influenced by the 'multiple 
realties' of the actors concerned. In this case, the farmers are able to make use of their power by 
unofficially controlling the tertiary and secondary structures which, in turn, leads to the reaction 
and action of MADA officials to the locking and chaining of these structures. This action and 
reaction is influenced by the interaction of these actors in the daily management of the water 
resource, and because MADA are relatively 'powerless' to the actions of the farmers, these staff 
are unable to ensure that the formal rules are followed. This is further influenced by the working 
hours of these staff who very often reside some distance from their place or work. Therefore, 
although MADA staff are unlikely to permit the opening and breaking of structures, even where 
they do not agree to such activities, there is very little that they can do. Hence, MADA officials 
will not officially condone the informal actions of the farmers but they cannot control the farmers 
through means other than education: 
'There is certain times that the farmers persuade me to open the gate but that is 
during supply time only. If after the supply time I will not entertain. Normally I will 
bring back the request from the farmers to the technician or the irrigation officer 
and then from there make the decision whether to entertain or not' (MADA 
informant, No.2). 
' ... if you simply open and close the gate through the canal you will create the 
problem, that is why we must better educate them to build up the additional 
irrigation. You need to educate them first what is the best way, do's and don'ts' 
(MADA informant, No.2). 
'Everybody needs it [water] and along here there is a lot of pump without our 
permission and that is out of control, they can pump at night when you are not on 
duty. Even if you patrol, when you patrol they go and already when you go they 
will come back .. .' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
Theoretically, it was argued that the interaction of individuals and institutions at the 'interface' of 
development intervention influences the outcome of policy intervention. In addition, these 
interactions shape the knowledge and agency of those involved. In altering this knowledge and 
agency, interaction influences the relations of power between actors which influences social 
change. In the Muda region, the actions of the fanners in the Muda II block have influenced the 
actions of the MADA staff at the local level. For example, because the farmers unofficially control 
the secondary and tertiary structures, and MADA are powerless to enforce rule compliance, the 
MADA official who is formally responsible for these structures is unable to fulfil his 
responsibilities. This has resulted in the abandonment of any formal control over the tertiary 
structures altogether. Instead, the informal practices of the farmers have been integrated into the 
daily management practices of MADA itself: 
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'I control the first gate only, no point controlling the others because farmers just 
simply go and open and close so there is no point to control these things ... They 
want water all at the same time, either they are in the first or third block they want 
at the same time so I control the main CHO and then the others no point to 
control, the farmers do [control] every day ... ' (MADA informant, No.5). 
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With such activities by the farmers it is hardly surprising that the Muda II irrigation block supplied 
a greater quantity of water than either the Muda I block or was targeted. The problem is that 
because MADA are 'powerless' to stop such actions this has influenced the daily activities of these 
staff. What occurs, therefore, is that the MADA staff close and mend structures on an ad hoc basis 
leaving much of the actual control to the farmers themselves in an informal capacity. This is 
because, for the system to function, MADA have to secure a cooperative relationship with the 
farmers: 
'let's say we know somebody that open up the gate, maybe at night, I will go to 
that person and advise them but all he say is that it is already open, I don't know 
that somebody open the gate I just see that area whether the water flow not 
damaged the paddy or not, it's OK no problem. Not OK and I try to find out who' 
(MADA informant, No.1). 
'Whenever I go around the area the farmers don't close the gate so I will close if it 
is still open, I will close to ensure that the water flow to the other area, that means 
the area which is far from canal will get enough water .. .' (MADA informant, No.6). 
There is an enforcement stated in the MADA act that you cannot simply open 
and close the gate on your own. But we have to maintain a good relationship with 
farmers, if we enforce the law it is impossible for us to work very closely with 
farmers. We can act on the bad behaviour of farmers like they want to open and 
close the gate but we don't want to implement this because of the bad feeling 
from farmers. Then they will not want to give cooperation' (MADA informant, No. 
7). 
'Normally I will visit that area from information brought back from line operator 
regarding to someone who Simply open and close the gate. If there is no effect to 
other farmers or no effect on the quantity of water that flow in, there is no other 
thing we can do to farmers. (but) If the action is making problem to other farmers 
then we will act by advising them that this is no good' (MADA informant, No.5). 
The 'illegal' tampering with control gates is legislated against in the parliamentary irrigation act 
but, as the above quotes illustrate, MADA is 'powerless' to enforce rule compliance through means 
other than advice and extension. One would expect, however, rule compliance to be in the best 
interest of the majority of the farmers in the irrigation block because the individual opening and 
closing of control structures inevitably results in some farmers gaining and others losing. 
Furthermore, considering the nature of the rice farming culture it is surprising that such 
individualistic attitudes are the norm rather than the exception in the Muda region. 
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As the following section illustrates, because the institutions that govern acceptable behaviour are 
located in the villages, the rules and regulations that guide social action are not located in the 
irrigation blocks, which are fragmented and lack cohesion. This inevitably means that there is no 
social structure and peer pressure at the farm level to restrict the exercising of individual power 
through informal actions. 
Individual power and social organisation 
The constrained political scene at the national level means that the farmers are unable to show 
discontent with the ruling coalition through open demonstrations and criticism. Instead, the village 
social organisation provides the vehicle through which the farmers can express any discontent. 
This is because of the close association between government incentives and rural organisation, 
evident in the symbiotic relationship between community development and political 
representation212. This symbiotic relationship materialises because, at the macro level, the 
government must be seen to be assisting the rural Malays in accordance with the aims of the 
National Development Policy (NDP). Likewise, at the micro level, the farmers cannot be seen to 
openly criticise the actions of the federal government. Instead, through the institutions and 
organisations at the village level, the requirements of the state and the farmers are negotiated. 
Therefore, as long as this symbiotic relationship between the farmers and the state remains, the role 
of the village social organisation will retain its importance. 
The social organisation of rice farming in the Muda region is dominated by village life213. 
Consequently, the expectations and preferences for behaviour and action by individual farmers, 
enshrined in the patronage, assistance and helpfulness of these farmers, are also focused on the 
village context. It is at the village-level that the power relations between the rich and poor 
articulated so well by Scott (1985) are located. Furthermore, the fragmentation of farming lots and 
the wide geographical dispersion of many of these lots has created two distinctly separate 
institutional arrangements for acceptable behaviou?14, whereby decisions made in the village are 
not mirrored in the irrigation block: 
212 See chapters five and six. 
213 See chapter five for an explanation of the relationship between the Malay identity and village life plus 
chapter six for an explanation of the role of the FA, JKKK and political parties at the village level. 
214 This has been illustrated throughout my thesis because of the fragmentation between the village 
community and the farmers fields. 
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' ... certain farmers they don't live close to the community so they don't get the 
information or decisions made by the community because they are not close to 
the community' (Farmer informant, No.4). 
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This dichotomy has created a situation whereby the actions of individual farmers in the village are 
constrained by the ideological values encapsulated in this context but no such structure exists at the 
field level: 
' ... the farmers are very close and stay together in the neighbourhood but in the 
field there is no neighbourhood concept working' (MADA informant, No. 18). 
' ... all together is very difficult, it is basically farmers attitudes ... here the farmers 
are operating separate their paddy from the community. The village and rice are 
separate. They don't farm where they are living and after we form a group here 
[in the village] it is impossible [to transfer this to the block]. In fact this thing is 
more the norm than exception. Farmers living somewhere else in one kampung 
but operating plots elsewhere so they can be nominal members of a group but 
they will have no active part and if they don't tow the line, what can we do?' 
(MADA informant, No. 17). 
This means that the farmers are able to make use of their individual power in the tampering with, 
and breaking of, structures without resistance from the moral obligations of the village social 
organisation. This is not to suggest that disparities do not exist within the irrigation blocks 
regarding who has 'more power' to operate and control structures but that the rules and regulations 
that guide village life and the codes of conduct that this entails are not to be found at the field 
level215 . 
The disparities between the organisation of the village and the organisation of the irrigation blocks 
results in limited resistance by the village communities to the actions of individual farmers in the 
fields. However, because these communities are central to the culture of rice farming, MADA 
have found no other way to work with the farmers than to embrace this social organisation in their 
daily management of the Muda region. Consequently, the unit leaders, BOD's and other 'key 
farmers' that are utilised by MADA in the linkage between themselves and the farming population 
serve to further reinforce the disparity between the village social organisation and the farmers 
fields. In particular, because these 'key farmers' are located within the village structure they have 
limited power to exert pressure for non-conformance to the formal rules and regulations at the 
block level. This is evident in the poor performance of both the group fanning projects in the 
Muda I block and tertiary development in the Muda II block216 . It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
215 For a detailed examination of the influence of the village social structure on the actions of farmers readers 
are directed to Scott (1985). 
216 S h . h ee c apter elg t. 
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that the governments' attempt to improve the coordination and cooperation of the farmers at the 
block level has been difficult to secure: 
'You have got a whole series of leaders at the farm level, a whole series so now 
suddenly MADA set up the unit leaders but this solution is made in the village so it 
doesn't mean anything ... today the farmers work more on their own and normally 
certain people have more power. Politics plays a big role, the split is more UMNO 
so it is difficult to go back to the traditional system we had .... we seem to be 
moving in the opposite direction' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
By increasing the number of 'sites of interaction' between MADA and the farmers, tertiary 
development has increased the oppOliunity for these farmers to operate and control the structures 
in an informal capacity. This informal action has been harnessed by the MADA staff in the daily 
management of the water resource because of their relative 'powerlessness' to stop such 
activities217, which has attributed to the intended and unintended outcomes of tertiary intervention 
illustrated in chapters seven and eight, and the overall failure of MADA to secure its procedural 
objectives. The question is why has tertiary development, and the Muda region as a whole, failed 
to meet the substantive expectations of the national government? In analysing this question, the 
following section focuses on the collective political power of the fanners vis-a.-vis both MADA 
and the federal government. 
9.2 The collective power of the farmers 
The intended and unintended outcomes of tertiary development have been dealt with in chapter 
eight. In particular, the farmers in the Muda II irrigation block were found to have lower yields, 
less coordination, less cooperation, similar overall production costs and a water supply that is more 
inadequate, unreliable and inequitable than farmers under Muda I conditions. Furthermore, even 
accounting for the lower yields in the Muda II block there is no significant difference in the overall 
household income of these farmers due to their reliance on off-farm employment as a percentage of 
total household income. What this suggests is that the policy of tertiary intervention has increased 
the scope of livelihood strategies open to the farmers by reducing the amount of time invested in 
rice farming. However, by investing less time in rice farming and obtaining a lower yield, the 
farmers in the Muda II block are not achieving the expectations of the substantive requirements of 
the national government for increased yields21s . This section argues that such a situation has 
217 This argument is developed fUliher in section 9.3. 
218 The findings in chapter eight also illustrate that the farmers in the Muda I blocks are also failing to 
increase their yields in accordance with the 6.0tlha and 6.5t1ha requirements of the national government. 
They do, however, illustrate consistently higher yields than the Muda II farmers. 
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emerged because of the collective political power of the farmers vis-a.-vis MADA and the federal 
government. 
Relations of power 
Possibly the most significant illustration of the collective power of the farmers has been the farmer 
initiated transformation from transplanting to direct seeding. This cultural change, when combined 
with the wet seeding preference, has significantly increased the quantity of water required during 
the cropping process thus resulting in an increased water demand and scarcity in the region. With 
the reducing trend in annual rainfall this is not in accordance with MADA's water saving 
requirements. However, as with their individual power, the fanners' preference for the direct 
seeded method illustrates the relative 'powerlessness' of MADA to restrict the farmers use of 
direct seeding under wet seeded conditions. For as the following MADA official comments, the 
government is obliged to follow the fanners actions even though the irrigation scheme is not 
designed to accommodate the direct seeding technique219 : 
' ... Actually direct broadcasting is firstly done by the farmers, it was not introduced 
by MADA or the government, they do it first and then followed by MADA. The 
government have to follow because of the shortage of water, shortage of labour. 
They [the farmers] come to the conclusion that they have to broadcast...' (MADA 
informant, No. 10). 
In addition, my research has indicated that the majority of the farmers are not motivated by the 
federal government's requirement for increased yields. This is not surprising considering the rapid 
development of the Malaysian economy and the increased incomes available in other sectors of the 
economl20 . Instead, the farmers are concerned with maintaining the culture of rice farming as one 
part of their overall livelihood strategy. Furthermore, tertiary intervention has enabled the farmers 
to invest less time in rice farming whilst retaining access to this farming culture. From this 
perspective, teltiary intervention has improved the farmers 'quality of life' as determined by social 
characteristics even if it has not increased the 'standard of living' of these farmers in economic 
terms. This trade-off between obtaining a higher income and maintaining a 'quality of life' has 
been recognised by MADA staff as one of the reasons why the government subsidies have not 
f: '1' d' ., ld 221 aCI Itate an mcrease 111 yle S : 
219 See chapter four for an explanation of the mis-match between irrigation design and direct seeding. 
220 After all, the economic return for labour invested is significantly lower for farming than other sectors of 
the economy. 
221 The subsidies are offered according to the quantity of paddy milled. Therefore, the more the farmer sends 
to the mill the larger the subsidy provided by the government. 
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'The difference is between our attitudes and the farmers attitudes, I heard in one 
of the countries that when the government suggests subsidy they start to produce 
more to gain more subsidy but in our [country, the] farmers they just maintain the 
income, they don't try to get more' (MADA informant, No. 15). 
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The problem is, that by not increasing yields and maintaining the culture of rice farming as part of 
a wider livelihood strategy, the farmers are not securing the substantive requirements of the federal 
government. However, independent of the productivity performance of these farmers, the 
government continues to provide financial incentives through subsidies and infrastructure 
programmes to ensure political support. This argument suggests that provided the farmers 
continue to support the UMNO dominated ruling coalition, this coalition will continue to provide 
support for the fanners irrespective of the outcome of this support. This, in effect, symbolises the 
collective political power of the farmers vis-a-vis the federal government who continue to support 
this community even though these policies are consistently failing to secure their substantive 
b. . 222 o ~ectIves . 
Water - a negotiated resource 
With increasing demand for water from industrial and domestic sources, MADA must reduce the 
quantity of water used in the cultivation of rice in the Muda region. Here, however, we find 
another conflict between MADA and the farmers, whereby tertiary intervention was expected to 
reduce the amount of water required but the outcome has been an increase in the amount supplied. 
This is again illustrative of the collective power of the farmers because neither MADA nor the 
federal government can implement policies to ensure that the farmers use less water in their 
cropping process. After all, not only has it been recognised that MADA are 'powerless' to stop the 
fanners taking water 'illegally' but they are also 'powerless' to implement policies which would 
force the farmers to adopt water saving strategies. For as the following MADA official comments: 
' ... the government under the previous chief minister was talking about raising 
water rates to I think about 40RM per acre, which is still much below [actual 
costs], but I think that the public has already created a lot of unhappiness and 
resentment and being a strong political thing think that the government has to 
backtrack' (MADA informant, No. 18). 
This 'backtracking' by the government illustrates the political power of the farmers and their 
resultant ability to secure a nominal charge for the cost of water. However, because this cost is 
222 See chapter five for an explanation of the relationship between the rural Malay and the UMNO dominated 
alliance government which provides support for this argument. 
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enveloped in the overall land tax and does not refer to the quantity of water used, many farmers are 
unaware that there is a cost attached to the water resource at all: 
'Right now the farmers don't realise that the government charge them for water 
because they charge it along with the land tax. It makes no difference how much 
water they get, so the result is that they don't feel any responsibility to ensuring 
that its efficiently used so they take too much when they don't need that much, or 
they just let it flow out and flow in at the same time' (MADA informant, No.2). 
'It does not matter how much water you take it is a government charge per relong 
per year as part of the land tax' (Farmer informant, No.1). 
Because the water rates are enveloped in the land tax administered by the state governments, and 
the Muda II farmers are able to use their power to control their own supply via informal actions, 
MADA is highly critical of the value attributed to this resource by the farmers. Similarly, the poor 
water management practices of the Muda II farmers has attributed to the impression by MADA 
staff that the farmers have little value for the water resource223 : 
'We tell them [about the importance of water] but they don't care enough about 
this. They don't appreciate, they don't care about how much water they use or 
about how much water because they don't have to pay, just a very small amount 
only .. .' (MADA informant, No.9). 
' ... they don't know what is exactly the amount of water so they just take as much 
as they can get. This is the attitude of farmers' (MADA informant, No.5). 
'No the farmers are not good managers of water because basically to do the rice 
farming here they think that its like air you know its free, they don't attach any 
value to it per se, they know that they require it and they get upset if they don't 
have it but they don't attach any value to it as an input, certainly not an economic 
value .. .' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
The need to recognise water as an 'economic good' is not specific to irrigation. Agenda 21, for 
example, recognises that water needs to be valued as an 'economic good' as part of its definition of 
sustainable development (United Nations, 1992). The question is how can MADA implement 
policies that recognise the economic value of water as an overall production cost without exposing 
the federal government to political anxiety? Furthermore, how can MADA implement water 
saving policies when they are 'powerless' to influence the quantity or timing of water taken by 
each farmer? 
223 This is a global phenomenon which is clearly not specific to the Muda region. 
CHAPTER NINE: Informal practice: The power of the farmers 303 
When approached with the question of how MADA could improve the value attributed to the water 
resource by the farmers, suggestions from MADA staff included the direct charging of water to the 
farmers, the implementation of some sort of incentive programme for the saving of water and the 
formation of Water User Associations (WUA's): 
'I think that they should pay for water - we are looking towards that in our country. 
We did bring in an irrigation act which we are now in the process of trying to make 
an act of parliament. We are trying to identify in the future the rewards for, we are 
not using primitive measures to try to achieve to use less water. The mechanism 
may be a bit difficult but the idea is good. The irrigation community has been 
identified to try to encourage people to conserve water through monetary 
rewards. If they use less they pay less irrigation fees, we are working towards 
that and this is one of the other measures to use water more efficiently. Probably, 
we start on a block basis - so we can monitor a seasons usage as a start and 
then go to the micro-level' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
'Nothing is easy, you have to start somehow. If they [the farmers] realise the 
value of water and what we are trying to do for the country, first of all for 
themselves and then for the country' (MADA informant, No 17). 
'We hope that by forming the WUA's farmers can have a stronger sense of 
commitment to the irrigation infrastructure provided to them. They can treat all 
this infrastructure as part of their own but we are yet to see how this can function. 
At the same time we have to be very cautious also, we shouldn't establish an 
institution to be dependent on our assistance, so WUA's should work under the 
umbrella of the FA' (MADA informant, No. 19). 
'How to make them have an economic value of water? We have been talking 
about this, handing over systems to the farmers, even to a limited extent, once 
the farmers organise themselves we can even reward them financially by giving 
them maintenance funds for this area direct to the farmers rather than the 
contractors' (MADA informant, No. 16) 
Whether any of these suggestions will be acceptable to the farmers is, however, debatable. Firstly, 
because the irrigation infrastructure is owned and managed by the government, the fanners have 
neither the 'sense of responsibility' or actual responsibility for these structures. This means that 
the fanners regard the supply of water and the structures that supply it to be the responsibility of 
MADA and the government. Secondly, the implementation of financial incentive programmes 
requires a change in the water pricing policy with the political connotations of such action. This is 
unlikely to be acceptable to the fanning community who up until now have not had to directly pay 
for the water they receive. Furthermore, because of the collective political power of the farming 
community, an unacceptable policy is unlikely to achieve its expected aims. Finally, because of 
the fragmentation of field lots and the dichotomy between the social organisation of the village and 
the fields, the WUA's are likely to suffer from similar difficulties as experienced by the group 
farming policy. Therefore, it is unlikely that any of the policy suggestions examined above will 
contribute to a reduced water demand. Here again it is the collective political power of the farmers 
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that restricts the policy options available to either MADA or the government, recognised in the 
intonation of the following quotes: 
'I don't want to comment because it will create more problems because the 
farmers will be angry whfm they have to pay for water so I don't want to 
make any comment' (MADA informant, No.6). 
There is no way to do it [regulate the amount of water taken by each farmer] 
because we just give water for the whole area and consider that they get enough 
water according to their block. Whatever the farmers do we have to follow' 
(MADA informant, No.6). 
' .. .I don't think that the government dare to put up any drastic policy 
change, charge the farmers on water use according to quantity because this 
can be politically suicidal. For generations the farmers have been using water 
freely and there's a joke again: the farmers used to say, in the past we though 
we could depend on the water supply now if we don't get water we can blame 
MADA for the lack of water supply. MADA is supposed to make sure that there is 
adequate water in the primary and in the past they have charged only 15RM per 
acre per year. Suddenly the government want to change, now the farmers are 
quite unhappy .. .' (MADA informant, No. 19). 
Whilst the farmers do not value the water resource as an 'economic good', to suggest that they 
"don't care" or "think it's like air" illustrates the conflicting perceptions between MADA and the 
farmers. The timing and supply of the water resource is the most critical factor in the cultivation 
of standing water paddy with the entire cropping process, from land preparation through to 
harvesting, dependent on the farmers' ability to control the water resource. Recognising that the 
fanners, even under Muda II conditions, rely on average 69 per cent on this farming to support 
household income, clearly the control of water is critical to their ability to secure their standard of 
living. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the farmers attach no value to the water resource. After 
all, why would the farmers utilise their power to control the structures to secure an adequate supply 
if they did not recognise the value of this supply? 
The problem is that MADA and the farmers value the water resource in completely different ways. 
This is illustrated in their different 'realities' and expectations. For the farmers, the expectations 
focus on receiving an adequate and timely supply for their cropping requirements to ensure 
adequate yields and hence incomes. By contrast, MADA staff are not concerned with adequate 
yields but with higher yields and these staff are as much concerned with the allocation of a timely 
and adequate supply as they are with the efficient use of this supply and the corresponding water 
saving potential. The problem is that the farmers are disinterested in the efficiency of supply 
because there are no incentives for them to practice any water-saving techniques at the farm level: 
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from everything, am I going to be rewarded if my block saves water?' (MADA 
informant, No. 16). 
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Without incentives, or any mechanisms for enhancing the accountability of the farmers to the 
water resource, it is unlikely that the farmers will invest the increased labour required to improve 
their on-farm water management practices. Furthermore, as tertiary development increases the 
time available for off-farm employment and the unofficial control of the water resource, yields will 
continue to stagnate and water will continue to be ineffectively utilised. The problem is that 
because of the collective power of the fanners both at the meso and macro spatial scales there is 
very little that either the government or MADA can do that will not cause friction and political 
instability in the region. The question, therefore, is can water be depoliticised? 
Can water be depoliticised? 
As has been expanded on throughout my thesis the role of politics cannot be understated. 
Therefore, in order for the expectations of MADA to be realised, the negotiations between the 
farmers and MADA in the control of water needs to be depoliticised. This is difficult for MADA 
to achieve because the manipulation of politics serves the interests of the majority of the farming 
population and the federal government. Consequently, whilst these actors use the political arena to 
secure their objectives, MADA remains 'stuck in the middle' at the meso spatial scale. It is, 
therefore, very difficult for MADA to implement any of its policies without recognising and 
incorporating the influence of these political arrangements. For as the following official comments 
with respect to Water User Associations: 
'WUA's are quite good but you know trying to make it non-political certainly helps 
because we are talking about these water user groups in relation to the water use 
not politics. It would be better to keep politics away because it complicates it but 
this is very very difficult in our scheme. So when we come back to talk about 
water user groups we are still struggling' (MADA informant, No .18). 
The power of MADA to secure their formal requirements, whilst attempting to depoliticise water 
management, is very limited. Because of this, the approach taken by MADA in attempting to 
secure the substantive requirements of the federal government is similar to the 'wait and see' 
approach of the farmers during cultivation. The difference is that MADA are waiting for the next 
generation of farmers before attempting to alter the culture of fanning in the Muda region: 
'I think it is their attitude generally, it is their culture and it is very hard for them. 
So we wait for the next generation. In the mean time we are in the intermediate 
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time for changing attitudes because some of the younger farmers are still 
following their family practice and some are very particular about this. New 
technologies are a problem, if they are younger it is quite easier for us not the 
eldest. Sometimes you can let them do it, you cannot force them' (MADA 
informant, No. 12). 
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This suggests that rather than influencing social change, MADA are waiting for social change to 
secure the substantive requirements of the federal government. This is hardly surprising 
considering the average age of the farming population is 50 years224 and with: the rapid expansion 
of the economy; the increased education of the younger generation; and the uneconomic size of the 
land units, the majority of those inheriting the land are disinterested in farming225 • 
The evidence examined in this section suggests that, as an organisation, MADA is 'powerless' to 
impose its formal rules and regulations on the farming community due to the politicised nature of 
rice farming and the resultant collective power of the rice farmers. The following section focuses 
on this notion of 'organisational power' in more detail, asking in particular what are the 
. I' . .c ?226 nup IcatlOns lor system governance. 
9.3 MADA - a powerless organisation? 
Chapter six illustrated that MADA has the capacity to develop and implement policies that 
prescribe to the substantive objectives of the federal government. In this respect, MADA has the 
power to set procedural rules and regulations in the governance of the Muda region. However, 
their ability to utilise this power is dependent on their relationship with the farmers. This 
relationship has been illustrated as being both coercive and cooperative. The aim of this section is 
to examine the extent to which this approach facilitates the effective use of MAD A's formal power 
in the governance and management of the Muda region. 
This section begins with an analysis of the dichotomy between the formal organisation of 
governance and the informal reality of management. In particular, attention is focused on 
MADA's conflicting function as agents of extension for cooperation and agents of enforcement for 
coercion. Having articulated the difficulties experienced by MADA in making use of their 
organisational power the following section focuses on the implications of this for system 
governance and management. 
224 46% of farmers in the Muda region are over the age of 50 and only 19% are under the age of 40 
(fieldwork, 1997). 
225 See chapter five. 
226 This is in direct response to the 1 st research question in section 1.5. 
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Formal power 
The formal power of MADA is legislated into their rules, regulations and mandates. Possibly the 
most significant undertaking by MADA is their control over the timing, distribution and allocation 
of the water resource via the irrigation schedule. As was expanded on in chapter six, the setting of 
the stati and stop dates for each irrigated season is the most important decision-making process in 
determining the timing of the agronomic practices of the farmers. Leaving aside the informal 
actions of the farmers that influence the implementation of this schedule, the farmers regard 
MADA's control over the water resource to be indicative of the 'power' of MADA in the 
governance of the irrigation scheme: 
' ... the power to release the water is in MADA's hands' (Farmer informant, No.9). 
'The engineer [within MADA] has the final say, they are the engineer and the 
farmers are nobody so they just put like that' (Farmer informant, No.2). 
Where this schedule is inadequate, MADA provide the farmers with mobile pumps that assist the 
farmers, without access to such technology, to conduct their agronomic practices in accordance 
with the crop activity programme associated with the irrigation schedule227 . In this respect, 
MADA controls the mechanism by which the farmers can formally control the water resource228 . 
In so doing, MADA determines who can obtain access to this mechanism and the duration in which 
they can secure this access. For as the farmers articulate: 
'The unit leader they don't have any power to decide about that [who can access 
pumps and for how long], they can arrange only. If MADA say they want the 
pump we have to give back even if we have not got enough water yet. They [the 
unit leaders] act as an arranger only, MADA tell the unit leader who can have the 
pump and then they tell the farmers' (Farmer informant, No. 16). 
Further to the management of the water resource, MADA's 'formal power' is manifested in their 
control and management of the FA. By controlling this organisation MADA retains 'formal 
power' in the supply of subsidies, credit, agricultural advice, new technologies, maintenance 
contracts, agricultural inputs and the marketing of produce. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
farmers recognise MADA's role both in conjunction with, and independent of, the FA to be 
illustrative of their formal power: 
227 See Appendix C: 1, Figure 2 for an example of this crop activity programme. 
228 By mechanism I refer to the control structures in the irrigation blocks and the mobile pumps supplied to 
the farmers. 
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'It [rural investment] should be done by MADA because MADA have more power 
than PPK, PPK is just a member organisation and they attach somebody from 
MADA as a caretaker of PPK. So the MADA have more power than PPK so 
MADA should start this scheme [rural investment], (Farmer informant, No. 20). 
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The extent to which MADA can utilise their power is determined by the informal actions of the 
farmers and the interaction of the farmers and MADA staff in the daily management of the region. 
Even with the strict rules governing the actions of these actors what is legislated on paper 
invariably occurs in practice. This is because the interaction of the farmers and MADA staff 
influences the actions of both these sets of actors. In expanding this argument, the following 
section explores the 'informal reality' in the daily management of the water resource that 
significantly differs from the formal process articulated in chapter six. 
Informal reality 
The most significant factor contributing to the ability of the farmers to exercise their individual 
power is the inability of MADA to regulate the amount of water allocated to, or taken by, each 
farmer. Even under Muda II conditions, where the geographical scale of management is reduced, 
MADA is unable to control the quantity of water taken by the farmers229 • Consequently, 
independent of the formal rules and regulations implemented in the coercive approach to water 
management, the 'informal reality' is that the farmers can take any quantity of water they desire 
provided there is water available. This is problematic because the Water Management and Control 
System (WMCS), used by MADA in the daily management of the water resource, is dependent on 
accurate data from the field staff. In turn, this data is dependent on the ability of these staff to 
control the structures and supply water as legislated. Although the locality staff attempt to 
incorporate the water taken by the informal actions of the farmers as part of the total supply, this 
cannot be achieved in totality. Therefore, the inability of MADA to regulate the actions of the 
farmers creates uncertainty in supply and hence problems: 
'There is no way [we can determine how much water the farmers take], we can 
regulate the amount of water in the CHO but we cannot regulate the amount of 
water each farmer takes, that is the biggest problem' (MADA informant, No.4). 
The inability to control the actions of the fanners means that MADA staff do not have the capacity 
to manage the water resource in accordance with formal requirements. This means that rather than 
229 In fact, the informal actions of the farmers in the Muda II block increases the quantity of water to this 
block (see chapter seven). 
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MADA actively managing the water resource they are reactive to the actions of the farmers 
themselves23o. This necessitates institutional flexibility as recognised by MADA themselves: 
'If the farmers change then we have to change. If we compare the farmers now 
with the last 30 years we have already changed but we have to change some 
more too. Maybe in another 10 years the farmers will be totally different farmers 
and we have to change too' (MADA informant, No. 14). 
'Right now they are doing direct seeding so that's why the picture of what we 
have here, what we designed for is totally different so we have to adjust to suit 
their demand' (MADA informant, No. 14). 
Institutional flexibility is dependent on the recognition by MADA of the power of the farmers. 
Here again the informal actions of the fanners have facilitated understanding by the MADA 
locality staff that they are relatively 'powerless' to impose rules on the farming community. The 
problem is that the informal actions of the fanners are not institutionalised into the legislation of 
management. For as the following staff member illustrates, where formal legislation exists MADA 
are 'powerless' to enforce the legality of this legislation: 
'There is an act [of parliament about the control of structures] but it cannot be 
enforced here because of the farmers, they simply say there is the big gate here 
at the main CHO there is the MADA main control there and for the small one in 
the small canal that one is supposed to be taken care by MADA but how can we 
want to take care because of the problems with the farmers? I suggest that we 
seek advice from state legal advisor to enforce that and the state legal advisor 
said keep quiet because you are not an enforcement officer because you are an 
extension officer, you are not an enforcement officer. So there is nothing we can 
do, it is very difficult to manage. We have conflicting roles' (MADA informant, No. 
9). 
'Sometimes we may be delayed for one or two days, of course the farmers get 
very angry and they may fire us you know' (MADA informant, No. 13). 
The conflicting roles between extension and enforcement are the focus of the section that follows. 
However, of importance here is the illustration of the 'powerlessness' of MAD A to enforce the law 
and restrict the informal actions of the farmers. Because of this, MADA focus on extension for 
education rather than enforcement for resentment. In this capacity MADA conduct both formal 
and informal training and extension practices with the aim of altering the attitude of the farming 
population: 
230 This point is illustrated in the failure of MAD A field-staff to operate and control the structures for which 
they have responsibility resulting in the abandonment of formal control in favour of the documentation of 
farmer control (see section 9.1). 
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'It totally depends on their responsibility whatever the situation, I think that maybe 
I don't know in the future maybe we can do this but politically, socially we need to 
change their attitudes' (MADA informant, No. 14). 
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Through this process MADA interacts with the farmers in an informal capacity in: the daily 
practice of extension; the operation of the farmers own structures 'below the outlet'; and in the 
provision of advice231 . What MADA cannot do, however, is enforce the farmers to follow this 
advice or conduct their practices in accordance with the strict rules and regulations of either the 
government or MADA: 
'We must always visit the area and then when we see the farmers give them 
advise so when they already have water "please close the tunnel, let the other 
person get water because there is still many farmers that don't get enough water 
so please close the tunnel." We cannot force them to follow' (MADA informant, 
No.5). 
We give them advise, if they want to follow good and if they don't we can't do 
anything. (MADA informant, No.6). 
, I stop the water supply and then of course this farmer [who resides some 
distance from the field] has no water so to ensure that he gets water, the farmer 
that stay far from the plot, I will open the tunnel for him' (MADA informant, No.4). 
Because of the unofficial strategies of the farmers, MADA are themselves operating structures in 
an informal capacity by opening and closing the farmers structures 'below the outlet'. To some 
staff this informal practice is itself encouraging the lack of responsibility of the fanners to 
MADA's formal rules and regulations: 
'if we have to close every tunnel at their plot so the farmers will be less 
responsibility otherwise you see the land belongs to them so they are supposed 
to put more effort than the MADA officer, so the MADA officer just go and check 
and see what is the problem they are facing and not to close every tunnel they 
have, that is not the MADA officer job .... (MADA informant, No.5). 
The problem is that MADA officials at the local level have dual responsibilities. On the one hand 
they are entrusted with the responsibility to ensure that the rules and regulations that define formal 
actions are adhered to by the fanners. On the other hand they are entrusted with the responsibility 
for disseminating information and advice between the top echelons of MADA, the federal 
government and the farmers. These responsibilities require two distinctly separate approaches with 
enforcement requiring a coercive approach and extension requiring a cooperative approach. The 
result is a mis-match in expectations between the practice of extension and the requirements of 
enforcement. 
231 This is regarded as informal because it does not correspond with the formal information flows illustrated 
in chapter six or the formal management responsibilities of MAD A 'above the outlet'. 
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The mis-match of extension and enforcement 
The organisational structure of MADA is hierarchically divided into two key divisions - agriculture 
and engineering. As chapter six has illustrated, the formal responsibilities of each of these 
divisions are strictly divided into agronomic and water management practices. In addition, MADA 
illustrates a bottom-heavy hierarchical structure with the procedural decision-making occurring at 
the headquarters level and the implementation of these decisions the responsibility of the local-
level irrigation and extension staff. These local-level staff are located at the critical 'interface' 
between MADA and the fanners, pro.viding the nodal point for the negotiation of conflicts between 
these sets of actors. 
The unofficial activities of both the fanners and MADA staff has highlighted the negotiated 
process of management. Possibly the most important negotiation for these local-level staff is the 
balancing of the requirements ofthe farmers with the requirements of MAD A. This is particularly 
important when the expectations of these two sets of actors are in conflict. However, as the 
following quote illustrates, where there is conflict it is very difficult for these local-level staff to 
serve the interests of MAD A and the farmers concurrently: 
' ... in the first place we have to protect MADA and in the second place we have to 
protect the farmers. So we are either responsible for MADA or for farmers so it is 
very difficult to say, either we want to protect the farmers or MADA we can't do 
both at the same time' (MADA informant, No.7). 
The most significant illustration of this problem is the mis-match in the requirements of extension 
and the requirements of enforcement. Formally, it is illegal for the farmers to operate or manage 
the control structures. However, in order for MADA to restrict the unofficial actions of the 
farmers they must firstly appropriate blame and secondly exercise their power through legal action. 
To appropriate blame the local-level staff must rely on information from the farmers about who is 
responsible for illegal actions. If MADA had the capacity to exercise this power it would create 
antagonism within the farming community: 
' ... Iet's say we enforce the law and someone gets caught by their action because 
maybe they damage the gate so they don't care about you because they know 
that someone gives information to the enforcement officer. That's why they get 
their punishment so they will act against the person who give information, they 
don't act against the enforcement officer (MADA informant, No.7). 
In addition, the strict enforcement of the rules of operation would also create antagonism between 
the local-level staff and the farmers. This would further reduce the cooperation between the 
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farmers and MADA staff which would inhibit the ability of these staff to work with the farmers in 
the practice of extension: 
'It cannot work because if you put someone that enforce the law in this section, 
that means that he will answer all the problems to MADA so he will be responsible 
totally to MADA so he don't care whatever farmers say because he want to 
enforce the law. So it cannot work because first the information from what 
happen to the gate must be from the line operator or from me so that means that 
the farmers will know whenever the enforcement officer will act that the 
information that they get will come from the line operator so it cannot work. Then 
they will not give cooperation any more when the line operator come for visit the 
next time, it will not work' (MADA informant, No.7). 
'We cannot do extension at the same time as we have to do enforcement, we 
cannot do. Extension is praising them and at the same time we cannot tell them 
they are wrong. So we have to do extension, we don't do enforcement' (MADA 
informant, No. 10). 
For MADA to secure the substantive requirements of the federal government, it is critical that the 
local-level staff work with the farmers in securing these objectives. However, to do so, MADA 
cannot enforce rule compliance at the same time as convince the farmers to act on the information 
provided by MADA. Consequently, the mis-match of extension and enforcement means that 
MADA is 'powerless' to enforce the fanners to follow their rules and regulations. This has clear 
implications for system governance and the daily management practices of MADA staff and the 
farmers. 
9.4 Implications for system governance and management 
So far this chapter has highlighted the power of the farmers when contrasted with that of MADA 
and the federal government. This has been illustrated by the farmers' ability to make use of their 
power through informal action. In turn, the daily interaction between the farmers and MADA staff 
is also influencing the informal practices of these staff in the management of the water resource. 
These informal practices significantly differ from the formal rules and regulations illustrated in 
chapter six. To elaborate further, this section focuses on the interaction of the farmers and MADA 
staff at the field level and the implications of this for system governance and management. 
Implications for MADA 
Firstly, the official node of contact between the farmers and MADA staff is at the locality-level. 
This contact is determined by the time invested by MADA staff in the field, talking with and 
CHAPTER NINE: Informal practice: The power of the farmers 313 
guiding the actions of, the farmers. Formally the locality staff are expected to spend a considerable 
proportion of their time in the fields. However, because they are relatively 'powerless' to 
determine the actions of the fanners this has influenced their commitment to this practice. On 
average MADA locality staff spend only two hours per day in the fields altering control structures 
and talking with farmers232. This indicates that 75 per cent of their time is devoted to office-based 
activities: 
'I just go around that area and then come back. When I see the farmers then only 
I speak, when I see the farmers in the paddy field then I talk to them' (MADA 
informant, No.2). 
'I don't go direct to meet the farmers but whenever during the prayers in the 
afternoon I mix with the farmers when we meet at the small mosque. Then we 
have a discussion if they want to ask me about certain matters regarding to the 
water problem and then I meet the farmers and they bring up the problem 
indirectly' (MADA informant, No.3). 
From the farmers perspective the ad hoc contact with MADA staff is highly inadequate and 
contributes to the inability of these staff to recognise the difficulties experienced by the farmers. 
From this perspective improvements in the management of the Muda scheme can only be made by 
increasing the formal and informal contact between the farmers and MADA staff. In so doing, 
these staff can become more knowledgeable about the problems experienced by, and the attitudes 
of, the farmers themselves: 
'They [MADA] have to spend more time in the field than in the office. The MADA 
officers should try to understand better the attitude of the farmers and from there 
the farmers will follow the advice. If they understand what farmers have in mind 
then from there they can work better' (Farmer informant, No. 26). 
' ... maybe the MADA staff should make the regular visit to find out what is the 
problem with paddy, to talk to farmers, find out the best solution, give them advice 
what is the best weedicide [herbicide] or pesticide to use' (Farmer informant, No. 
20). 
'The MADA staff do not come to the paddy field, the farmers are supposed to go 
to MADA. The MADA staff should come to the fields and find out the problems 
being faced by the farmers so they can integrate with the farmers more' (Farmer 
informant, No.3). 
'MADA staff are supposed to go to the paddy field and meet the farmers and 
learn about their problem and then from there they can give advice better than 
before' (Farmer informant, No.3). 
'Sometime only MADA staff come here to have discussion with the farmers, most 
of the time they stay in their offices. The present role by MADA is good but they 
have to devote more time to visit farmers and have discussion with them about 
232 This figure is based on the interviews conducted with MADA officials at the locality level. 
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the problem they are facing and try to solve, not just stay in their office' (Farmer 
informant, No. 19). 
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Such a situation has emerged because there are no incentives for MADA staff at the locality level 
to invest time in the fields. Consequently, without investing this time, these staff are unaware of 
the causes of many of the problems faced by the farmers. This problem is recognised by MADA 
themselves, however: with limited power to influence the actions of the farmers; without any 
incentives to spend their time in the fields; and because the Malay culture does not allow for open 
criticism, the day-to-day management of the scheme is likely to continue to be practised in an 
informal capacity: 
'they [locality staff] never go out and then we talk to farmers and it comes up 
from the farmers themselves who complain that they never see MADA staff in the 
field ( ... ) I do not hide this because I am an officer in government staff but we do 
bring it up at the heads of division meeting where these issues can be discussed 
but we cannot offend. Especially in Malaysian culture because there is a loss of 
face involved and there is a lot of cultural practices which do not allow open 
criticism' (MADA informant, No. 16). 
'On my side they have to give more time to visit field and mix among farmers' 
(MADA informant, No.6). 
'As extension staff we should be more in the field rather than in the office asking 
what their problems are regarding what they do. If we can reduce the office work 
and concentrate on the extension work. When it comes to advice sometimes 
they follow and sometimes they don't because some of them say that we're not 
doing the farming we are just talking, we are farming on the table they say. 
That's also their excuse so I ask them that why then we are working on the table 
and you're working in the field why don't we join, you see our experience we put 
our knowledge together so that we can do farming better. It is very very hard to 
help them, we are giving them courses but not fully attended. We ask around 20 
and they come around 5 or 6 people. They are not interested, they shouldn't say 
they are not interested because they are doing the farming, we are talking about 
farming we are not talking about anything else. They are more interested in 
talking in their coffee shop. Sometimes you go into the coffee shop and they are 
talking nonsense .. .' (MADA informant, No. 10). 
From a management perspective MADA needs to implement incentives to ensure that locality-
level staff invest more time in the fields with the farmers. If this can be achieved the cooperation 
and trust between MADA and the farmers will be greatly enhanced. For as the following MADA 
official comments: 
'MADA can improve the management of this irrigation scheme by getting the 
farmers closer to them, the farmers should give cooperation higher than they give 
now so from there MADA can pass the information and other new seeds which 
they are going to introduce. So whenever there is full cooperation from farmers 
then MADA can improve the management of the scheme. The MADA officers or 
PPK officers should give more time' (MADA informant, No.3). 
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Such cooperation and trust cannot, however, be enhanced without formally recognising the power 
of the farmers and the resultant strategies of these farmers. Therefore, to ensure a cooperative 
relationship between MADA and the farmers, MADA must devolve more formal responsibility and 
decision-making to the farmers themselves in the governance of the scheme. This requires MADA 
to adopt a cooperative approach to the overall governance of the Muda region. However, by 
empowering the farmers with formal decision-making capacities this does not mean devolving 
responsibilities and costs to the farmers which should otherwise be done by MADA themselves. 
Instead the farmers must be integrated into the decision-making process not just devolved 
operation and management responsibilities: 
' ... somehow he [the farmer] must be given the empowerment, he must be 
empowered, he must have the authority and he must have the incentive to do that 
kind of work' (MADA informant, No. 18). 
To provide the farmers with authority in the management of the Muda region MADA must provide 
incentives for the farmers to invest the labour required to achieve this. This is particularly 
important considering their present capability for operating and managing the structures in an 
informal capacity. If, however, MADA and the farmers were able to effectively implement 
mechanisms for devolving decision-making to the farmers there are at least three obstacles to 
success. Firstly, the dichotomy between the social organisation of the village and the social 
organisation of the farmers' fields means that it will be very difficult for MADA to devolve formal 
responsibility to the farmers. This is illustrated in the inability of MADA to secure the formal 
management of tertiary structures by the farmers. Secondly, because the structures are perceived 
by the farmers to be the government/MADA's responsibility, changing this mind-set will require 
an alteration in the formal arrangements between MADA and the farmers without detrimenting the 
present capacity of the fanners for informal action. Finally, by formally empowering the farmers, 
this may indirectly increase the inequalities already evident in the region. If, for example, the 
control of the main CHO's were devolved to the farmers, without the introduction of institutional 
arrangements to ensure that formal regulations are adhered to, this structure is likely to continue to 
be operated in an informal capacity by those farmers who can effectively utilise their power. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that this will facilitate the timely and adequate supply of water to 
individual farmers fields. For as expressed by MADA: 
'If we give authority for farmers to control the main CHO the problem will be 
worse because the distribution of water will be even worse because they don't 
know how much water exactly flow to their side, so that is the responsibility of 
MADA officer to ensure that the distribution of water is fair even though we cannot 
satisfy everybody but 90% of them will be satisfied ... ' (MADA informant, No.5). 
:~, I 
CHAPTER NINE: Informal practice: The power of the farmers 316 
The implications for system governance and management are not, however, focused only on the 
activities of the farmers. After all, it has already been recognised, by MADA, that to achieve the 
procedural and substantive objectives they must be flexible to the requirements of the farming 
community. Therefore, it is the attitudes and perceptions of MADA themselves that must be 
flexible and alert to the demands of the farming community. For as one MADA official 
comments: 
'I think the whole attitude needs to change of the staff. When I was in charge of 
district x I used to tell my staff every time a farmers comes to see you, you have 
to see that as a challenge, you have to view them [sic] as a confidence that the 
farmers have in you, they don't come and lecture you know, just to make trouble 
for you. They spend maybe 2RM to get to the office and because they have 
confidence in you they will come and see you. If not they will go higher and how 
would you feel if they go up to your boss and your boss will ask what is 
happening at the bottom? So this is the right attitude, don't view it as something 
against you. Make it positive .. (MADA informant, No. 18). 
What has been highlighted so far is that the informal actions of the fanners are influencing the 
commitment of MADA staff to their own formal practices. In this respect the actions of the 
farmers have influenced the knowledge and agency of these staff. Furthermore, the power of the 
fanners is influencing both the farmers themselves and MADA staff resulting in conflicting 
perceptions about how the Muda region should be managed and governed. The task for MADA, 
therefore, is to harness and integrate the informal actions of the farmers and MADA staff into the 
formal procedures for the governance and management of the scheme. However, because MADA 
are relatively powerless and 'stuck in the middle' between the requirements of the farmers and the 
requirements of the federal government, the procedures to achieve this will be dependent on the 
inclination of the fanning community to formalise their informality and the inclination of the 
federal government to actively pursue such change. 
Implications for the federal government 
One of the primary controlling mechanisms of the federal government is the subsidies offered to 
the farmers. Therefore, to facilitate change, the federal government has three options: 
• The first is to adopt the neo-liberal approach and remove subsidies to allow rice farming to 
become dependent on the free market; 
• The second is to alter and/or increase the subsidies offered to the farmers233 ; and 
233 Such increases could, for example, include the subsidisation of mechanised activities. 
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• The third is to continue the current system of subsidies without change. 
The question is which of these will be most beneficial for the future of farming in the Muda 
region? Firstly, there is clearly a need for change. The current subsidies were expected to 
increase yields, decrease costs of production and generally improve the welfare of the farmers. 
They were implemented over 20 years ago and have failed to secure the substantive requirements 
of the federal government. Without altering the subsidy system it is unlikely that the government 
will be able to meet its production and productivity objectives in the foreseeable future. The 
options, therefore, are either to abolish subsidies or to alter/increase those currently in place. 
The removal or alteration of subsidies can have both beneficial and detrimental effects. Firstly, 
there is the argument that subsidies in fact offer a disincentive to farmers for maximising the yield 
obtained from the inputs supplied. This hypothesis has support within the Muda region because of 
the mis-match between subsidy expectations and farmer' priorities. In this respect the tied 
relationship between the guaranteed minimum price and yields is expected to act as an incentive 
for farmers to produce a higher yield234 . From this perspective, the government should not 
increase subsidies or the price of paddy but should instead invest in research which will help the 
farmers obtain a higher yield: 
'The government should not increase the paddy price or the subsidy, they must 
increase the yield. When the yield is more that means more subsidies because 
the subsidies depends on the yield. More subsidies, more money. They need to 
invest in research on the weeds and the water problem. Solve the water problem 
and then the yield will be higher and then the more subsidies the farmers will 
enjoy' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
'They [subsidies] are a disincentive, the farmers cannot farm well because they 
think that the subsidy will increase their yield. They think that their yield will 
improve by more subsidies rather than improving their own [farm] management. 
At the moment we have two subsidies ... but they are still asking to have a subsidy 
on tractors, on ploughing ... on weedicides [herbicides] and pestiCides. That is 
what they are asking for and at the same time they are asking the government to 
increase their paddy price but the government cannot increase their paddy price 
because they are involved in other sectors. What about the government staff? 
What about the fishermen? This is why the government doesn't want to increase 
the paddy price. It is better for the government to import rice than produce rice .. 1 
shouldn't say this ... ' (MADA informant No. 10). 
234 The practice is that the greater the yield obtained the greater the subsidy given. 
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If it is better for the government to impOlt rice than produce rice then there is an argument for 
abolishing the subsidies and allowing market forces to dictate both production costs and farm-gate 
prices for national rice production: 
'Definitely the subsidy helps the farmers as far as income is concerned but that is 
not the solution. We should have a free market, you produce this and you get a 
fair share not use the subsidy to make it fair. Because of this false economy 
which is in effect, we need to plant otherwise they would be left abandoned. Of 
course the scenario is changing from day to day, every day we buy rice at a 
higher value so this rice has high value. The government is actually trying to 
protect the lower income from the higher price of rice but there is already top 
management thinking to withdraw the subsidies and give the rice its own value. 
Food security is one thing .... ' (MADA informant No. 17). 
The problem with this, however, is that rice cannot be produced within the Muda region at a 
competitive value. Any reduction in subsidies will ultimately lead to either the abandoning of rice 
production, in favour of higher valued crops, or the large-scale commercialisation of the rice 
sector. This would be detrimental to the cultural tradition of many of the small farmers currently 
employed in this sector which would impact on the ability of the government to: secure the rural 
Malay vote; secure self-sufficiency in rice; and ensure a rural standard of living for these farmers. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that this will be a policy option in the near future. 
Instead of abolishing the subsidies the other option is to increase or alter the current system of 
subsidies. Most of the farming community believe that the current subsidies are inadequate, 
arguing that they cannot increase their yields without the government providing more subsidies for 
their farming activities. This attitude is fUlther emphasised by the argument that if the fanners are 
not to be left behind in the economic development of Malaysia, the government must increase 
subsidies: 
'The government subsidies are inadequate and the government should increase 
the subsidy or the price of the paddy. The price of the goods is going higher 
everyday and the government servants also enjoy the higher salary and then the 
farmers are left behind. The government should do something, if the government 
can't increase the price of the paddy or subsidy then they need to have better 
control of the other goods' (Farmer informant No. 13). 
To increase yields many of the farmers believe that it is the governments' responsibility to either 
increase the price of the paddy or increase both the extent of, and type of, subsidies. Under this 
hypothesis, if rice farming is to become economic then the government needs to provide 
subsidised assistance for mechanised activities and chemical inputs. For example, the farmers 
argue that the government needs to subsidise the cost of tractors, grass cutters etc. in order to 
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reduce this cost for the small farmer. At present the high cost of machinery favours the larger 
farmers or 'middle men' who are able to purchase machinery and rent it to the smaller farmers: 
'The government can improve the welfare of the farmers by giving them a tractor 
to share among the farmers or give a grass cutter to be shared, then the farmers 
can improve their welfare' (Farmer informant No.1). 
'The government can improve the welfare of the farmers by giving us subsidy on 
other inputs like the cost of a tractors is about 1 DORM so the government should 
pay 50RM and the farmers the rest. Also the other cost of input' (Farmer 
informant No. 21). 
'Now the Malaysian government depends 65% on the paddy from farming in 
Malaysia. The government can less the burden on farmers by giving them 
machinery. They can share a machine for harvesting for every 1000 relongs for 
example .. .'(Farmer informant No.4). 
In addition, many of the fanners have argued that the government should provide subsidies for 
pesticides and herbicides in the same way that they at present subsidise fertilisers: 
'The government are supposed to give other inputs, subsidies for other inputs like 
pesticides, weedicides [herbicides] and so on for more yield' (Farmer informant 
No.5). 
'The subsidy is inadequate but there is a statement by the federal government, by 
the acting Prime Minister Mr Anwar that they are not going to increase the 
subsidy, they are not going to increase the price of paddy. They have to give 
subsidies on other inputs like the tractors, more fertilisers, more weedicides 
[herbicides]' (MADA informant No. 12). 
'Right now the cost for pesticides, weedicides [herbicides] and labour costs to 
apply fertiliser and then to cut the grass, whatever it is always increases every 
year. So that means that the government should intervene' (Farmer respondent 
No. 13). 
If the government was to intervene in the farming community by assisting farmers in the subsidy 
of these chemicals there would be an obvious effect on the environmental sustainability of the 
region. This is especially true because the increased use of herbicides and pesticides is in direct 
contrast to the promotion ofIntegrated Pest Management and the control of weeds by efficient and 
effective water use. Both of these approaches are currently the preferred option of MADA's 
agricultural division: 
'We also make a point that they shouldn't give subsidies for pesticides because 
this will go against the idea of IPM' (MADA informant No. 19). 
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Most of the farmers' suggestions for improving the assistance that the government and MADA can 
provide relate directly to some form of financial intervention often with specific reference to the 
development of tertiary infrastructure: 
'To solve the problem the government should build the canal for irrigation to 
supply water from the main river. The government are not supposed to put their 
money to the other projects, this is the most important project because this paddy 
supply is the main food to the Malaysian people. So the government should do 
something to help .. .' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
'There is a resolution from farmers in this area to the authority to build up the 
canal but not yet decided by the government. The government can improve the 
welfare of the farmers by making the irrigation system here first and then let's talk 
about the other things' (Farmer informant No. 15). 
However, in light of the research findings articulated in chapters seven and eight, tertiary 
intervention will only be a successful policy if the expectations of this policy are altered from a 
focus on improving productivity to a focus on improving the opportunities for the farmers to 
widen their livelihood strategies. In any case, the current economic crisis within the Malaysian 
economy means that the government will be unable in the foreseeable future to provide additional 
financial assistance to the farmers either in the form of subsidies or infrastructure investment. In 
fact it is even conceivable that the crisis could make it increasingly difficult for the government to 
continue with the current levels of subsidy. The question then is how else can MADA and the 
government assist the farmers to improve their livelihood strategies? 
As it becomes increasingly clear that the farmers require secondary occupations to supplement 
their income from farming, the role of the government and MADA should be to facilitate the 
provision of alternative employment in the rural communities. The main suggestions for which 
have been to facilitate the development of cottage industries, or factory production, in the rural 
areas with collaborative activities between the government, MADA and the Farmers' Association: 
'The government can have small cottage industry to improve the welfare of the 
farmers in this area and the SUbsidies that we enjoy now are inadequate, they 
should increase' (Farmer informant No. 22). 
'The small farmers, let's say they don't want to work in the farming of paddy so 
that they can go to other activities like cottage industry. So they need to build up 
the industry, that is the welfare which the government is supposed to give 
attention for' (Farmer informant No. 14). 
'I think that the farmers groups should set up a small company and let the farmer 
in this area finish the product and then get the income' (Farmer informant No.3). 
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'The government should build up the small factories in this area. To ask the 
people who have a small size of land, they give to a body and let the body run the 
land and then they get the profit and they can work for that company or for the 
factory which is also set up. From there they can improve their welfare' (MADA 
informant No. 11). 
'The government in the first place should build up more industry in the rural area 
but this PPK have to playa good role. The current role of this PPK, they already 
have a small factory to make the garments so the PPK should play more roles 
beside of setting up this kind of factory. They should venture to other factory 
maybe they can produce a better product and make a better market for them' 
(MADA informant No.7). 
'I think that the government should either increase the price of the paddy or they 
should build up the cottage industry to give the farmers more jobs and more 
income' (Farmer respondent No.3). 
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By diversifying the rural economy the government will be able to harness the reduced labour 
requirements of tertiary development and facilitate their substantive objectives for increasing the 
standard of living of the farmers. In addition, the government needs to invest time and resources in 
the education of farmers, farm families and MADA staff. This can either relate to: farm 
management practices to improve yields; education for alternative employment; or education for 
the next generation which will improve opportunities and, in turn, increase the remittances which 
this generation can provide for their family: 
'We need to educate the farmers so that the next generation better understand 
which is going to be implemented by MADA, what is the target, what is the vision, 
what is the main policy. Then the next generation will better understand 
compared to the current generation' (MADA informant No. 12). 
'Before we hardly hear of even one son or daughter of the farmers going to 
university, right now everywhere we can see' (Farmer informant No.5). 
'The main policy of the government is to increase yield ... to ensure that this target 
is achieved we must educate the farmers to properly maintain their batas, water 
supply better from MADA and properly maintain their canals' (MADA informant 
No.1). 
In summary, the government is required to provide an enabling environment within which the 
farmers can create and define space for their own interests and requirements in securing their 
broader livelihood strategies. Whether it is correct that this enabling environment should be 
dependent on subsidies is debatable. Perhaps it is time that the subsidies were targeted at the 
smaller farmers only rather than the current system which is, in practice, independent of scale235 . 
235 In theory, the subsidies are tied to the size of land operated. In practice, however, the farmers are able to 
subdivide the ownership' on paper' and ensure a larger percentage of subsidies. 
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This could then release financial resources for use in education, training and the development of 
the rural economy to facilitate the diversification of this economy. 
9.S Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated the links between the micro, meso and macro spatial scales by 
examining the relationship between the individual and collective power of the farmers and their 
relationship with both MADA and the federal government. These power relations have had three 
primary effects: firstly, there is a direct relationship between the individual power of the farmers 
and their non-conformance with the policy objectives of the national government; secondly, 
because of the powerful political position of the farmers, it is problematic for both MADA and the 
federal government to implement policies that are not agreeable to the farming community; and 
finally, because of the relative powerlessness of MAD A vis-a.-vis the farmers and they must ensure 
a cooperative relationship with the farmers. Such cooperation is important because any high-
profile non-cooperation on the part of the farmers would reflect badly on MADA itself. 
Focusing in particular on tertiary development, it was argued that this policy has increased the 
capacity of the farmers to use both their individual and collective power. Individually, because 
MADA are 'powerless' to stop the informal actions of the farmers, this has resulted in: higher 
supplies; lower field water depths; lower efficient usage; and the reduced commitment by MADA 
staff to their formal responsibilities. This has, in turn, increased the informal actions of MADA 
staff at the local level. Furthermore, because the institutions that govern acceptable behaviour are 
located in the villages, no social structure exists at the farm level to restrict the exercising of 
individual power. 
Likewise, because tertiary development has increased the amount of time the farmers can spend 
off-farm, hence increased their opportunities for alternative employment, this has also influenced 
their commitment to increasing yields. The failure to increase yields has not, however, influenced 
the commitment of the federal government to continue to provide incentives to achieve 
productivity goals. This is illustrative of the collective political power of the farmers and reduces 
the policy options available to both MADA and the federal government. 
The interconnection between the micro, meso and macro spatial scales symbolises how the 
interaction of actors influences the knowledge and agency of these actors which, in turn, influences 
their power and capacity to informal action. The problem is that MADA is 'stuck in the middle' 
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between both the federal government and the farmers who use the political arena to secure their 
own objectives. Furthermore, because MADA has adopted a coercive approach to the governance 
of the Muda region, this does not reflect the day-to-day cooperative approach illustrated in the 
incorporation of the farmers' informal actions in the management of the water resource. Instead, 
MADA should adopt a cooperative relationship in governance to ensure that they have the capacity 
and commitment of the farmers to secure procedural objectives. To do so, both the farmers and 
MADA staff must be provided with incentives and it must to be formally recognised that MADA 
cannot practice extension and enforcement simultaneously. After all, if a cooperative relationship 
was implemented in system governance then enforcement would not be necessary. 
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Harnessing informality: Conclusions and 
recommendations 
In exploring government intervention my study has presented findings that illustrate the complex 
relationship between policy expectations and policy outcomes. These findings suggest that whilst 
tertiary intervention has not met with the productivity or water saving expectations of MADA and 
the federal government, it has succeeded in providing the farmers with the opportunity to diversify 
their livelihood strategies - thus complementing the societal restructuring policies of the federal 
government. Set out below is an overview of the conclusions and recommendations that emerge 
from the research findings presented. 
This study set out to investigate the complex process by which policies are implemented and 
manipulated in the Muda irrigation scheme, Malaysia. It was argued that to understand the 
outcomes of government intervention, research is required that analyses the networks and 
interactions of all actors in this process. To achieve this, an actor-oriented theoretical approach 
was applied to the irrigation management context. This facilitated the examination of the 
dichotomy between the formal framework of intervention and the reality of informal practice. 
Because the irrigation management concepts and models fail to address the nature of the 
relationship between governments, irrigation agencies and irrigators they are unable to incorporate 
the objectives of all actors in the intervention process. As a result, these models dichotomise 
between users and rule-makers at the level of the irrigated agricultural system, ignoring the 
political-economy context within which policies are created. To fill this conceptual gap a 
coercive/cooperative framework was applied to the study of irrigated agriculture. 
It is the combination of these two theoretical perspectives236 that enabled the inter-linked nature of 
the nation-state, irrigation system and farmers' fields to be analysed. In examining the usefulness 
of this approach, one particular government policy (tertiary intervention) was analysed in detail. 
The concluding comments that follow highlight: the value of the approach adopted; the theoretical 
reflections that emerge; the usefulness of tertiary development as a government policy; the 
resultant policy implications; and the opportunities for future research. 
236 Actor-oriented research and a coercive/cooperative framework. 
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10.1 The value of actor-oriented research in a coercive/cooperative 
framework 
The value of actor-oriented research in a coercive/cooperative framework is the recognition that 
government intervention is a complex and dynamic process involving actors at all spatial scales. 
This approach differs from the 'blueprint' or 'farmer-first' approaches of the 1980's which 
advocate a directional approach to development that is either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up'. Instead, 
my thesis argues that government intervention is a negotiated process whereby the outcomes of 
this intervention are dependent on the management of the differing 'multiple realities' of the 
various interest groups. In this respect, the federal government, MADA and the fanners are 
separate but inter-linked actors who negotiate, accommodate, and conflict with one another in the 
management and governance of the Muda region. 
Because the actor-oriented approach recognises that the interaction of actors influences the 
agency, knowledge and power of these actors, neither the structural level nor the local level 
dominates. Rather it is the interaction per se that influences policy options and policy outcomes. 
From this perspective, water management practices are not dictated by the physical system or the 
prescribed rules but are instead influenced by the relations of power between governments, 
irrigation agencies and farmers. This is manifested in the negotiations, conflicts and informal 
practices of these actors. 
In the Muda region the perception that: the state is the powerful actor; MADA implements 
government policies; and the farmers are passive recipients of these policies, is inappropriate and 
wrong. Instead, my research indicates that because the fanners can utilise their power through 
informal actions, active resistance, and political pressure it is the farmers' interpretations that 
prevail over those of MAD A. From this perspective: 
' ... the 'powerful' are not in complete control of the stage and the extent to which 
their power is forged by the so-called 'powerless' should not be underestimated' 
(Long & Villarreal, 1994:50). 
By recognising that agency, knowledge and power are influenced by the transformation of 
meaning in the interaction of different actors' lifeworlds (Long & Villarreal, 1994), a more 
representative picture of irrigation management emerges. This 'picture' highlights the process by 
which the farmers utilise their power vis-a-vis both MADA and the federal government. In 
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particular, because the federal government and the farmers use the political arena to secure their 
normative interests, MADA remains 'stuck in the middle' and relatively powerless to the informal 
actions of the farmers. Likewise, although the farmers are not achieving the substantive 
requirements of the federal government, because of their powerful position vis-a-vis the macro 
level the federal government is relatively powerless to the actions of the farmers. This influences 
the policy options available to the federal government. Moreover, it highlights the effectiveness of 
actor-oriented research for an evaluation of irrigation management whereby the actions of actors at 
the micro level influence those at the macro level and vice-versa. Consequently, the behaviour of 
actors is not determined by their structural position but is instead dependent on their action and 
reaction to the 'life worlds' of other actors. 
The understanding of the linkage between the micro, meso and macro spatial scales is facilitated 
by the integration of an actor-oriented analysis in a coercive/cooperative framework. This is 
important because the actor-oriented framework, articulated by Long & Long (1992), focuses on 
the micro and meso levels and largely ignores the macro level within which these are located. In 
this respect, the coercive/cooperative framework facilitates the inclusion of the political economy 
context and its role in the decision-making process of actors at all spatial scales. Furthermore, 
because the linkage between the different spatial scales is largely ignored in the irrigation 
management literature it fails to incorporate how different actors respond to, and influence, 
development intervention. The coercive/cooperative framework again provides the valuable link. 
The value of this combined approach is reflected in the research findings presented throughout my 
thesis. In particular, through the analysis of tertiary development my research highlights the need 
to harness informality in the governance and management of the Muda region 'if the high ideals of 
productive, sustainable and equitable agricultural development are to be realised' (Guijt & 
Thompson, 1994:296). Furthermore, if the outcomes of government policies are to corresponded 
with the intentions of these policies, what is needed is the recognition that this intervention is 
complex, dynamic and diverse not simplistic, deterministic and prescribed. This requires 
government institutions to be flexible and responsive to the unexpected outcomes which will 
always occur. 
10.2 Is tertiary intervention a valuable policy? 
When analysing teliiary intervention on a 'with' and 'without' project basis my research has 
indicated that this policy is not fulfilling the substantive requirements of the federal government or 
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the procedural requirements of MADA. Drawing on the main findings of my research this section 
examines the extent to which tertiary intervention is a valuable policy. It is argued that because 
tertiary intervention has increased the capacity of the farmers to diversify into other sectors of the 
economy, without increasing yields or reducing their incomes, this policy can be assumed to have 
succeeded by failure. By this I mean that the scope of livelihood strategies available to the 
farmers have been improved but the expected water savings and yield increases have not. What 
this suggests is that if the government expectations focused on enhancing the farmers' wider 
livelihood strategies, rather than focusing on productivity and efficiency, then tertiary intervention 
is a valuable policy. 
The research findings indicate that the tertiary irrigation block requires a higher irrigation supply 
than was targeted. In addition, this supply was significantly higher than under Muda I conditions. 
In theory this should ensure higher field water depths in the Muda II irrigation block. However, 
although these depths were not found to influence yields, they were consistently lower than in the 
Muda I block. The results is a lower water-use efficiency in the Muda II block with more of the 
rainfall and supply being wasted at the farm level. The reasons for this have been attributed to the 
poor water management strategies of the Muda II farmers in the construction of field ridges, the 
operation of Field Irrigation Turnouts (FIT's) and Drainage Outlets (DO's). This is because there 
is no real ownership over control structures and the farmers in the Muda II irrigation block have 
the capacity to receive water without improving their water management strategies. Likewise, the 
higher supply in the Muda II block is a direct result of the increased capacity of these farmers to 
tamper with, and break, control structures. Consequently, the operation and management of 
tertiary structures is not in accordance with the formal rules and regulations implemented by 
MADA, and the wastage of water is not in accordance with the water saving requirement of either 
MADA or the federal government. 
The informal control of the secondary and tertiary structures, and the opening of the FIT's and 
DO's simultaneously, has influenced the reliability, adequacy and fairness of the water supply in 
the Muda II block. In comparison with the Muda I farmers, the Muda II farmers receive: a more 
unreliable supply more often; an equally as inadequate supply more often; and higher intra-block 
variation in distribution. This has been attributed to the informal actions of the farmers which, in 
turn, reduces the capacity of MADA to control the water supply structures as formally prescribed. 
On a positive note the fanners under Muda II conditions have significantly better control over 
drainage. However, this negatively influences the water use efficiency in this block and the 
observed over-supply of water. Furthermore, although the schedule implemented by MADA was 
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perceived to be 'fair' by those cultivating in the Muda II block, the informal actions and reduced 
agricultural coordination means that these farmers are unable to follow this schedule which, in 
turn, influences the informal actions of other farmers and MADA staff. In this sense, the informal 
actions of the farmers are self-perpetuating. 
Of critical importance to the federal government is increased yields. However, my research has 
indicated that not only does the Muda II block not exhibit increased yields in the irrigated season, 
they are in fact worse than under Muda I conditions. This is clearly not in accordance with the 
substantive requirements of the federal government. Moreover, it has been argued that because 
tertiary intervention has increased the amount of tilne the farmers can spend off-farm, hence their 
increased opportunities for alternative employment, this has also influenced their commitment to 
increasing yields. Here again there is a conflict in expectations whereby the farmers perceive 
irrigation, and the yields obtained, to be one part of their overall livelihood strategy and the federal 
government perceive yield increases to be the ultimate objective of their intervention policies. 
This dichotomy results directly from the different values, knowledge and perceptions of the actors 
involved. 
The findings presented in my research indicate that tertiary intervention is a valuable policy for 
increasing the time available for off-farm activities whilst enabling the farmers to retain access to 
the rice farming culture. However, because this policy has negatively influenced productivity and 
efficiency it has not satisfied the procedural or substantive requirements of MADA or the federal 
government. This does not, however, mean that tertiary intervention has failed. Instead, it means 
that tertiary intervention has succeeded for different reasons than were originally envisaged. 
Firstly, tertiary intervention has facilitated the uniting of traditional values and kampung identities 
with Dr. Mahathir's desire for a second rural development transformation (to release labour into 
the manufacturing and high technology industries). From this perspective, if the federal 
government focused less on productivity gains and more on livelihood enhancement then the 
tertiary intervention policy would be regarded as a success. Furthermore, if MADA harnessed 
informality in the management and operation of the control structures, and involved the farmers in 
the formal governance of the Muda region, then the dichotomy between the formal rules and 
regulations and the informal practices of the farmers could be reduced. This would then integrate 
the procedural requirements of MAD A and the informal practices of the farmers into the rules and 
regulations of operation and management. To achieve this, MADA needs to focus on facilitating a 
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cooperative policy design in the governance of the water resource rather than the observed 
coercive approach currently practised. 
Likewise, because MADA does not have the power to force the farmers to adhere to its prescribed 
rules and regulations, it does not have the capacity to restrict the informal actions of the farmers. 
This results in an increased wastage of water at the farm level and is problematic because of the 
increasing water scarcity in the region, making the efficient use of water a critical objective. The 
farmers, however, are not encouraged to value water as an economic good and the collective 
political power of the farmers vis-a.-vis the federal government limits the scope of policy options 
available. Bearing this in mind, the following section examines the policy implications that have 
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emerged from my work . 
10.3 Policy implications 
The most important implication of my study is the need to develop an enabling environment that 
will harness the informal actions of the fanners and integrate this with the formal requirements of 
MADA and the federal government. This requires improvements in, and the cooperation of, all 
actors in the intervention process. After all, if improvements are made by MADA in their daily 
management of the water resource this will be ineffective if the farmers are unable to follow 
formal procedures because they fail to correspond with the farmers own agendas and priorities. 
Likewise, if the federal government increases the subsidies offered to the farmers by, for example, 
subsidising mechanised activities, this will again be ineffective if the expectations of these 
incentives remain focused on productivity rather than wider livelihood strategies. Furthermore, 
whilst improvements can be made by the farmers in their cultivation practices, for the farmers to 
invest the increased labour required to achieve this both MADA and the government must provide 
the incentives for this to occur. Considering the lack of social organisation at the field level and 
the relative power of the fanners vis-a.-vis MADA and the federal government the policy 
implications that follow are suggestive rather than prescriptive. 
Firstly, MADA and the federal government must alter their expectations of government 
intervention, and tertimy development in particular. My research has indicated that the farmers 
value rice farming as a cultural practice rather than an economic venture, preferring instead to 
invest the increased labour available under tertiary conditions in off-farm productive and non-
237 It is not my intention to prescribe what these policies should be. Instead, the focus is on possible policy 
implications. 
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productive activities. Therefore, MADA and the federal government should focus not on 
productivity gains but on increasing the ease with which farming can be conducted. This would 
increase the farmers' ability to seek off-farm employment and hence increase the percentage of 
Malays in other sectors of the economy. This would be in accordance with the aims of the NDP 
without conflicting with the Malay identity to rice farming and its culture. To achieve this, the 
role of the federal government should focus on increasing the employment opportunities in the 
rural areas by providing incentives for the development of rural manufacturing and cottage 
industries. One vehicle through which this could be achieved is the Farmers' Associations (FA) 
whose responsibility it is to develop the rural economy and community. To achieve this, the 
federal government must cooperate with the FA to facilitate understanding of rural needs and to 
provide resources and incentives to foster farmer involvement. Here again there needs to be an 
alteration in expectations from both MADA and the government to the role of the FA and the role 
of the farmers. 
As I have expanded on above, tertiary intervention is a successful policy if the focus of its 
performance is improvements in the livelihoods of farmers as opposed to improvements in yields. 
However, as my research results have indicated, the informal actions of the farmers in the tertiary 
irrigation block influence the over-supply of water and the under-utilisation of this supply. This is 
clearly problematic in a region regarded as water scarce and experiencing increasing resource 
competition from other sectors of the economy. This is especially poignant as MADA is 
increasingly required to justify the water used in the Muda region. To accommodate for this 
MADA is focusing on recycling as a policy for reducing the wastage of water throughout the 
region. In accordance with this, it is suggested that MADA should intensify their recycling of the 
water resource that passes directly though the farmers' fields into the drains. After all, those 
fanners located some distance from the water resource are already forced to use these drains as a 
source of supply. However, the question for MADA is how to ensure water quality when 
recycling this drainage water. 
Where recycling is not possible a further policy option is to reduce the extent to which the farmers 
under tertiary conditions have direct access to drainage facilities. From this perspective, without 
direct access to drainage outlets the farmers would be unable to open the field irrigation turnouts 
and drainage outlets simultaneously, thus reducing the direct wastage of water at the farm level. 
However, the problem with this approach is that it could further decrease the yields under Muda II 
conditions by increasing the flooding of individual fields, a factor compounded by the decreased 
coordination of the farmers in the tertiary irrigation block. 
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To improve the coordination of activities, and the cooperation of the farmers at the block level, 
MADA and the federal government need to provide incentives for the fanners to invest the 
increased labour to achieve this. What these incentives should be is difficult to assess because of 
the lack of social arrangements at the farm level to guide individual attitudes and actions. This 
said, with the high average age of the farmers, and the increasing disaffection towards farming by 
the younger generation, it appears likely that some form of estate farming will emerge. 
Furthermore, with the cultural tradition of land ownership it is unlikely that the younger 
generation will sell their inherited land. Instead, it is likely that this will be rented out under some 
form of cooperative arrangement. If this occurs then the Muda region will accommodate Dr. 
Mahathir's vision that' less and less farmers should farm more and more land'. In expectation of 
this change the role for MADA, the FA and the federal government should be proactive to this 
change rather than reactive to its consequences. It is suggested, therefore, that research is 
conducted to facilitate a greater understanding of the expectations for change in the rural areas. In 
so doing, the role of the Fanners' Association, MADA and the federal government in harnessing 
this change should be improved. 
Of critical importance to the development of the Muda region is the relationship between MADA 
and the farmers. My research has highlighted the dichotomy between the formal arrangements of 
management and governance and the informal actions of the farmers and MADA staff at the local 
level. To harness the informal practices of the farmers, the governance of the Muda region needs 
to be altered from one of coercion to one of cooperation. This means that the rules and regulations 
should not be prescribed 'from above' but there should be active negotiation between the farmers 
and MADA staff to illuminate the requirements of each of these sets of actors and to facilitate the 
joint achievement of policy goals. To achieve this, emphasis needs to be placed on building the 
capacity of the farmers and MADA staff to cooperate with one another. This requires shared 
governance in the management of the water resource whereby the farmers are actively involved in 
the decision-making process. Here again the Farmers' Association could be the vehicle by which 
real participation can be secured. Furthermore, to build and enhance local capacity the role of the 
federal government should focus on providing financial, technical and other incentives. For the 
farmers, these incentives should focus not only on agronomic practices but also on the 
development and enhancement of off-farm opportunities. For MADA, these incentives should 
focus on the local-level to ensure that these staff members fulfil the tasks for which they have 
formal responsibility. 
CHAPTER TEN: Harnessing informality: Conclusions and recommendations 332 
This will not, however, be achievable whilst MADA retains both enforcement and extension 
responsibilities. After all, a cooperative relationship in governance assumes that commitment and 
compliance is not a problem. If it is formally recognised that MADA cannot practice extension 
and enforcement simultaneously, and that a cooperative framework is required, there would be 
limited need for MADA to enforce rule compliance. Here again the federal government must 
provide the resources for, and facilitate the commitment and compliance of, both these sets of 
actors. In adopting a cooperative approach, there would be increased scope for resources to be 
transferred from enforcement to extension. 
One possible way of reducing the perception of the institutional power of MADA is to reduce the 
levels of hierarchy in this organisation. After all, the greater the nodes of contact between the 
fanners and the decision-makers the more scope there is for the transfer of meaning between 
actors and the manipulation of information. This ultimately influences the ability of the higher-
level officials to respond to the requirements of the farming community in the decision-making 
process. One solution is for MADA and the FA to integrate their activities in both the 
management of the water resource and the management of rural livelihoods. The extent to which 
this is possible is, however, dependent on further research. 
10.4 Future research opportunities 
My research has highlighted the difference in expectations between the various actors involved in 
the intervention process. Furthermore, these expectations are themselves moulded by the 
intervention process which has a continuing dynamic and never occurs in a political, social or 
economic vacuum. To explore these changing expectations, research is required that not only 
assesses intervention on a 'with' and 'without' project basis but also as part of an on-going 
monitoring process - 'before' and 'after' project implementation. Ideally, such research should be 
conducted by the Planning and Evaluation division of MADA in collaboration with researchers 
from the national and global community. 
The lack of commitment by the fanners to the formal rules and regulations implemented by 
MADA has been partly attributed to the conflicting relationship between the cooperative approach 
to management and the coercive approach to governance. What is needed is a cooperative 
approach to both governance and management if the informal practices and formal rules are to be 
realigned. This cannot, however, be achieved without appropriate research to establish the 
institutional arrangements necessary to secure such an arrangement. Moreover, research must 
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establish how such a cooperative relationship could develop without further reinforcing 
inequalities in the region by increasing the power of those members of the farming community 
who are already powerful within the village. 
The Muda region is at the cross-roads of change whereby the present generation of rice farmers 
are unresponsive to new technologies, approaches etc. and the future generation are disinterested 
in farming the land. It is imperative that MADA is proactive to this change. To be proactive, 
MADA must be provided with research that establishes not only the role which they themselves 
have but also the role of the Farmers' Association and the federal government. These 'roles' 
cannot be defined without a clear understanding of the expectations of the farmers, MADA, the 
F A and the federal government to the future of rice farming in the Muda region. Here again, 
policy development must incorporate the different expectations of all actors involved in the 
intervention process. This, however, requires research that illuminates what these expectations 
are. One such expectation has been presented in my research regarding the diversification of the 
rural economy. What is not clear, however, is what this diversification should be or the process by 
which such diversification should occur. Here again there is a need for extensive research. 
More specifically, the policy implications that have emerged from my research indicate that to 
save water under tertiary conditions, the water that flows directly through the farmers' fields must 
be recycled. To achieve this, MADA must be knowledgeable about the type, dimension and social 
acceptability of drainage recycling. This requires research that focuses on both the social and 
engineering designs of recycling as a policy option. Furthermore, the policy implications in 
section 10.3 also indicate a need for institutional change within MADA which separates the 
extension and enforcement responsibilities of MADA and reduces hierarchical structures. Such 
significant changes to the organisational structure and philosophy of MADA will provide 
opportunities for researchers internal and external to this organisation. 
My research findings have highlighted the usefulness of examining government intervention using 
an actor-oriented approach in a coercive/cooperative framework. This approach now needs to be 
applied in different contexts at different time-scales and at different spatial scales. This is 
particularly important considering the emphasis of this theoretical approach on the significance of 
diversity. The theoretical challenge for researchers interested in irrigation intervention is to 
examine how to incorporate the different perceptions, attitudes, objectives and knowledge of the 
various actors involved in this process. 
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These research directions are extensive and highlight the scale of the challenge facing the federal 
government, MADA, the farmers and academics when attempting to understand: the complex 
dynamics of government intervention; the complex dynamics of social life; the complex dynamics 
of human interaction; and the complex outcomes of government intervention. Only through the 
exploration of this complexity can researchers guide policy options. For without recognising 
diversity, research contributes 'little or nothing to illuminating the alternatives facing policy-
makers and other responsible actors concerned with less developed countries' (Booth, 1994b, 4-5). 
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APPENDIX A:1 - Questionnaire - English 
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
AND 
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY (UK) 
CONFIDENTIAL 
A: 1 
FARMER SURVEY FOR THE MUDA IRRIGATION SCHEME, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 
For Office Use Only 
Questionnaire Number Time interview began ____ (24Hrs) 
Interviewers Name Time interview finished (24Hrs) 
Name of village Length of interview ____ (mins) 
Irrigation sub-block 
Address ofparticipant ________________________ _ 
Notes for Interviewer 
Any statement in bold is for interviewer's information only 
2 Any statement in parentheses is for interviewer's information only 
3 Most coded answers are for interviewers information only. They should only be 
read out to participants where specified in parentheses in the question. 
4 If any question is not applicable write N/ A 
5 If participant refuses to answer any question: code -9 
6 If participant answers don't know: code-8 
7 Interviewers are to fill in Ql by observation only (interviewers may refer to 
the participant in the event of ambiguity) 
8 Each box is for single digits only 
9 If the participant is not a farmer in the Muda region terminate interview 
APPENDIX A:l - Questionnaire - English A: 2 
Interviewer Observation 
1 What is the participants: 
(a) Gender? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Male 
Female 2 
(b) Ethnicity? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Malay 
Chinese 2 
Indian 3 
Other 4 
(TO BE READ OUT TO P ARTICIP ANT) 
Purpose of the Survey 
We are carrying out a study into the way that water is managed, allocated and distributed in the 
Muda irrigation scheme. The purpose of the survey is to learn from farmers about their water 
needs and practices in the last dry and wet season, 1996. We are doing this because it is important 
that your practices and opinions about irrigation are understood and made available to as many 
people as possible who are involved in the Muda irrigation scheme. 
Institutional support 
The survey is supported by Middlesex University (UK) and the Universiti Sains Malaysia. 
Although it is independent of MAD A, MADA have agreed to us conducting this survey and will 
be provided with a copy ofthe final results. 
Confidentiality 
Due to the nature of this work, none of the information that you give us will be reported in any 
way which will identify any specific individuals. 
Benefit to you 
By providing information for this survey, you will be helping improve the knowledge of farmers 
needs in the Muda region, hopefully, this should assist with policy design in the future. 
Thanks 
Finally, may we take this opportunity to thank you for agreeing to help in this survey, your time is 
very much appreciated. 
APPENDIX A: 1 - Questionnaire - English 
SECTION 1 
The survey is divided into 5 parts each with a short introduction about the questions we 
are asking. 
Section one, for example, asks for information about yourself, your position in the 
household, the experience that you have with farming and the type of land that your 
household farms. 
2 Are you responsible for the farming activities of this household? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
3 
[ IF NO: Locate responsible member, otherwise terminate interview] 
(a) How many relongs ofland does this household farm? 
[Insert number: Round up to 1 decimal place] 
Yes 
No 
A: 3 
I RIg 
(b) How many relongs of land did this household farm 5 years ago? I RIg 
[Insert number: Round up to 1 decimal place] 
4 How many relongs of land does this household: 
[Insert number: Round up to 1 decimal place] 
(a) own 
(b) rent/lease in 
(c) rent/lease out 
(d) Do you farm any land which is neither owned or rented? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (d): 
(dl) What is this arrangement? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
I 
I 
Yes 
No 
I I Rig 
I Rig 
I Rig 
2 
(d2) How many relongs do you farm in this way? 
[Insert number: Round up to 1 decimal place] 
I Rig 
2 
APPENDIX A:l - Questio11naire - English 
5 Could you please tell me which planting methodes) you used: 
(a) in the last dry season (1996:1)? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
A: 4 
Dry seeding 1 
Wet seeding 2 
Volunteer seeding 3 
Transplanting 4 
Mixed methods 5 
Other 6 
(Specify ) 
(al) Why did you use this planting method? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(b) which planting method did you use in the last wet season (1996:2)? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Dry seeding 
Wet seeding 2 
Volunteer seeding 3 
Transplanting 4 
Mixed methods 5 
Other 6 
(Specify ________________ _ 
(bl) Why did you use this planting method? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(c) Which padi variety do you use? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
(Specify 
MR48 
IR42 
MRI03 
MRI06 
MR167 
MR84 
Mixed 
Others 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
) 
APPENDIX A:l - Questionnaire - English A: 5 
6 How many years have you been padi farming: 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest year] 
7 
8 
(a) 
(a) in the Muda region? 
(b) using irrigation? 
How many plots of land do you farm in total? 
[Insert number] 
yrs 
yrs 
(b) How many plots of land do you farm in the LBLBD 6/7 Irrigation Block 
[Insert number] 
(c) How many relongs do you farm in the LBLBD 6/7 Irrigation Block 
[Insert number] jRlg 
(d) Do any of these plot(s) get irrigation water in any of the following ways? 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
Yes No 
(dl) Directly from canal 2 
(d2) From neighbours plot 2 
(d3) Mada pump house 2 
(d4) Own pump 2 
(d5) Back irrigation 2 
(d6) Drainage canal 2 
(d7) No irrigation 2 
(d8) In any other way 2 
(IF OTHER: Please specify __________________ _ 
(a) On average, are your plots/is your plot: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Very flat 
Fairly flat 2 
Not very flat 3 
Not at all flat 4 
IF VERY FLAT: 
(al) Why is a flat plot impOliant? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
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FOR ALL OTHER ANSWERS: 
(a2) Do you try to level your plots? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
(a3) Why is it important that you level your plots? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(b) What is the height of your land relative to the irrigation canal in: 
Yes 
No 
[Ask Qbl to single plot farmers and Qb2 and b3 to multiple plot farmers: Insert 
number in centimeters] 
(bI) your plot? [ -1- -I cm 
(b2) your highest plot? [ -1- -I cm 
(b3) your lowest plot? 1 1 1 cm 
SECTION 2: WATER MANAGEMENTIW ATER CONTROL 
Now we would like to ask you about your irrigation needs, any difficulties that you may 
have with irrigating your plot(s) and your views about the irrigation supply, its reliability 
and adequacy. In particular we are interested in your irrigation for the wet and dry 
seasons 1996 and your experiences over the last 5 years/l0 seasons. 
2 
9 Did you hear or read about the water schedule set by MADA last season? 
IF YES: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Note filter: If participant does not understand the term schedule, 
explain as the timings set by MADA for the release of water into the canal] 
Yes 
No 2 
[IF NO: GO TO Q9(b)] 
(a) Was it: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant: Note filter] 
Very understandable 1 
[IF 1: GO TO QI0] 
Fairly understandable 2· 
Not very understandable 3 
Not at all understandable 4 
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(b) How did you know when you were going to receive water? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
10 Do you know the irrigation overseer in your area? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) Do you know his name? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
2 
2 
11 In general, would you say that you have a lot of difficulties, some difficulties or no difficulties in 
irrigating your plot(s) 
[Circle ONE answer only: Note filter] 
(a) In general, what is causing these difficulties? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(b) Do you try to improve this? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (b): 
A lot of difficulties 
Some difficulties 2 
No difficulties 3 
[IF 3: GO TO 12] 
Yes 
No 2 
(b 1) What do you do? 
[Answer can be more than one: Circle: Probe] 
Request help from MADA 
Use water pump (own) 2 
Use water pump (MADA) 3 
Co-operate. Self-help 4 
Clean the canal 5 
Other 6 
(Specify 
------------------------------
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IF NO to (b): 
(b2) Why not? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(c) In which season or seasons do you experience irrigation difficulties? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Dry season 
Wet season 
Both 
None 
12 To your knowledge, do other farmers in the Muda region experience a lot of irrigation 
difficulties, some irrigation difficulties or no irrigation difficulties? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
A lot of difficulties 
A: 8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Some difficulties 2 
(a) Why do you think this is? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
No difficulties 3 
13 When you irrigate, are you able to open and close the turnout to your plot(s)? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 2 
(a) Would you say that control of the turnout is: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Very Important 
Fairly Important 2 
Unimportant 3 
14 (a) How do you drain your plots? 
[Answer can be more than one: Circle: Probe] 
In plot drains 
In plot drainage channels 2 
Access to main drain 3 
Other 4 
(Specify _________________ _ 
) 
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(b) How often do you experience difficulties in draining your plot( s), is it: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Often 
IF OFTEN/SOMETIMES: 
(b 1) Why do you have difficulties in draining your plot(s)? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
15 Generally, would you say that access to drainage facilities is: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
16 How often did you experience: 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
Very Important 
Fairly ImpOltant 2 
Unimportant 3 
Dry season 
(a) too little water for your crop requirements in the last dry season (1996: 1), was it: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Often 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
(b) too much water for your crop requirements in the last dry season (1996: 1), was it: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Often 1 . 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
Wet season 
(c) too little water for your crop requirements in the last wet season (1996:2), was it: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Often 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
(d) too much water for your crop requirements in the last wet season (1996:2), was it: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
Often 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
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17 (a) Was the water level in your plot(s) in the last dry season ever too high for your crop 
requirements? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (a): 
(aI) Why was this? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(a2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
(b) Was the water level in your plot(s) in the last dlY season ever too low for your crop 
requirements? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (b): 
(b 1) Why was this? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(b2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
(c) Was the water in your plot(s) in the last wet season ever too high for your crop 
requirements? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 
A: 10 
I 
2 
2 
2 
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IF YES to (c): 
(c 1) Why was this? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(c2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(d) Was the water level in your plot(s) in the last wet season ever too low for your crop 
requirements? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (d): 
(a) 
(dl) Why was this? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(d2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
What does a high water level do to your crops? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
A: 11 
2 
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19 
(b) What does a low water level do to your crops? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(a) In the last dry season (1996: 1) did the irrigation supply 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Never change from the schedule 1 
Sometimes change from the schedule 2 
Often change from the schedule 3 
(b) In the last wet season (1996:2) did the irrigation supply 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Never change from the schedule 1 
Sometimes change from the schedule 2 
Often change from the schedule 3 
20 What do you do if you do not receive water when expected? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
21 Would you say that the distribution of water between the top and bottom of your Irrigation Block 
shows: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Major differences 
Minor differences 2 
No differences 3 
22 How many days, on average, does it take for water to reach your plot(s) once there is water in 
the canal? 
[Insert number of days] 
[ -] - ]- -] days 
23 In your plot(s), have you constructed any: 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable: Read out codes to participant: Note filter] 
Water supply channels 
Drainage channels 
Field ridges 
Drains 
Yes No 
2 
2 
1 2 
I 2 
[IF NO TO ALL: [GO TO Q23(d)] 
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IF YES: 
(a) Do you need to maintain these: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant: Note Filter] 
Often 
(b) When during a season do you maintain these structures? 
[Answer can be more than one: Circle: Probe] 
Sometimes 2 
Never 3 
[IF NEVER: GO TO Q24] 
At the beginning of each season 
At the end of each season 2 
When they collapse 3 
On a regular basis 4 
Other 5 
(Specify ________ _ 
(c) Would you say that the maintenance of these structures is: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Very Important 
Fairly ImpOliant 2 
Unimportant 3 
IF NO TO ALL OF Q23: 
(d) Why have you not needed to build any of these structures? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
24 Did you use a water pump in the: 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
(a) last dry season (1996: I)? 
(b) last wet season (1996:2)? 
IF YES to (a) or (b): 
(c) Why did you need to pump? 
[Refer to season: Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes No 
2 
2 
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(d) When pumping, did you: 
[Refer to season: Circle ONE answer only for each variable: Read out 
codes to participant: Record verbatim if Other] 
IF NO to (a) or (b): 
Own the pump 
Rent the pump 
Borrow the pump 
Other 
Yes No 
2 
2 
2 
2 
(Specify ________________ _ 
(e) Why did you not use a pump? 
[Refer to season: Answer can be more than one: Record verbatim if Other] 
Do not own 1 
Cannot afford 2 
Difficult to obtain when needed 3 
No need 4 
Not aware of its usage 5 
Do not believe it will work 6 
Other 7 
(Specify _________________ _ 
(f) Why do you think that other farmers in the Muda scheme use water pumps? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
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25 Using the ranges on the card, where 0 = Not a problem at all, to 10 = A very big problem, how 
would you rate: 
26 
[SHOW CARD 1] 
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF : 
Not a problem 
at all 
o 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A very big 
big problem 
9 10 
[Insert ONE code for each variable] 
(i) your right to take water 
(ii) your overall control of water 
(iii) the amount of water you can obtain 
(iv) the quality of your water 
(vi) the control of the water level in your plot(s) 
(vii) the irrigation schedule set by MADA 
(viii) the timing of water entering your plot(s) 
(ix) access to information on water use 
Now 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
We would now like to ask you some questions about your water experience over the last 
5 years. 
(a) In the last 5 years, have you ever not received enough water? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (a): 
Yes 
No 
Future 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
(al) How often has this occurred? 
[Insert number] 
r -r- I 
(a2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
2 
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(b) In the last 5 years have you ever received too much water? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (b): 
(bI) How often has this occurred? 
[Insert number] 
(b2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
( c) In the last 5 years, have your ever had difficulties with the reliability of your water 
supply? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (c): 
(el) How often has this occurred? 
[Insert number] 
(c2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
(d) In the last 5 years have you ever had any difficulties with your plot drainage? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES to (d): 
Yes 
No 
A: 16 
2 
2 
I 
2 
(dJ) How often has this occurred? 
[Insert number] 
CI 
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(d2) What did you do? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
27 Using the ranges on the card, where -3 = Very Bad to +3 = Very Good, over the last 5 years, how 
would you rate: 
[SHOW CARD 2: Insert coding in boxes] 
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF: 
-3 = Very bad, to +3 = Very good 
Very 
Bad 
-3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Very 
Good 
+3 
the adequacy of your water supply 
the reliability of your water supply 
the adequacy of drainage in your plots 
the fairness of the irrigation schedule 
SECTION 3 
P ARTICIP A TION/CO-OPERA TION 
Now we would like to ask you about your participation with MADA staff and other 
farmers within your irrigation block. We are particularly interested in information 
about the people and organisations that you find most helpful in solving any irrigation 
difficulties you may have. 
D 
D 
D 
D 
28 Have you met or discussed irrigation difficulties with anybody from MADA over the last 5 years? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) Who were they? 
Yes 
No 
[Answer can be more than one: Circle: Probe: If Other Record verbatim] 
Irrigation officer 
2 
FA staff 2 
Staff from MADA HQ 3 
Other 4 
(Specify _________________ _ 
APPENDIX A:l - Questionnaire - English A: 18 
IF NO: 
(b) Which of these would you say was most helpful? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Irrigation officer 
FA staff 2 
Staff from MADA HQ 3 
Other 4 
(Specify _________________ _ 
(c) When meeting MADA staff, do you always agree with the advice given: 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF NO TO (c) 
(el) What advice have you not agreed with? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(d) Why have you never met with any MADA personnel? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 2 
29 In the last 5 years, have you ever discussed irrigation difficulties with? 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable: If Other record verbatim] 
Yes No 
Wakil Rakyat Kawasan 2 
Menteri Besar 2 
Penghulu 2 
Anyone not already mentioned 2 
(Specify: ________________ _ 
APPENDIX A: 1 - Questionnaire - English 
IF YES: 
(a) 
(b) 
What difficulties did you discuss? 
[Record Verbatim: Probe] 
Were they able to help you? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 
30 In your opinion, which ofthe following should: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
a) Clean the b) Maintain the 
plot channels plot offtakes 
MADAOnly 1 1 
MADA and farmers 2 2 
Fanners co-operatives 3 3 
Individual farmers 4 4 
31 (a) Do you clean plot channels and drains: 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
On own 
With other fanners 
WithMADA 
(b) do you maintain plot offtakes 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
On own 
With other farmers 
WithMADA 
(c) do you operate plot offtakes 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
On own 
With other fanners 
WithMADA 
A: 19 
2 
c )Operate the 
plot offtakes 
and drains 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Yes No 
1 2 
2 
2 
Yes No 
1 2 
2 
2 
Yes No 
1 2 
2 
2 
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32 Are you a member of: 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable: If Yes: Insert number: Record verbatim] 
IF YES: How many years have you been a member and what is your membership type/position? 
No Yes No. of years Type of membership/ 
Position 
Farmers Association 2 yrs 
Group farming project 2 yrs 
(Kelompok Tani) 
Muda II 2 yrs 
Village co-operative 2 yrs 
Mini estate 2 yrs 
Water user association 2 yrs 
UMNO 2 yrs 
PAS 2 yrs 
Otherl 2 yrs 
Other2 2 yrs 
(Specify 
(a) Have any of these organisations helped you with irrigation difficulties? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 
IF YES to (a): 
(al) Which organisation(s) helped you? 
[Answer can be more than one: Circle: Probe] 
Farmers Association 
Group fanning project 
Muda II 
Village co-operative 
Water user association 
Mini estate 
UMNO 
PAS 
Other 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
(Specify _________________ _ 
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(a2) How did they help? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
(b) Which organisation do you consider most important for irrigation? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
33 Do you know the names of the other farmers in your Irrigation Block? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) Do you know: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Yes 
No 
All of them 
A: 21 
2 
Most of them 2 
Few of them 3 
34 Do you co-operate with other farmers in your Irrigation Block to help you with your 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
irrigation? 
IF YES: 
IFNO: 
(a) Is this with: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
(b) Why do you not need to co-operate? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
All of them 
2 
Some of them 2 
A few of them 3 
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35 Do you think that co-operation in your Irrigation Block can be improved? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) In what ways can this be improved? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
36 Does the irrigation of other farmers in your Irrigation Block affect your own irrigation? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) What are these affects? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Yes 
No 
37 In the last 5 years, have you had any disagreements with other farmers in your Irrigation Block 
about irrigation? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
(a) 
(b) 
What was this disagreement? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
Does this happen: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Yes 
No 
Often 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
Sometimes 2 
Rarely 3 
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SECTION 4 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Now we would like to ask about your general farming practices. We are interested in 
your production costs, your yields and what type of farm equipment you use. We are 
also interested in the way that you harvest your padi at the end of the season. 
38 Compared to your yield 5 years ago, has your yield: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Increased 
Decreased 2 
Remained the same 3 
39 Compared to your production costs 5 years ago, have your production costs: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
Increased 
Decreased 2 
Remained the same 3 
40 Could you tell me which ofthe letters on the card represents the average amount you pay for: 
(a) Ploughing per season? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
[SHOW CARD 3] 
o -200RM [A] 
>200 - 400RM [B] 
>400 - 600RM [C] 
>600 - 800RM [D] 
>800RM [E] 
(b) Harvesting by combine per season? 
[Insert ONE answer only] 
[SHOW CARD 4] 
o - 100RM [A] 
>100 - 200RM [B] 
>200 - 400RM [C] 
400 - 600RM [D] 
>600RM [E] 
(c) fertilisers per season? 
[Insert ONE answer only] 
[SHOW CARD 5] 
o -20RM [A] 
>20 - 40RM [B] 
>40 - 60RM [C] 
>60 - 80RM [D] 
>80RM [E] 
(d) weedicides and pesticides per season? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
[SHOW CARD 6] 
o -30RM [A] 
>30 - 60RM [B] 
>60 - 90RM [C] 
>90 - 120RM [D] 
>120RM [E] 
APPENDIX A:l - Questiollnaire - English 
(e) What is your average cost of production in the dry season? 
[Insert number to nearest RM] 
(f) What is your average cost of production in the wet season? 
[Insert number to nearest RM] 
41 Would you say it is right that you have to pay for water? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
(a) Do you think that the price you pay for water is: 
[Circle ONE answer only: Read out codes to participant] 
42 Does your household own or hire any of the following farm equipment? 
[Circle ONE answer only for each variable] 
(a) 
(b) 
(d) 
(e) 
2-wheel tractor 
4-wheel tractor 
Combined harvester 
Water pump 
43 Do you bag any of your harvest into guni sacks? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
IF YES: 
Own 
1 
1 
Hire 
2 
2 
2 
2 
(a) How many guni sacks did you produce in the last dry season (1996:1)? 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest bag] 
(b) and, how many in the last wet season (1996:2)? 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest bag] 
Yes 
No 
A: 24 
RM 
RM 
2 
Much too high 
Too high 2 
About right 3 
Too low 4 
Much too low 5 
Neither 
3 
Yes 
No 
3 
3 
3 
2 
bags 
bags 
44 Was any of your harvest in the last dry or wet season (1996) bulk handled by lorries? 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
Yes 
No 
1 
2 
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IF YES: 
How many tons in the; 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest Ton] 
(a) last dry season (1996: 1) 
(b) last wet season (1996:2) 
45 Of the padi that was marketed, how many tons could you not sell: 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest Ton] 
(a) last dry season (1996: 1) 
(b) last wet season (1996:2) 
(c) What were the main reasons for this? 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
46 What was your yield for the; 
[Insert number: Round up to nearest Tons/Rig] 
(a) last dry season (1996: 1) 
(b) last wet season (1996:2) 
A: 25 
1- T J - I Tns 
1- r=r-] Tns 
I-TI1Tns 
CT~-JTns 
I - [ -~ns/Rlg 
~ns/Rlg 
'--------'----L-----.J 
47 
SECTIONS 
DEMOGRAPHY AND FARM ECONOMY 
The final section of the survey asks some basic questions which are standard in most 
questionnaires. These questions are only used for our own purposes and your answers 
are completely confidential. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
How many people including yourself live in this household? 
[Insert number] 
During the last season how many of these worked on the farm? 
[Insert number] 
During the last season how many of these had jobs outside the farm 
[Insert number ] 
[J -, 
[ - I - I 
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48 
(d) During the last season how many of these were in full time education 
[Insert number] 
Could you please tell me your age? 
[Insert number] yrs 
49 What level of schooling did you have, was is: 
[Read out codes to participant: Circle ONE answer only] 
50 Could you please tell me what: 
[Record verbatim: Probe] 
None 
A few years in primary 2 
Completed primary 3 
Secondary 4 
Tertiary 5 
(a) Percentage of your household income comes from padi farming? 1% 1-----'----'-------' 
(b) Percentage of your household income comes from secondary occupations 
1-----'----,-------,1% 
51 Can you please tell me which of the letters on this card represents the total annual income from 
all sources in your household? 
[SHOW CARD 7] 
[Circle ONE answer only] 
[STRESS THAT THIS IS TOTAL INCOME OF ALL HOUSEHOLD INCOMES, 
INCLUDING NON-FARM] 
Letter Per year Code 
M$ 
(C) <2,000 
(B) >2,000-4,000 
(W) >4,000-6,000 
(L) >6000-8,000 
(D) >8,000-10,000 
(F) > 10,000-12,000 
(H) > 12,000 
This is the end of the survey, thank you very much for your time and co-operation it is 
very much appreciated 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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SHOW CARD ONE 
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF : 
Not a problem 
at all 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A very big 
big problem 
9 10 
Now 
(i) your right to take water D 
(ii) your overall control of water D 
(iii) the amount of water you can obtain D 
(iv) the quality of your water D 
(vi) the control ofthe water level in your plot(s) D 
(vii) the irrigation schedule set by MADA D 
(viii) the timing of water entering your plot( s) D 
(ix) access to information on water use D 
A: 27 
Future 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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SHOW CARD TWO 
Using the ranges on the card, over the last 5 years, how would you rate: 
(a) the adequacy of your water supply 
(b) the reliability of your water supply 
(c) the adequacy of drainage in your plots 
(d) the fairness of the irrigation schedule 
PLEASE RATE ON A SCALE OF: 
Very 
. B~ 
~ ~ -1 0 
Very 
Good 
+1 +2 +3 
A: 28 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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SHOW CARD THREE 
Could you tell me which of the letters on the card represents the average amount you pay 
for: 
(a) Ploughing per season? 
o -200RlJ [A] 
>200 - 400RlJ [B] 
>400 - 600RlJ [C] 
>600 - 800RlJ [D] 
>800RlJ [E] 
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SHOW CARD FOUR 
Could you tell me which of the letters on the card represents the average amount you pay 
for: 
(b) Harvesting by combine per season ? 
o -lOORM [A] 
> 100 - 200RM [B] 
>200 - 400RM [C] 
400 - 600RM [D] 
>600RM [E] 
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SHOW CARD FIVE 
Could you tell me which of the letters on the card represents the average amount you pay 
for: 
(c) fertilisers per season? 
o -20RM [A] 
>20 - 40RM [B] 
>40 - 60RM [C] 
>60 - 80RM [D] 
>80RM [E] 
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SHOW CARD SIX 
Could you tell me which of the letters on the card represents the average amount you pay 
for: 
(d) weedicides and pesticides per season? 
o -30RM [A] 
>30 - 60RM [B] 
>60 - 90RM [C] 
>90 - 120RM [D] 
>120RM [E] 
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SHOW CARD SEVEN 
Can you please tell me which of the letters on this card represents the total annual income 
from all sources in your household? 
Letter Per year 
M$ 
(C) <2,000 
(B) >2,000-4,000 
(W) >4,000-6,000 
(L) >6000-8,000 
(D) >8,000-10,000 
(F) > 10,000-12,000 
(H) > 12,000 
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UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
DAN 
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY (UK) 
SULIT 
BANCIAN PETANI-PETANI DALAM RANCANGAN PENGAIRAN MUDA, 
SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA 
Untuk Kegunaan Pejabat saia 
A: 34 
Nombor Soal Selidik Masa mula temuduga ____ (24Jam) 
Nama Penemuduga Masa tamat temuduga ____ (24Jam) 
Nama kampung Tempoh temuduga ____ (minit) 
Sub-blok Pengairan 
Alamat responden 
Nota untuk Penemudue:a 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Semua soalan yang berdawat hitam gelap (bold) adalah maklumat untuk 
Penemuduga sahaja 
Penyataan dalam kurungan adalah maklumat untuk Penemuduga sahaja 
Jawapan berkod adalah maklumat untuk Penemuduga sahaja. Kod-kod 
hanya boleh dibaca kepada responden jika dikehendaki dalam soalan. 
Sebarang soalan yang tidak berkenaan, sila tulis T/B 
Jika respond en enggan menjawap, tulis: -9 
Jika responden tak tahu, tulis: -8 
Penemuduga perlu mengisi S 1 melalui pemerhatian sendiri sahaja (penemuduga 
boleh merujuk kepada respondenjika ada keraguan) 
Setiap kotak hanya untuk satu digit sahaja 
Jika responden bukan petani di Daerah Muda, berhentikan temuduga 
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Pemerhatian Penemuduga 
1 Hal peribadi responden: 
(a) Jantina 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Lelaki 1 
Perempuan 2 
(b) Bangsa 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Melayu 
Cina 2 
India 3 
Lain-lain 4 
(UNTUK D1BACA KEPADA RESPONDEN) 
Tujuan Bancian 
Kami dari USM sedang menjalankan satu kajian tentang bagaimana sumber air diuruskan, 
diperuntukkan dan dibekalkan di dalam Rancangan pengairan Muda. Tujuan survei ini ialah 
untuk mengenalpasti keperluan dan amalan-amalan petani tentang air pada musim 
kering/kemarau dan musim tengkujuh dalam tahun 1996. Kajian ini penting kerana amalan-
amalan petani dan pendapat mereka tentang pengairan dapat difahamkanoleh ramai orang yang 
terlibat dalam Rancvangan Pengairan Muda. 
Sokongan Institusi 
Survei ini adalah dibiayai oleh Middlesex University (UK) dan Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau 
Pinang. MADA juga turut memberi sokongan dan keljasama dalam survei ini. 
Kesulitan Bancian 
Semua maklumat dan data yang diperolehi dalam survei ini adalah SULIT. Data-data hanya 
diterbitkan dalamjadual dan laporan yang tidak menyebutkan nama sesiapa pun. 
Faedah kepada anda 
Maklumat yang diperolehi dalam survei ini akan menambahkan pengetahuan petani-petani 
tentang keperlaun air dalam Rancangan Pengairan'Muda, dan hal ini akan membantu dalam 
perancangan dasar-dasar pertanian pada masa depan. 
Terima Imsih 
Kami mengambil kesempatan ini untuk mengucapkan ribuan terima kasih kepada anda yang 
sudi meluangkan masa untuk ditemuduga. 
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BAHAGIANI 
Bancian ini adalah dibahagikan kepada 5 bahagian. Setiap bahagian mempunyai 
pengenalan yang pendek tentang soalan-soalan yang akan dikemukakan. 
Bahagian 1, misalnya, menyoal tentang maklumat peribadi responden, status dalam isi 
rumah anda, pengalaman anda dalam penanaman padi dan jenis tanah yang diusahakan. 
2 Adakah anda dipertanggongjawab di dalam aktiviti penanaman padi? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
3 
Ya 
Tidak 
[JIKA TIDAK: Cari ahli yang bertanggungjaw, kalau tak jumpa, berhentikan temuduga] 
(a) 
(b) 
Berapa relong tanah isi rumah ini di kerjakan? 
[Tulis angka: Bulatkan kepada satu temp at perpuluhan] 
Berapa relong tanah isi rumah ini di ketjakan 5 tahun dahulu? 
[Tulis angka: Bulatkan kepada satu tempat perpuluhan] 
I I Rig 
I I I Rig 
4 Berapa relong tanah isi rumah ini : 
[Tulis angka: Bulatkan kepada satu tempat perpuluhan] 
(a) Milik sendiri r-r-r- ] Rig 
(b) Sewa dari orang lain I I I I Rig 
( c) Sewa kepada orang lain I I I Rig 
(d) Adakah anda mengusahakan tanah lain yang tidak dimiliki atau sewa atau? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
KALAU Y A untuk (d): 
(d!) Bagaimanakah perjanjiannya? 
[Relwd/tulis secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(d2) Berapa relong anda usahakan dalam cara ini? I I RIg 
[Tulis angka: Bulatkan kepada satu temp at perpuluhan] 
2 
2 
APPENDIX A:2 - Questionnaire - Bahasa Melayu 
5 Apakah cara penanaman yang anda gunakan: 
(a) pada luar musim yang lalu (1996: l)? 
[Bulatlmn SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Tabur Kering 
Tabur Basah 
Padi Batat 
Menanaman 
Pelbagai Kaedah 
Lain - Lain 
A: 37 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
) (Nyatakan-__________________ _ 
(al) Kenapa anda guna cara ini? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(b) Apakah cara penanaman yang anda gunakan: 
pada musim utama yang lalu (1996:2)? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Tabur Kering 
Tabur Basah 2 
Padi Batat 3 
Menanaln 4 
Pelbagai Kaedah 5 
Lain-lain 6 
(Nyatakan ) 
(bl) Kenapa anda guna cara ini? 
[Relwd/tulis secara mendalam] 
(c) Apakahjenis padi yang anda tanam? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
MR48 
IR42 2 
MRI03 3 
MRI06 4 
MR167 5 
MR84 6 
Campuran Benih 7 
Lain-lain 8 
(Nyatakan 
-----------------
--------) 
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6 Sudah berapa tahun, and a terlibat dalam penanaman padi?: 
[Tulis Angka: Nyatalmn tahun yang terdekat] 
7 
8 
(a) 
(b) 
(a) di kawasan Muda? 
(b) sejak guna pengairan? 
Berapa petak tanah yang anda keljakan, kesemuanya? 
[Tulis Angka] 
Berapa petak tanah and a kerjakan di LBLBD 6/7 BIok Pengairan? 
[Tulis Angka] 
(c) Berapa relong tanah anda kerjakan di LBLBD 6/7 BIok Pengairan? 
[Tulis Anglm 1 
tahun 
tahun 
I RIg 
(d) Adakah sebarang plot-plot ini mendapat air pengairan dalam cara-cara berikut? 
[Bulatkan SATU kod untuk setiap variable] 
(a) 
Ya Tidak 
(dl) Terus dari terusan 2 
(d2) Dari plotjiran 2 
(d3) Rumah Pam Mada 2 
(d4) Pam Sendiri 1 2 
(d5) Pengairan balik 2 
(d6) Parit saliran 2 
(d7) Tiada pengairan 2 
(dS) Lain-lain 2 
(JIKA LAIN CARA: Nyatakan. _________________ _ 
Secara purata, adakah plot-plot anda: 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja: Baca kod-Iwd kepada responden] 
Sangat rata 
Sederhana rata 2 
Tidak begitu rata 3 
Tidak rata 4 
JIKA SANGAT RATA: 
(al) Kenapakah plot rata penting? 
[Tulis secara mendalam] 
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UNTUK SEMUA JAWAPAN SELAIN DAIPADA DI ATAS (a1): 
(a2) Adakah anda cuba meratakan plot-plot anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
(a3) Kenapa penting untuk meratakan plot-plot anda? 
[Tulis secara mendalam] 
(b) Apakah ketinggian tanah anda berbanding dengan terusan di: 
Ya 
Tidak 
[Tanya Sb1 untuk petani mempunyai 1 plot dan Sb2 dan Sb3 untuk petani 
mempanyai 2 plot atau lebib. Tulis nombor dalam sentimeter] 
(e1) 
(e2) 
plot anda? 
plot anda yang paling tinggi? 
lrIem CD em 
(e3) plot anda yang paling rendah? ,--,--, em 
BAHAGIAN 2: PENGURUSAN PENGA WALAN AIR 
Sekarang saya ingintanya anda berkenaan dengan keperluan pengairan anda, maslah-
masalah berkenaan dengan plot-plot pengairan anda dan pendapat anda tentang bekalan 
air pengairan, kebergantungannya dan adakah ianya meneukupi. Saya juga ingin tanya 
anda tentang pengalaman pengairan anda pada kedua-dua musim utama dan luar musim 
1996 dan juga pengalaman anda pada 5 tahun/10 musim yang lepas. 
9 Adakah anda dengar atau baea jadual pembekalan air yang ditentukan oleh MADA pada musim 
yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja: Ambil perbatian: Jika responden tak faham istilah 
jadual, terangkan masa-masa yang ditentukan oleb MADA untuk melepaskan air l{e dalam 
terusan pengairan] 
Ya 
1 
2 
Tidak 2 
[JIKA TIDAK: PERGI S9(b)] 
JIKA VA: 
(a) Adakah ianya: 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja: Baca kepada responden kod-kod: Perbatikan] 
Sangat mudah difahami 1 
[JIKA 1: PERGI S10] 
Sederhana difahami 2 
Tidak begitu mudah difahami 3 
Sukar difahami 4 
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(b) Bagaimanakah and a tahu bilakah and a akan mendapat air? 
[Tulis secara mendalam] 
10 Adakah anda kenaI pegawai yang bertanggungjawab ke atas pengairan di kawasan plot anda? 
[Bultankan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
JIKA YA: 
(a) Tahukah namanya? 
[Bultanlmn SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Ya 
Tidak 
Ya 
Tidak 
11 Secara umum, adakah anda mempunyai masalah mendapatkan air untuk plot-plot anda: 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja: Perbatikan] 
Terdapat Banyak masalah 
2 
2 
Terdapat sedikit masalah 2 
Tak ada masalah langsung 3 
[JIKA 3: PERGI 12] 
(a) Secara Umum, apakah yang menyebabkan masalah tersebut? 
[Tulis secara mendalam] 
(b) Adakah anda cuba mengatasi masalah tersebut? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JlKA YA, UNTUK (b): 
(b 1 ) Apakah yang dilakukan anda? 
[Boleb lebih dari satu jawapan: Bulatalmn] 
Ya 
Tidak 
Minta bantuan dari MADA 
Guna pam air (sendiri) 
Guna pam air (MADA) 
Bergotong-royong. Bantu-diri 
Bersihkan terusan 
Lain-lain 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(Nyatakan. __________________ _ 
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JlKA TIDAK, UNTUK(b): 
(b2) Kenapa Tidak? 
[Rekod/Tulis secara mendalam] 
(c) Dalam musim-musim manakah anda selalu mengalami masalah pengairan? 
[Bulatlmn SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Luarmusim 
Musim utama 2 
Kedua-dua musim di atas 3 
Tiada 4 
12 Setahu anda, adakah petani-petani dalam Rancangan Pengairan Muda mengalami banyak masalah 
pengairan, sedikit masalah pengairan atau langsung tak ada masalaha? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
(a) Pada pendapat anda, kenapa begitu? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Banyak masalah pengairan 
Masalah pengairan yang serdikit 
Tak ada masalah pengh'an 
2 
3 
13 Bila hendak masuk air pengairan, adakah anda boleh buka dan tutup pintu air dalam plot anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
(a) 
14 (a) 
Ya 
Tidak 
Adakah pengawalan pintu air: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Bagaimanakah and a mengeluarkan air dari plot-plot anda? 
[Boleb lebih dari satu jawapan: Bulatkan] 
Sangat penting 
Sederhana penting 
Tidak penting 
Dalam terusan plot 
2 
2 
3 
Dalam alur saliran plot 2 
Sambungan alur ke terusan utama 3 
Lain-lain 4 
(Nyatakan __________________ _ 
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(b) Berapa kerapkah anda mengalami masalah dalam mengeluarkan air dari plot-plot 
anda?: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Selalu 
Kadang-kala 
Tak pernah 
2 
3 
JIKA SELALU ATAU KADANG-KALA: 
15 
(b 1) Kenapa anda mempunyai masalah dalam mengeluarkan air dari plot-plot 
anda? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Secara umum, adakah kemudahan mengeluarkan air: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Sangat penting 
Sederhana penting 
Tidak penting 
1 
2 
3 
16 Berapa kerapkah anda mengalami: 
LuarMusim: 
(a) terlalu sedikit air untuk keperluan tanaman pada musim kering yang lalu (1996:1)? 
Adakah keadaan ini: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Selalu 
Kadang-kala 2 
Tak pernah 3 
(b) terlalu banyak air untuk keperluan tanaman anda pada musim kering yang lalu 
(1996:1)7 Adakah keadaan ini: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Selalu 
Kadang-kala 2 
Tak pernah 3 
Musim Utama 
(c) terlalu sedikit air untuk keperluan tanaman pada musim utama yang lalu 
(1996:2)? Adakah keadaan ini: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Selalu 
Kadang-kala 2 
Tak pernah 3 
(d) terlalu banyak air untuk keperluan tan am an anda pada musim utama yang lalu 
(1996:2)? Adakah keadaan ini: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Selalu 
Kadang-kala 2 
Tak pernah 3 
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17 (a) Pernahkah paras air dalam plot-plot anda terlalu tinggi pada luar musim yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA VA, UNTUK(a): 
(al) Kenapa ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(a2) Apakah anda lakukan apabila berlaku keadaan ini? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(b) Pernahkah paras air dalam plot-plot anda terlalu rendah pada luar musim yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JlKA VA, UNTUK(b): 
(bI) Kenapa ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(b2) Apakah anda lakukan apabila berlaku keadaan ini? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(c) Pernahkah paras air dalam plot-plot anda terlalu tinggi pada musim utama yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Ya 
Tidak 
I 
2 
2 
I 
2 
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18 
JIKA VA, UNTUK(c): 
(cl) Kenapa ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(c2) Apakah anda buat apabila ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(d) Pernahkah paras air dalam plot-plot anda terlalu rendah pada musim utama yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Ya 
Tidak 
JIKA VA, UNTUK(d): 
(a) 
(dl) Kenapa ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(d2) Apakah anda buat apabila ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Apakah akan berlaku kepada tanaman andajika paras air menjadi terlalu tinggi? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
2 
APPENDIX A:2 - Questionnaire - Bahasa Me/ayu A: 45 
19 
(b) Apakah akan berlaku kepada tanaman andajika paras air menjadi terlalu rendah? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(a) Pada l11usim luar yang lalu (1996: 1) adakah bekalan air pengairan 
[Bulatlmn SATU kod sahaja. Baca kod-Imd kepada responden] 
Tepat mengikut jadual MADA 
Kadang-kala berubah dari jadual MADA 2 
Selalu berubah dari jadual MADA 3 
(b) Pada musim utal11a yang lalu (1996:2) adakah bekalan air pengairan 
[Bulatkan SATU kod sahaja. Baca kod-Imd l{epada responden] 
Tepat mengikut jadual MADA 1 
Kadang-kala berubah dari jadual MADA 2 
Selalu berubah dari jadual MADA 3 
20 Apakah tindakan anda jika plot-plot anda tidak l11enerima bekalan air seperti yang dijangkakan? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
21 Adakah taburan air pengairan di antara bahagian atas dan bawah Blok Pengairan anda 
mempunyai: 
[Bulatkan SATU kod sahaja. Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Perbezaan Besar 
Perbezaan Keeil 2 
Tiada Perbezaan 3 
22 Seeara purata, sebaik sahaja air dimasukkan dalam terusan utama, berapa harikah air itu kemudian 
sampai ke plot-plot anda? 
[Tulis berapa hari] [=r=T-1 hari 
23 Dalam plot-plot anda, adakah anda telah membina sebarang: 
[Bulatkan SATU kod untuk setiap variable. Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Parit pembekal air 
Parit keluar air 
Ya Tidak 
2 
2 
Batas sawah 2 
Parit 1 2 
[ JlKA JAW APNY A KESEMUA TIDAK SILA KE S23( d)] 
APPENDIX A:2 - Questionnaire - Bahasa Me/ayu 
JIKA VA: 
(a) Adakah anda perlu menyelenggarakannya: 
[Bulatkan SATU lwd untuk setiap variable. Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Selalu 
A: 46 
Kadang-kala 2 
Tak Pernah 3 
[JIKA TAKPERNAH: SILA KE S24] 
(b) Bilakah dalam sesuatu musim, anda selalu memperbaikinya ? 
[Jawapan boeh lebih dari pada SATU: Bulatkan] 
Pada awal sesuatu musim 
Pada hujung setiap musim 2 
Apabila ianya rosak 3 
Pada bila-bila masa 4 
Lain-lain 5 
(Nyatakan _________ _ 
(c) Pada pendapat anda, adakah kerja menyelenggara struktur-struktur ini: 
[Bulatkan SATU kod untuk setiap variable. Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Sangat penting 
Sederhana penting 
Tidak penting 
JIKA TIDAK KEPADA SEMUA JAWAPAN S23: 
(d) Kenapa anda tidak perlu membina struktur-struktur ini? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
24 Adakah anda gun a pam air pada: 
[Bulatakan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap variabel] 
) 
2 
3 
Ya Tidak 
(a) luar musim yang lalu (1996: I)? 2 
(b) musim utama yang lalu (1996:2)? 2 
JIKA YA KEPADA (a) atau (b): 
(c) Kenapa anda perlu pam air? 
[Rujuk kepada musim: Rekod secara mendalam] 
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(d) Bila mengapam air, adakah anda: 
[Rujul{ kepada musim: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap 
varia bel. Baca lmd-kod l{epada responden: Rekod secara mendalam jika 
Lain] 
JIKA TIDAK PERGI (a) atau (b): 
Memiliki pam 
Sewa pam 
Pinjam pam 
Lain-lain 
Ya Tidak 
1 2 
2 
2 
2 
(Nyatakan. __________________ _ 
(e) Kenapa anda tidak menggunakan pam air? 
[Rujuk kepada musim: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap 
variabel. Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Rekod secara mendalam jilm 
Lain] 
Tidak memliki 1 
Tidak mampu 2 
Sukar untuk dapat pam bila memerlukannya 3 
Tidak perlu pam 4 
Tidak tahu ten tang guna pam 5 
Saya percaya pam tidak berguna 6 
Lain-lain 7 
(Nyatakan, ___________________ _ 
(f) Pada pendapat anda, kenapakah petani lain di Rancangan Pengairan Muda menggunakan 
pam air? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
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25 Berdasarkan nilai-nilai dalam Kad Penunjuk, dimana 0 = Tiada Masalah, kepada 10 = Masalah 
Yang Sangat Besar, bagaimanakah anda menilai: 
[KAD PENUNJUK 1] 
SILA BERIKAN NILAI DARI SKALA BERIKUT : 
Langsung Tiada 
Masalah 
Masalah Yang 
Sangat Besar 
o 
26 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
[Masukkan SATu kod untuk setiap varia bel] 
Sekarang 
(i) hak anda untuk mendapatkan air D 
(ii) pengawalan air keseluruhan D 
(iii) jumlah bekalan air yang anda boleh dapat D 
(iv) kualiti air yang didapati D 
(vi) pengawalan paras air dalam plot-plot anda D 
(vii) jadual pengairan yang ditentukan oleh MADA D 
(viii) masa air memasuki plot-plot anda D 
(ix) kemudahan mendapat maklumat tentang guna air D 
Sekarang, saya ingin tanya beberapa soalan berkenaan dengan pengalaman anda dalam 
penggunaan air pada 5 tahun yang lalu. 
Masa 
Depan 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
(a) Pada 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda tidak mendapat bekalan air yang mencukupi? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA kepada (a): 
(al) Berapa kerapkah ini berlaku? 
[Tulis berapa kali] 
(a2) Apakah tindakan and a apabila hal ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
[-r-] 
2 
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(b) Pada 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda menerima air yang terlalu banyak ? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA kepada (b): 
(bl) Berapa kerapkah ini berlaku? 
[Tulis berapa kali] 
(b2) Apakah tindakan anda apabila hal ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(e) Pada 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda mengalami sebarang masalah tentang 
reliabiliti bekalan air? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA I{epada (c): 
(el) Berapa kerapkah ini berlaku? 
[Tulis berapa kali] 
(e2) Apakah tindakan anda apabila hal ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(d) Pada 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda mengalami sebarang masalah dengan 
plot saliran mengeluarkan air? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
JIKA YA kepada (d): 
(dl) Berapa kerapkah ini telah berlaku? 
[Tulis berapa kali] 
Ya 
Tidak 
2 
2 
1 
2 
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(d2) Apakah tindakan anda apabila hal ini berlaku? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
27 Berdasarkan nilai-nilai dalam Kad Penunjuk 2, dimana -3 = Sangat teruk, kepada +3 = Sangat 
Baik, pada 5 tahun yang lalu, bagaimanakah anda menilai: 
[KAD PENUNJUK 2: Tulis kod berl{enaan dalam kotak] 
SILA BERI NILAI BERDASARKAN SKALA BERIKUT: 
-3 = Sangat Teruk, kepada +3 = Sangat Baik 
Sangat 
Teruk 
-3 -2 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
-1 o +1 +2 
Sangat 
Baik 
+3 
Cukup atau tidak bekalan air pengairan 
Reliabiliti bekalan air pengairan 
Cukup atau tidak saliran mengeluarkan air dalam plot-plot anda 
Adil atau tidak jadual pengairan MADA 
BAHAGIAN3 
MENGAMBIL BAHAGIANIBEKERJASAMA 
Sekarang saya ingin tanya anda tentang kerjasama anda dengan kakitangan MADA dan 
lain-lain petani dalam blok pengairan anda. Kamijuga ingin mengetahui maklumat 
siapakah yang akan l11enolong anda dalam mengatasi l11asalah pengairan yang anda 
hadapi. 
D 
D 
D 
D 
28 Pernahkah anda beltemu atau berbincang l11aslah pengairan dengan sesiapa dari MADA dalam 
tel11poh masa 5 tahun yang lalu? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA: 
(a) Siapakah mereka? 
Ya 
Tidak 
[Boleh lebih dari satu jawapan: Bulatkan: Jika Lain, relwd secara mendalam] 
Pemeriksaan Taliair 
Kakitangan PPK 
Kakitangan MADA HQ 
Lain-lain 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
(Nyatakan __________________ _ 
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(b) Antara mereka, siapakah yang paling banyak dapat membantu anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
Pemeriksaan Taliair 
Kakitangan PPK 
Kakitangan MADA HQ 
Lain-lain 
1 
2 
3 
4 
(Nyatakan __________________ _ 
(c) Apabila bertemu dengan kakitangan MADA, adakah anda selalu bersetuju dengan 
nasihat mereka: 
JIKA TIDAK: 
[Bulatkan SATU sabaja] 
JIKA TIDAK PERGI (c) 
(c 1) Apakah jenis nasihat yang anda tidak setujui? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
(d) Kenapa anda tidak pernah bertemu/berbincang dengan sebarang kakitangan MADA? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
29 Dalam 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda berbincang masalah pengairan dengan? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja untuk setiap variabel: Jika Lain Rekod secara 
mendalam] 
2 
Ya Tidak 
Wakil Rakyat Kawasan 
Menteri Besar 
Penghulu 
Lain 
2 
2 
2 
2 
(Nyatakan: _________________ _ 
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JIKA VA: 
(a) 
(b) 
Apakah masalah yang anda bincangkan? 
[Relmd secara mendalam] 
A: 52 
Adakah mereka berupaya membantu and a? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
Ya 
Tidak 
1 
2 
30 Pada pendapat anda, siapa daripada mereka berikut patut bertanggungjawap: 
[Baca kod-kod l{epada responden: Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja untuk setiap variabel] 
31 
a) Bersihkan 
terusan plot 
b) Menyelenggara 
pintu hantm"an petak 
MADA sahaja 
MADA dan petani 
Persatuan peladang 
Petani individu 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
4 
(a) Adakah anda membersikan alur plot dan parit: 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap variabel] 
Secara sendiri 
Bersama-sama petani lain 
Bersama MADA 
(b) Adakah anda memyelenggara pintu hantm"an petak 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap variabel] 
Secara sendiri 
Bersama-sama petani lain 
Bersama MADA 
(c) Adakah anda 'operate' pintu hantm"an petak 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja untuk setiap variabel] 
Secara sendiri 
Bersama-sama petani lain 
Bersama MADA 
c)Operasi 
pintu hantaran 
petak 
2 
3 
4 
Ya 
Ya 
Ya 
1 
Tidak 
2 
2 
2 
Tidak 
2 
2 
2 
Tidak 
2 
2 
2 
APPENDIX A:2 - Questionnaire - Bahasa Melayu A: 53 
32 Adakah anda ahli dalam: 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja untuk setiap variabel: Jika Va: Tulis anglm berkenaan: 
Rekod secara mendalam] 
JIKA Y A: Sudah berapa tahun anda menjadi ahli dan apa jenis jawatan yang dipegang? 
Tidak Ya lumlah tahun lenis lawatan 
Persatuan Petani 2 I tahun 
Kelompok Tani 2 I tahun 
Muda II 2 I tahun 
Kooperasi kampung 2 I tahun 
Estet Mini 2 I tahun 
Persatuan Pengguna Air 2 I tahun 
UMNO 2 I tahun 
PAS 2 I tahun 
Lainl 2 I tahun 
Lain2 2 I tahun 
(Nyatakan 
(a) Pernahkan sebarang persatuan tersebut membantu and a menyelesaikan masalah 
pengairan? 
[Bulatkan SATU sabaja] 
JIKA Y A kepada (a): 
(al) Persatuan manakah yang membantu and a? 
[Boleh lebib dari satu jawapan: Bulatkan] 
Persatuan Petani 
Ya 
Tidak 
1 
2 
Project Tani Berkelompok 2 
Muda II 3 
Kooperasi Kampung 4 
Persatuan Pengguna Air 5 
Estet Mini 6 
UMNO 7 
PAS 8 
Lain-lain 9 
(Nyatakan __________________ _ 
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(a2) Bagaimanakah mereka membantu anda? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
(b) Pertubuhan manakah yang anda [lkir paling penting untuk pengairan? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
33 Adakah anda kenaI nama petani-petani lain dalam Blok pengairan anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA: 
(a) Adakah anda tahu: 
Ya 
Tidak 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja: Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Kesemua nama mereka 
1 
2 
Kebanyakan nama mereka 2 
Hanya sebilangan kecil nama mereka 3 
34 Adakah anda berkerjasama dengan petani-petani lain dalam Blok Pengairan anda untuk membantu 
anda dengan pengairan anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA YA: 
(a) 
JlKA TIDAK: 
Adakah anda berkerjasama dengan: 
Ya 
Tidak 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sahaja: Baca kod-kod kepada respond en] 
Kesemua nama mereka 
Kebanyakan nama mereka 
Hanya sebilangan kecil nama mereka 
(b) Kenapa and a tidak periu berkerjasama dengan mereka? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
2 
2 
3 
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35 Adakah anda berpendapat bahawa kerjasama dalam Blok Pengairan anda boleh diperbaiki ? 
[Bulatkan SATU jawapan sabaja] 
JIKA VA: 
(a) Apakah bantuk kerjasama yang boleh di perbaiki? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
36 Adakah pengairan oleh petani lain dalam Blok Pengairan anda mendatangkan kesan kepada 
pengairan anda? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
JlKA VA: 
(a) Apahah kesan-kesannya? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
Ya 
Tidak 
37 Dalam masa 5 tahun yang lalu, pernahkah anda tidak bersetuju dengan petani lain dalam Sub-
Unit Pengairan and a mengenai peagairan ? 
(Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
JIKA VA: 
(a) 
(b) 
Apakah bentuk ketidak persetujuan itu? 
[Rekod secar mendalam] 
Adakah ketidak perstujuan ini: 
Ya 
Tidak 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja: Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Seialu 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Kadang-kala 2 
Jarang 3 
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BAHAGIAN 4 
PRODUKTIVITIIHASIL PERTANIAN 
Sekarang saya ingin tanya anda tentang amalan-amalan pelianian anda. Kami adalah 
berminat tentang kos, hasil keluaran dan jenis-jenis alat/jentera yang anda gunakan. 
Kami juga berminat tentang cara andit menuai padi pada hujung musim. 
38 Bet'banding dengan hasil keluaran and a 5 tahun yang lalu, apakah hasil anda sekarang: 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja: Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Beliambah 1 
Berkurangan 2 
Sama Sahaja 3 
39 Berbanding dcngan kos penanaman padi 5 tahun yang lalu, apakah kos sekarang: 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja: Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Beliambah 
Berkurangan 2 
Sama Sahaja 3 
40 Sila beritahu saya abjad manakah yang mewakili kos purata yang anda bayar untuk: 
(a) Membajak setiap musim? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
[KAD PENUNJUK 3] 
o -200RM [A] 
>200 - 400RM [B] 
>400 - 600RM [C] 
>600 - 800RM [D] 
>800RM [E] 
(b) Menuai setiap musim ? 
[Bulatlmn SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
[KAD PENUNJUK 4] 
o - lOORM [A] 
>100 - 200RM [B] 
>200 - 400RM [C] 
400 - 600RM [D] 
>600RM [E] 
(c) Baja setiap musim? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
[KAD PENUNJUK 5] 
o -20RM [A] 
>20 - 40RM [B] 
>40 - 60RM [C] 
>60 - 80RM [D] 
>80RM [E] 
(d) Racun rumpai dan racun serangga setiap musim? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja] 
[KAD PENUNJUK 6] 
o - 30RM [A] 
>30 - 60RM [B] 
>60 - 90RM [C] 
>90 - 120RM [D] 
>120RM [E] 
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(e) Apakah purata kos pengeluaran anda dalam musim luar? 
[Tulis angka dalam RM] 
(f) Apakah purata kos pengeluaran anda dalam musim utama? 
[Tulis angka dalam RM] 
41 Adakah adil anda perlu bayar untuk air pengairan? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja] Ya 
Tidak 
A: 57 
RM 
RM 
2 
(a) Pada pendapat anda, adakah harga air pengairansekarang: 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja: Baca kod-kod kepada responden] 
Terlalu tinggi 
42 Adakah keluarga anda memiliki atau menyewa jentera berikut? 
[Bulatlmn SATU Jawapan sabaja untuk setiap variabel] 
Milik Sendiri 
(a) traktor 2-roda I 
(b) traktor 4-roda 
(c) Jentera menuai 
(d) Pam Air 
43 Adakah anda memasukan padi yang dituai dalam beg guni? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja] 
JIKA VA: 
Sewa 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Sangat Tinggi 2 
Berpatutkan 3 
Sangat rendah 4 
Terlalu rendah 5 
Kedua-dua tidak 
Ya 
Tidak 
3 
"3 
3 
3 
(a) Berapa kah guni padi yang dihasilkan oleh anda pada musim luar yang lalu(1996: I )? 
2 
[Tulis jumlab beg guni] beg 
(b) Berapa kah guni padi yang dihasilkan oleh and a pada musim utama yang lalu(1996:2)? 
[Tulis jumlab beg guni ] 
44 Adakah hasil padi pada musim kering/luar musim atau musim lembap/utama (1996) dibawa 
oleh lori? 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sabaja] Ya 
Tidak 
beg 
1 
2 
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JIKA VA: 
Berapa tan pada; 
[Tulis berapa Tan] 
(a) musim luaryang lalu (1996:1) 
(b) musim utama yang lalu (1996:2) 
45 Untuk hasil padi yang dipasarkan, berapa tan tidak dapat dijual: 
[Tulis berapa Tan] 
(a) musim luar yang lalu (1996:1) 
(b) musim utama yang lalu (1996:2) 
(c) Apakah sebab-sebab utama tidak boleh dijual? 
[Rekod secara mendalam] 
46 Berapakah hasil keluaran untuk; 
[Tulis berapa Tan tRig] 
(a) musim luar yang lalu (1996: 1) 
(b) musim utama yang lalu (1996:2) 
BAHAGIAN5 
DEMOGRAFI DAN EKONOMI TANI 
A: 58 
1- - [ - J Tan 
! -] J Tan 
1--r-LlTan 
I I I I Tan 
r -r - J - -trantRlg 
~antRlg 
'---'----'--------" 
Bahagian akhir ini akan meliputi soalan-soalan biasa dalam semua soal-selidik. Soalan-
soalan ini adalah untuk tujuan kami sahaja dan jawapan anda adalah rahsin. 
47 (a) Termasuk and a, berapa orang tinggal dalam rumah ini ? 
[Tulis nombor ] 
(b) Pada musim yang lalu, berapa orang dalam rumah ini telah kelja dalam plot 
sawah anda? 
[Tulis nombor] 
C]--I 
(c) Pada musim yang lalu, berapa orang dalam rumah ini telah dapat kelja lain? 1 - J 
[Tulis nombor] 
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48 
(d) Pada musim yang lalu, berapa orang dalam rumah ini adalah pelajar penuh 
masa? 
[Tulis nombor] 
Apakah umur/usia anda? 
[Tulis nombor] 
. -1- -I 
tahun 
49 Apakah taraf pendidikan anda?: 
[Baca kod-kod kepada responden: Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
Tiadalbuta huruf 
Beberapa tahun sekolah rendah 2 
Tamat sekolah rendah 3 
Tamat sekolah Menengah 4 
KolejiUniversiti 5 
50 Sila beritahu apakah: 
[Tulis %] 
(a) % pendapatan isi rumah dari tanaman padi? 
(b) % pendapatan isi rumah dari kerja sambilan lain? 
·1·1 1% 
[--[-1--1% 
51 Sila tunjuk dalam Kad ini abjad manakah yang mewakili jumlah pendapatan tahunan isi rumah 
anda (termasuk semua jenis pendapatan)? 
[KAD PENUNJUK 7] 
[Bulatkan SATU Jawapan sahaja] 
[SILA PASTIKAN BAHAWA INI IALAH JUMLAH PENDAPATAN SELURUH 
KELUARGA DALAM lSI RUMAH INI, TERMASUK SEMUA JENIS PENDAPATAN] 
Pendanpatan 
Abjad Tahunan Kod 
M$ 
(C) <2,000 
(B) >2,000-4,000 
(W) >4,000-6,000 
(L) >6000-8,000 
(D) >8,000-10,000 
(F) >10,000-12,000 
(H) >12,000 
Tamat bangan. Kami ingin mengucapkan ribuan terima kasih ke atas kerjasama anda 
kerana sudi ditemuduga. Harap berjumpa lagi. Selamat maju jaya. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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KAD PENUNJUK 1 
SILA BERIKAN NILAI DARI SKALA BERIKUT: 
Langsung tiada 
masalah 
Masalah yang 
sangat besar 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sekarang 
(i) hak anda untuk mendapatkan air 
D 
(ii) pengawalan air keseluruhan 
D 
(iii) jumlah bekalan air yang anda boleh dapat D 
(iv) kualiti air yang didapati 
D 
(vi) pengawalan paras air dalam plot-plot anda 
D 
(vii) jadual pengairan yang ditentukan oleh MADA D 
(viii) masa air memasuki plot-plot anda 
D 
(ix) kemudahan mendapat maklumat tentang guna air 
D 
A: 60 
Masa 
Depan 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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KAD PENUNJUK 2 
Dengan menggungakan nilai-nilai dalam kad, pada 5 tahun yang lalu, bagaimanakah anda 
menilai: 
(a) cukup atau tidak bekalan air pengairan 
(b) reliabiliti bekalan air pengairan 
(c) cukup atau tidak saliran mengeluarkan air dalam plot-plot anda 
(d) adil atau tidak jadual pengairan MADA 
SILA BERI NILAI BERDASARKAN SKALA BERIKUT: 
Sangat 
Teruk 
-3 -2 -1 0 
Sangat 
Baik 
+1 +2 +3 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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KAD PENUNJUK 3 
Sila beritahu saya abjad manakah yang mewakili kas purata yang anda bayar untuk: 
(a) Membajak setiap musim? 
o -200R}J [A] 
>200 - 400R}J [B] 
>400 - 600RM [C] 
>600 - 800RM [D] 
>800R}J [E] 
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KAD PENUNJUK 4 
Sila beritahu saya abjad manakah yang mewakili kos purata yang anda bayar untuk: 
(b) Menuai setiap musim? 
o -lOORM [A] 
> 100 - 200RM [B] 
>200 - 400RM [C] 
400 - 600RM [D] 
>600RM [E] 
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KAD PENUNJUK 5 
Sila beritahu saya abjad manakah yang mewakili kos purata yang anda bayar untuk: 
(c) Baja setiap musim? 
o -20R}J [A] 
>20 - 40R}J [B] 
>40 - 60R}J [C] 
>60 - 80R}J [D] 
>80R}J [E] 
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KAD PENUNJUK 6 
Sila beritahu saya abjad manakah yang mewakili kos purata yang anda bayar untuk: 
(d) Rucun rumpai dan rucun serangga setiap musim? 
o -30R}J [A] 
>30 - 60R}J [B] 
>60 - 90R}J [C] 
>90 - 120R}J [D] 
>120R}J [E] 
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KAD PENUNJUK 7 
Sila tunjuk dalam Kad ini abjad manakah yang mewakili jumlah pendapatan tahunan isi 
rumah anda (termasuk semuajenis pendapatan)? 
Abjad Pendan12atan tahunan 
M$ 
(C) <2,000 
(B) >2,000-4,000 
(W) >4,000-6,000 
(L) >6000-8,000 
(D) >8,000-10,000 
(F) > 10,000-12,000 
(H) > 12,000 
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KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND PRACTICE OF FARMERS IN THE MUDA 
IRRIGATION SCHEME. 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
KEY INFORMANT QUESTIONS 
Farm characteristics 
• How many relongs do you farm? 
• How many plots do you farm? 
• How do you receive irrigation water? 
• How many years have you been farming in the Muda region? 
• How many years experience do you have of irrigation? 
Alterations in farming practices 
• What have been the major changes to your farming practices during this time? 
What have been the advantages of these changes? 
What have been the disadvantages of these changes? 
• What changes do you think may occur in the future? 
Why do you think this is? 
What effect do you think this will have on the farming community? 
• What would you say is the biggest problem for your farming practice? 
Water control 
• Do you have any problems receiving enough water for your crop requirements? 
Yes: When is this most problematic? 
What do you do? 
Who do you contact if you need more water? 
Can you get more water from other sources? 
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No: How do you ensure that you get enough water? 
Who do you contact if you need more water? 
• Is the irrigation supply to your fields reliable? 
No: When is it most unreliable? 
Why do you think this is? 
What do you do when you don't receive water when expected? 
What do you think can be done to improve the reliability of your water supply? 
• Would you say that the distribution of water within your block is fair to all farmers? 
Yes: Why do you think that some farmers complain of unreliable and inadequate water 
supply? 
No: What do you think is causing this? 
Which farmers are worst affected? 
What do you think can be done to improve the situation? 
• Can you receive irrigation water whenever you need it? 
Yes: How do you ensure this is possible? 
No: Why do you think that this is? 
Water management 
• Do you have any sense of ownership of the irrigation scheme? 
• What responsibilities do you have to the running of the scheme? 
• Can you open and close the turnout to your fields? 
Yes: Is there always enough water in the canal for water to flow onto your fields? 
No: How do you get enough water? 
No: How does water reach your fields? 
What problems does this create? 
What do you think can be done to improve the situation? 
B: 68 
APPENDIX B:l - Farmer semi-structured interview guide 
• Can you drain water from your fields without difficulty? 
Yes: How do you do this? 
No: What is the problem? 
What can be done about it? 
• What techniques do you use to manage the water in your fields? 
• Have you constructed any batas in your fields? 
Yes: What is the width and height of these batas? 
How often do you maintain them? 
Why are batas important for managing water in your fields? 
No: Why not? 
Farm management 
• What planting method do you use? 
Why do you use this method? 
• What water levels are required in your fields for each cropping stage? 
• When is the best time to apply weedicides? 
• What is your average net yield in the dry season? 
• What is your average net yield in the wet season? 
• What is your average cost of production? 
• How much do you pay for water per year? 
• Is all of your household income from farming? 
No: What other employment do you or your household do? 
Do you think that this is likely to increase in the future? Why? 
• Do your children wish to inherit and farm your land? 
No: What will happen to your land? 
B: 69 
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Participation/Co-operation 
• Are you a member of any organisations? 
Yes: Which organisations are you a member of? 
How long have you been a member? 
Who was responsible for setting up thislthese organisations? 
Do you hold any position of responsibility in this/these organisations? 
What is the main function ofthis/these organisations? 
How often do you attend meetings by this/these organisation? 
Do you gain any advantages or disadvantages from your membership? 
No: Which organisations do you think are useful for farmers? 
Why are you not a member? 
Do you think that farmers which are members gain any advantages or disadvantages 
from their membership? 
• Do you have any contact with MADA staff? 
Yes: Are MADA staff able to assist you with you irrigation difficulties? 
Which staff do you think are most helpful? Why? 
What advice have you sought from MADA? Has this been useful? What was the 
outcome? 
What can be done to improve the assistance given to you by MADA? 
No: Why have you not met with any MADA staff? 
How do you think that MADA can improve your irrigation difficulties? 
• Have you met with any local farmer leaders? 
Yes: Why? 
Were they helpful? 
• Have you ever attended any training programmes offered by MADA? 
Yes: Which ones? 
Were they useful? 
APPENDIX B:l - Farmer semi-structured interview guide 
Have you adopted any oftheir recommendations? 
No: Have you heard about these programmes? 
Yes: Why have you not attended any of these programmes? 
• What do you think about Group Farming and Mini-estates in the Muda region? 
• Are you a member of a Kelompok or Mini-estate? 
Yes: How long have you been a member? 
How many farmers are involved? 
Have you gained any advantages from membership? 
Why do you think that other farmers do not want to be involved in Group farming? 
No: Do you plan to become a member in the future? 
Yes: What advantages do you think can be gained from group farming? 
Do other farmers in your block want to become involved in group farming? 
How many? 
Why do you think that other farmers do not wish to be involved in group 
farming? 
No: Why do you not wish to become involved in group farming? 
• Do you co-operate with other farmers in your irrigation block? 
Yes: Why is this important? 
What happens when farmers do not co-operate? 
What benefits do you gain from co-operation? 
Have you had any disagreements with other farmers about water? 
No: Why do you not need to co-operate? 
Have you had any disagreements with other farmers about water? 
• What role do you think that the Farmers Association has in assisting farmers with their 
farming and irrigation? 
• Have you ever heard of Water User Associations? 
Yes: Do you think they could be of benefit to Muda farmers? 
B: 71 
APPENDIX B:l- Farmer semi-structured interview guide 
Why? and How? 
Social Organisation 
• Do you hold any positions of responsibility in the community? 
Yes: 
No: 
What are these? 
Do these responsibilities assist you in your farming activities and irrigation? 
How? 
Do you think that these farmers receive additional benefits for their farming due to 
these positions? 
What positions are most influential in the community? 
How does this assist their farming activities? 
Attitudes and Policies 
• Do you think that the government subsidy policies are adequate? Why? 
• How do you think the government could improve the welfare of the farmers? 
• What do you think of the irrigation schedule set by MADA? 
B: 72 
• How do you think that MADA could improve the management of the scheme to benefit 
farmers? 
APPENDIX B:2 - .MADA semi-structured interview guide 
LARGE SCALE IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
MADA KEY INFORMANT QUESTIONS 
Role and responsibilities 
• What position do you hold in MADA? 
• How many years have you been working for MADA? 
• What are your main responsibilities? 
• On average, how much time do you spend in the field? 
• Do you have regular contact with the farmers? 
If Yes: What are the main concerns expressed by farmers? 
Are you able to assist the farmers in solving these problems? 
If No: Why do you not have contact with the farmers? 
MADA policies and management 
• Do you know what policies are currently being pursued by MADA? 
If Yes: What are these policies? 
How is MADA implementing these policies? 
What are the expected benefits of these policies? 
Have any of these benefits been realised? 
• What policies do you think will be adopted in the future? 
What affect will these have on the farming practices in the Muda region? 
• Which other MADA officers do you regularly have contact with? 
B: 73 
• What is the procedure for the passing of information from yourself to other MADA staff? 
• How is information passed from MADA to farmers? 
How do you think that this can be improved? 
• How is information transferred from farmers to MADA staff? 
How do you think that this can be improved? 
• Would you say that you are accountable to the farmers or to MADA? 
APPENDIX B:2 - MADA semi-structured interview guide B: 74 
• What would you say is the biggest problem being faced in the Muda irrigation scheme at 
present? 
Water management 
• Has the Muda II scheme achieved all the expected benefits of its design? 
What advantages do Muda II farmers gain over Non-Muda II farmers? 
• What are the operation and maintenance responsibilities of MAD A? 
• What are the operation and maintenance responsibilities of the farmers? 
• How is water allocated in the Muda scheme? 
If farmers require more water than is allocated is this possible? 
If Yes: What is the procedure? 
• How is the water distributed within the scheme? 
How is this distribution managed and organised? 
Would you say that the distribution of water is fair to all farmers? 
• Do the farmers receive enough water for their crop requirements? 
If Yes: Why do some farmers complain of an inadequate water supply? 
What can be done to improve this? 
If No: Why is this? 
Which are the worst affected areas? 
What do you think can be done to improve this? 
• Are there any disagreements with farmers over the supply of water? 
If Yes: How are these disagreements solved? 
• What level of efficiency is achieved in the Muda scheme? 
How do you think that the efficiency of the scheme could be improved? 
• What are the main water management responsibilities of the farmers? 
Would you say that farmers are good managers of water? 
If No: What do you think can be done to improve this? 
• Is MADA able to supply enough water to meet the needs of all farmers? 
APPENDIX B:2 - MADA semi-structured interview guide 
If No: What affect does this have on the irrigation schedule? 
• How often are there problems with the irrigation schedule? 
What percentage of the water that you request do you actually receive? 
What happens when there is a breakdown in communication for the request of 
water? 
What can MADA do to improve this? 
• How do you regulate the amount of water abstracted by farmers in a season? 
What can be done about the illegal removal of water by farmers? 
Do farmers try to persuade you to release water which has not been allocated? 
• How often are the control gates altered by the farmers? 
What affect does this have on the management of the irrigation schedule? 
B: 75 
• What do you do when you observe farmers abstracting water illegally or altering the control 
gate settings? 
Participation/Co-operation 
• Which organisations do you think are most useful for farmers? 
• Are most farmers members of the PPK? 
Why do you think that some farmers do not wish to become members of the PPK? 
What role does MAD A have in the running of the PPK? 
• What other organisations assist the development of the Muda region? 
How does MADA link with these organisations? 
• How important is Group farming to the future of the Muda irrigation scheme? 
Why do you think that many group farming projects are inactive? 
Why do you think that some farmers are reluctant to join the group farming 
programme? 
What is MADA doing to try to improve this? 
• In general would you say that farmers are co-operative in their farming activities? 
If No: Why do you think this is? 
What can be done to improve the co-operation of fanners? 
APPENDIX B:2 - .MADA semi-structured interview guide B: 76 
• How do farmers participate in the running of the irrigation scheme? 
Are farmers represented at the project level and involved in the decision making process? 
Why do you think that some farmers are reluctant to participate in the running of the 
scheme? 
What is MADA doing to improve this? 
Farm mana!!ement 
• Would you say that the farmers properly maintain their batas? 
If No: Why do you think that some fanners do not properly maintain their batas? 
What do you think can be done to improve this? 
• What would you say distinguishes a good farmer from a bad farmer? 
• What have been the advantages of direct seeding in the Muda region? 
• Why do you think that farmers are reluctant to adopt dry seeding? 
What can MADA do to increase the use of dry seeding in the Muda region? 
• What do you think can be done to improve the current weed problem facing the farmers? 
• How do you think that the current problem of low and high land can be overcome? 
Attitudes and policies 
• What are the current government policies towards the agricultural sector? 
How is this likely to affect the farmers in the Muda region? 
• Would you say that the current subsidies offered by the government are adequate? 
• How do you think that government can improve their assistance given to farmers? 
• How do you think that MADA can improve the management of the irrigation scheme to the 
benefit of the farmers? 
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APPENDIX C:1 - Figure 2: Wet seeding cropping schedule, 1996 c: 78 
Proposed date Time Action taken Note 
(1996 - 1 
24/09 2 DBB Use delivered fertiliser 1-2 bags (25kg) cultivated 
into the soil 
26/09 o Day Sow the germinated seed into Rate: 20kg/rlg 
the field 
26/09 - 29/09 0-4 DAB Use pre-emergence 'Sofit' - rate: 100ml + 3 gals 
weedicide to control for water (500ml/rlg) 
weeds. Maintain the field in 
wet condition 
30109 - 02/10 5-7 DAB Use post-emergence 'Santunil' - rate: 150mll 3 gal 
weedicide to control weeds. pump (5 pumpslrlg) 
Maintain the field in wet 
condition 
05/10 - 10/10 10 -15 DAB Flood the field Make sure the depth is 3-5 
cm 
15/10-20/10 20-25 DAB Do the first fertilising + Use 3 gags of mixed fertiliser 
'Mipround' 6.5 gals to control + 1.5 bags miproundlrlg 
stem borers (mipround 2kg per bag) 
15/10 20 DAB 1 st round of rodenticide Use 'matikusldrat bait' - rate: 
control 20 cubeslrlg 
22/10 27 DAB 2nd round of rodenticide - as above-
control 
23/10 - 25/10 28-30 DAB Do field surveillance to check If necessary use insecticide 
pest problem according to the advice 
depending on the 
seriousness of the problem 
25/10 - 30/10 30-35 DAB Use Amigro and Bicomin to rate: 1 OOml Amigro + 3ml 
encourage and increase Bicomin/3 gal pump 
better grain filling (5/pumps/rlg) 
25/10 - 04/11 30 - 40 DAB If there is still a weed problem According to the rate 
especially the 'sambau', recommended 
'r.miang' and 'c.cina' use 
Whip SINabu 
29/10 34 DAB 3rd round of rondenticide According to the 1 st round 
control 
04/10 - 09/11 40-45 DAB Do the 2nd fertilising with For every rig - use 112 bag 
Urea and compound fertiliser Urea + 1/2 bag mixed 
Do the field surveillance with fertiliser 
special focus on stem borers If necessary use pesticide as 
and other pests advised. 
Use Apploud 10% insecticide Rate: Apploud 10% 3.5 
and Moncat fungicide to tablespoons + Moncat 1 table 
control Brown Plant Hopper spoon/3 gallpump ( 5 
(BPH) pumps/rlg) 
05/11 41 DAB 4th round rodenticide control As rodenticide control above 
12/11 48 DAB 5th round rodenticide control - as above-
14/11 50 DAB Do manual weeding 
19/11 55 DAB 6th round rodenticide control - as above-
25/11 61 DAB 7th round rodenticide control - as above-
26/11 - 04/12 62 - 69 DAB Do field surveillance with If necessary use 
special observation on BPH, Broadox/Laybacid/Diafuran/E 
Green Leaf Hoppers (GLH) ndosulfanlBassa - as 
and Stem Borers recommended 
APPENDIX C:1- Figure 2: Wet seeding cropping schedule, 1996 c: 79 
29/11 - 05/12 65-70 DAB 
03/12 68 DAB 
05/12 - 17/12 71 - 83 DAB 
09/12 - 24/12 75 - 90 DAB 
22/12 - 06/01 88-103 DAB 
3rd round fertiliser application 
with Urea + Wonderful 
8th (final) round rodenticide 
control 
If weed is still problematic do 
manual weeding 
Use insecticide 'Padan 50 
WP' if there are BPH, GLH or. 
other leaf hoppers 
To increase grain filling and 
weight, use Amigrow and 
Bicomin 
Do field surveillance with 
special focus on plant 
hoppers and neck rot disease 
13/01 - 18/01 110 - 115 DAB Drain off water in the fields 
24/01 - 28/01 121-125 DAB Be for 
Where: DBB = Days Before Broadcasting 
DAB = Days After Broadcasting 
rig = relong 
gal = gallon 
For 1 rig use 1/2 bag Urea + 
3/4 bag Wonderful. 
- as above-
Weedicide is totally prohibited 
at this time 
Use PAdan 50 WP - rate: 4 
tables spoons/ 3 gal. 15 
gal/rig 
rate: 1 OOml Amigro + 3ml 
Bicomine/3 gal. 15 gal/rig. 
If necessary use Broadox at 
the rate recommended 
Figure 2: Crop activity programme for the 2nd season, 1996. 
Source: MADA, BII 
APPENDIX C:l- Figure 3: Irrigation scheduleflow chart c: 80 
I 
Collection of weekly field activities data in each compartment Marking 
on plan activities status fortnightly in each compartment in the 
District. 
1 
;---
Summary of weekly field activities data of whole District Marking on 
-plan activities status of whole District fortnightly 
Submission of field activities Preliminary discussion of 
data weekly and plan showing schedule by water supply 
activities status fortnightly to committee at District Level basing 
control centre by District. on collected field activities data. 
Monitoring of field activities Submission of preliminary 
forecasting of harvesting pattern schedule to control centre by 
of whole project by control District. 
centre 
Review and summary of preliminary schedule and Preparation of 
4 alternative schedule. Projection of reservoir storage implication of +--
alternative by control centre. 
Discussion of Alternative Schedule 
and reservoir storage condition. Meeting of Water Supply Committee at 
Recommendation of schedule(s) by District Level. Discuss Schedule(s) 
Water Supply Committee at recommended. 
Headquarters Level. 
Preparation of working paper on Confirm by District. Any further schedule(s) recommended by Control 
amendment to Control Centre. Centre and submission to Top 
Management. 
General manager to present 
Schedules to Meeting between 
Preparation of paper on Top Management and Farmers' 
planting schedule and Leaders and decide on Final 
submission to Ministry by Schedule. 
Top Management 
I 
Printing of planting schedule/handout by Top Management and distribution to District 
Officer/Farmer cooperatives/other government agencies 
Figure 3: Flow chart for the formulation of the irrigation schedule 
Source: Chaw and Seng, 1989:41-42. 
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Irrigation management, concepts and models 
Irrigation management activities 
The model articulated by Uphoff (1986) and Uphoff et al (1991) focuses on the activities required 
to accomplish certain tasks in the management of irrigation schemes. The authors provide a 
matrix to show how the activities of various elements of irrigation management interact in order 
to secure the general objectives of increased production and productivity, improved water 
distribution, a reduction in conflict, greater resource mobilisation and sustained system 
performance (Uphoff et aI, 1991 :59). The three management activities considered relate directly 
to: the use of water including its acquisition, allocation, distribution and drainage; the physical 
structures required to control the water including their design, construction, operation and 
maintenance; and the organisation of actors for the management of the water and the structures, 
incorporating decision-making, resource mobilisation, communication and conflict resolution 
(Uphoff 1986) (Figure 1). 
The model is a means of understanding both the variety of activities involved and the interactive 
nature of these sets of activities. With respect to interaction, for example, the organisation must 
decide how to mobilise resources for the design and construction of the control structures in order 
to facilitate effective water distribution. Likewise, the organisation must operate and maintain the 
structures for the acquisition and allocation of the water resource (Martin et aI, 1986). However, 
because the examination of activities is very prescriptive, the model does not offer any 
explanation of either the types of organisations or institutions required to secure these activities, 
or any clear recognition of the objectives of these institutions and organisations (Vincent, 1995). 
In addition, the model does not assess how and by whom activities can be organised. Instead: 
'the model indirectly standardizes potential tasks, and seems to have fuelled 
belief that there are ideal, standard irrigation management arrangements where 
production objectives and social principals emphasize intensive, market-
oriented output and water rights' (Vincent, 1995:94) 
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As a direct consequence of this standardisation, the Uphoff model does not incorporate the 
diversity of objectives or the institutional and organisational arrangements which interact in the 
daily management of irrigation schemes. In addition, such standardisation does not facilitate the 
inclusion of the livelihood and resource strategies of irrigators or the institutional and personal 
strategies of managers. Likewise, because the model is directly focused on the management of 
the irrigation system per se it does not embody the influence of the wider political economy on 
the setting of objectives and the implementation of programmes, rules and procedures. 
Furthermore, the model fails to recognise the distinction between the formal processes and 
procedures (how the system is meant to be managed, operated and governed) and the informal 
practices of those actors engaged in the daily governance, management and operation of this 
system (how the system is actually managed, operated and governed). 
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Criteria, objectives and causal chains 
The second influential approach to the study of irrigation management is provided by Chambers 
(1988) and developed from his dichotomy between objectives and criteria in understanding 
irrigation performance (see chapter seven). Within this work, Chambers regards the ultimate 
objective of irrigation management to be one of human well-being (Figure 2). This approach 
recognises the complexity of irrigation management which is both internal and external to the 
irrigation system, hence the identification of rural and urban 'well-being' as the ultimate 
objectives of irrigation management. By explicitly stating this, Chambers is able to argue that the 
criteria of productivity, equity and stability are merely means to achieve human 'well-being' 
(Chambers, 1988:29-40). In addition, by adopting a continuum approach for his cause and effect 
model, he recognises that as the analysis moves towards the 'ultimate goal' of irrigation it 
becomes more difficult to establish any direct causal relationships (Hvidt, 1997). 
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The advantage of this model is its ability to move beyond production and productivity as an end in 
itself by embracing a broader perception of outcomes. However, although it is less prescriptive 
than the 'irrigation management model' above, it suffers from similar inadequacies in 
incorporating; the wider livelihood strategies of actors; the diversity of objectives; the 
management strategies employed to meet these objectives; and the types of organisations and 
objectives required to secure 'human well-being'. In particular, it is interesting that the objectives 
of irrigation management are conceptualised as belonging to the wider political economy but the 
criteria required to achieve this are not. As a consequence, the model does not incorporate the 
role of the political economy in the decision-making process. This is clear by the absence of a 
policy design framework in the examination by Chambers (1988) of the various domains, 
dimensions and linkages of canal irrigation which affect performance (Figure 3). Although three 
domains are presented in the model, there is a clear absence of any institutional or organisational 
influence beyond an irrigation-agency linkage. This in effect omits the role of policy and policy 
design from the domains and linkages of irrigation systems. 
HUMAN 
DOMAIN 
System 
Boundary 
MARKETS 
BIO-ECONOMIC 
DOMAIN 
Figure 3: Domains and linkages of a canal irrigation system 
Source: Chambers, 1988: 44 
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Organisational coordination 
The third framework is provided by Clyma and Lowdermilk (1988) (Figure 4). Like Chambers, 
the authors regard 'well-being' to be the ultimate objective of irrigated agriculture. Unlike 
Chambers, however, this framework focuses specifically on 'farmer well-being' with the general 
objectives of irrigation management being: productivity, resource conservation, appropriate 
financial return on investment, and effective water control which is reliable, equitable and 
adequate I. In particular, it is argued that these criteria are fundamental to successful irrigation 
management: 
'In other words, for a system to perform well, the managers must secure an 
adequate, dependable and equitable water supply and a yield that is 
appropriately related to potential yield. Also, resource conservation is essential 
if irrigated agriculture is to be sustained (counteracting such problems as water 
logging and salinity), and incomes must be sufficient to pay costs to 
governments and farmers if irrigation is to be sustained (financial 
sustainability), (Hvidt, 1997:48) 
To achieve these objectives, the authors identify two processes which must be integrated within 
irrigation management; firstly, it must involve fanners in the decision-making process; and 
secondly, there must be coordination in organisational activity (Clyma & Lowdermilk, 1988: 10-
11). 
Although the model is useful for expanding our understanding of the factors which influence 
effective management it does not by itself establish why rules exist and conflicts emerge. In 
addition, although the model recognises the requirement for farmer involvement and 
organisational coordination this does not establish the complex objectives of the various actors in 
these organisations or the way these interact. Likewise, the model provides limited understanding 
of the broader livelihood and resource strategies employed by organisations, farmers and 
individuals which impact on, and are impacted by, irrigation management. Furthermore, in 
focusing on 'farmer involvement' there is no indication of the 'level' at which such involvement 
should occur, and the formalised nature of this involvement. 
1 Although the authors regard water control, return on investment, productivity and resource conservation 
as being objectives of irrigation development, in response to the arguments of Chambers (1988), they are 
regarded here as criteria to achieve 'farmer well-being'. 
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Governance, institutions and organisations 
c: 88 
The final two bodies of work do not provide descriptive models, as such, but are more concerned 
with articulating a broader conceptual understanding of irrigation management. The first of these 
is the institutional and organisational conceptual approach of Coward (1980; 1991), Coward's 
interest in the role of institutions and organisations was developed from his earlier model of 
hydraulic tenure and hydraulic property in which he saw the organisational arrangements of 
irrigation management as being 'a reflection of the underlying property grid, formed during the 
initial period of construction' impacting on the resultant water rights and maintenance activities of 
irrigators, (Vincent, 1995:94), From this work, he developed a conceptual argument which 
identified irrigation systems as technical structures imposed on the ecological landscape, which 
influence the pattern of interaction and organisation of government agencies and water-users, 
Using this framework, Coward argues that the study of irrigation management needs to confront 
the issue of governance, involving the critical role of institutions and organisations in the 
development and management of schemes, Coward's work, therefore, expands on the 'irrigation 
activities model' of Uphoff (1986) by explicitly matching the rules, roles and social groups which 
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emerge from institutions and organisations with the critical tasks of irrigation management (Table 
1). 
Task 
and 
organisational Water Water System Resource Conflict 
_____ el~me_~~ ____ ?cquisit!<:)~ 
Key rules Rules for 
acquiring 
extra water 
supplies for 
the systems 
allocation maintenance mobilization management 
Rules for------Rure-s for-whar-- Rules-fOr----~--Rules for-------~ 
allocating repairs need mobilizing avoiding or 
water to be done, labor, resolving 
between sub where, and by materials, disputes 
units of whom money or between 
system, other systems, 
farms, and so resources zones of a 
on needed to system or 
perform individuals 
system tasks 
and for 
responding to 
shortfalls in 
resources 
-Tm-porta-nt--------Roles for---------Roles for Ro'iesfcir--------Roles -fo-r-----Roies for--
roles planning and establishing identifying implementing mediating 
implementing and maintenance and disputes, 
water implementing jobs and monitoring the making 
acquisition water supervising resource judgements, 
activities allocation repairs mobilization and enforcing 
policies process sanctions 
-Signi-fTca-nt "----- GroupsthaT-----Group·s-thaf-----Groupsthat----Grou-psthat-------G-rQUps-thaT---
social groups seek influence provide collect participate in 
additional water routine or specific settling 
water supplies allocation emergency resources disputes and 
policies and repairs to in enforcing 
implement system sanctions 
water 
distribution 
Table 1: Irrigation system tasks, by institutional and organisational element 
Source: Coward, 1991:51 
In so doing, Coward regards the term 'institution' as a normative concept, whereby it is: 
'a concept associated with ideal behaviour and expectations and can be used as 
a generic concept for the variety of rules that help to pattern social behaviour: 
norms, folkways, mores, customs, convention, fashion, etiquette, law' (Coward, 
1980:18) 
These patterns of behaviour then interact between the different social groups which creates the 
formal and informal social structure. In patiicular, Coward uses an ecological perspective to 
establish the reasons for celiain actions, rules, roles and social interactions which regards the 
physical and natural habitat as influencing the institutional and organisational patterns which 
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emerge. This approach is very useful for understanding the relationship between institutions and 
organisations at the 'interface' of irrigation management and development. By articulating the 
specified rules, roles and groups, the correlation between what Coward refers to as the 
institutional element (what people believe should occur) and the structural element (what actually 
occurs) can be explored. This is in line with the theoretical arguments expanded on in chapter 
two. However, because Coward's approach focuses on the dichotomy between users and rule 
makers it does not explore the ultimate objectives of irrigation management. As a conceptual 
framework it is unable to establish why these rules, roles or groups exist and, therefore, does not 
facilitate the integration of the policy design process in establishing the' institutional element' or 
the resultant 'structural element'. 
The final body of work draws on the concepts of institutions and governance but instead of trying 
to identify the relationship between these factors and irrigation activities, the work of Tang and 
Ostrom (1993) focuses on the means by which institutions are created in the management of 
schemes. In so doing, the authors define an institution as being: 
'the rules actually used (rules-in-use or working rules) by a set of individuals to 
organize repetitive activities that produce outcomes affecting those individuals 
and potentially affecting others' (Tang & Ostrom, 1993 :4; Ostrom, 1990). 
Institutions in this context are not just organisations but manifest themselves through 
arrangements in society which are dependent on organisational structures, recognised procedures, 
rules, norms and values in the pattern of social action. In addition, however, it should be noted 
that institutions are socially constructed entities which are constantly re-negotiated and dependent 
on the amalgamation of the formal and informal aspects of social organisation in determining 
actor strategies. 
The 'unwritten' rules which are informal and often misunderstood have not been explicitly stated 
by Tang and Ostrom (1993). What the authors do articulate, however, is the importance of three 
sets of institutional rules which impact on the governance and management of irrigation schemes, 
and hence their performance. The first of these are the 'operational rules' relating to the day-to-
day decision making of users and suppliers with respect to water, operation and management. The 
second are 'collective-choice rules' which are the rules about how the system should be managed, 
and the third are the 'constitutional-choice rules' which effect who is eligible to participate and 
who decides on the rules of operation (Tang & Ostrom, 1993: 5-6). By articulating these three 
'rule types', Tang and Ostrom distinguish between governance (who establishes the rules) and 
management (how these rules are implemented). Such a distinction is important because it 
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describes the extent to which irrigation schemes are either controlled by government 
bureaucracies or are self-governing (Ostrom, 1992). What it does not do, however, is extrapolate 
to the policy environment within which government agencies and users negotiate the 
'operational', 'collective-choice' and 'constitutional-choice' rules. In addition, the authors do not 
establish either the institutional framework necessary to facilitate actor negotiation or the reasons 
why the formal and informal rules exist, and hence why informal practices emerge. 
APPENDIX D:1 - Figure 1: Water supply data/orm (Muda I) - English 
Season: 
FORM 1 : WATER SUPPLY THROUGH CHO AND PUMP 
CLARE GORTON: PhD: USM. 
1/97 Date: ~_ (dIm) 
Block: LBLBD6 DrainlCanal officer: 
1. Rain Station No. __ Tunjang Drain: __ . __ (mm) 
2. CHO: 
Drainl Size Water flow Time of CHO Difference Actual Volume 
Canal of requirement reading gate in water water supplied 
CHO (cusec) (hIm) opening level flow (acre-
(feet) (cm) (em) (cusec) feet) 
LBLB6 
3. Pump: 
Code Pump No. Pump Water flow Length of Volume 
capacity requirement use supplied 
(cusec) (cusec) (hours) (cm-Ha) 
1 
2 
3 
--
, ---
-
Data recorded by: 
Data checked by: 
Figure 1: Muda I water supply data collection form - English 
D: 92 
Total 
supply 
(acre-
feet) 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 2: Water supply dataform (MI) - Bahasa Melayu 
Musim: 
Blok: 
BORANG 1: BEKALAN AIR MELALUI CHO DAN PAM 
CLARE GORTON: PhD: USM. 
1/97 
LBLBD6 
Tarikh: 
Pengawas Taliair: 
--.!_ (h/b) 
1. Catatan Hujan Stesen No. __ Tunjang Drain: __ . __ (mm) 
2. CHO: 
Taliair Saiz Kadaralir Masa u/s dIs Pembukaan Perbezaan Kadaralir 
CHO Kehendaki Baeaan Pintu CHO Paras Air Sebenar 
(kaki) (eusee) (hIm) (em) (em) (eusee) 
LBLBD6 B.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
3. Pam: 
Isapadu 
dibekal 
(ekar-
kaki) 
Kod No. Pam Kapasiti Pam Kadaralir Perjalanan Isapadu 
(cusec) Kehendaki Pam dibekal 
(cusec) Uam) (cm-Ha) 
1 
2 
3 
Data di rekod oleh: 
Data di semak oleh: 
Figure 2: Muda I water supply data collection form - Bahasa Melayu 
D: 93 
Jumlah 
dibekal 
(ekar-
kaki) 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 3: Water supply dataform (MIl) - English 
Season: 
FORM 1: WATER SUPPLY THROUGH CHO AND PUMP 
CLARE GORTON: PhD: USM. 
1/97 Date: 
_/_ (d/m) 
Block: LBLBD7 Drain/Canal officer: 
1. Rain Station No. __ Tunjang Drain: __ . __ (mm) 
2. CHO: 
Drainl Canal Size of Waterflow Time of CHO Difference Actual Volume 
CHO requirement reading gate in water water supplied 
(feet) (cusec) (hIm) opening level flow (acre-feet) 
(cm) (cm) (cusec) 
MAIN CHO 
LBLBD 7/1 
LBLBD 7/2 
T1/2 
T1/3 
T1/4 
T2/2 
Data recorded by: 
Data checked by: 
Figure 3: Muda II water supply data collection form - English 
D: 94 
Total 
supply 
(acre-feet) 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 4: Water supply data form (MIl) - Bahasa Melayu 
Musim: 
Blok: 
BORANG 1: BEKALAN AIR MELALUI CHO DAN PAM 
CLARE GORTON: PhD: USM. 
1/97 
LBLBD7 
Tarikh: 
Pengawas Taliair: 
_1_ (h/b) 
1. Catatan Hujan Stesen No. __ Tunjang Drain: __ . __ (mm) 
2. CHO: 
Tailair Saiz Kadaralir Masa u/s dIs Pembukaan Perbezaan Kadaralir Isapadu 
CHO Kehendaki Baeaan (m) (m) Pintu CHO Paras Air sebenar dibekal 
(kaki) (eusee) G/m) (em) (em) (eusee) (ekar -kaki) 
MAIN a.OOam 
CHO 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T1/1 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T 1/2 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T1/2 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T1/3 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T1/4 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
T2/2 a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
Data di rekod oleh: 
Data di semak oleh: 
Figure 4: Muda II water supply data collection form - Bahasa Melayu 
D: 95 
Jumlah 
dibekal 
(ekar-kaki) 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 5: Field water level dataform (MI) - English 
WATER LEVEL DATA RECORDING FORM 
CLARE GORTON: PhD USM. 
Observation Form 2: LBLBD6 
D: 96 
Water depth readings, planting method and planting situation in LBLBD6: Muda I Block: Off 
season: 1997. 
Code Lot No. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
*Planting method code 
01 = Wet seeding 
02 = Dry seeding 
03 = Transplanting 
2002 
1042 
1031 
886 
861 
1578 
1559 
1534 
2007 
1827 
1826 
1523 
1579 
1589 
1210 
1166 
1602 
-
1239 
1134 
1249 
2313 
1824 
1812 
1802 
04 = Volunteer seeding 
Date:_I_ (dim) 
Planting 
Method 
Code* 
--
Time of Water level 
reading (cm) 
(him) 
----
**Planting situation code 
01 = Fallow 
02 = Land preparation 
03 = Sowing 
04 = Padi growth 
05 = Flowering 
Planting 
Situation 
Code** 
--
06 = MaturationlRipening 
07 = Harvest 
Data recorded by ________ _ 
( 
Data checked by _______ _ 
( 
Figure 5: Muda I field water level data collection form - English 
APPENDIX D:1 - Figure 6: Field water level data form (MI) - Bahasa Melayu D: 97 
BORANG REKOD DATA PARAS AIR 
CLARE GORTON: PhD USM. 
Pemerhatian Borang 2: LBLBD6 
Bacaan kedalaman air, cara tanaman dan kedudukan tanaman dalam LBLBD6: Blok Muda I: 
ISU A: Luar: 1997. 
Kod No Lot. 
01 2002 
02 1042 
03 1031 
04 886 
05 861 
06 1578 
07 1559 
08 1534 
09 2007 
10 1827 
11 1826 
12 1523 
13 1579 
14 1589 
15 1210 
16 1166 
17 1602 
18 -
19 1239 
20 1134 
21 1249 
22 2313 
23 1824 
24 1812 
25 1802 
*Kod Cara Tanaman 
01 = Tabur Basah 
02 = Tabur Kering 
03 = Menanam 
04 = Padi Batat 
Tarikh:-'_ (h/b) 
Kod Cara 
Tanaman* 
--
Masa Paras Air Kod 
Bacaan (cm) Kedudukan 
U/m) Tanaman** 
**Kod Kedudukan Tanaman 
01 = Terbiar 
02 = Penyediaan Tanah 
03 = Menabur 
04 = Tumbuhan Padi 
05 = Peringkat Berbunga 
06 = PeringkatMasak 
07 = Menuai 
Data di rekod oleh: _______ _ 
( 
Data di semak oleh: _______ _ 
( 
Figure 6: Muda I field water level data collection form - Bahasa Melayu 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 7: Field water level dataform (MIl) - English 
Observation Form LBLBD7 
WATER LEVEL DATA RECORDING FORM 
CLARE GORTON: PhD USM. 
D: 98 
Water depth readings, planting method and planting situation in LBLBD7: Muda II Block: ISU 
A: Off season: 1997. 
Code Lot No. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
*Planting method code 
01 = Wet seeding 
02 = Dry seeding 
03 = Transplanting 
1968 
1015 
2285 
1001 
-
1020 
853 
848 
812 
2190 
1970 
856 
849 
844 
997 
1971 
868 
864 
814 
817 
868 
866 
1493 
1495 
1474 
04 = Volunteer seeding 
Data recorded by: 
( 
Date:-,_ (d/m) 
Planting 
method 
code* 
--
Time of Water level Planting 
reading (cm) Situation 
(h/m) Code** 
---- --
**Planting situation code 
01 = Fallow 
02 = Land preparation 
03 = Sowing 
04 = Padi growth 
05 = Flowering 
06 = Maturation/Ripening 
07 = Harvest 
Data checked by: 
Figure 7: Muda II field water level data collection form - English 
APPENDIX D:l - Figure 8: Field water level dataform (MIl) - Bahasa Melayu D: 99 
BORANG REKOD DATA PARAS AIR 
CLARE GORTON: PhD USM. 
Pemerhatian Borang 2: LBLBD7 
Bacaan kedalaman air, cara tanaman dan kedudukan tanaman dalam LBLBD7: Blok Muda II: 
ISU A: Luar: 1997. 
Kod No Lot. 
01 1968 
02 1015 
03 2285 
04 1001 
05 -
06 1020 
07 853 
08 848 
09 812 
10 2190 
11 1970 
12 856 
13 849 
14 844 
15 997 
16 1971 
17 868 
18 864 
19 814 
20 817 
21 868 
22 866 
23 1493 
24 1495 
25 1474 
*Kod Cara Tanaman 
01 = Tabur Basah 
02 = Tabur Kering 
03 = Menanam 
04 = Padi Batat 
Tarikh:_I_ (h/b) 
Kod Cara 
Tanaman* 
--
Masa Paras Air Kod j 
Kedudukan I Bacaan (cm) 
U/m) Tanaman** 
**Kod Kedudukan Tanaman 
01 = Terbiar 
02 = Penyediaan Tanah 
03 = Menabur 
04 = Tumbuhan Padi 
05 = Peringkat Berbunga 
06 = Peringkat Masak 
07 = Menuai 
i 
Data di rekod oleh: _______ _ 
( 
Data di semak oleh: 
-----------( 
Figure 8: Muda II field water level data collection form - Bahasa Melayu 
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APPENDIX D:2 - Table 3: Weekly FWD's during growth (Muda J) D: 102 
Weekly Water depth Growth Count Weekly % 
Grow 
<-300 
-100 -50 0 50 100 150 >150 15 to 0 
06/03/97 06/03/97 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27/03/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10/04/97 10/04/97 
17/04/97 0 4 8 9 2 0 17104197 16 
24/04/97 0 1 27 56 26 36 17 12 24/04/97 45 
01/05/97 0 0 0 0 2 24 56 43 01/05/97 66 
08/05/97 0 0 0 0 2 61 42 20 08/05/97 84 
15/05/97 0 0 0 0 2 17 59 47 15/05/97 62 
22/05/97 0 0 0 0 2 62 55 31 22105197 79 
29/05/97 0 0 3 0 0 69 48 30 29/05/97 78 
05/06/97 0 0 1 0 1 54 44 25 05/06/97 79 
12/06/97 0 5 0 0 50 48 46 12/06/97 66 
19/06/97 0 2 1 3 21 42 80 19/06/97 44 
26/06/97 0 0 0 0 1 37 56 54 26/06/97 64 
03/07/97 0 0 0 0 26 58 28 15 03/07/97 88 
10/07/97 0 0 0 0 13 45 3 -7 10/07/97 90 
17107197 0 0 0 0 9 6 3 3 17/07/97 86 
24/07/97 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 24/07/97 100 
31/07/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31107197 
07/08/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 
14/08/97 
21/08/97 
28/08/97 
04/09/97 
Table 3: Weekly field water depths during growth (Muda I) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 4: Weekly FWD's during flowering (Muda J) D: 103 
Weekly Water depth Flower Count Weekly % 
Flower 
<-300 -100 -50 a 50 100 150 >150 1() to-5 
06/03/97 06103197 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27103/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10/04/97 10104/97 
17104197 a 0 a 0 0 a 0 a 17/04/97 
24/04/97 0 0 a 0 0 a 0 0 24/04/97 
01/05/97 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 01/05/97 
08/05/97 0 a a 0 0 0 0 0 08/05/97 
15/05/97 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 15/05/97 
22/05/97 0 a 0 0 0 0 a 0 22105197 
29/05/97 0 0 a 0 a a a 0 29/05/97 
05/06/97 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05/06/97 
12106197 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 12106/97 
19/06/97 a a 0 a a 0 0 a 19/06/97 
26/06/97 0 0 0 a a 2 0 a 26/06/97 100 
03/07/97 0 0 0 1 12 10 0 a 03/07/97 100 
10107/97 0 0 1 18 34 2 0 10/07/97 95 
17107197 a a 2 a 27 38 1 1 17/07/97 94 
24/07/97 0 0 a 3 70 37 2 a 24/07/97 98 
31/07/97 a 0 16 21 7 2 a 0 31/07/97 65 
07/08/97 0 a a 3 a 0 0 0 07/08/97 100 
14/0B/97 
21/08/97 
2B/08/97 
04/09/97 
Table 4: Weekly field water depths during flowering (Muda I) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 5: Weekly FWD's during ripening (Muda J) D: 104 
Weekly Water depth Ripen Count Weekly % 
Ripen 
<·300 ·100 ·50 0 50 100 150 >150 5 to·l0 
06/03/97 06/03/97 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20103/97 20103/97 
27103/97 27/03/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10104/97 10104/97 
17104197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17/04/97 
24/04/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24/04/97 
01/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01/05/97 
08/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08/05/97 
15/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15/05/97 
22/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22105197 
29/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29/05/97 
05/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05/06/97 
12106197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12/06/97 
19/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19/06/97 
26/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26/06/97 
03/07/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03/07/97 
10107/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10/07/97 100 
17/07197 0 0 1 0 6 2 0 0 17/07/97 78 
24/07/97 0 0 5 0 33 7 0 0 24/07/97 84 
31/07/97 0 0 13 44 7 2 0 0 31/07/97 97 
07/08/97 0 0 6 33 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 100 
14/08/97 
21/08/97 
28/08/97 
04/09/97 
Table 5: Weekly field water depths during ripening (Muda I) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 6: Weekly FWD's during harvesting (Muda J) D: 105 
Weekly Water depth Harvest Count Weekly % 
Harvest 
<-300 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 >150 <-10 
06/03/97 06/03/97 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27/03/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10/04/97 10/04/97 
17104197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17/04/97 
24/04/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24/04/97 
01/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01/0si97 
08/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08/05/97 
15/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15/05/97 
22105197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22105/97 
29/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29/05/97 
05/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05/06/97 
12106197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12106/97 
19/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19/06/97 
26/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26/06/97 
03/07/97 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 03/07/97 
10/07/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10/07/97 
17107197 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 17/07/97 0 
24/07/97 0 2 0 3 8 0 0 0 24/07/97 15 
31/07/97 0 5 6 25 2 0 0 0 31/07/97 13 
07/08/97 0 0 6 25 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 0 
14/06/97 
21/08/97 
28/08/97 
04/09/97 
Table 6: Weekly field water depths during harvesting (Muda I) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 7: Weekly FWD's during growtlt (Muda II) D: 106 
Weekly Water depth Growth Count Weekly % 
Grow 
<·300 ·100 ·50 0 50 100 150 >150 15 to 0 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27/03/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10/04/97 10104/97 
17104197 0 1 4 12 5 2 1 0 17/04/97 32 
24/04/97 0 2 6 90 42 26 6 24/04/97 43 
01/05/97 0 0 0 0 20 60 55 40 01/05/97 77 
08/05/97 0 0 0 3 27 78 49 12 08/05/97 91 
15/05/97 0 0 1 1 29 45 26 13 15/05/97 87 
22105197 0 0 7 57 47 12 8 22/05/97 88 
29/05/97 0 0 4 30 57 41 4 29/05/97 93 
05/06/97 0 0 0 3 25 51 27 9 05/06/97 90 
12/06/97 0 0 1 0 26 59 43 9 12106197 93 
19/06/97 0 1 0 0 21 43 51 14 19/06/97 88 
26/06/97 0 4 0 2 37 52 12 2 26/06/97 93 
03/07/97 0 5 4 '25 18 1 0 03/07/97 61 
10/07/97 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 10/07/97 100 
17/07/97 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17/07/97 0 
24/07/97 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 24/07/97 
31/07/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31/07/97 
07/08/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 
14/08/97 14/08/97 
21/08/97 21/08/97 
28/08/97 28/08/97 
04/09/97 04/09/97 
Table 7: Weekly field water depths during growth (Muda II) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 8: Weekly FWD's during flowering (Muda II) D: 107 
Weekly Water depth Flower Count Weekly % 
Flower 
<-300 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 >150 10 to-5 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27/03/97 
03/04/97 03/04/97 
10/04/97 10/04/97 
17/04/97 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 17104197 100 
24/04/97 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 0 24/04/97 80 
01/05/97 0 0 0 0 5 6 0 01/05/97 92 
08/05/97 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 08/05/97 50 
15/05/97 0 0 0 0 4 0 5 15/05/97 50 
22/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 5 22105197 33 
29/05/97 0 0 0 0 6 4 6 0 29/05/97 63 
05/06/97 0 0 2 9 13 2 0 0 05/06/97 92 
12/06/97 0 15 0 9 21 1 0 0 12106197 67 
19/06/97 0 4 0 4 45 23 0 0 19/06/97 95 
26/06/97 0 0 4 27 12 0 0 26/06/97 98 
03/07/97 0 0 2 1 9 0 0 0 03/07/97 83 
10107/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10/07/97· 
17/07/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17107197 
24/07/97 0 0 0 ci 0 0 0 0 24/07/97 
31107197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31/07/97 
07/08/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 
14/08/97 14/08/97 
21108197 21108/97 
28/08/97 28/08/97 
04/09/97 04/09/97 
Table 8: Weekly field water depths during flowering (Muda II) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 9: Weekly FWD's during ripening (Muda II) D: 108 
Weekly Watl~r depth Ripen Count 
Weekly % 
Ripen 
<-300 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 >150 13/03/97 
5 to -10 
13/03/97 
20/03/97 
20/03/97 
27/03/97 
27/03/97 
03/04/97 
03/04/97 
10/04/97 
10/04/97 
17104197 
17/04/97 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 
24/04/97 
24/04/97 0 a 0 0 0 a a a 
01/05/97 
01/05/97 a 0 a a 0 0 0 0 
08/05/97 
08/05/97 0 a 0 0 0 a a 0 
15/05/97 
15/05/97 a 0 a 0 0 a a a 
22105197 
22/05/97 a 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 29/05/97 
29/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05/06/97 
05/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12106197 
12/06/97 0 0 0 a 0 O. 0 0 19/06/97 
19/06/97 0 0 a 0 0 3 0 26/06/97 
a 
26/06/97 0 0 2 1 3 6 3 0 03/07/97 
40 
03/07/97 a 20 3 2 7 2 4 0 10/07/97 
32 
10/07/97 0 4 3 33 4 3 0 17107197 
77 
17/07/97 0 1 0 16 38 2 0 0 24/07/97 
95 
24/07/97 0 24 30 32 3 3 0 0 31/07/97 
71 
31/07/97 0 50 20 16 0 0 0 0 07/08/97 
42 
07/08/97 0 6 16 5 0 0 0 0 14/08/97 78 
14/08/97 21/08/97 
21/08/97 28/08/97 
28/08/97 04/09/97 
04/09/97 
Table 9: Weekly field water depths during ripening (Muda II) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 10: Weekly FWD's during harvesting (Muda II) D:109 
Weekly Water depth Harvest Count Weekly % 
Harvest 
<-300 
-100 
-50 a 50 100 150 >150 <-10 
13/03/97 13/03/97 
20/03/97 20/03/97 
27/03/97 27/03/97 03/04/97 
03/04/97 
10/04/97 10/04/97 17104197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17/04/97 24/04/97 o· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24/04/97 01/05/97 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 01105197 08/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 08/05/97 
15/05/97 /0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15/05/97 
22105197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22105/97 29/05/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29/05/97 05/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05/06/97 
12106197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12106197 19106/97 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19/06/97 
26/06/97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26/06/97 
03/07/97 a 0 0 6 5 0 0 03/07/97 0 10/07/97 0 0 0 2 5 0 7 0 10/07/97 0 17107197 0 0 0 4 9 4 6 0 17/07197 0 24107/97 0 14 6 10 11 5 0 0 24/07/97 30 31/07/97 0 41 16 7 0 0 0 0 31/07/97 64 07/08/97 0 17 23 8 0 a 0 0 07/08/97 35 14/08/97 
14/08/97 21/08/97 
21/08/97 28/08/97 
26/06(97 04/09/97 04/09/97 
Table 10: Weekly field water depths during harvesting (Muda II) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 11: Average weekly WDCP (Muda 1) D: 110 
Weekly % Average % 
Grow Flower Ripen Harvest WDe 
15 to 0 10 to-5 5 to -10 <-10 
06/03/97 
13/03/97 
20/03/97 
27/03/97 
03/04/97 
10/04/97 
17/04/97 16 16 
24/04/97 45 45 
01/05/97 66 66 
08/05/97 84 84 
15/05/97 62 62 
22/05/97 79 79 
29/05/97 78 78 
05/06/97 79 79 
12/06/97 66 66 
19/06/97 44 44 
26/06/97 64 100 82 
03/07/97 88 100 94 
10/07/97 90 ' 95 100 95 
17/07/97 86 94 78 0 64 
24/07/97 100 98 84 15 75 
31/07/97 65 97 13 58 
07/08/97 100 100 0 67 
Table 11: Average weekly water depth control performance (Muda I) 
APPENDIX D:2 - Table 12: Average weekly WDCP (Muda II) D:ll1 
Weekly % Average % 
Grow Flower Ripen Harvest woe 
15 to 0 10 to-5 5 to -10 <-10 
13/03/97 
20/03/97 
27/03/97 
03/04/97 
10/04/97 
17/04/97 32 100 66 
24/04/97 43 80 62 
01/05/97 77 92 84 
. 08/05/97 91 50 71 
15/05/97 87 50 68 
22/05/97 88 33 61 
29/05/97 93 63 78 
05/06/97 90 92 91 
12/06/97 93 67 80 
19/06/97 88 95 0 61 
26/06/97 93 98 40 77 
03/07/97 81 83 32 0 49 
10/07/97 100 77 0 59 
17/07/97 0 95 0 32 
24/07/97 71 30 51 
31/07/97 42 64 53 
07/08/97 78 35 57 
14/08/97 
21/08/97 
28/08/97 
04/09/97 
Table 12: Average weekly water depth control performance (Muda II) 
APPENDIX D:3 - Water supply mathematical calculations D: 112 
1. The size of the CHO is fixed - (e.g. 3' or 4'). 
2. Target supply (cusec - Q) is dependent on the area (A) serviced and the cropping stage. 
The target supply is calculated using the following four conditions: Al48, Al60, Al80 or Al1 00. 
Under these conditions LBLBD6 and LBLBD7 target supplies are as follows: 
LBLBD7 (Muda II) Area = 1075 acres LBLBD6 (Muda I) Area = 1487 acres 
Target ratio Target supply (Q) Target ratio Target supply (Q) 
Al48 
Al60 
Al80 
Al100 
22.4 cusec 
17.8 cusec 
13.4 cusec 
10.8 cusec 
Al48 
Al60 
Al80 
Al100 
30.9 cusec 
24.8 cusec 
18.5 cusec 
14.9 cusec 
3. The actual water released is dependent on the amount of water already in the canal. If, for 
example, this level was at the Full Supply Level (FSL) the actual release will equal the target 
release. To calculate the actual supply the following equation is used: 
difference in water 
Supply (cusec) = level uls to CHO (cm) x gate opening (cm) x size ofCHO (feet) x 0.029 
4. The quantity of water actually released (acre-feet) is dependent on the time period the gate 
is open and the cusec flow during this period. The time checks in the Muda region occur at 8.00hrs, 
12.00hrs and 16.00hrs. This results in the following supply information: 
Q8 = supply through gate after alteration at 8.00hrs. 
Q'12 = supply through gate before alteration at 12.00hrs. 
Q12 = supply through gate after alteration at 12.00hrs. 
'16 Q = supply through gate before alteration at 16.00hrs. 
QI6 = supply through gate after alteration at 16.00hrs. 
Q'8 = supply through gate before alteration at 8.00hrs on the following day. 
Vi = Volume supplied though gate from 8.00hrs to 12.00hrs on the same day. 
V 2 = Volume supplied through gate from 12.00hrs to 16.00hrs on the same day. 
V 3 = Volume supplied though gate from 16.00hrs on the same day to 8.00hrs the next day. 
The actual water released is dependent on the culmination of cusecs during a 24hr period using the 
following equations: 
( 8 '12) / Vi = Q + Q 12 x %4 x 1.98 V2 (Q12 + Q'16}{ x %4 x 1.98 
V3 = (Q16 + Q'8}{ x %4 x 1.98 
Therefore, total volume (acre-feet) = Vi + V2 + v3 
APPENDIX D:4 - Mathematical computations for data systematisation model 
ETT: Anticipated amount of evapotranspiration. 
dFWO: 
FWR: 
FWOT: 
WST: 
WSA: 
WSI: 
WSE: 
RFE: 
RFI: 
IRI: 
IRE: 
ETT = EP x ETTtEP using the ETtEP ratio in the following stages: 
Land preparation & sowing: 
Rice growth and flowering: 
Maturing and harvesting: 
1.00 
1.25 
0.00 
Change in field water depth during the week 
dFWD = FWDI - FWDF 
(FWDI of the week - FWDI of the next week) 
Field water requirement 
FWR = ETT + SPT 
Average target FWD for block 
FWDT = FWDC - (FWRt2) 
where; FWDC is target FWD logically formulated from cropping 
pattern: 
Land preparation stage: 
Sowing stage: 
Growing and flowering stage: 
Maturing and harvesting stage: 
50mm 
Omm 
50mm 
Omm 
FWD>FWDT = proper FWD management 
Target water supply 
WST = FWDC + FWR - FWDI, if >0 
Actual water supply 
WSA = IRA + RFA 
Ineffective water supply 
WSI = dFWD + WSA - FWR, if 2:: 0 
Effective water supply 
WSE = WSA - WSI or IRE + RFE 
Effective rainfall 
RFE = RFA- WSI, if ~ 0 
Ineffective rainfall 
'RFI = RFA - RFE 
I neffective irrigation supply 
IRI = WSI - RFI, if ~ 0 
Effective irrigation supply 
IRE = IRA - IRI 
Source: Adapted from Yashima, 1995b:appendix 1:16 
D: 113 
APPENDIX D:5 - Maths for performance assessment indicators 
WDCPPI: 
WDCPPs: 
WDCPPg: 
WDCPPf: 
WDCPPm: 
WDCPPh: 
WDCPPav: 
WDCsd: 
WSP: 
WSEF: 
RFEF: 
IREF: 
Field water depth control performance during planting stage 
% of FWD's in the range 5 to 10cm 
Field water depth control performance during sowing stage 
% of FWD's in the range 0 to -10cm 
Field water depth control performance during growth stage 
% of FWD's in the range 0 to 15cm 
Field water depth control performance during flowering stage 
% of FWD's in the range 10 to -5cm 
Field water depth control performance during maturation stage 
% of FWD's in the range 5 to -10cm 
Field water depth control performance during harvesting stage 
% of FWD's in the range -10cm to -00 cm 
Weekly average field water depth control performance 
Average FWDCP if FWDIIFWDT ~ 1 
Standard deviation of weekly WDCPPav 
Water supply performance 
WSP = WSAlWST, if ~ 1 
Water supply efficiency 
WSEF = WSEIWSA 
Rainfall efficiency 
RFEF = RFE/RFA 
Irrigation efficiency 
IREF = IREIIRA 
Source: Yashima, 1995b: appendix 1:16 
D: 114 
APPENDIX D:6 - Table 1: Muda I irrigation block primary data D:115 
Week Fa LP S G FI R H FWDC FWDI RFA IRT IRA EP 
Commencing mmlw mm/w mm/w mm/w mmlw mm/w 
06/03/97 100 0 
13/03/97 66 34 
20103/97 61 39 
27/03/97 13 87 
03/04/97 0 96 
10104/97 0 59 
17/04/97 0 7 
24/04/97 0 0 
01/05/97 0 0 
08/05/97 0 0 
15/05/97 0 0 
22/05/97 0 0 
29/05/97 0 0 
05/06/97 0 0 
12/06/97 0 0 
19/06/97 0 0 
26/06/97 0 0 
03/07/97 0 0 
10107/97 0 0 
17/07197 0 0 
24/07/97 0 0 
31/07/97 7 0 
07/08/97 44 0 
14/08/97 56 0 
21/08/97 74 0 
28/08/97 94 0 
04/09/97 100 0 
Total (mm) 
17/04 to 26/06 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 17 
0 0 0 0 0 20 
0 0 0 0 0 44 
4 0 0 0 0 48 
37 4 0 0 0 32 
52 41 0 0 0 24 -4 
7 93 0 0 0 47 36 
0 100 0 0 0 50 133 
0 100 0 0 0 50 113 
0 100 0 0 0 50 142 
0 100 0 0 0 50 115 
0 100 0 0 0 50 120 
0 100 0 0 0 50 113 
0 100 0 0 0 50 124 
0 100 0 0 0 50 156 
0 99 1 0 0 50 129 
0 94 6 0 0 50 70 
0 73 27 0 0 50 71 
0 27 65 8 0 46 57 
0 15 62 16 7 39 33 
0 0 35 21 37 18 -16 
0 0 5 39 12 3 -16 
0 0 0 26 18 0 
0 0 0 6 20 0 
0 0 0 1 5 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 1: Primary data for LBLBD6 (Muda I) 
Source: Fieldwork 
21 72 105 38 
60 44 51 42 
0 48 30 42 
93 9 0 38 
15 0 0 33 
0 7 10 40 
51 30 41 36 
61 54 94 38 
30 43 58 32 
32 0 0 29 
0 30 33 32 
0 15 19 31 
3 7 7 33 
17 58 72 33 
62 62 88 26 
14 0 0 27 
6 0 0 27 
142 0 0 34 
54 0 0 
55 0 0 
14 0 0 
2 0 0 
732 479 608 611 
256 306 422 330 
APPENDIX D:6 - Table 2: Muda II irrigation block primary data D: 116 
Week Fa LP S G FI R H FWDC FWD I RFA IRT IRA EP 
Commencing mm/w mm/w mm/w mm/w mmlw mmlw 
13/03/97 49 51 0 0 0 0 0 26 21 0 0 38 
20/03/97 8 92 0 0 0 0 0 46 60 0 0 42 
27/03/97 0 93 7 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 42 
03/04/97 0 78 15 7 0 0 0 43 93 0 0 38 
10/04/97 0 50 28 22 0 0 0 36 15 0 0 33 
17/04/97 0 0 50 50 0 0 0 25 15 0 0 0 40 
24/04/97 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 50 22 51 0 0 36 
01/05/97 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 50 111 ·61 35 95 38 
08/05/97 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 50 86 30 0 0 32 
15/05/97 0 0 0 96 4 0 0 50 84 32 0 0 29 
22/05/97 0 0 0 96 4 0 0 50 59 0 30 118 32 
29/05/97 0 0 0 96 4 0 0 50 80 0 30 105 31 
05/06/97 0 0 0 96 4 0 0 50 86 3 20 74 33 
12/06/97 0 0 0 93 7 0 0 50 94 17 43 101 33 
19/06/97 0 0 0 93 7 0 0 50 95 62 30 53 26 
26/06/97 0 0 0 85 10 5 0 48 54 14 0 0 27 
03/07/97 0 0 0 55 28 13 4 42 26 6 0 0 27 
10/07/97 4 0 0 17 47 31 1 32 40 142 0 0 34 
17/07/97 6 0 0 7 35 51 1 21 31 54 0 0 
24/07/97 7 0 0 0 13 64 17 7 6 55 0 0 
31/07/97 24 0 0 0 0 58 18 0 -3 14 0 0 
07/08/97 42 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 -3 2 0 0 
14/08/97 71 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 
21/08/97 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total (mm) 732 188 546 611 
17/04 to 26/06 256 188 546 330 
Table 2: Primary data for LBLBD7: T1 and T2 (Muda II) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
APPENDIXD:6 - Table 3: Systematised data/or LBLBD6 (Muda J) D:117 
Week 
Commencing 
13/03/97 
20103/97 
27/03/97 
03/04/97 
10104/97 
17/04/97 
24/04/97 
01/05/97 
08/05/97 
15/05/97 
22/05/97 
29/05/97 
05/06/97 
12/06/97 
19/06/97 
26/06/97 
03/07/97 
10107/97 
17/07/97 
24/07/97 
31/07/97 
07/08/97 
14/08/97 
21/08/97 
28/08/97 
04/09/97 
Total (mm) 
17/04 to 
26/06 
Err SPT FWDT dFWD FWR WST WSA WSI WSE RFE RFI IRI IRE 
13 2 9 15 126 
16 3 10 19 111 
37 6 22 43 30 
38 7 26 45 93 
33 7 12 40 15 
44 7 -2 -40 51 79 10 0 10 0 0 0 10 
44 7 21 -97 51 62 92 0 92 51 0 0 41 
48 7 23 20 55 0 155 120 35 0 61 59 35 
40 7 27 -29 47 0 88 12 76 18 12 0 58 
36 7 29 27 43 0 32 16 16 16 16 0 0 
40 7 27 -5 47 0 33 0 33 0 0 0 33 
39 7 27 7 46 0 19 0 19 0 0 0 19 
41 7 26 -11 48 0 10 0 10 3 0 0 7 
41 7 26 -32 48 0 89 9 80 8 9 0 72 
33 7 30 - 27 40 0 150 137 13 0 62 75 13 
34 7 30 59 _41 0 14 32 0 0 14 18 0 
34 7 30 -1 -41 21 6 0 6 6 0 0 0 
43 7 25 14 50 29 142 106 36 36 106 0 0 
6 46 24 54 
5 49 55 
2 0 14 
0 2 
Err SPT FWDT dFWD FWR WST WSA WSI WSE RFE RFI IRI IRE 
406 70 233 -133 476 141 678 294 384 
Table 3: Systematised data for LBLB06 (Muda I) 
(See Appendix 0:4 for explanation of acronyms) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
96 160 134 288 
APPENDIX D:6 - Table 4: Systematised data for LBLBD7 (Muda II) D: 118 
Week 
Commencing 
13/03/97 
20103/97 
27/03/97 
03/04/97 
10104/97 
17/04/97 
24/04/97 
01/05/97 
08/05/97 
15/05/97 
22/05/97 
29/05/97 
05/06/97 
12/06/97 
19/06/97 
26/06/97 
03/07/97 
10107/97 
17/07/97 
24/07/97 
31/07/97 
07/08/97 
14/08/97 
21/08/97 
Total (mm) 
17/04 to 
26/06 
ETT SPT FWOT dFWO FWR WST WSA WSI WSE RFE RFI IRI IRE 
19 4 14 23 21 
39 6 23 45 60 
42 7 22 49 0 
39 7 20 46 93 
35 7 15 42 15 
45 7 -1 -8 52 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 7 24 -89 52 80 51 0 51 51 0 0 0 
48 7 23 26 55 -7 156 127 29 0 61 66 29 
40 7 27 1 47 11 30 0 30 30 0 0 0 
36 7 28 25 43 9 32 14 18 18 14 0 0 
40 7 27 -21 47 38 118 49 68 0 0 49 68 
39 7 27 -5 46 15 105 54 51 0 0 54 51 
41 7 26 -8 48 13 77 20 56 0 3 17 56 
41 7 26 -2 48 5 118 68 50 0 17 51 50 
33 7 30 42 40 -6 115 117 0 0 62 55 0 
32 7 28 27 39 33 14 2 12 12 2 0 0 
28 6 25 -14 34 49 6 0 6 6 0 0 0 
27 4 16 9 32 24 142 119 23 23 119 0 0 
3 25 54 
1 9 55 
0 0 14 
0 -3 2 
0 
0 
ETT SPT FWOT dFWO FWR WST WSA WSI WSE RFE RFI IRI IRE 
408 70 236 -39 478 220 801 450 353 99 
Table 4: Systematised data for LBLBD7, T1 and T2 (Muda II) 
(See Appendix D:4 for explanation of acronyms) 
Source: Fieldwork, 1997 
157 293 254 
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APPENDIX D:8 - Table 1: Total supply through CHO (Muda J) 
Mein CHO lBlBD6 
Oalo Time 
13·Mar 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.ooem 
14·Mar 8.00am 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.ooam 
l!>-Mar 8.ooam 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
16-Mar 8.ooam 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
17-Mar 8.00am 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
18·Mar 8.ooam 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.00om 
19·Mar B.OOom 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00em 
24·Mar 8.ooom 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.ooam 
Waterflow 
requirement 
(<usee) 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
30.00 
2!>-Mar 8.ooam 56.20 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.ooam 
26·Mar 8.00am 54.20 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
27·Mar 8.00am 48.90 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
28·Mar 8.00am 48.90 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.ooam 
02·Apr 8.00om 21.40 
.12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
03·Apr 8.00am 21.40 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.ooam 
8.00am 
22-Apr 8.ooam No Supply 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
B.OOam 
23·Apr 8.ooam 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
a.COam 
27·Apr 8.ooam 18.60 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
B,OOam 
28·Apr 8.00am 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.ooam 
29·Apr 8.00am 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
30-Apr 8.ooam 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
01·May 8.ooam 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
B.OOam 
02·May 8.ooam 18.60 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
03-May 8.ooam 41.50 
Irrigation target . lnigation target 
(acre-f •• t) (mm) 
59.40 11.98 
59.40 11.98 
59.40 11.98 
59.40 11.98 
59.40 11.98 
59.40 11.98 
111.28 22.45 
107.32 21.65 
96.82 19.53 
96.82 19.53 
42.37 8.55 
42.37 8.55 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7,43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7,43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7,43. 
82.17 16.58 
Size 4' 
CHO 
Opening 
(an) 
ufs dis Difference in Actual water 
water level 
(m) (m) (em) 
now 
(cusec) 
53 
78.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
78.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
76.20 
90.00 
90.00 
3.48 3.05 26.00 31.34 
3.45 3.08 11.60 30.11 
3.48 3.05 11.60 30.11 
3.48 3.05 11.60 30.11 
3.45 3.08 12.00 30.62 
3.45 3.08 11.60 30.11 
3.65 3.11 20.00 + 11.6 30.11 + 39.53 
3.65 3.11 11.60 30.11 
3.65 3.13 11.00 29.32 
3.65 3.13 11.60 30.11 
3.71 3.13 22.00 41.46 
3.71 3.13 22.00 41.46 
3.68 3.10 12.20 30.87 
3.66 3.10 
2.68 3.10 
3.54 3.15 
3.50 3.14 
3.50 3.H 
3.47 3.14 
3.47 3.14 
3.52 3.14 
3.52 3.14 
3.52 3.14 
3.52 3.14 
3.53 3.20 
Closed 3.23 3.00 
3.37 3.00 
3,49 3.00 
90.00 3.69 3.34 
90.00 3.69 3.34 
90.00 3.72 3.36 
90.00 3.80 3.36 
90.00 3.54 3.31 
90.00 3.54 3.31 
90.00 3.53 3.30 
90.00 3.52 3.30 
90.00 3.52 3.30 
90.00 3.52 3.30 
90.00 3.52 3.30 
Closed 3.52 3.30 
Closed 3.14 2.90 
Closed 3.14 2.90 
90.00 3.32 3.30 
Closed 3.32 3.30 
Closed 3.14 2.90 
90.00 3.54 2.70 
90.00 3.64 2.92 
90.00 3.42 3.10 
90.00 3.20 2.90 
90.00 3.20 2.80 
Closed 3.20 2.80 
Closed 3.20 2.80 
Closed 3.84. 2.60 
0.00 2.80 
Closed 2.62 0.00 
2.72 0.00 
2.84 0.00 
55.00 3.32 3.05 
73.20 3.32 3.05 
73.20 2.90 3.00 
Clo,ad 2.80 3.00 
Closed 2.73 2.70 
73.20 3.21 3.01 
73.20 3.21 3.01 
73.20 3.10 3.01 
73.20 2.96 2.90 
73.20 2.96 2.90 
13.20 3.00 2.96 
73.20 3.04 2.98 
73.20 3.13 3.00 
73.20 3.13 3.00 
73.20 3.13 3.00 
73.20 3.13 3.00 
73.20 3.20 3.02 
73.20 3.20 3.02 
73.20 3.30 3.06 
73.20 3.51 3.20 
73.20 3.60 3.24 
73.20 3.60 3.24 
73.20 3.62 3.24 
73.20 3.62 3.24 
73.20 3.70 3.30 
73.20 3.70 3.30 
73.20 3.70 3.30 
73.20 3.70 3.30 
73.20 3.73 3.37 
73.20 3.73 3.37 
12.20 
12.20 
13,40 
11.80 
11.60 
10.90 
10.90 
12.60 
12.60 
12.60 
22.00 
25.00 
29.00 
29.00 
20.00 
24.00 
27.00 
27.00 
26.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
4.20 
5.30 
4.90 
3.10 
3.10 
18.00 
4.90 
2.80 
4.90 
4.90 
3.20 
2.50 
2.50 
3.00 
3.20 
3.50 
3.50 
3.50 
3.50 
9.00 
9.00 
15.00 
19.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
22.00 
24.00 
24.00 
30.87 
30.87 
32.36 
30.36 
30.11 
29.16 
29.18 
31.38 
31.38 
31.38 
48.97 
52.20 
56.22 
56.22 
46.69 
51.15 
54.25 
54.25 
53.23 
48.97 
48.97 
48.97 
24.45 
48.97 
21.40 
24.03 
23.11 
18.38 
18.38 
27.07 
18.80 
14.21 
18.80 
18.80 
15.19 
13.43 
13.43 
14.71 
15.19 
15.89 
15.89 
15.89 
15.89 
25.47 
25.47 
32.89 
37.01 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
39.83 
41.60 
41.60 
Volume lIegal Total supply 
suppfied pipe QncI. pips) 
(acre-feet {acre·'eet (acr&-'.et) 
41.36 
9.93 
9.93 
40.00 
11,49 
9.94 
39.22 
11.81 
13.68 
47.65 
10.19 
10,43 
41.40 
9.78 
9.63 
39.97 
10.35 
13.25 
66.79 
37.09 
16.98 
16.14 
69.50 
17.74 
16.86 
64.54 
18.16 
40.32 
48.41 
7.50 
7.78 
27.32 
27.32 
35.73 
5.45 
6.20 
5.61 
18.89 
4.64 
4.93 
20.51 
5.24 
5.24 
27.30 
9.63 
11.53 
50.71 
13.14 
13.14 
52.58 
13.14 
13.14 
53.74 
14.85 
14.85 
14.85 
14.85 
14.85 
15.02 
10.50 
12.86 
17.Bl 
20.19 
20.19 
20.19 
41.36 
59.66 
75.50 
87.99 
76.87 
74.23 
105.24 
37.09 
117.64 
99.14 
58,48 
48.41 
42.60 
27.32 
46.23 
5.45 
30.70 
42.94 
37.78 
89.68 
99.05 
100.21 
102.56 
D: 127 
Pump 
(mrn) 
0.01 
0,01 
T olal supply 
(ex. pump) 
(mmlday) 
8.34 
12.08 
15.23 
17.75 
15.51 
14.98 
21.23 
7.48 
23.73 
20.00 
11.39 
9.77 
8.59 
5.51 
9.33 
1.10 
6.19 
8.68 
7.62 
18.09 
19.98 
20.22 
20.69 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 1: Total supply through CHO (Muda J) 
12.0Opm 
4.00pm 
a.aoam 
04-M.y 8.00.m 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
a.aOam 
05-M.y 8.ooam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
B.OOam 
OS-May 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.0Opm 
8.00am 
ll-M.y 8.oo.m 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
12-Moy 8_00om 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
13-M.y 8.00am 
12.oopm 
4.oopm 
B.OOam 
14-May 8.00.m 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.oo.m 
24-May 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
25-May 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.0Opm 
8.00om 
26-May 8.00am 
12.oopm 
4.00pm 
6.aOam 
28-May 8.00om 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
29-May 8.00.m 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
3D-May 8.00am 
01-Jun 
02-Jun 
O~Jun 
O4-Jun 
05-Jun 
08-Jun 
09-Jun 
lD-Jun 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
6.00am 
, l-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
e.OOam 
12-Jun B.aOam 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
13-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.OOam 
14-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
154 Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00.m 
16-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
17-Jun B.aDam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
18~Jun B.ODam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
B.OOam 
19-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
lB.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
32.80 
37.90 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
18.60 
14.90 
14.90 
18.60 
18.60 
26.60 
26.30 
24.40 
22.10 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
64.94 13.10 
75.04 15.14 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
29.50 5.95 
29.50 5.95 
36.83 7.43 
36.83 7.43 
52.67 10.63 
52.07 10.51 
48.31 9.75 
43.76 8.83 
73.20 3.73 3.37 
73.20 3.73 3.37 
24.00 
24.00 
41.60 
41.60 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
Closed 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
Closed 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
3.73 3.38 24.00 41.60 
3.73 3.38 4.90 lB.80 
3.82 3.38 4.90 + 6.70 18.80 + 21.98 
3.78 3.38 
3.37 3.38 
3.37 3.38 
3.37 3.38 
3.53 3.38 
3.62 3.32 
3.62 3.32 
3.67 3.15 
3.67 3.15 
3.33 3.05 
3.50 2.93 
3.65 2.98 
3.68 2.98 
3.59 3.18 
3.59 3.18 
3.55 3.16 
3.53 3.16 
3.51 3.15 
3.51 3.15 
3.51 3.15 
3.51 3.15 
3.63 3.20 
3.63 3.20 
3.80 3.20 
3.65 3.20 
3.24 3.04 
3.68 2.95 
3.68 2.95 
3.70 3.05 
3.70 2.84 
3.70 2.84 
3.63 2.96 
3.58 3.03 
3.38 2.96 
3.38 2.96 
3.27 3.00 
3.27 3.00 
4.90 + 5.50 18.80 + 19.91 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 18.80 
4.90 + 4.00 18.80 + 18.98 
4_90 18.80 
3.90 16.79 
4.90 18.80 
9.00 25.47 
12.90 30.50 
20.40 38.35 
20.40 38.35 
9.00 25.47 
9.00 25.47 
15.00 
15.00 
15.00 
15.00 
20.00 
20.00 
22.00 
19.00 
7.00 
4.90 
4.90 
10.40 
4.90 
4.00 + 4.90 
3.50 + 4.90 
2.80 
2.80 
3.60 
4.90 
32.89 
32.89 
32.89 
32.89 
37.97 
37.97 
39.83 
37.01 
22.47 
18.80 
18.80 
27.38 
18.80 
16.98. 18.80 
15.89 + 18.80 
14.21 
14.21 
16.11 
18.80 
Closed 3.38 2.80 
Closed 3.50 2.80 4.90 
73.20 3.53 2.80 4.90 18.80 
73.20 3.53 3.00 4.90 18.80 
73.20 3.43 3.02 3.80 16.55 
73.20 3.43 3.02 3.80 16.55 
73.20 3.36 3.02 3.20 + 4.90 15.19 + 18.80 
73.20 3.36 3.02 4.90 18.80 
73.20 3.41 2.96 2.50 13.43 
73.20 3.41 2.96 2.50 13.43 
73.20 3.36 3.02 4.90 18.80 
73.20 3.35 3.02 4.90 18.80 
73.20 3.41 2.96 2.50 13.43 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
73.20 
3.50 3.08 
3.23 3.02 
3.23 3.02 
3.02 2.95 
3.02 2.95 
3.02 2.95 
3.02 2.05 
3.20 3.00 
3.20 3.00 
3.02 2.95 
3.02 2.95 
3.20 3.00 
3.20 3.00 
3.26 3.01 
3.26 3.01 
3.20 3.00 
3.20 3.00 
3.42 .3.06 
3.46 3.08 
3.51 3.01 
3.51 3.01 
3.51 3.01 
3.51 3.01 
3.50 3.03 
3.50 3.03 
3.53 3.03 
3.56 3.04 
3.48 3.08 
3.48 3.08 
3.48 3.08 
3.44 3.04 
3.42 3.04 
3.42 3.04 
3.42 3.04 
9.00 
4.40 
4.40 
2.60 
2.60 
2.60 
4.90 
4.90 
2.60 
2.60 
4.90 
4.90 
5.00 
5.00 
4_90 
4.90 
7.80 
9.30 
9.80 
9.80 
9.80 
9.80 
9.60 
9.60 
9.70 
10.10 
8.30 
8.30 
8.30 
7.30 
6.80 
6.80 
6.80 
25.47 
17.81 
17.81 
13.69 
13.69 
13.69 
18.80 
18.80 
13.69 
13.69 
18.80 
18.80 
18.99 
18.99 
18.80 
18.80 
23.71 
25.89 
26.58 
26.58 
26.58 
26.58 
26.31 
26.31 
26.45 
26.99 
24.46 
24.46 
24.46 
22.94 
22.14 
22.14 
22.14 
13.73 
13.73 
54.91 
6.73 
6.39 
25.55 
6.20 
6.20 
24.82 
5.90 
6.20 
23.49 
7.30 
9.24 
45.44 
10.53 
6.41 
38.52 
10.85 
10.85 
48.77 
12.84 
12.68 
39.26 
6.20 
7.62 
18.08 
5.90 
5.72 
21.79 
5.00 
5.76 
6.20 
23.33 
5.83 
5.61 
21.27 
5.32 
6.20 
21.27 
7.14 
5.88 
20.79 
4.52 
26.81 
5.36 
4.52 
21.44 
6.23 
6.27 
24.94 
7.01 
8.19 
34.63 
8.77 
8.77 
34.91 
8.70 
8.82 
33.95 
8.07 
7.82 
29.75 
7.31 
20.19 58.86 
19.00 56.22 
11.86 47.45 
61.98 
10.33 67.79 
17.81 86.28 
8.29 73.07 
52.09 
20.19 
11.86 45.27 
11.86 22.62 
41.37 
11.84 
13.05 45.76 
13.05 45.84 
33.81 
31.33 
31.32 
8.29 45.73 
49.83 
15.43 67.88 
15,43 66.90 
15.43 61.07 
16.62 64.94 
0.Q1 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0,04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.05 
D: 128 
11.87 
11.34 
9.57 
12.50 
13.68 
17.41 
14.74 
10.51 
9.13 
4.56 
8.35 
9.23 
9.25 
6.82 
6.32 
6.32 
9.23 
10.05 
13.69 
13.50 
12.32 
13.10 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 1: Total supply through CHO (Muda J) D: 129 
4.00pm 73.20 3.42 3.04 6.80 22.14 7.31 
8.00am 73.20 3.58 3.10 11.60 28.92 33.70 
20-Jun 8.00am 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.58 3.10 11.60 28.92 16.62 
67.10 13.54 
12.oopm 73.20 3.42 3.10 6.80 22.14 8.43 
4.00pm 73.20 3.42 3.04 11.60 28.92 8.43 
8.00am 73.20 3.58 3.04 6.80 22.14 33.62 
21-Jun a.OOam 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.58 3.10 6.80 22.14 
43.84 8.84 
12.oopm 73.20 3.58 3.10 6.80 22.14 7.31 
4.oopm 73.20 3.58 3.10 6.80 22.14 7.31 
8.00am 73.20 3.54 3.08 6.80 22.14 29.22 
22-Jun 8.00am 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.54 3.08 6.80 22.14 56.45 
0.02 11.39 
12.oopm 73.20 3.60 3.10 lUO 29.04 8.45 
4.00pm 73.20 3.60 3.10 11.70 29.04 9.58 
8.00am 73.20 3.68 3.15 11.80 29.04 38.42 
23-Jun 8.00am 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.68 3.15 6.80 22.14 17.81 
74.26 0.02 14.98 
12.00pm 73.20 3.68 3.15 11.70 29.04 8.45 
4.00pm 73.20 3.68 3.15 11.70 29.04 9.58 
SOOam 73.20 3.68 3.15 11.80 29.17 38.42 
24-Jun 8.ooam 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.68 3.15 6.80 22.14 17.81 67.16 
13.55 
12.00pm 73.20 3.68 3.15 6.80 22.14 7.31 
4.00pm 73.20 3.70 3.15 7.20 22.78 7.41 
8.ooam 73.20 3.72 3.15 12.20 29.69 34.63 
2S-Jun 8.00am 22.10 43.76 8.83 73.20 3.72 3.15 6.80 22.14 15.43 
59.88 12.08 
12.00pm 73.20 3.50 3.05 8.50 24.76 7.74 
4.00pm 73.20 3.46 3.00 5.80 20.45 7.46 
8.00am 73.20 3.53 3.10 7.90 23.87 29.25 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 2: Weekly supply through CHO (Muda J) 
Week Rainfall 
(mm) 
13/03 -19/03 21.00 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 
27103 - 02104 0.00 
03104 - 09/04 93.00 
10104 - 16104 15.00 
17104 - 23104 0.00 
24104 - 30/04 51.00 
01105 - 07/05 60.50 
08105- W05 30.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 
22/05 - 28/05 0.00 
29105 -4/06 0.00 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 
12/06 -18/06 16.50 
19/06 - 25/06 62.00 
26/06 - 02107 14.00 
03/07 - 09107 5.50 
10107 -16/07 141.50 
17107 - 23/07 53.50 
24/07 - 30/07 55.00 
31107 - 06/07 14.00 
07108 -11/08 1.50 
Walernow 
requirement 
(cusec) 
180.00 
110AO 
119.20 
21.40 
0.00 
18.60 
74.40 
134.50 
107.90 
0.00 
74.40 
37.20 
18.60 
144.30 
154.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Targel suppl Targel supply Volume supplie Volume supplio mogal pipe mogal pipo Tolal supply 
(incl. pump) 
(acro feel) (mm) (acre·feel) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre.feel) 
356AO 71.90 446.80 90.14 74.25 14.98 521.05 
218.59 44.10 238.85 48.19 15.02 3.03 253.87 
236.02 47.62 147A9 29.76 0.00 0.00 147A9 
42.37 8.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
36.83 7A3 41.18 8.31 10.50 2.12 51.68 
147.31 29.72 170A3 34.38 30.67 6.19 201.10 
266.31 53.73 352.73 71.16 111.62 22.52 464.35 
213.64 43.10 252.69 50.98 36.43 7.35 289.12 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
147.31 29.72 105.60 21.30 55.75 11.25 161.35 
73.66 14.86 65.50 13.21 26.10 5.27 91.60 
36.83 7.43 33.81 6.82 0.00 0.00 33.81 
285.71 57.64 299.48 60.42 54.58 11.01 354.06 
306.31 61.80 349.34 70.48 84.29 17.01 433.63 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D: 130 
Pump Total supply 
(mm) (mm) 
105.12 
51.22 
29.76 
0.00 
0.00 
10.43 
40.57 
93.68 
58.33 
0.00 
0.02 32.57 
0.13 18.61 
0.13 6.95 
0.24 71.67 
0.04 87.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 3: Total supply through CHO (Muda II) 
Main CHO L8LB07 
Dale TIm. Rainfall Water nOW' Irrigation InigaUOn 
requM1lment teT1Jel tartle! 
(mm) (cust!lc) (acre-feet) (mm) 
U .. Mar 8.COam 
12.00pm 
•. OOpm 
I!;.OOam 
14-Mar 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.OOam 
IS-Mar a.ODam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.OOam 
16-Mar a.oo.m 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
I!tOOarn 
17 -Mer S.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.ODam 
1S-Mar 8.DOlm 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.DOam 
10·Mar a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.aOarn 
24oMa( a.OOlm 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.0Dam 
Z5-Mar a.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.DOam 
26.Mar 8.0Dam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.OOam 
27 .. M3r 8.00arn 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
02-Apr 8.00llm 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.aOam 
03-Apr a.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.DOam 
D .. -Apr a.DOlm 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.DOam 
26.Apr 8.DDam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.ODam 
27-Apr a.DDam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
2ft·Apr a.ODam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00arn 
12 
49 
20·Apr a.COam 47 
12.00prn 
4.00pm 
a.aOam 
30.Apr 8.00lm 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.ooam 
at-May a.OOam 44.5 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
S.DOam 
02 .. M8Y S.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.DOam 
OJ..May 8.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.5 
7.5 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
No Supply 
No Supply 
13.4 
13.4 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
No Supply 
No Supply 
No Supply 
No Supply 
13.4 
No Supply 
No Supply 
No Supply 
No Supply 
No Supply 
13.4 
13.4 
13.4 
13.4 
22.4 
22." 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
26.53 
26.53 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
26.53 
26.53 
26.53 
26.53 
26.53 
405 
.... 35 
g.34 
9.44 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
7.40 
7.40 
9.84 
g.a4 
9.84 
9.&4 
9.04 
7.40 
7.40 
7.40 
1.40 
7.40 
12.38 
12.38 
Size 3' 
CHO 
openng 
(em) 
U/S dis Difference in Actual water 
walel ~vel now 
(em) (em) (em) (eusee) 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
3.4 
3.5 
3.4 
3.4 
3.62 
3.64 
3.52 
3.52 
3.82 
3.62 
3.56 
3.56 
3.56 
3.5 
3.46 
3."6 
3.46 
1.46 
3.54 
3.54 
3.54 
3.54 
3.54 
Ck>sed 3.24 
Closed 3.36 
57.9 3.48 
57.9 3.63 
57.9 3.62 
57.9 3.& 
70.1 3.82 
70.1 3.6 
70.1 3.6 
70.1 3.6 
70.1 3.66 
70.1 3.6 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
3.6 
3.6 
3.1 
3.5 
3.58 
3.46 
3.2 
3.2 
3.24 
3.24 
3.88 
Closed 3.86 
Closed 2.73 
Closed 3.06 
CJond 3.26 
71 3.2 
57.9 3.2 
CJosed 3.12 
Ck>sed 3.1 
Closed 2.96 
Closed 2.96 
Closed 3.02 
57.9 3.14 
57.9 3.1 
57.9 3.1 
51.9 3.1 
57.9 3.14 
57.9 3.14 
57.9 3.14 
57.9 3.36 
57.9 3.34 
57.9 3.7 
57.9 3.6 
57.9 3.56 
57.9 3.56' 
57.9 3.7 
57.9 3.56 
8.5 
10.1 
U 
15 
18 
~ 
1~3 
~3 
M 
M 
~ 
~ 
~ 
17 
ffi 
16 
ffi 
15 
tl 
12 
I. 
16 
~ 
11 
11 
14.3 
14.3 
11 
11 
12.5 
11.8 
9.3 
10 
5 
12 
8 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
~,5 
3.8 
3.& 
5.8 
u.e 
10." 
11 
5.4 
12.2 
5.4 
16.3 
5.4 
26.8 
17.78 
19.38 
23.62 
23.62 
25.87 
25.87 
26.79 
26.79 
29.88 
29.88 
30.49 
30.49 
30.49 
25.15 
24.39 
24.39 
24.39 
23.62 
21.13 
21.13 
24.39 
25.87 
27.27 
14.25 
18.71 
16.71 
19.05 
23.06 
20.23 
20.23 
21.56 
20.95 
1&.30 
18.30 
1&.60 
18.14 
17.25 
19.29 
13.64 
12.20 
12.20 
10.56 
10.56 
10.56 
21.40 
14.25 
9.42 
9.42 
9.42 
9.42 
9.82 
9.82 
12.13 
15.61 
16.24 
16.71 
11.71 
17.59 
11.11 
20.34 
11.71 
34.32 
26.8 34.32 
Volume 
supptied 
(acro--feet) 
6.13 
35."8 
8.17 
8.54 
3-4.78 
9.35 
9.116 
39.84 
10.06 
9.18 
32.10 
&.05 
7.92 
29.53 
7.51 
8.29 
35.08 
20.43 
5.90 
6.95 
2&.57 
fU~O 
1.01 
25.90 
6.09 
28.68 
8.03 
5.43 
17.05 
3.76 
3.49 
13.94 
28.11 
2.34 
12.44 
3.11 
3.18 
12.96 
4.58 
5.26 
21.15 
'4.&3 
4.83 
21.15 
45.56 76.2 
76.2 
76.2 
78.2 
3.7 
3.1 
3:'7 
3.7 
26.8 +18.2 3.4.32 + 28.28 11.33 
~I.J3 1&.2 28.28 
D: 131 
!negal Total 
pipe (10 L8) supply (ex. pipe) 
Total 
SUPM' 
(mm) (acce-feel) (acre-feet) 
41.61 11.61 
5.1" 51.41 14.36 
5.14 59.05 16.48 
-4.75 51.94 14.49 
os 45.51 12.70 
".75 50.88 14.20 
us 20.43 5.70 
4.75 41.42 11.56 
4.75 39.81 11.11 
34.74 9.70 
28.51 7.96 
21.18 5.91 
10.40 2.93 
28.11 7.84 
2.34 0.65 
12."4 3.47 
1925 5.37 
31.5& &.61 
30.82 8.60 
45.56 12.72 
57.99 16.18 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 3: Total supply through eHO (Muda II) 
a.DOam 
C'-May a.OOam 
. 12.00pm 
UOpm 
8.00am 
OS-May B.DOam 0 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
a.aOam 
06-May 8.00am 0 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.DOam 
l1-May B.DOam 13 
12.00pm 
HOpm 
a.DOam 
12-May a.DOam 12.5 
12.00pm 
UOpm 
a.CDam 
13·May 8.ooam 3.5 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
B.DOam 
14-May a.DDam 
12.00pm . 
4.00pm 
a.aOam 
2 .. ·May 8,aOam 0 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
25-May a.OOam 
12.00pm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
26-May 8.00am 
12.()()pm 
4.00pm 
a.ODam 
27-May 8.00am 
12.C>Opm 
4.oopm 
8.00am 
28-May 8.aOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.aDam 
2g-May 8.00em 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
30-May a.aDam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.OOam 
09-Jun e..DOam 
12J)Opm 
4.00pm 
a.DDem 
lO-Jun a.COam 
12.00pm 
4.oDpm 
a.DOam 
l1-Jun S.DOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.DOam 
12-Jun a,aDam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
13·Jun a.aOam 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.aDam 
14-Ju" 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.aOam 
lS·Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
a.DOam 
16-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
17-Jun 8.00am 
12.00pm 
4.00pm 
8.00am 
18-Ju" 8.aOam 
o 
o 
o 
165 
o 
2H 
22.4 
22.4 
No Suppty 
No Supply 
13.4 
22.4 
22.4 
22.4 
No Suppty 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
11.8 
17.8 
17.8 
17.8 
44.35 
••. 35 
·U.35 
26.53 
44.35 
44.35 
'4.35 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
35.2-4 
35.24 
35.24 
35.24 
12.38 
12.38 
12.38 
7.40 
12.38 
12.38 
12.38' 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
U4 
9.a.( 
9.64 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
9.84 
9.64 
9.84 
9.84 
U4 
76.2 3.7 
76.2 3.7 
76.2 3.8 
76.2 3.78 
76.2 3.72 
76.2 3.72 
76.2 3.7 
76.2 3.66 
76.2 3.62 
76.2 3.62 
76.2 3.7 
76.2 3.12 
76.2 3.3 
Closed 3.56 
Clos&d 3.68 
57.9 3.72 
57.D 3.64 
76.2 3.64 
76.2 3.54 
78.2 3.47 
76.2 3.53 
76.2 3.53 
16.2 3.53 
76.2 3.53 
76.2 3.62 
76.2 3.62 
16.2 3.86 
76.2 3.64 
76.2 3.18 
Closed 3.68 
70.1 3.14 
70.1 3.7 
70.1 3.64 
70.1 3.64 
70.1 3.6 
70.1 3.57 
70.1 3.37 
70.1 3.37 
70.1 3.4 
10.1 3.21 
70.1 3.34 
70.1 3.34 
70.1 3.28 
70.1 3.28 
70.1 3."8 
70.1 3.48 
70.1 3.51 
70.1 3.51 
70.1 3.41 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
10.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.' 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
70.1 
3.41 
3.41 
3.39 
3.41 
3.39 
3.5 
3.46 
3.44 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.46 
3 .• 6 
3.26 
3.2 
3.02 
3.02 
2.98 
3.18 
2.98 
3.18 
3.18 
3.18 
32 
3.2 
3.2 
3.4 
3.42 
3.48 
3.48 
3.46 
3.48 
3.48 
H6 
3.5 
3.58 
3.46 
3.46 
162 
162 
2~6 
18 
ffi 
lU 
11.3 
~2 
tQ2 
11.3 
lU 
lU 
U 
11 
9 
8.5 
D 
11 
11 
8.5 
2.5 
8.5 
10 
13 
13 
12 
11.5 
6.5 
6.5 
5 
4.5 
10 
10 
11.5 
11 
9 
8.5 
6.5 
9 
11 
8.5 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10.5 
11 
11 
9 
10 
10 
28.28 
26.28 
32.88 
28.13 
26.52 
22.29 
22.29 
21.17 
21.17 
22.29 
24.09 
2-4.09 
17.29 
13.33 
13.33 
21.99 
19.69 
19.33 
19.89 
19.89 
lD.89 
IUD 
2U9 
19.89 
21.99 
lU3 
10 . .43 
17.78 
19.29 
21.9. 
21.99 
21.13 
20.68 
17.25 
17.25 
14.9. 
14.9. 
15.55 
15.55 
13.64 
12.94 
19.29 
19.29 
20.68 
20.23 
18.30 
18.30 
17.78 
17.25 
17.78 
17.25 
18.30 
20.23 
18.30 
lUO 
18.30 
18.30 
17.78 
19.29 
19.29 
18.30 
16.14 
13.6-4 
13.64 
12.20 
14.94 
1220 
lU4 
14.04 
14.04 
13.64 
13.64 
13.64 
16.14 
16.30 
19.29 
19.29 
19.29 
19.76 
20.23 
20.23 
18.30 
18.30 
19.29 
19.29 
37.33 
10.09 
10.07 
36.07 
7.35 
7.17 
27.95 
7.65 
7.95 
27.31 
17.59 
6.91 
6.47 
25.88 
6.56 
6.56 
27.64 
6.91 
6.82 
19.67 
6.12 
27.24 
7.11 
6.90 
25.03 
5.31 
4.93 
20.12 
4.82 
4.38 
21.27 
6.59 
6.75 
25."3 
5.95 
26.90 
34.68 
6.36 
6.36 
24.15 
6.04 
5.95 
2 •. 46 
6.20 
5.68 
lD.65 
4.26 
22.39 
26.86 
4.03 
4.72 
18.00 
4.91 
5.68 
24.M 
6.36 
6.4.4 
26.39 
6.36 
6.04 
2UO 
D: 132 
58.23 15.69 
42.47 11.45 
42.91 11.97 
17.59 4.9' . 
39.26 10.De 
40.76 11.38 
33.40 9.32 
33.36 9.31 
39.05 10.90 
30.36 8.47 
30.47 8.50 
38.77 10.82 
3U5 D.73 
3U8 D.68 
36.&6 10.29 
36.45 10.17 
31.53 8.80 
26.65 7.44 
26.66 7.50 
27.65 7.72 
35.40 9.88 
39.20 lo.D4 
37.20 10.38 
33.18 D.2B 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 3: Total supply through CHO (Muda II) D: 133 
12.00pm 70.1 3.45 18.30 6.20 
".OOpm 70.1 3.44 18.14 5.68 
a.OOam 70.1 3.38 16.14 21.30 
19·Jun e.OOam 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.38 16.'. 
34.55 9.64 
12.00pm 70.1 3.38 7. 16.14 5.32 
4.00pm 70.1 
ft.OOam 70.1 3.58 10 19.29 29.22 
20·Jun a.OOam 48.5 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 
35.07 9.79 
12.00pm 70.1 3.58 16.14 
4.00pm 70.1 
ft.OOam 70.1 3.58 10 19.29 35.07 
21·Juo 8.00.m 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.58 10 19.29 
36.72 10.25 
12.00pm 70.1 3.58 10 19.29 6.36 
4.00pm 70.1 3.58 Ul.30 620 
a.aDam 70,1 3.48 18.30 24.15 
22·Jun 8.00am 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 H8 18.30 
38.32 10.89 
12.00pm 70.1 3.48 18.30 6.04 
4.00pm 70.1 3.48 10 19.29 6.20 
8.oo8m 70.1 3.86 11 20.23 26.08 
23·Jun 8.00am 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.66 11 20.23 
.'.3Q 11.55 
12.00pm 70.1 3.7 12 21.13 6.82 
4.00pm 70.1 3.7 12 21.13 6.97 
8.00am 70.1 3.69 11.5 2D.68 27.59 
24·Jun fLOO,m 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.69 11.5 20.68 
41.61 11.61 
12.00pm 70.1 3.7 11.5 20.68 6.82 
".OOpm 70.1 3.7 12 21.13 
6,9O 
8.DOam 70.1 3.72 12 21.13 27.89 
25-Jun 8.008m 7.5 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.72 11.5 20.68 
35.83 10.00 
12.00pm 70.1 3.72 11 20.23 8.75 
4.00pm 70.1 3.48 18.30 6.36 
a,DOarn 70.1 3.4. 16.14 22.72 
2().Jun a.DOam 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.48 11.5 20.68 
37.42 10.44 
12.00pm 70.1 3.5 11 20.23 6.75 
4.oopm 70.1 3.5 11 20.23 6.67 
8.00am 70.1 3.36 7 16.14 24.00 
27..Jun 8.00am 3.5 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.36 
36.00 10.05 
12.00pm 70.1 3.5 11 20.23 
4.00pm 70.1 
8.00am 70.1 3.36 16.14 36.00 
28.Jun 8.00am 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.36 16.14 
30.58 8.53 
12.00pm 70.1 3.31 6 14.94 5.13 
4.00pm 70.1 3.27 5 13.64 4.72 
8.00sm 70.1 3.44 8.5 17.78 20.74 
29·Juo a.ODam 17.8 35.24 9.84 70.1 3.44 8.5 17.78 
37.61 10.50 
12.00pm 70.1 3.44 9 18.30 5.95 
4.00pm 70.1 3.44 10 19.29 6.20 
a.GOam 70.1 3.48 10 19.29 25.46 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 4: Total supply through TIll (Muda II) 
T1I1 Size 2' 
Date 
03-May 
D"-May 
OS-May 
06-May 
26-May 
27-M.y 
26-May 
29-May 
30· May 
31-May 
10-Jun 
11·Jun 
12·Jun 
13..Jun 
1-4·Jun 
15-Jun 
16·Jun 
17·Jun 
18..Jun 
19--Jon 
20-Jun 
21·Jun 
22·Jun 
23-Jun 
Opening Water now ln1gation 
requ)rement tarvet 
(em) (cusec) (arn·reel) 
80 
60 
60 
60 
80 
60 
80 
80 
~0.3 
~0.3 
~0.3 
40.3 
70.6 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.6 
70.6 
70.8 
70.6 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.6 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.8 
70.6 
70.6 
70.8 
70.6 
65 
85 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
65 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.8 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
70.6 
3.15 
3.15 
3.15 
3.15 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
2.52 
6.23 
6.23 
6.23 
6.23 
4.99 
~.99 
4.99 
4.99 
~.99 
4.99 
4099 
4099 
4.99 
U9 
4.99 
~.99 
4,99 
~.99 
4.99 
U9 
4.g0 
4099 
~.99 
~.99 
IrrigAtion 
target 
(mm) 
12.38 
12.38 
12.38 
12.38 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 . 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
9.90 
Difference in 
wilter~vel 
(em) 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
~ 
~ 
Actual Volume 
water !low supplied 
(cosec) (acre-feel) 
8.0~ 
8.04 
8.~ 
8.~ 
9.28 
9.28 
9.28 
9.26 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
~.1 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
6.21 
8.21 
8.21 
8.21 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
7.11 
5.8 
5.8 
5.6 
5.8 
7.54 
7.54 
7.54 
7.54 
6.52 
6.52 
6.52 
6.52 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
6.52 
6.52 
6.52 
6.52 
3.77 
3.77 
3.77 
3.77 
6.52 
6.52 
6.52 
8.52 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.CS 
~.09 
4.09 
.4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
409 
~.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
4.09 
2.65 
2.65 
2.65 
10.61 
3.06 
3.06 
3.06 
12.25 
1.72 
1.72 
1.72 
6.86 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.41 
2.35 
2.35 
2.35 
9.39 
2.35 
2.35 
2.35 
9.39 
2.71 
2.71 
2.71 
10.M 
2.35 
2.35 
2.35 
9.39 
2.35 
2.35 
2.35 
9.39 
1.91 
1.91 
1.91 
7.66 
2.49 
2.49 
2.49 
9.95 
2.15 
2.15 
2.15 
8.61 
1.76 
1.76 
1.78 
7.04 
1.76 
1.78 
1.76 
7.04 
2.15 
2.15 
2.15 
8.61 
1.24 
1.24 
1.24 
4.08 
2.15 
2.15 
2.15 
8.61 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5 .• 0 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.40 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.40 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.40 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.40 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
5.40 
5.40 
Total supply 
beyond nil 
(acre.feel) 
18.56 
21.44 
12.01 
9.47 
16.42 
16.42 
18.97 
16.42 
16.42 
13.40 
17.42 
15.06 
12.31 
12.31 
15.06 
8.71 
15.06 
9.45 
9.45 
9.45 
9.45 
9.45 
9.45 
5.4 
Total supply 
boyond T1Il 
(mm) 
36.85 
42.57 
23.85 
18.80 
32.60 
32.60 
37.66 
32.60 
32.60 
26.60 
34.59 
29.90 
24.44 
24.44 
29.00 
17.29 
29.90 
18.76 
18.76 
18.76 
18.76 
18.76 
18.76 
10.72 
D: 134 
Total suppty Total suppty 
(oA1 (oAl 
Clue-foet) (mm) 
4,50 8.93 
13.32 26.45 
2.07 4.11 
1.35 2.68 
U4 9.81 
4.94 9.81 
10.85 21.54 
4.94 9.&1 
4.04 9.81 
5.28 1048 
5.94 11.79 
3.58 7.11 
4.19 8.32 
4.19 8.32 
3.58 7.11 
·5.35 -10.62 
3.58 7.11 
1.32 2.62 
1.32 2.62 
1.32 2.62 
1.32 2.62 
1.32 2.62 
1.32 2.62 
0.75 1.49 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 5: Total supply through TII2 (Muda II) D: 135 
Tll2 Size 2' 
Date O~nlng Difference in Adull Volume Tot.1 supply Totel supply Tola'suppty Tolal supply 
water level wltarRow suppied beyond T112 beyond TI/2 foA2 foA2 
(em) (em) (cusec) (acre-fael) (acre-feet) (mm) (aent-feet) (mm) 
03-May 00.6 6.0G 2.01 14.06 2H2 2.60 5.16 
00.6 6.09 2.01 
&0.6 6.0G 2.01 
60.6 6.OG 6.G4 
~.M8y 60.6 3.51 1.18 6.12 16.12 -3.34 -6.63 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 '.5' 
OS·Mey 60.6 1.5 '.30 1.02 9.9' 19.74 1.83 3.63 
60.6 1.5 4.30 1.02 
eM 1.5 00 1.42 
60.6 1.5 '.30 5.66 
06-May 60.& 3.51 1.16 6.12 16.12 -5.14 -10.21 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
&0.6 3.51 4.6' 
26·May 60.6 4.97 1.64 11.'6 22.79 2.10 4.17 
60.6 '.97 1.6. 
60.6 2 4.97 1.64 
60.6 2 4.97 6.56 
27-May &0.6 2 4.07 1.54 11.46 22.79 2.10 4.17 
80.6 2 4.07 1.6' 
60.6 2 4.07 1.6' 
&0.6 '.97 6.56 
28-May 60.8 3.51 1.16 8.12 16.12 -1.26 -2.50 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
80.8 3.51 1.16 
60.& 3.51 U4 
29·May 60.6 4.07 1.64 11.46 22.79 -1.76 -3.53 
80.6 4.97 1.54 
60.6 4.07 1.64 
60.6 4.07 6.56 
lO-Mey 60.6 4.07 1.54 11.46 22.79 -1.76 -3.53 
60.6 4.07 1.64 
80.& U7 1.64 
60.6 4.97 6.56 
31-May 60.6 3.51 1.16 8.12 16.12 -1.26 -2.50 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6. 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 4.54 
10-Jun 60.6 '.97 1.64 11_46 22.19 2.10 4.17 
60.6 4.97 1.64 
60.6 2 4.97 1.64 
60.6 2 4.97 6.56 
1t-Jun 60.6 2 4.97 1.64 11.46 22.79 2.10 4.17 
60.0 2 4.97 1.6' 
60.6 2 4.97 1.64 
60.6 2 4.07 6.56 
12-Jun 60.6 3.51 1.16 8.12 16.12 -1.26 -2.50 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 U4 
13-Jun 60.6 3.51 1.16 8.12 16.12 -1.26 -2.50 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 1.16 
60.6 3.51 '.64 
, "'·Jun 60.6 4.97 1.64 11 .• 8 22.79 -1.78 -3.53 
60.6 4.97 1.64 
60.& 4.07 1.64 
60.6 4.07 6.56 
1S..Jun 60.6 6.09 2.01 14.06 27.02 0.80 1.59 
60.6 5.09 2.01 
60.& 6.09 2.01 
60.6 6.09 8.04 
16-.Jun 80.6 4.97 1.64 11.48 22.79 2.10 4.17 
60.6 4.97 1.64 
60.6 4.97 1.6' 
60.6 4.97 6.56 
17-Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 6.13 16.14 0.36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
18-Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 8.13 16.14 0.36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
19-Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 8.13 16.14 0,36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
20·Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 8.13 16.14 0.36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
21-Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 8.13 16.14 0.36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
22·Jun 60.7 3.52 1.16 8.13 16.14 0.36 0.71 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 1.16 
60.7 3.52 4.65 
23·Jun 60.7 3.52 4.65 '.65 9.23 0.21 0.42 
No sUPP'r 
No supply 
No supply 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 6: Total supply through TII3 (Muda II) D: 136 
TlIJ Size 2' 
Date Opflning Difference il A~ual Volume Total supply TotAl supply Total suppty T Of31 suppfy 
watllr~vef walernow suppied beyond T11J beyond T1f3 loA3 toA3 
(em) (em) (cosec) (acre-feet) (8cto-'aet) (mm) (acre-feel) (mm) 
030May 60.5 4.96 1.6. 11.46 22.75 11.46 22.75 
60.5 U6 1.6. 
eO.5 4.06 1.64 
60.5 U6 6.55 
O.-May 60.5 U6 1.64 11.46 22.75 11.-46 22.75 
60.5 •. 96 1.6. 
60.5 4.96 1.6. 
60.5 •. 96 6.55 
OS-May 60.5 3.51 1.16 e.l1 16.10 6.11 16.10 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
80.5 3.51 1.18 
60.5 1 3.51 •. 63 
06-May 70 2 5.7. 1.69 13.26 26.33 6.93 13.76 
70 2 5.7. 1.89 
70 2 5.74 1.89 
70 2 5.7. 7.56 
2a..May 70 •. 06 1.34 9.36 16.62 9.3e 18.62 
70 •. 06 1.34 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 5.36 
27·May 70 •• Of! 1.3. 9.36 18.62 9.36 18.62 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 1.J4 
70 •. 06 5.36 
28·May 70 •. 06 1.3. 9.36 16.62 9.36 18.62 
70 •. 06 1.3. 
70 •• Of! 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 5.36 
2Q·May 70 5.7. 1.69 13.26 26.33 13.26 26.33 
70 5.74 1.89 
70 2 5.7. 1.69 
70 2 5.7. 7.58 
30-May 70 2 5.74 U9 13.26 26.33 13.26 26.33 
70 2 5.7. U9 
70 2 5.7. 1.89 
70 2 5.7. 7.56 
31-May 70 1 •. 06 1.3. 9.36 18.62 9.36 1 •. 62 
70 1 •. 06 1.34 
70 •. 06 1.34 
70 •. 06 5.36 
To-Jun 70 •• Of! 1.3. 9.36 18.62 9.36 18.62 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 5.36 
11-Jun 70 •. 06 1.3. 9.36 16.62 0.36 18.62 
70 4.06 1.34 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •. 06 5.36 
12·Jun 70 •. 06 1.3. 9.36 16.62 9.36 1 •. 62 
70 •. 06 1.3 • 
70 •• Of! 1.3 • 
70 4.06 5.36 
':!-Jun 70 •. 06 1.34 0.38 18.62 9.38 18.62 
70 4.06 1.3. 
70 4.06 1.3. 
70 •. 06 5.36 
14-Jun 70 5.74 1.89 13.26 26.33 13.26 26.33 
70 5.7-'4 1.89 
70 5.74 1.69 
70 5.74 7.58 
15.Jun 70 5.74 1.89 13.26 26.33 13.26 26.33 
70 5.74 1.89 
70 5.74 1.69 
70 5.74 7.58 
16·Jun 70 4.06 1.34 Q.J8 18.62 9.36 18.62 
70 •. 06 1.34 
70 4.06 1.34 
70 •. 06 5.36 
17-Jun 58 3.36 1.11 7.71 15.43 7.77 15.43 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 4 .• -4 
la·Jun 56 3.36 1.11 7.77 15,43 7.11 15.43 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 4 .•• 
19·Jun 56 3.36 1.11 7.71 15 .• 3 7.77 15.43 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
56 3.36 .... 
20.Juo 58 3.36 1.11 7.71 15.43 7.77 15.'3 
58 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
56 3.36 ....... 
21-Juo 58 3.36 1.11 7.77 lS.'3 7.77 15 .• 3 
S6 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
56 3.36 4.4" 
22-Jun 58 3.36 1.11 7.77 15.'3 7.77 15 .• 3 
56 3.36 1.11 
58 3.36 1.11 
56 3.36 ".44 
23-Jun 56 3.36 ..... 4.44 8.82 4.4. 8.82 
No supply 
No supply 
No supply 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 7: Total supply through Tll4 (Muda II) D: 137 
T1/4 Size 1.5' 
Date Opening Difference in Actual Volume Total supply Total supply Total supply Total supply 
water level waterflow supplied beyond T1/4 beyond T1/4 toM toM 
(cm) (cm) (cusec) (acre-feet) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
06-May 40.1 2 3.2 6.33 6.33 12.57 6.33 12.57 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 8: Totaly supply through T21J (Muda II) D: 138 
T2I1 Size 2' 
Date Opening Water now Irrigation Irrigation Difference in Actual Votuma Total Total T alai supply Tol.1 supply 
requirament targel target watarlevel watertfow supplied supply supply loA5 (0 AS 
beyond T2/1 beyond T2I1 (acta-feet) (nvn) (em) (cusac) (aCto-feel) (mm) (em) (cusee) (aero-r •• I) (acre-reet) (mrn) 
03-May 62 1.97 3.90 12.38 7.19 2.37 16.61 52.67 16.61 52.67 62 7.19 2.37 
62 7.19 2.37 
62 7.19 9.49 
26-May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 6.73 2.22 15.54 49.28 4.08 12.94 58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 8.88 
27-May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 6.73 2.22 15.54 49.28 7.43 23.56 58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 8.88 
28-May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 3 5.83 1.92 13.46 42.68 5.35 16.97 58 3 5.83 1.92 
58 3 5.83 1.92 
58 3 5.83 7.69 
29-May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 6.73 2.22 15.54 49.28 7.43 23.56 58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 2.22 
58 6.73 8.88 3(}'May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 5.83 1.92 13.46 42.68 5.35 16.97 58 3 5.83 1.92 
58 3 5.83 1.92 
58 3 5.83 7.69 31-May 58 1.58 3.12 9.90 2 4.76 1.57 10.99 34.85 2.88 9.13 58 2 4.76 1.57 
58 2 4.76 1.57 
58 4.76 6.28 
10·Jun 60 !.58 3.12 9.90 6.03 1.99 13.92 H.14 2.46 7.80 60 3 6.03 1.99 
60 3 6.03 1.99 
60 3 6.03 7.96 
11..Jun 60 1.58 3.12 9.90 6.03 1.99 13.92 44.14 5.81 16.42 60 3 6.03 1.99 
60 3 6.03 1.99 
60 6.03 7.96 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 9: Totaly supply through T212 (Muda II) D:139 
T2I2 Size 2' 
Date Opening Difference in Actual Volume Total Total Total supply Total supply 
water level waterflow supplied supply supply toA6 toA6 
beyond T2I2 beyond T2/2 (acre-feet) (mm) 
(em) (cm) (cusec) (acre-feet) (acre-feet) (mm) 
03-May 
26-May 60.5 2 4.96 1.64 11.46 36.34 11.46 36.34 
60.5 2 4.96 1.64 
60.5 2 4.96 1.64 
60.5 2 4.96 6.55 
27-May 60.5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
28-May 60 .. 5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
29-May 60.5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
30-May 60.5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
31-May 60.5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
10-Jun 60.5 2 4.96 1.64 11.46 36.34 11.46 36.34 
60.5 2 4.96 1.64 
60.5 2 4.96 1.64 
60.5 2 4.96 6.55 
ll-Jun 60.5 3.51 1.16 8.11 25.72 8.11 25.72 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 1.16 
60.5 3.51 4.63 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 10: Weekly supply through CHO (Muda II) D: 140 
MainCHO 
Week Rainfall Waterflow Target supply Target supply Volume Volume Illegal pipe Total supply Total supply 
requirement supplied supplied (ex. pump) 
(mm) (cusec) (acre-feet) (mm) ( acre-Ieet) (mm) (acre-feet) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 106.80 211.46 59.01 300.46 83.85 24.53 300.46 83.85 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 62.40 123.55 34.4B 101.66 28.37 14.25 101.66 2B.37 
27/03 - 02/04 0.00 35.60 70.49 19.67 63.25 17.65 0.00 63.25 17.65 
03/04 - 09104 93.00 17.8.0 35.24 9.84 21.18 5.91 0.00 31.67 8.84 
10/04 - 16104 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30/04 51.00 53.60 106.13 29.62 93.72 26.15 0.00 93.72 26.15 
01/05 - 07/05 60.50 125.40 246.29 69.29 275.98 77.02 0.00 275.98 77.02 
OB/05 - 14/05 30.00 60.60 159.59 44.54 131.02 36.56 0.00 131.02 36.56 
15/05 - 21105 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22105 - 28/05 0.00 71.20 140.98 39.34 172.00 48.00 0.00 172.00 48.00 
29/05 - 4106 0.00 35.60 70.49 19.67 69.53 19,40 0.00 69.53 19.40 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 53.40 105.73 29.51 104.85 29.26 0.00 104.85 29.26 
12/06 - 18/06 16.5 106.8 211.46 59.01 226.14 63.11 0.00 226.14 63.11 
19/06 - 25/06 62 124.6 246.71 68.85 263.48 73.53 0.00 263.48 73.53 
26/06 - 02107 14 71.2 140.98 39.34 141.61 39.52 0.00 141.61 39.52 
03/07 - 09107 5.5 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/()7 141.5 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.5 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31107 - 06107 14 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 - 11/08 1.5 a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 11: Weekly supply through T111 (Muda II) D: 141 
T1Il Size 2' 
Week Rainfall Target supply Target supply Volume supplied Volumed supplied Total supply Total supply 
through nIl through nl1 through nIl through T1Il toAl toAl 
(mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feel) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27/03 - 02104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09104 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/04 -16/04 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30/04 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/05 - 01/05 60.50 24.93 49.50 61.48 122.06 21.24 42.17 
08/05 - 14/05 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/05 - 28/05 0.00 14.96 29.70 51.81 102.87 20.73 41.16 
29/05- 4/06 0.00 14.96 29.70 46.24 91.81 15.16 30.10 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 9.97 19.80 32.48 64.49 9.52 113.90 
12/06 - 18/06 16.50 34.90 69.30 82.35 163.50 12.83 25.47 
19/06 - 25/06 62.00 24.93 49.50 43.20 85.77 6.03 . 11.97 
26/06 - 02/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09107 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/07 141.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 -11108 1.50 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 12: Weekly supply t!troug!t T112 (Muda II) D: 142 
T1/2 Size 2' 
Week Rainfall Total supply Total supply Total supply Total supply 
beyond T1/2 beyond T1/2 toA2 toA2 
(mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20103 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27103 - 02/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09/04 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10104 - 16/04 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17104 - 23/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30104 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/05 - 07/05 60.50 40.24 79.89 -4.05 -8.04 
08/05 - 14/05 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/05 - 28/05 0.00 31.08 61.71 2.94 5.84 
29/05 - 4106 0.00 31.08 61.71 
-4.82 -9.57 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 22.96 45.59 4.20 8.34 
12/06 - 18/06 16.50 69.52 138.03 -0.68 -1.35 
19/06 - 25/06 62.00 37.17 73.BO 1.65 3.28 
26/06 - 02/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 -16/07 141.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 -11/0B 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table i3: Weekly supply through Til3 (Muda II) D: 143 
T1/3 Size 2' 
Week Rainfall Total supply Total supply Total supply Total supply 
beyond T1/3 beyond T1/3 toA3 toA3 
(mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27/03 - 02/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09/04 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/04 - 16/04 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30/04 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/05 - 07/05 60.50 44.29 87.94 37.96 75.37 
08/05 - 14/05 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22105 - 28/05 0.00 28.14 55.87 28.14 55.87 
29/05 - 4/06 0.00 35.90 71.28 35.90 71.28 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 18.76 37.25 18.76 37.25 
12/06 - 18/06 16.50 70.20 139.38 70.20 139.38 
19/06 - 25/06 62.00 35.52 70.52 35.52 70.52 
26/06 - 02107 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/07 141.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 - 11/08 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 14: Weekly supply through T114 (Muda II) D: 144 
T1/4 Size 2' 
Week Rainfall Total supply Total supply Total supply Total supply 
beyond T1/4 beyond T1/4 toA4 toM 
(mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27/03 - 02/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09/04 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/04 - 16/04 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30/04 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/05 - 07/05 60.50 6.33 53.80 6.33 12.57 
08/05 - 14/05 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/05 - 28/05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29/05 - 4/06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12106 - 18/06 16.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19/06 - 25/06 62.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26/06 - 02/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/07 . 141.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 - 11/08 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
APPENDIX D:8 - Table 15: Weekly supply through T211 (Muda II) D: 145 
T2Il 
Week Rainfall Target supply Target supply Volume supplied Volume supplied T alai supply Tolal supply 
Ihrough T2Il through T2Il through T2Il through T2Il toA5 toA5 
(mm) (acre-feel) (mm). (acre·feal) (mm) (acre-feal) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20/03 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27/03 - 02104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09104 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/04 - 16104 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30104 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01105 - 07/05 60.50 3.90 12.38 16.61 52.67 16.61 52.67 
08/05 - 14105 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/05 - 28/05 0.00 9.37 29.70 44.54 141.26 16.86 53.48 
79/05 -4/06 0.00 9.37 29.70 39.99 126.82 15.66 49.66 
05/06 - 11/06 3.00 6.24 19.80 27.85 88.31 8.28 26.25 
12/06 - 18106 16.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19/06 - 25106 62.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26/06 - 02107 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 5.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/07 141.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 • 30/07 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06107 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08·11/08 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Week Rainfall Total supply Total supply Total supply Total supply 
beyond T2/2 beyond T2/2 toA6 toA6 
(mm) (acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20103 - 26/03 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27/03 - 02/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09/04 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0104 - 16/04 -15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23/04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30104 51.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/05 - 07/05 60.S0· 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
08/0S - 14/0S 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1S/OS - 2110S 31.S0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/0S - 28/0S 0.00 27.68 87.78 27.68 87.78 
29/0S - 4106 0.00 24.33 77.16 24.33 77.16 
OS/06 - 11/06 3.00 19.57 62.06 19.57 62.06 
12106 - 18/06 16.S0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19/06 - 2S/06 62.00 0.00 _ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26/06 - 02/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 S.SO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10107 - 16/07 141.S0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 S3.S0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30107 SS.OO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 - 11/08 1.S0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Supply through T1 and T2 
T1/1 
Week Rainfall Target supply Target supply Volume supplied Volumed supplied 
through T1 and T2 through T1 and T2 through T1 and T2 through T1 and T2 
(mm) ( acre-feet) (mm) (acre-feet) (mm) 
13/03 - 19/03 21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20103 - 26/03 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27103 - 02/04 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/04 - 09/04 93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/04 - 16/04 15 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/04 - 23/04 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/04 - 30/04 51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 
01/05 - 07/05 60.5 28.83 35.21 78.09 95.35 
08/05 - 14/05 30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15/05 - 21/05 31.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22/05 - 28/05 0 24.32 29.70 96.35 117.65 
29/05 - 4106 0 24.32 29.70 86.23 105.29 
05/06 - 11/06 3 16.22 19.80 60.33 73.66 
12/06 - 18/06 16.5 34.90 42.62 82.35 100.55 
19/06 - 25/06 62 24.93 30.44 . 43.20 52.75 
26/06 - 02/07 14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
03/07 - 09/07 5.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/07 - 16/07 141.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17/07 - 23/07 53.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24/07 - 30/07 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
31/07 - 06/07 14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
07/08 - 11108 1.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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The Yashima methodology1 
Underlying assumptions 
The methodology developed and tested by Yashima (199Sb) is based on the assumption that, with 
standing water rice fields, changes in field water depths can be used as a performance index in the 
assessment of both water delivery and water supply performance. This methodology is based on 
two main assumptions: 
• That yields are influenced by the field water depth which varies dependent on the cropping 
stage of production and the method of planting; and 
• that by measuring changes in these depths during the irrigation season it is possible to 
establish three water supply performance indicators: irrigation supply efficiency, rainfall 
efficiency and water supply performance. 
The range of control and allowable field water depths with respect to each cropping stage are 
shown in Table 1. The relationship between these figures and rice yields is based on the following 
arguments: 
• During the land preparation and sowing stage, the field water depth influences both the 
germination and establishment of seedlings. Failure to control the field water depth at this 
stage leads to a reduction in the number of panicles per hill; 
• During the rice growth stage, MADA requests that farmers retain lScm (Le. the maximum 
depth) of water in their fields in order that the fields can be used as water storage units to 
enhance the water utilisation performance of the irrigation scheme. During growth, as long as 
the water level remains below the top of the paddy there is no adverse effect on crop 
development. However, water shortage during this time will reduce the number of spikelets 
,per panicle; 
• Field water depths below -Scm in the flowering stage and -10cm during the maturing stage 
will decrease the number of mature grains per unit area; and 
• The control and allowable depths in the maturation period are a direct result of the 
requirements of the combine harvester. lfthe surface of the field is in any way wet, the work 
rate of the combine will be slower, grains will be damaged and production costs will increase. 
1 This discussion is entirely based on the work ofYashima (1995b). 
APPENDIX D:9: The Yashima Methodology D: 149 
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Cropping stage Wet seeding Dry seeding Transplanting 
Land preparation 5(10to5) -30 (-10 to -00) 5 (10 to 5) 
Sowing/planting 0(Oto-10) -30 (-10 to -00) 5(15to5) 
Growth 5(15toO) 5 (15 to -5) 5 (15 to -5) 
Flowering 5 (10 to -5) 5 (10 to -5) 5 (10 to -5) 
Maturing 0(5to-10) 0(5to-10) 0(5to-10) 
Harvesting -30 (-10 to -00) -30 (-10 to _00) -30 (-10 to -00)* 
Table 1: Control and allowable field water depths in rice fields (em) 
(* - Figure in parentheses is allowable FWD, negative value is underground water depth, not water 
volume depth) 
Source: Yashima, 1995b:7) 
In the original study conducted by Yashima (l995b), the range of both irrigation and rainfall 
supply efficiencies were categorised from 0 to 100 per cent with a tentative standard set at 70 per 
cent. However, in light of the criticisms of the implicit understanding of efficiency by Small 
(1992), and the misgivings towards setting such standards by Yashima (1995b), such an 
assessment is not applied to the results in the current study. Instead, comparative analysis will be 
conducted on the differences in results obtained in the Muda I and Muda II blocks, hence the 
'with' and 'without' project focus. 
Model for assessing water supply performance 
To assess the change in field water depths as a function of water supply performance, the Yashima 
methodology focuses on the balance between inputs and outputs. The primary of which include: 
the irrigation supply; rainfall; evapotranspiration; seepage, percolation and leakage; overflow and 
drainage. The interconnected relationship between these factors determines the water delivery 
performance at the field level and the water supply performance of MADA. The model for 
understanding these linkages and their relationship to the initial and final field water depths is 
shown in Figure 1. This model is a means of systematising the data required for an assessment of 
water supply performance. The data collected in my research area to operationalise this model is 
shown in Box 1, with the data collection forms illustrated in Appendix D: 1. 
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@] 
Target field water 
depth (FWDT) 
Ineffective rainfall 
(RFI) 
~ Primary field 
data 
RFA-WSI 
..... 
.... 
T 
Actual iITigation supply 
(ffiA) 
WSI-RFI 
Effective ilTigation supply 
(ffiE) 
ffiA - IRI 
Figure 1: Data systematisation model for assessing water delivery performance 
Source: Yashima, 1995b: 5 (Changes made to inaccurate original) 
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Box 1: Fieldwork data collection 
1. Actual cropping pattern at each observation point, on each day, categorised as fallow, land 
preparation, sowing, growth, flowering, maturing/ripening and harvesting. In addition, the 
planting method was also coded in order to establish the control and target field water depths 
and the target water supply. 
2. Initial field water depth at each observation point, on each day, converting the ground water 
level into water volume depth (FWDv)*. Data collected in cm. 
3. Actual pan evaporation (EP) in mm, collected on each day, at the central Kepala Batas rainfall 
station. 
4. Actual rainfall in cm, collected on each day, from rainfall station No. 17 in the Muda I block. 
5. Target seepage and percolation is regarded as 1 mm per day for each of the cropping stages of 
land preparation, sowing, growing and flowering. 
6. Actual irrigation supply was collected through the main CHO in the Muda I and Muda II irrigation 
blocks. Irrigation supply was also recorded for the secondary canal and tertiary canal offtakes 
for the Muda II block T/1 (T1/1-4) and T/2 (T2/1-2). See Map 3.4, chapter three. Total supply 
was calculated in acre-feet and subsequently recalculated into mm. See Appendix D:3 for 
mathematical calculations. 
7. Target irrigation supply is calculated by MADA at the HQ using the Water Control Management 
System. The four target supplies are: N48, N60, N80 or N100 dependent on the cropping 
stage and water availability. For example, N48 is the recommended irrigation duty for the 
presaturation period. 
8. Final field water depth is the initial field water depth of the previous assessment 
(day/week/month) . 
* - Based on field experiments conducted by Yashima in the Muda region, FWDv can be calculated 
as: FWDv = -0.826 x D 0.5 where D is the underground water level in cm and FWD v = field water 
depth volume. 
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In order to use the model in Figure 1 in any meaningful manner, the interval of assessment needs 
to be articulated. Yashima (l995b) notes that this can be daily, weekly or monthly, dependent on 
the type of irrigation context. In schemes with large time-lags in delivery, or schemes with 
intermittent supply, daily assessment is not recommended. Instead, in a scheme with an 
intermittent supply in weekly cycles, the unit of assessment should also be weekly. Furthermore, 
to establish target field water depths, and hence the water supply target, both the type of cropping 
method adopted and the cropping stage are required. In order that these figures can be used for 
formulating the target water supply, the distribution of recorded field water depth's in each 
cropping stage are converted into percentages in factors of 5 from <-30 to > 15cm (Appendix D:2). 
It is then possible to assess the percentage of achievement of recorded field water depths to the 
range of allowable depths shown in Table 1. 
_. 
Cropping stage Wet seeding Dry seeding Transplanting 
-~,--
Fallow 
Land preparation 1.00 0 1.00 
Sowing/planting 1.00 0 1.00 
Dormancy 0 
Growth/flowering/maturing 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Harvesting 0 0 0 
Table 2: ET/EP ratio by cropping stage and cropping method 
(0 - Supplemental supply not required, '-' - Not applicable for wet seeded or transplanted conditions) 
Source: Yashima, 1995b:8 
Evaporation and transpiration alter dependent on the cropping stage. Therefore, to establish the 
target evapotranspiration, a graph of the ratio between evapotranspiration (ET) and pan 
evaporation (EP), under direct seeding, has been developed by Chaw & Seng (1989) (Figure 3.l, 
chapter three). Using this model and field experiments as a guide, the ET/EP ratio under different 
cropping stages used in the Yashima model is shown in Table 2. Under wet seeded conditions, for 
example, the ET/EP ratio is evaluated as 1.00 in the land preparation and sowing stages, 1.25 in 
the growth and flowering stages and 0 in the maturation and harvesting stages. 
Critical to an understanding of the Yashima model is understanding the factors which impact on 
the balance of water, in standing water rice fields, between time x and y. Therefore, to elaborate 
on the logic of the model (Figure 1) it is necessary to elaborate on these factors when describing 
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the process of change between the initial field water depth at time x and the final field water depth 
at time y (the mathematical computations are shown in Appendix D:4)2. 
Field level water balance in the Yashima model 
The logic for understanding the field level water balance is shown in Figure 2. Using this model, 
the change in field water depths from the initial depth at time 1, to the final depth at time 2, is 
dependent on increases from rainfall and irrigation and decreases from drainage, seepage, 
percolation and evapotranspiration. 
Where: 
RFA 
IRA 1 
dFWD 
FWDI i 
Time 1 
FWDI: Initial field water depth 
FWDF: Final field water depth 
dFWD: Change in field water depth 
ET: Evapotranspiration 
DR 
ET&SP 
FWDF 
Time 2 
RFA: Rainfall 
IRA: 
DR: 
SP: 
Irrigation supply 
Drainage water (overflow) 
Seepage and percolation 
Figure 2: Rice field water balance 
Source: Yashima, 1995b:10 
2 The calculations for the target field water depth are not illustrated in Appendix D:4, because this is 
dependent on whether the irrigation system is continuous or intermittent. In a system with continuous 
irrigation, the target field water depth is the control field water depth (FWDC) but in a system with 
intermittent irrigation supply, the field water depth is lowered in between supplies by evapotranspiration 
(ET) and seepage (SP) if there is no rainfall or drainage. In this respect, the target field water depth is 
computed as: FWDC - (ET + SP)/2. 
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This balance is expressed in the following equation: 
FWD! + IRA + RFA= FWDF+ ET+ SP + DR 
where: DR = dFWD + IRA + RF A - (ET + SP) and dFWD = FWDF - FWDI 
Where: 
Scenario One 
RFI = RFA- DR 
= ET + SP - IRA - dFWD 
RFE = RFA - RFI 
IRE = IRA 
IRI = 0 
RFI = Ineffective rainfall 
RF A = Actual rainfall 
DR = Drainage 
ET = Evapotranspiration 
IRE = Effective irrigation 
Scenario Two Scenario Three 
RFI = RFA RFI = RFA 
RFE= 0 IRI = IRA 
IRE = IRA + RFA - DR RFE = 0 
= ET + SP - dFWD 
IRI = IRA - IRE IRE= 0 
IRA = Actual irrigation 
dFWD = Change in field water depth 
RFE = Effective rainfall 
SP = Seepage 
IRI = Ineffective irrigation 
Table 3: Effective and ineffective irrigation and rainfall - 3 scenarios 
Source: Adapted from Yashima, 1995b:9-10 
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From the equation, drainage represents the water supply which is ineffective, comprising of 
ineffective rainfall, ineffective irrigation supply and decreases in the field water depth. The 
primary concern for irrigation management is to supply water after the rainfall has either been 
made effective or gone to waste. Therefore, the extent to which the ineffective water supply is a 
result of the management of the irrigation supply is dependent on the extent to which this is a 
result of ineffective rainfall, irrigation supply or both. Using these three scenarios, the following 
conditions emerge3 : 
• Scenario One: All ineffective water supply is due to ineffective rainfall. i.e. DR<RF 
Under this condition, all water supplied by irrigation is effective, with the drainage 
(ineffective water supply) being solely made up of ineffective rainfall. 
3 See Table 3 for computations of effective and ineffective rainfall and supply under each scenario 
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• Scenario Two: Ineffective water supply is made up of all rainfall plus part of the irrigation 
supply, i.e. RF<DR<RF + IR. Under this condition, no rainfall is effective and the effective 
rainfall is dependent on the sum of evapotranspiration, seepage and percolation minus the 
change in field water depth between time 1 and 2. 
• Scenario three: That all the rainfall and irrigation supply is ineffective, therefore lowering the 
field water depth, i.e. DR>RF A + IRA. 
If conclusions are to be drawn from the three indicators of effective irrigation, rainfall and water 
supply performance, it is important that an understanding is gained of the scenarios which 
contribute to the effective or ineffective use of the rainfall and irrigation supply. For example, in 
scenario one, the ineffective water supply is due to ineffective rainfall only, with the ineffective 
irrigation supply being zero. Under this condition, all water supplied by irrigation is being made 
effective. From this one could conclude that water management practices are consistent with 
rainfall providing that the water supply performance is over 100 per cent. If the water supply 
performance is below 100 per cent, the lack of ineffective irrigation would be consistent with 
sh0l1ages in the total irrigation supply. Therefore, good water management practices could not be 
concluded. By contrast, the fact that rainfall is ineffective is suggestive of either too great an 
intensity of rainfall or the poor management practices of farmers in repairing field dikes, operating 
turnouts and so on. 
Indicators of assessment 
To establish the most likely impacts of both farmer management and government interventions, 
Yashima has suggested five key assessment indicators which can be developed from the data 
collected and modelled outcomes. These include: a field water depth control performance 
indicator; a water supply performance indicator; a water supply efficiency indicator; an irrigation 
supply efficiency indicator; and a rainfall efficiency indicator (see Appendix D:5 for mathematical 
computations). Set out below is a brief overview of the usefulness of these indicators for 
examining the performance of each of the irrigation blocks: 
Indicator one - Irrigation supply efficiency: This is a ratio of actual irrigation supply to effective 
irrigation supply at the farm gate. As an indicator of water delivery performance, this reflects the 
quality of the field water management practices of the farmers and the water management 
practices of MADA. For example, a low irrigation supply efficiency is indicative of excessive 
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water intake, the improper operation of turnouts and inadequate maintenance of field batas and 
drainage outlets. By contrast, a high irrigation supply efficiency is indicative of a consistency of 
supply with Tainfall. 
Indicator two - Rainfall efficiency: This is a ratio of effective rainfall to actual rainfall and an 
indicator of the consistency with which irrigation water is supplied in relation to rainfall. In the 
Muda area, the fields are utilised as water storage units because of the long time-lag between the 
supply of water from the dams and the delivery of water to the blocks and fields. In theory, the 
irrigation supply should be used to supplement rainfall. However, because of this time-lag, water 
has to be released from the dam when it is raining in the command area. Consequently, rainfall 
efficiency is an indicator of the extent to which irrigation water is supplied when rainfall should be 
the main source of water, i.e. the extent to which rainfall is not utilised. It is, however, recognised 
that heavy rainfall intensity inevitably leads to overflow and wastage. 
Indicator three - Water supply performance: This is a ratio of actual water supply to target water 
supply. Consequently, it is an indicator of over supply, where: actual water supply is the sum of 
actual rainfall plus actual irrigation supply; and target water supply is the balance between the 
initial depth of water in the field and the targeted field water depth (for wet seeding this would be 
Scm in the preparation, sowing, growth and flowering stages, Ocm in the maturing stage and -
30cm at harvesting (Table ]). A water supply performance Figure of less than 100 per cent is 
suggestive of water scarcity and a water supply performance Figure of more than 100 per cent is 
suggestive of poor water delivery performance on the part of MADA. Consequently, this is a 
useful indicator of the quality of MAD As water management practices during a given time period. 
Indicator four - Water depth control performance: The control and allowable field water 
depths illustrated in Table 1 provide the basis for the water depth control performance indicator. 
In a system with continuous irrigation, a ratio of actual field water depths to control field water 
depths can be an indicator of the extent to which actual water depths correspond with 
recommended water depths. In a system with intermittent supply, however, a ratio of actual field 
water depths to control field water depths minus (ET + SP)/2 is required due to the losses incurred 
during times of no supply and no rainfall. 
Indicator five - Water supply efficiency: This indicator is based on the assumption that water 
which is lost due to evapotranspiration, seepage and percolation is effective water supply, whereas 
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water lost in overflow and leakage is ineffective water supply. Consequently, water supply 
efficiency is a ration of effective to actual water supply. 
Using the five indicators developed, the models usefulness for assessing the constraints, or 
otherwise, to management interventions on the part of both the farmers and MADA staff should be 
apparent. For example, where there is poor water supply performance this could be caused by: 
shortages in supply due to either improper management or an inadequate water resource for 
requirements; high water consumption due to a prolonged cropping period; or high water loss due 
to poor water management in relation to rainfall or improper field water management on the part 
of the farmers (Yashima, 1995b: 10). A low water depth control performance indicator, for 
example, is suggestive of poor farmer management practices whereas a low water supply 
performance is indicative of poor water delivery performance on the part of MADA. 
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A Comparison of means 
Type: 
Dependent: 
Descriptive .statistic: 
Inferential statistic: 
Independent 
padi v2 
meth d2 
meth w2 
pit tot3 
pt flat3 
location 
yrs irr3 
no f3 
cc3 
cp3 
cf3 
cwp3 
p2tc 
opump 
pchc 
p4tc 
mfa 
Ordinal - Interval 
Interval 
Eta 
F-test 
yield d (log) 
Eta 2 F-sig 
ns 
ns 
-
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
ns 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
B Crosstabulation 
Type: 
Dependent: 
Nominal-Ordinal 
Ordinal 
Descriptive statistic: Cramer V 
Chi-square Inferential statistic: 
Independent 
Gender 
Ethnicity 
Dependent 
yield w (log) cpd d (log) cpd w (log) 
Eta 2 F-sig Eta 2 F-sig Eta 2 F-sig 
ns ns ns 
- ns ns 
ns ns -
ns ns ns 
ns ns ns 
ns .05 5 .06 5 
ns - -
ns - -
- .25 5 .20 5 
- .15 5 .12 5 
- .09 5 .12 5 
- .11 5 .13 5 
- .12 5 .10 5 
- ns ns 
- ns ns 
- ns ns 
- .08 5 .12 5 
Dependent 
Income 
CV Chi-sig 
.20 5 
nea nea 
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C Linear correlation 
Type: Interval - Interval 
Dependent: 
Descriptive statistic: Pearsons r 
Inferential statistic: Test for significance of r, T test of direction and strength. 
Independent Dependent 
yield d (log) yield w (log) cpd (log) 
r 2 sig T r 2 sig T r 2 sig T 
ha (log) 0.3 5 0.2 0.6 5 -3.7 0.44 5 12.2 
cpd (log) ns - -
cpw (log) - ns -
Independent Dependent 
ha (log) 
r 2 sig 
ha own (log) .57 5 
ha rin (log) .81 5 
D Rank correlation 
Type: 
Dependent: 
Descriptive statistic: 
Inferential statistic: 
Independent 
Ordinal - Interval 
If dependent variable is not interval 
Spearman's rho 
Test for significance of rho 
Dependent 
hi yield d (log) yield w (log) no nf c 
rho sig rho sig rho sig rho sig 
age ns - - -
lev s ns - - -
pg padic -.15 5 - - -
no p2 .31 5 - - .18 5 
no nf c ns - - -
no e c .18 5 - - -
no f2 ns ns ns -
hi3 - - -2.1 5 ns -
cpw (log) 
r 2 sig 
0.35 5 
-
-
no e c 
rho sig 
-
-
-
.49 5 
-
-
-
-
ns = not significant, p>O.05 
nea = not enough arguments 
s = significant p<O.05 
- = non modeled relation 
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: 
T j 
10.2 
! 
I 
T . 
13.9 
18.8 I 
no f2 
rho sig 
-
-
-
ns 
-
-
-
-
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Farm and field characteristics 
S 
T 
U 
Ha 
P 
Md 
Ct 
L 
Ed 
Source of supply 
Plot topography 
Use pump in the irrigated season 
Size of land operated 
Planting method in irrigated 
season 
Method of drainage 
Ability to control turnout 
Field location 
Experience of irrigation 
difficulties 
Rd Regularity of drainage difficulties 
Water control 
Rp Perception of reliability 
Ep Experience of reliability 
diffi culti es 
Rr Regularity of reliability 
difficulties 
Edm Experience of too much supply in 
irrigated season 1996 
Ewl Experience of inadequate supply 
in non-irrigated season 1996 
Ewm Experience of too much water 
supply in non-irrigated season 
1996 
El5 Experience of inadequate supply 
in past 5 yrs 
Em5 Experience of too much supply in 
past 5 yrs 
Pda Perception of overall adequacy of 
drainage 
Sf Perception of schedule fairness 
Df Differences in distribution within 
block 
Cooperation 
Con 
Nk 
Np 
Experience of conflict 
Extent of knowledge 
Extent of patiicipation 
Water management strategies 
Cc Construction of channels 
Cr Construction of ridges 
Cpd Construction of in plot drains 
Ih Too high water level in irrigated 
season 
Wo Who should operate structures 
Ms Action to maintain structures 
Rm Regularity of structure 
maintenance 
Wmc Who should maintain canals 
Wmo Who should maintain offtakes 
Mcm Maintain canals with MADA 
Moo Maintain offtakes on own 
Mom Maintain offtakes with MADA 
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HIERARCHICAL LOGLINEAR ANALYSIS FOR FIGURE 8.20 
Table 1: Perception oftbe reliabilty of water supply 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BRp) (BS) (RpS) BRpS 2 0.73 ns 
2. (BS) (RpS) BRp 1 4.78 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BS) SRp 4 3.34 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BRp) (BT) (RpT) BRpT 1 2.03 ns 
2. (BT) (RpT) BRp 1 9.23 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BT) TRp 1 23.93 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BRp) (BU) (RpU) BRpU 1 1.80 ns 
2. (BU) (RpU) BRp 1 15.16 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BU) URp 1 6.26 <0.05 
Size of land 1. (BRp) (BHa) (RpHa) BRpHa 1 0.44 ns 
2. (BHa) (RpHa) BRp 1 9.23 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BHa) HaRp 1 0.01 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BRp) (BP) (RpP) BRpP 1 0.50 ns 
2. (BP) (RpP) BRp 1 9.77 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BP) PRp 1 0.01 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BRp) (BCt) (RpCt) BRpCt 1 1.20 ns 
2. (BCt) (RpCt) BRp 1 15.10 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BCt) CtRp 1 16.28 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BRp) (BL) (RpL) BRpL 2 0.73 ns 
2. (BL) (RpL) BRp 1 4.78 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BL) LRp 2 3.34 ns 
I rrigation difficulties 1. (BRp) (BEd) (RpEd) BRpEd 2 5.12 ns 
2. (BEd) (RpEd) BRp 1 17.61 <0.05 
3. (BRp) (BEd) EdRp 2 24.66 <0.05 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
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Table 2: Experience of reliability difficulties 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BEp) (BS) (EpS) BEpS 2 16.15 <0.05 
2. (BS) (EpS) BEp 
3. (BEp) (BS) SEp 
Plot topography 1. (BEp) (BT) (EpT) BEpT 1 15.32 <0.05 
2. (BT) (EpT) BEp 
3. (BEp) (BT) TEp 
Use pump 1. (BEp) (BU) (EpU) BEpU 1 1.99 ns 
2. (BU) (EpU) BEp 1 24.66 <0.05 
3. (BEp) (BU) UEp 1 8.10 <0.05 
Size of land 1. (BEp) (BHa) (EpHa) BEpHa 1 1.04 ns 
2. (BHa) (EpHa) BEp 1 16.70 <0.05 
3. (BEp) (BHa) HaEp 1 0.21 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BEp) (BP) (EpP) BEpP 1 8.37 <0.05 
2. (BP) (EpP) BEp 
3. (BEp) (BP) PEp 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BEp) (BCt) (EpCt) BEpCt 1 1.27 ns 
2. (BCt) (EpCt) BEp 1 16.70 <0.05 
3. (BEp) (BCt) CtEp 1 3.33 ns 
Field location 1. (BEp) (BL) (EpL) BEpL 2 16.15 <0.05 
2. (BL) (EpL) BEp 
3. (BEp) (BL) LEp 
I rrigation difficulties 1. (BEp) (BEd) (EpEd) BEpEd 2 2.87 ns 
2. (BEd) (EpEd) BEp 1 32.65 <0.05 
3. (BEp) (BEd) EdEp 2 56.44 <0.05 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 3: Regularity of reliability difficulties 
--
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BRr) (BS) (RrS) BRrS 4 6.63 ns 
2. (BS) (RrS) BRr 2 65.86 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BS) SRr 4 4.40 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BRr) (BT) (RrT) BRrT 2 4.20 ns 
2. (BT) (RrT) BRr 2 71.84 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BT) TRr 2 17.00 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BRr) (BU) (RrU) BRrU 2 0.26 ns 
2. (BU) (RrU) BRr 2 47.61 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BU) URr 2 11.98 <0.05 
Size of land 1. (BRr) (BHa) (RrHa) BRrHa 2 0.71 ns 
2. (BHa) (RrHa) BRr 2 71.84 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BHa) HaRr 2 14.81 <0.05 
Planting methods 1. (BRr) (BP) (RrP) BRrP 2 4.89 ns 
2. (BP) (RrP) BRr 2 71.34 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BP) PRr 2 0.94 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BRr) (BCt) (RrCt) BRrCt 2 2.58 ns 
2. (BCt) (RrCt) BRr 2 75.04 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BCt) CtRr 2 11.37 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BRr) (BL) (RrL) BRrL 4 6.63 ns 
2. (BL) (RrL) BRr 2 65.86 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BL) LRr 4 4.40 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BRr) (BEd) (RrEd) BRrEd 2 0.68 ns 
2. (BEd) (RrEd) BRr 2 71.84 <0.05 
3. (BRr) (BEd) EdRr 2 0.79 ns 
difficulties N/A 
APPENDIX E:3 Tables 1-26: Log linear analysis E: 164 
Table 4: Experience of too much supply in the irrigated season 1996 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BEdm) (BS) (EdmS) BEdmS 2 8.9 <0.05 
2. (BS) (EdmS) BEdm 
3. (BEdm) (BS) SEdm 
Plot topography 1. (BEdm) (BT) (EdmT) BEdmT 1 2.55 ns 
2. (BT) (EdmT) BEdm 1 68.41 <0.05 
3. (BEdm) (BT) TEdm 1 7.95 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BEdm) (BU) (EdmU) BEdmU 1 5.06 <0.05 
2. (BU) (EdmU) BEdm 
3. (BEdm) (BU) UEdm 
Size of land 1. (BEdm) (BHa) (EdmHa) BEdmHa 1 0.11 ns 
2. (BHa) (EdmHa) BEdm 1 68.41 <0.05 
3. (BEdm) (BHa) HaEdm 1 0.15 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BEdm) (BP) (EdmP) BEdmP 1 1.34 ns 
2. (BP) (EdmP) BEdm 1 71.71 <0.05 
3. (BEdm) (BP) PEdm 1 3.74 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BEdm) (BCt) (EdmCt) BEdmCt 1 0.12 ns 
2. (BCt) (EdmCt) BEdm 1 68.41 <0.05 
3. (BEdm) (BCt) CtEdm 1 0.08 ns 
Field location 1. (BEdm) (BL) (EdmL) BEdmL 2 8.9 <0.05 
2. (BL) (EdmL) BEdm 
3. (BEdm) (BL) LEdm 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BEdm) (BEd) (EdmEd) BEdmEd 1 0.80 ns 
2. (BEd) (EdmEd) BEdm 1 71.81 <0.05 
3. (BEdm) (BEd) EdEdm 1 3.98 ns 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 5: Experience of inadequate supply in the non-irrigated season 1996 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BEwl) (BS) (EwIS) BEwlS 2 20.79 <0.05 
2. (BS) (EwIS) BEwl 
3. (BEwl) (BS) SEwl 
Plot topography 1. (BEwl) (BT) (EwIT) BEwlT 1 0.20 ns 
2. (BT) (EwIT) BEwl 1 24.40 <0.05 
3. (BEwl) (BT) TEwl 1 0.26 ns 
Use pump 1. (BEwl) (BU) (EwIU) BEwlU 1 0.26 ns 
2. (BU) (EwIU) BEwl 1 24.40 <0.05 
3. (BEwl) (BU) UEwl 1 1.13 ns 
Size of land 1. (BEwl) (BHa) (EwIHa) BEwlHa 1 0.01 ns 
2. (BHa) (EwIHa) BEwl 1 24.40 <0.05 
3. (BEwl) (BHa) HaEwl 1 0.18 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BEwl) (BP) (EwIP) BEwlP 1 0.44 ns 
2. (BP) (EwIP) BEwl 1 29.45 <0.05 
3. (BEwl) (BP) PEwl 1 4.25 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BEwl) (BCt) (EwICt) BEwlCt 1 0.00 ns 
2. (BCt) (EwICt) BEwl 1 19.41 <0.05 
3. (BEwl) (BCt) CtEwl 1 3.94 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BEwl) (BL) (EwIL) BEwlL 2 20.79 <0.05 
2. (BL) (EwIL) BEwl 
3. (BEwl) (BL) LEwl 
I rrigation difficulties N/A 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 6: Experience of too much supply in the non-irrigated season 1996 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic squar 
e 
~-Source orsupply ---T.~~(~BEwm) (BS) (EwmS) ,~~~~=r~~~ __ =.v,~. __ BEwmS 2 0.35 ns 
2. (BS) (EwmS) BEwm 1 74.09 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BS) SEwm 2 2.31 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BEwm) (BT) (EwmT) BEwmT 1 1.76 ns 
2. (BT) (EwmT) BEwm 1 84.98 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BT) TEwm 1 9.19 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BEwm) (BU) (EwmU) BEwmU 1 0.00 ns 
2. (BU) (EwmU) BEwm 1 84.98 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BU) UEwm 1 0.29 ns 
Size of land 1. (BEwm) (BHa) (EwmHa) BEwmHa 1 0.60 ns 
2. (BHa) (EwmHa) BEwm 1 84.98 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BHa) HaEwm 1 12.39 <0.05 
Planting methods 1. (BEwm) (BP) (EwmP) BEwmP 1 1.73 ns 
2. (BP) (EwmP) BEwm 1 91.01 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BP) PEwm 1 4.13 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BEwm) (BCt) (EwmCt) BEwmCt 1 1.87 ns 
2. (BCt) (EwmCt) BEwm 1 84.98 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BCt) CtEwm 1 DAD ns 
Field location 1. (BEwm) (BL) (EwmL) BEwmL 2 0.35 ns 
2. (BL) (EwmL) BEwm 1 74.09 <0.05 
3. (BEwm) (BL) LEwm 2 2.31 ns 
Irrigation difficulties N/A 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 7: Regularity of inadequate supply in past 5 yrs 
- - --
Farm & Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BRIS) (BS) (RISS) BRISS 2 O.SS ns 
2. (BS) (RI5S) BRIS 1 64.13 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BS) SRIS 2 1.S6 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BRIS) (BT) (RIST) BRIST 1 0.38 ns 
2. (BT) (RIST) BRIS 1 68.90 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BT) TRIS 1 11.0S <O.OS 
Use pump 1. (BRIS) (BU) (RISU) BRISU 1 1.S7 ns 
2. (BU) (RISU) BRIS 1 68.90 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BU) URIS 1 0.48 ns 
Size of land 1. (BRIS) (BHa) (RISHa) BRISHa 1 0.12 ns 
2. (BHa) (RISHa) BRIS 1 68.90 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BHa) HaRIS 1 1.S9 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BRIS) (BP) (RISP) BRISP 1 0.29 ns 
2. (BP) (RISP) BRIS 1 67.91 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BP) PRIS 1 1.86 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BRIS) (BCt) (RISCt) BRISCt 1 0.04 ns 
2. (BCt) (RISCt) BRIS 1 74.S1 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BCt) CtRIS 1 7.13 <O.OS 
Field location 1. (BRIS) (BL) (RISL) BRISL 2 O.SS ns 
2. (BL) (RISL) BRIS 1 64.13 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BL) LRIS 2 1.S6 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BRIS) (BEd) (RISEd) BRISEd 1 0.68 ns 
2. (BREd) (RISEd) BRIS 1 68.90 <O.OS 
3. (BRIS) (BEd) EdRIS 1 0.49 ns 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 8: Experience of too much supply in past 5 yrs 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BEm5) (BS) (Em5S) BEm5S 2 1.15 ns 
2. (BS) (Em5S) BEm5 1 42.05 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BS) SEm5 2 0.20 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BEm5) (BT) (Em5T) BEm5T 1 3.82 ns 
2. (BT) (Em5T) BEm5 1 50.21 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BT) TEm5 1 7.36 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BEm5) (BU) (Em5U) BEm5U 1 00.41 ns 
2. (BU) (Em5U) BEm5 1 50.21 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BU) UEm5 1 0.04 ns 
Size of land 1. (BEm5) (BHa) (Em5Ha) BEm5Ha 1 2.26 ns 
2. (BHa) (Em5Ha) BEm5 1 50.21 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BHa) HaEm5 1 2.17 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BEm5) (BP) (Em5P) BEm5P 1 1.93 ns 
2. (BP) (Em5P) BEm5 1 47.47 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BP) PEm5 1 0.03 ns 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BEm5) (BCt) (Em5Ct) BEm5Ct 1 00.30 ns 
2. (BCt) (Em5Ct) BEm5 1 56.11 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BCt) CtEm5 1 6.72 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BEm5) (BL) (Em5L) BEm5L 2 1.15 ns 
2. (BL) (Em5L) BEm5 1 42.05 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BL) LEm5 2 0.20 ns 
Irrigation d ifficu Ities 1. (BEm5) (BEd) (Em5Ed) BEm5Ed 1 0.00 ns 
2. (BEd) (Em5Ed) BEm5 1 41.04 <0.05 
3. (BEm5) (BEd) EdEm5 1 4.84 <0.05 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 9: Perception of overall adequacy of drainage 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply N/A 
Plot topography 1. (BPda) (BT) (PdaT) BPdaT 1 0.10 ns 
2. (BT) (PdaT) BPda 1 28.86 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BT) TPda 1 17.04 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BPda) (BU) (PdaU) BPdaU 1 0.17 ns 
2. (BU) (PdaU) BPda 1 8.85 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BU) UPda 1 7.49 <0.05 
Size of land 1. (BPda) (BHa) (PdaHa) BPdaHa 1 2.05 ns 
2. (BHa) (PdaHa) BPda 1 23.75 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BHa) HaPda 1 0.03 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BPda) (BP) (PdaP) BPdaP 1 3.13 ns 
2. (BP) (PdaP) BPda 1 22.00 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BP) PPda 1 1.94 ns 
Method of drainage 1. (BPda) (BMd) (PdaMd) BPdaMd 2 2.24 ns 
2. (BMd) (PdaMd) BPda 1 20.98 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BMd) MdPda 2 7.12 <0.05 
Control of turnout N/A 
Field location 1. (BPda) (BL) (PdaL) BPdaL 2 0.58 ns 
2. (BL) (PdaL) BPda 1 26.32 <0.05 
3. (BPda) (BL) LPda 2 8.38 <0.05 
Irrigation difficulties N/A 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BPda) (BRd) (PdaRd) BPdaRd 8.92 <0.05 
2. (BRd) (PdaRd) BPda 
3. (RPrl::l) (RRrl) RdPda 
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Table 10: Perception of the fairness of the irrigation schedule 
Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BSf) (BS) (SfS) BSfS 2 0.78 ns 
2. (BS) (SfS) BSf 1 17.95 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BS) SSf 2 3.13 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BSf) (BT) (SfT) BSfT 1 0.00 ns 
2. (BT) (SfT) BSf 1 19.06 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BT) TSf 1 10.87 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BSf) (BU) (SfU) BSfU 1 0.20 ns 
2. (BU) (SfU) BSf 1 16.45 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BU) USf 1 1.92 ns 
Size of land 1. (BSf) (BHa) (SfHa) BSfHa 1 2.29 ns 
2. (BHa) (SfHa) BSf 1 16.45 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BHa) HaSf 1 0.24 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BSf) (BP) (SfP) BSfP 1 0.10 ns 
2. (BP) (SfP) BSf 1 18.65 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BP) PSf 1 6.89 <0.05 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BSf) (BCt) (SfCt) BSfCt 1 1.12 ns 
2. (BCt) (SfCt) BSf 1 9.17 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BCt) CtSf 1 13.43 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BSf) (BL) (SfL) BSfL 2 0.78 ns 
2. (BL) (SfL) BSf 1 17.95 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BL) LSf 2 3.13 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BSf) (BEd) (Sf Ed) BSfEd 1 0.00 ns 
2. (BEd) (Sf Ed) BSf 1 10.61 <0.05 
3. (BSf) (BEd) EdSf 1 5.16 <0.05 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
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Table 11: Differences in distribution within the block 
Farm & Model Oifference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply 1. (BOf) (BS) (DfS) BDfS 4 3.61 ns 
2. (BS) (OfS) BOf 2 14.10 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BS) SOf 4 6.61 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BOf) (BT) (OfT) BOfT 2 3.20 ns 
2. (BT) (OfT) BOf 2 25.80 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BT) TOf 2 16.45 <0.05 
Use pump 1. (BOf) (BU) (OfU) BOfU 2 0.14 ns 
2. (BU) (OfU) BOf 2 31.65 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BU) UOf 2 13.99 <0.05 
Size of land 1. (BOf) (BHa) (OfHa) BOfHa 2 2.50 ns 
2. (BHa) (DfHa) BDf 2 23.74 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BHa) HaOf 2 0.94 ns 
Planting methods 1. (BOf) (BP) (OfP) BOfP 2 5.41 ns 
2. (BP) (DfP) BOf 2 29.05 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BP) POf 2 11.31 <0.05 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BOf) (BCt) (OfCt) BOfCt 2 0.18 ns 
2. (BCt) (OfCt) BOf 2 19.79 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BCt) CtDf 2 13.07 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BOf) (BL) (OfL) BOfL 4 3.61 ns 
2. (BL) (DfL) BOf 2 14.10 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BL) LOf 4 6.61 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BOf) (BEd) (Of Ed) BOfEd 2 1.06 ns 
2. (BEd) (Of Ed) BOf 2 31.57 <0.05 
3. (BOf) (BEd) EdOf 2 38.12 <0.05 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
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Table 12: Experience of conflict 
_. 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Field location 1. (BCon) (BL) (ConL) BConL 2 1.67 ns 
2. (BL) (ConL) BCon 1 8.35 <0.05 
3. (BCon) (BL) LCon 2 0.47 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BCon) (BEd) (ConEd) BConEd 1 4.56 <0.05 
2. (BEd) (ConEd) BCon 
3. (BCon) (BEd) EdCon 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BCon) (BRd) (ConRd) BConRd 1 0.15 ns 
2. (BRd) (ConRd) BCon 1 8.89 <0.05 
3. (BCon) (BRd) RdCon 1 0.81 ns 
Table 13: Extent of knowledge of other farmers in block 
=."",~~-.. 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Field location 1. (BNk) (BL) (NkL) BNkL 2 26.39 <0.05 
2. (BL) (NkL) BNk 
3. (BNk) (BL) LNk 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BNk) (BEd) (NkEd) BNkEd 1 2.01 ns 
2. (BEd) (NkEd) BNk 1 101.75 <0.05 
3. (BNk) (BEd) EdNk 1 5.45 <0.05 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BNk) (BRd) (NkRd) BNkRd 1 2.35 ns 
2. (BRd) (NkRd) BNk 1 97.26 <0.05 
3. (BNk) (BRd) RdNk 1 0.47 ns 
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Table 14: Extent of participative activities 
field characteristic 
Field location 1. (BNp) (BL) (NpL) 
2. (BL) (NpL) 
3. (BNp) (BL) 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BNp) (BEd) (NpEd) 
2. (BEd) (NpEd) 
3. (BNp) (BEd) 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BNp) (BRd) (NpRd) 
2. (BRd) (NpRd) 
3. 
Difference 
BNpL 
BNp 
LNp 
BNpEd 
BNp 
EdNp 
BNpRd 
BNp 
RrlNn 
E: 173 
df Chi-square P 
2 21.42 <0.05 
1 1.24 ns 
1 93.92 <0.05 
1 3.45 ns 
1 0.11 ns 
1 70.52 <0.05 
1 4.46 <0.05 
'~~m=_~==-"==='_' ___ " _._==== 
Table 15: Too high water level in irrigated season 
. _.... - _ .. _ .. 
..-- - .. -" .. "~". ... - • ••• >W~ 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (Blh) (BS)(lhS) BlhS 2 1.73 ns 
2. (BS) (lhS) Blh 1 40.21 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BS) Sih 2 2.06 ns 
Plot topography 1. (Blh) (BT) (lhT) BlhT 1 0.47 ns 
2. (BT) (lhT) Blh 1 45.17 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BT) Tlh 1 3.19 ns 
Use pump 1. (Blh) (BU) (lhU) BlhU 1 0.98 ns 
2. (BU) (lhU) Blh 1 45.17 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BU) Ulh 1 3.11 ns 
Size of land 1. (Blh) (BHa) (lhHa) BlhHa 1 1.85 ns 
2. (BHa) (lhHa) Blh 1 45.17 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BHa) Halh 1 1.18 ns 
Planting methods 1. (Blh) (BP) (lhP) BlhP 1 0.34 ns 
2. (BP) (lhP) Blh 1 43.26 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BP) Plh 1 00.26 ns 
Method of drainage 1. (Blh) (BMd) (lhMd) BlhMd 2 1.16 ns 
2. (BMd) (lhMd) Blh 1 32.52 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BMd) Mdlh 2 13.70 <0.05 
Control of turnout 1. (Blh) (BCt) (lhCt) BlhCt 1 0.15 ns 
2. (BCt) (lhCt) Blh 1 45.17 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BCt) Ctlh 1 0.11 ns 
Field location 1. (Blh) (BL) (lhL) BlhL 2 1.73 ns 
2. (BL) (lhL) Blh 1 40.21 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BL) Llh 2 2.06 ns 
I rrigation difficulties 1. (Blh) (BEd) (lhEd) BlhEd 1 0.42 ns 
2. (BEd) (lhEd) Blh 1 45.17 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BEd) Edlh 1 2.12 ns 
Drainage difficulties 1. (Blh) (BRd) (lhRd) BlhRd 1 1.14 ns 
2. (BRd) (lhRd) Blh 1 30.77 <0.05 
3. (Blh) (BRd) Rdlh 1 6.03 <0.05 
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Table 16: Construction of drainage channels 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi- P 
field characteristic square 
Source of supply N/A 
Plot topography 1. (BCc) (BT) (CcT) BCcT 1 2.86 ns 
2. (BT) (CcT) BCc 1 21.36 <0.05 
3. (BCc) (BT) TCc 1 1.34 ns 
Use pump 1. (BCc) (BU) (CcU) BCcU 1 0.47 ns 
2. (BU) (CcU) BCc 1 21.36 <0.05 
3. (BCc) (BU) UCc 1 2.78 ns 
Size of land 1. (BCc) (BHa) (CcHa) BCcHa 1 1.13 ns 
2. (BHa) (CcHa) BCc 1 21.36 <0.05 
3. (BCc) (BHa) HaCc 1 0.86 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout N/A 
Field location 1. (BCc) (BL) (CcL) BCcL 2 5.41 ns 
2. (BL) (CcL) BCc 1 16.99 <0.05 
3. (BCc) (BL) LCc 2 1.07 ns 
Irrigation difficulties N/A 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BCc) (BRd) (CcRd) BCcRd 1 0.05 ns 
2. (BRd) (CcRd) BCc 1 21.36 <0.05 
3. (BCc) (BRd) RdCc 1 3.15 ns 
Table 17: Construction of in-plot drains 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
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Source of supply N/A 
Plot topography 1. (BCpd) (BT) (CpdT) BCpdT 1 0.35 ns 
2. (BT) (CpdT) BCpd 1 4.42 <0.05 
3. (BCpd) (BT) TCpd 1 0.02 ns 
Use pump 1. (BCpd) (BU) (CpdU) BCpdU 1 0.28 ns 
2. (BU) (CpdU) BCpd 1 10.36 <0.05 
3. (BCpd) (BU) UCpd 1 8.07 ns 
Size of land 1. (BCpd) (BHa) (CpdHa) BCpdHa 1 1.18 ns 
2. (BHa) (CpdHa) BCpd 1 4.42 <0.05 
3. (BCpd) (BHa) HaCpd 1 0.40 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout N/A 
Field location 1. (BCpd) (BL) (CpdL) BCpdL 2 6.78 <0.05 
2. (BL) (CpdL) BCpd 
3. (BCpd) (BL) LCpd 
Irrigation difficulties N/A 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BCpd) (BRd) (CpdRd) BCpdRd 1.00 ns 
2. (BRd) (CpdRd) BCpd 4.42 <0.05 
3. (BCpd) (BRd) RdCpd 0.33 ns 
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Table 18: Construction of field ridges 
.- .... - ... -
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BCr) (BS) (CrS) BCrS 2 1.03 ns 
2. (BS) (CrS) BCr 1 40.91 <0.05 
3. (BCr) (BS) SCr 2 6.29 <0.05 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BCr) (BHa) (CrHa) BCrHa 1 0.11 ns 
2. (BHa) (CrHa) BCr 1 53.88 <0.05 
3. (BCr) (BHa) HaCr 1 18.28 <0.05 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout N/A 
Field location 1. (BCr) (BL) (CrL) BCrL 2 1.03 ns 
2. (BL) (CrL) BCr 1 40.91 <0.05 
3. (BCr) (BL) LCr 2 6.29 <0.05 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BCr) (BEd) (CrEd) BCrEd 1 1.17 ns 
2. (BEd) (CrEd) BCr 1 53.88 <0.05 
3. (BCr) (BEd) EdCr 1 0.22 ns 
difficulties N/A 
Table 19: Maintain canals and drains with MADA 
~""-.. ~, Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
--Source--oTsupPlY-""---1.--(BiV'-c"m) (BS)(M-cmS)----BM"c'mS--""------2-------'2:43"--'---- ns 
2. (BS) (McmS) BMcm 1 4.32 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (B8) 8Mcm 2 8.34 <0.05 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BMcm) (BHa) (McmHa) BMcmHa 1 0.15 ns 
2. (BHa) (McmHa) BMcm 1 22.66 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (BHa) HaMcm 1 0.88 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage 1. (BMcm) (BMd) (McmMd) BMcmMd 2 2.29 ns 
2. (BMd) (McmMd) BMcm 1 4.72 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (BMd) MdMcm 2 15.67 <0.05 
Control of turnout 1. (BMcm) (BCt) (McmCt) BMcmCt 1 0.33 ns 
2. (BCt) (McmCt) BMcm 1 11.83 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (BCt) CtMcm 1 3.08 ns 
Field location 1. (BMcm) (BL) (McmL) BMcmL 2 2.43 ns 
2. (BL) (McmL) BMcm 1 4.32 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (BL) LMcm 2 8.34 <0.05 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BMcm) (BEd) (McmEd) BMcmEd 1 2.45 ns 
2. (BEd) (McmEd) BMcm 1 15.58 <0.05 
3. (BMcm) (BEd) EdMcm 1 4.73 ns 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BMcm) (BRd) (McmRd) BMcmRd 1 0.56 ns 
2. (BRd) (McmRd) BMcm 1 11.83 <0.05 
3. (8Mcm) (BRd) RdMcm 1 2.19 ns 
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Table 20: Maintain offtakes on own 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BMoo) (BS) (MooS) BMooS 2 5.26 ns 
2. (BS) (MooS) BMoo 1 2.94 ns 
3. (BMoo) (BS) SMoo 2 11.20 <0.05 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BMoo) (BHa) (MooHa) BMooHa 1.21 ns 
2. (BHa) (MooHa) BMoo 4.42 <0.05 
3. (BMoo) (BHa) HaMoo 1.75 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BMoo) (BCt) (MooCt) BMooCt 1 0.02 ns 
2. (BCt) (MooCt) BMoo 1 4.42 <0.05 
3. (BMoo) (BCt) CtMoo 1 2.33 ns 
Field location 1. (BMoo) (Bl) (Mool) BMool 2 5.26 ns 
2. (Bl) (Mool) BMoo 1 2.94 ns 
3. (BMoo) (Bl) lMoo 2 11.20 <0.05 
I rrigation difficulties 1. (BMoo) (BEd) (MooEd) BMooEd 1 0.12 ns 
2. (BEd) (MooEd) BMoo 1 1.84 ns 
3. (BMoo) (BEd) EdMoo 1 8.19 <0.05 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
Table 21: Maintain offtakes with MADA 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
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Source of supply 1. (BMom) (BS) (MomS) BMomS 2 0.08 ns 
2. (BS) (MomS) BMom 1 10.95 <0.05 
3. (BMom) (BS) SMom 1 8.86 ns 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BMom) (BHa) (MomHa) BMomHa 1 1.78 ns 
2. (BHa) (MomHa) BMom 1 8.44 <0.05 
3. (BMom) (BHa) HaMom 1 4.70 <0.05 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BMom) (BCt) (MomCt) BMomCt 1 0.87 ns 
2. (BCt) (MomCt) BMom 1 14.27 <0.05 
3. (BMom) (BCt) CtMom 1 4.22 ns 
Field location 1. (BMom) (Bl) (Moml) BMoml 2 0.08 ns 
2. (Bl) (Moml) BMom 1 10.95 <0.05 
3. (BMom) (Bl) lMom 1 8.86 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BMom) (BEd) (MomEd) BMomEd 1 14.20 <0.05 
2. (BEd) (MomEd) BMom 
3. (BMom) (BEd) EdMom 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
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Table 22: Who should maintain offtakes 
~--... -".~--- .. -
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BWmo) (BS) (WmoS) BWmoS 4 1.79 ns 
2. (BS) (WmoS) BWmo 2 30.48 <0.05 
3. (BWmo) (BS) SWmo 4 2.20 ns 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BWmo) (BHa) (WmoHa) BWmoHa 2 2.24 ns 
2. (BHa) (WmoHa) BWmo 2 36.01 <0.05 
3. (BWmo) (BHa) HaWmo 2 0.33 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BWmo) (BCt) (WmoCt) BWmoCt 2 5.34 ns 
2. (BCt) (WmoCt) BWmo 2 38.31 <0.05 
3. (BWmo) (BCt) CtWmo 2 7.74 ns 
Field location 1. (BWmo) (BL) (WmoL) BWmoL 4 1.79 ns 
2. (BL) (WmoL) BWmo 2 30.48 <0.05 
3. (BWmo) (BL) LWmo 4 2.20 ns 
Irrigation d ifficu Ities 1. (BWmo) (BEd) (WmoEd) BWmoEd 2 3.80 ns 
2. (BEd) (WmoEd) BWmo 2 36.01 <0.05 
3. (BWmo) (BEd) EdWmo 2 0.13 ns 
difficulties N/A 
Table 23: Who should maintain canals 
Farm Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
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Source of supply 1. (BWmc) (BS) (WmcS) BWmcS 4 7.03 ns 
2. (BS) (WmcS) BWmc 2 7.89 <0.05 
3. (BWmc) (BS) SWmc 4 11.26 <0.05 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BWmc) (BHa) (WmcHa) BWmcHa 2 3.90 ns 
2. (BHa) (WmcHa) BWmc 2 13.18 <0.05 
3. (BWmc) (BHa) HaWmc 2 2.26 ns 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BWmc) (BCt) (WmcCt) BWmcCt 2 0.82 ns 
2. (BCt) (WmcCt) BWmc 2 13.18 <0.05 
3. (BWmc) (BCt) CtWmc 2 3.64 ns 
Field location 1. (BWmc) (BL) (WmcL) BWmcL 4 7.03 ns 
2. (BL) (WmcL) BWmc 2 7.89 <0.05 
3. (BWmc) (BL) LWmc 4 11.26 <0.05 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BWmc) (BEd) (WmcEd) BWmcEd 2 10.24 <0.05 
2. (BEd) (WmcEd) BWmc 
3. (BWmc) (BEd) EdWmc 
difficulties N/A 
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Table 24: Action to maintain structures 
Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BMs)(BS) (MsS) BMsS 2 2.60 ns 
2. (BS) (MsS) BMs 1 32.53 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BS) SMs 2 9.83 ns 
Plot topography 1. (BMs) (BT) (MsT) BMsT 1 0.05 ns 
2. (BT) (MsT) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BT) TMs 1 0.14 ns 
Use pump 1. (BMs) (BU) (MsU) BMsU 2 2.10 ns 
2. (BU) (MsU) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BU) UMs 1 1.49 ns 
Size of land 1. (BMs) (BHa) (MsHa) BMsHa 1 0.31 ns 
2. (BHa) (MsHa) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BHa) HaMs 1 8.02 <0.05 
Planting methods 1. (BMs) (BP) (MsP) BMsP 1 0.41 ns 
2. (BP) (MsP) BMs 1 33.94 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BP) PMs 1 0.66 ns 
Method of drainage 1. (BMs) (BMd) (MsMd) BMsMd 2 3.98 ns 
2. (BMd) (MsMd) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BMd) MdMs 2 3.47 ns 
Control of turnout 1. (BMs) (BCt) (MsCt) BMsCt 1 0.76 ns 
2. (BCt) (MsCt) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BCt) CtMs 1 18.80 <0.05 
Field location 1. (BMs) (BL) (MsL) BMsL 2 2.60 ns 
2. (BL) (MsL) BMs 1 32.53 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BL) LMs 2 9.83 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BMs) (BEd) (MsEd) BMsEd 1 1.10 ns 
2. (BEd) (MsEd) BMs 1 35.03 <0.05 
3. (BMs) (BEd) EdMs 1 0.25 ns 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BMs) (BRd) (MsRd) BMsRd 1 4.13 <0.05 
2. (BRd) (MsRd) BMs 
3. (BMs) (BRd) RdMs 
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Table 25: When should structures be maintained 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BRm) (BS) (RmS) BRmS 4 18.06 <0.05 
2. (BS) (RmS) BRm 
3. (BRm) (BS) SRm 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BRm) (BHa) (RmHa) BRmHa 2 0.98 ns 
2. (BHa) (RmHa) BRm 2 10.46 <0.05 
3. (BRm) (BHa) HaRm 2 77.72 <0.05 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage 1. (BRm) (BMd) (RmMd) BRmMd 4 15.10 <0.05 
2. (BMd) (RmMd) BRm 
3. (BRm) (BMd) MdRm 
Control of turnout 1. (BRm) (BCt) (RmCt) BRmCt 2 6.27 <0.05 
2. (BCt) (RmCt) BRm 
3. (BRm) (BCt) CtRm 
Field location 1. (BRm) (BL) (RmL) BRmL 4 18.66 <0.05 
2. (BL) (RmL) BRm 
3. (BRm) (BL) LRm 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BRm) (BEd) (RmEd) BRmEd 2 4.02 ns 
2. (BEd) (RmEd) BRm 2 77.72 <0.05 
3. (BRm) (BEd) EdRm 2 0.14 ns 
Drainage difficulties 1. (BRm) (BRd) (RmRd) BRmRd 2 0.61 ns 
2. (BRd) (RmRd) BRm 2 50.03 <0.05 
3. (BRm) (BRd) RdRm 2 13.60 <0.05 
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Table 26: Who should operate structures 
Farm & Model Difference df Chi-square P 
field characteristic 
Source of supply 1. (BWo) (BS) (WoS) BWoS 4 2.64 ns 
2. (BS) (WoS) BWo 2 25.87 <0.05 
3. (BWo) (BS) SWo 4 6.71 ns 
Plot topography N/A 
Use pump N/A 
Size of land 1. (BWo) (BHa) (WoHa) BWoHa 2 8.52 <0.05 
2. (BHa) (WoHa) BWo 
3. (BWo) (BHa) HaWo 
Planting methods N/A 
Method of drainage N/A 
Control of turnout 1. (BWo) (BCt) (WoCt) BWoCt 2 1.61 ns 
2. (BCt) (WoCt) BWo 2 30.73 <0.05 
3. (BWo) (BCt) CtWo 2 6.15 ns 
Field location 1. (BWo) (BL) (WoL) BWoL 4 2.64 ns 
2. (BL) (WoL) BWo 2 25.87 <0.05 
3. (BWo) (BL) LWo 4 6.71 ns 
Irrigation difficulties 1. (BWo) (BEd) (WoEd) BWoEd 2 15.71 <0.05 
2. (BEd) (WoEd) BWo 
3. (BWo) (BEd) EdWo 
d ifficu Ities N/A 
